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Abstract 
This thesis is a socio-legal interdisciplinary study of risk governance in the oil and gas sector 
in the Russian North. Against a backdrop of the author's experience of training to be and 
working as a lawyer in both Siberia and the United States, it is based on four types of sources: 
(i) texts of relevant policies, laws, and administrative regulations; (ii) transcripts of official 
presidential meetings, addresses, and speeches on matters relevant to oil and gas 
development; (iii) observations obtained during fieldwork, including data from semi-
structured interviews; and (iv) energy statistics and results of various public polls. After a 
review of the basic characteristics and trends of the industry, highlighting the distinctive role 
hydrocarbons play in the Russian economy, society, and politics, the argument starts with 
theories ofrisk and risk governance in the context of the global energy sector. Moving on to 
rules of risk governance, the discussion homes in on how these rules actually work in the 
policy, legal, and regulatory regime of Russia. A subsequent chapter introduces the 
conceptual common denominator for analysing the dynamic between the principal parties in 
risk governance - the social concept of power. It includes a study of a trunk pipeline called 
(appropriately) the Power of Siberia, in which law emerges as a demarcation of sovereign 
power. The next chapter explains particular challenges of risk governance of the oil and gas 
sector through the concept of network power. The final chapter examines sovereign power 
structures responsible for governing risk posed by oil and gas activities, and the allocation of 
such risks and benefits, in Russia's 'Petrostate'. Throughout the thesis, the relevant Russian 
policy, legal, and regulatory regime, which serves as the case study, is closely interwoven 
with wider social theory. This study contributes to risk theory by proposing the Risk 
Governance Power Framework, an analytical framework for understanding power relations 
that shape risk governance of the oil and gas sector. The framework asserts that the following 
three factors play critical roles in influencing the power relations: (i) the strength of network 
power behind the hazardous activity; (ii) the capacity of the sovereign power structures and 
agents responsible for governing risks related to the activity to counter-balance the network 
power behind the hazardous activity; and (iii) the spatial and temporal allocation of individual 
and public risks and benefits. The network power of the oil and gas sector is premised on 
three dependences: technological, socio-economic, and political. 
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1. Introduction and Background 
1.1. The academic and policy rationale for the study 
1.1.l. Why the Russian Arctic and Subarctic? 
An interest in a region alone, regardless of how strong, does not provide a sufficient reason 
for conducting a PhD study. Fortunately, in the context of energy and the environment, the 
Russian North - Arctic and Subarctic - provides a plethora of compelling reasons for 
studying it. This region has been home to oil and gas development for over 50 years. More 
importantly, the Russian Arctic and Subarctic has the potential to become the site of a new 
wave of oil and gas exploration and extraction, despite considerable environmental, 
socioeconomic, and geopolitical concerns. Accordingly, this study concerns a concept that is 
important to the region's future, the governance of risks associated with oil and gas 
development. 
In 2008, the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) published a study entitled 'Circum-Arctic 
Resource Appraisal: Estimates of Undiscovered Oil and Gas North of the Arctic Circle' 
(USGS, 2008). This four-page publication provided a quick and simple reference for 
academics, corporate executives, journalists, policy-makers, and politicians researching, 
considering, and ( or) advocating for energy development in the Arctic. The USGS estimated 
that the Arctic might hold 412,157.09 million hoe (Id. p. 4). This amounts to 13% of the 
world's undiscovered oil, 30% of its undiscovered natural gas, and 20% of its undiscovered 
natural gas liquids. As Table 1 depicts, 52% of resources, largely natural gas and natural gas 
liquids are located in Russia. These estimates came with the following disclaimer: 
[Q]uantitative assessments were conducted in those geologic areas considered to 
have at least a 10-percent chance of one or more significant oil or gas 
accumulations. For the purposes of the study, a significant accumulation contains 
recoverable volumes of at least 50 million barrels of oil and/or oil equivalent 
natural gas. The study included only those resources believed to be recoverable 
using existing technology, but with the important assumptions for offshore areas 
that the resources would be recoverable even in the presence of permanent sea ice 
and oceanic water depth. No economic considerations are included in these initial 
estimates; results are presented without reference to costs of exploration and 
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development, which will be important in many of the assessed areas (USGS, 
2008, p. 4). 
The study sparked interest in the Arctic; it also inspired some to study it. Unfortunately, 
because the USGS study was referred to so frequently, and because the disclaimer above was 
almost universally disregarded or omitted, the Arctic energy discourse has narrowed to a 
discussion of the region's foremost importance as a resource base. 
The USGS study coincided with the growing oil and gas prospecting and exploration activity 
in the Arctic, a stage during which energy companies were competing for a starting position 
in the Arctic oil and gas race (EY, 2012). Some of the notable developments included Cairn 
Energy commencing its eight-well drilling campaign offshore Greenland by 2010 (Id. p. 9). 
In North America, Conoco Phillips and Shell were both in the middle of the exploratory plan 
approval process (Id. p. 11 ). The Norwegian continental shelf saw the highest level of 
activity, with the Snovit gas field already in production and Skrugard, Havis, and Goliat 
projects in the development stage (Id.). Russia was not far behind with Rosneft' and Gazprom 
negotiating joint projects with foreign oil and gas companies in the Barents, South Kara, and 
Okhotskoe Seas and Gazprom entering the development stage for the Prirazlomnoe project 
(Id.). 
At the time of writing this thesis, only two projects have come into fruition. Prirazlomnoe 
began production in December 2013 (Gazprom, 2016j) and Goliat in March 2016 (ENI 
N orge, 2016). The rest of the aforementioned initiatives did not fare well. Carin Energy failed 
to find oil in commercial quantities in offshore Greenland (Webb, 2010) and Statoil failed to 
find it in offshore Norway despite spending nearly $1 billion and over $3 billion respectively 
(Reuters, 2015). Rosneft' postponed exploratory drilling in Arctic offshore in 2014 (Reuters, 
2015a). Conoco Phillips suspended its Arctic campaign in April 2013 (Krauss, 2013). Shell's 
Arctic adventure proved the most eventful and costly. Its first attempt at exploratory drilling 
resulted in a beached drilling rig and investigation by the enforcement agency (U.S. 
Department of the Interior, 2013, pp. 1-2) and its second attempt in 2015 lasted only a few 
weeks (Eilperin & Mufson, 2015). The combined cost of Shell's unsuccessful adventure 
exceeded $7 billion (Id.). 
10 
Interest in the region declined due to poor exploratory drilling results, the sharp drop in oil 
prices in the second half of 2014, and U.S. and E.U. economic sanctions against Russia. In 
January 2015, however, the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (the government agency 
responsible for awarding oil and gas exploration and extraction licences on the Norwegian 
continental shelf) announced it would commence its 23rd licensing round, and interest 
exceeded expectations. As of December 2015, 26 energy companies were gearing up for the 
next oil price climb by expressing interest in exploring 57 licensing blocks, 54 of which are 
located in the Barents Sea (NPD, 2015). 
Exxon Mobil CEO Rex Tillerson succinctly captured the oil and gas industry's interest in the 
Arctic region in an interview with the Associated Press: 
Associated Press: Why the Arctic? 
Tillerson: The size of the resource prize has to be large to support the risked 
capital that has to be put in place. The Arctic is one of the few places left where 
we believe those opportunities exist (AP, 2015). 
The oil and gas industry has a more reliable source than the USGS survey to justify its Arctic 
ambitions - historic data. If we are to narrow the definition of the Artie to its continental 
shelf, the region displays all the characteristics of an energy frontier. It is one of the most 
remote and fastest-changing regions, and has one of the harshest climates for exploring, 
developing, and extracting hydrocarbons. However, because of an extensive history of 
hydrocarbon exploration and extraction, the Arctic appears to be more of an energy 
playground than a frontier (Table 1 ). The supergiant Russian Samotlor discovered an oilfield 
there in 1965, quickly followed by discovery of the American Prudhoe Bay oilfield in 1968 
(Budzik, 2009, pp. 3-5). The Russian portion of this playground is particularly impressive -
out of 61 discovered large oil and gas fields, 43 are located in Russia. 1 
1 
Arctic states include Canada, the Kingdom of Denmark (including Greenland and the Faroe Islands), Finland, 
Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the United States. These nations comprise sovereign members of the 
Arctic Council and are known as the Arctic Eight. (Arctic Council, 2015) As Figure 1 shows, Canada, the 
Kingdom of Denmark (including Greenland and the Faroe Islands), Norway, Russia, and the United States are 
Arctic littoral states. This group of nations is known as the Arctic Five. Under the U.N. Convention on the Law 
of the Sea, non-littoral Arctic states do not have jurisdiction over Arctic shelf. Thus, the discourse regarding 
future oil and gas development in the Arctic usually centres on the Arctic Five. (UN, 1982) 
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Table J: Discovered Arctic oil and gas fields with recoverable resources exceeding 500 million boe 
and undiscovered resources (USGS, 2008) (Budzik, 2009) 
Country Discovered Oil Fields Currently Fields Have Yet Percentage of 
and Natural in Production to Commence Undiscovered 
Gas Fields Production Resources 
Russia 43 41 2 52% 
Canada 11 0 11 5% 
United States 6 4 2 20% 
Norway 1 1 0 12% 
Greenland/Denmark 0 0 0 11% 
Whether a field is located in the Arctic depends on the definition of the region. Figure 1 
shows the region pursuant to the three most common definitions - north of the Arctic Circle 
(66° 32" N), north of the permanent tree line, and average summer temperatures not 
exceeding 10 degrees Celsius (NSIDC, 2016). 
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Figure 1: Map the three definition of the Arctic the Arctic (NSIDC, 2016) 
, ..... .., .t\•·:._....... ... ___ _ ~-....... ~--... 
4 • , 
u ... 
---
:rc.i., ..... --._. .... ,,...... . . ...... _,. 
The Arctic is sometimes defined legislatively. For example, pursuant to the law 'On the 
Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation' (Figure 2), some regions located north of the Arctic 
Circle are excluded from the Arctic Zone (Sakha Government, 2015).2 
2 
The Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation is shaded in yellow. 
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Figure 2: Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation (Sakha Government, 2015) 
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Oil and gas fields span according to the rules of geology, not according to legal or any other 
rules that exist 'above the ground'. In addition, many fields on different sides of the Arctic 
boundary are often connected through geological formation, infrastructure, and management 
and ownership. However, as depicted on Figures 3 and 4, the regions of oil and gas 
production in the Russian Federation can be grouped to those located in the Arctic and 
Subarctic and to those located outside this combined region (Peel, M.C., et al., 2007). 3 
3 
The Subarctic is shaded in non-grey colours. 
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Figure 3: Russian Subarctic (Peel, MC., et al., 2007) 
Figure 4: Spatial allocation of oil and natural gas production in Russia in 2013 (EIA, 2014) 
In addition, as Figures 1 and 2 above show, many regions located in the Russian Subarctic 
po e imilar remoteness and climatic challenges to oil and gas development than those 
located in the Arctic Zone. Finally, Arctic and Subarctic oil and natural gas dominate Russia's 
oil and gas production as captured in Tables 2 and 3. For these reasons, I opted to focus on 
the Ru ian Arctic and Subarctic as the geographic region for this study. 
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Table 2: Russia's oil production in Arctic and Subarctic regions in 2013 (EIA, 2015) 
Region/Territorial Output Percentage 
Unit (thousand b/d) 
Western Siberia 6,422 61.60% 
Krasnoyarsk 426 4.09% 
Sakhalin 277 2.66% 
Arkhangelsk 269 2.58% 
Komi Republic 257 2.47% 
Irkutsk 227 2.18% 
Sakha (Yakutia) 149 1.43% 
Total 8,027 77% 
Table 3: Russia's Natural Gas Production in Arctic and Subarctic Regions in 2013 (EIA, 2015) 
Territorial Region Output Percentage 
Unit (bcf/day) 
Yamalo-Nenets West Siberia 53.7 82.87% 
Khanti- West Siberia 3.5 5.40% 
Mansiisk 
Tomsk West Siberia 0.5 0.77% 
Sakhalin East Siberia 2.7 4.17% 
and the Far 
East 
Irkutsk East Siberia 0.3 0.46% 
and the Far 
East 
Krasnoyarsk East Siberia 0.3 0.46% 
and the Far 
East 
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Territorial Region Output Percentage 
Unit (bcf/day) 
Yakutsk East Siberia 0.2 0.31% 
and the Far 
East 
Komi Republic European 0.3 0.46% 
North 
Total 61.5 95% 
1.1.2. Why risk? 
The Arctic and Subarctic have provided billions of barrels of oil and trillions of cubic feet of 
natural gas. However, the Arctic energy development has caused significant negative 
environmental and socio-economic impacts.4 The on-going interest in the resource base of 
the region indicates that many government and corporate decision-makers are on the 
threshold of making very important decisions about the development of the Arctic resource 
base. Judging by the past, these decisions will cause far-reaching consequences, some of 
which will be adverse. Therefore, the exact outcomes of these decisions, both positive and 
negative are uncertain. 
Risk, the meaning of which I discuss at length in Chapter 3, aims to reduce the uncertainty. 
As I elaborate in Chapter 3, risk has become a critical concept in the energy policy discourse. 
For example, my review of the Russian President's official meetings, speeches, and remarks 
concerning energy matters revealed that the term risk was mentioned 67 times. 5 For these 
reasons, I made risk and risk governance, the comprehensive process of handling it, the 
central theoretical point of this study. 
It is impossible to study governance of risks posed by oil and gas development without having 
a general idea of what such risks are. Most reports that I reviewed listed an oil spill as the 
4 
I will elaborate on the impacts of oil and gas development in the Russian Arctic and Subarctic in Chapter 7. 
~UNDP, 2009) (IWACO, 2001) (Greenpeace, 2016) 
I elaborate further on the sources of my energy discourse data later in this chapter. 
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most serious risk to the Arctic environment. 6 A report produced jointly by Lloyd's and 
Chatham House titled 'Arctic Opening: Opportunity and Risk in the High North' (the 
'Lloyd's Report') lists the following ways ('other than direct release of pollutants') in which 
ecosystems can be disturbed: '[t]hrough noise pollution from offshore drilling, seismic; 
[t]hrough the construction of pipelines and roads, survey activity or additional maritime 
traffic; [t]hrough physical disturbance of the sea and seabed during drilling; [and, t]hrough 
the break-up of sea ice' (Emerson & Lahn, 2012, p. 38). The E&Y Arctic Report lists some 
of these items as 'large environmental risks' associated with 'greenfield development' of 
supporting infrastructure (EY, 2012, p. 5). Surprisingly, the Lloyd's Report does not 
specifically mention emissions to the sea (other than oil spills) and to the air. The former 
include waste, produced water, and drilling mud disposal (Bellona, 2007). The latter include 
emissions from vessels and casing head gas flaring (Id). 
Some reports view such environmental risks as a much more inclusive category. For example, 
the report entitled 'Oil Spill Prevention and Response in the U.S. Arctic Ocean, Unexamined 
Risks, Unacceptable Consequences' (the 'Pew Oil Spill Report') covers potential adverse 
consequences of an oil spill on fish, marine animals, birds, and the very species who cause 
oil spills -people (Nuka, 2010). The Arctic risk database developed by DNV GL also targets 
oil spills as the primary risk driver. It approaches to identifying and spatially tracking these 
risks in the environmental and safety contexts (DNV GL, 2016). 
The report entitled 'An Evaluation of the Science Needs to Inform Decisions on Outer 
Continental Shelf Energy Development in the Chukchi and Beaufort Seas, Alaska' prepared 
by the U.S. Geological Survey (the 'USGS Circular') elaborates on the systemic approach 
taken in the Pew Oil Spill Report and investigates risks to subsistence activities of the 
indigenous Ifiupiat (USGS, 2011 ). The report also covers cumulative impacts, i.e. adverse 
consequences, that 'can result from factors that may be insignificant by themselves but 
significant when interacting and (or) accumulating over time and space, through repetition, 
or in combination with other effects.' (Id p. 203) Such consequences include inter alia 
6 I converged on the sources in which risk was the main focus of the discussion, and gave a cursory review to 
the sources where risk was discussed tangentially. See e.g. (AMAP, 2010) (Rees & Sharp, 2011) I also had to 
scrutinize sources for potential bias, dictated by organizational agenda. See e.g. (Bellona, 2007) 
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socioeconomic change; aesthetic, cultural, and spiritual impacts; and human health effects 
(Id p. 207). 
The Lloyd's Report takes note of nations' commitments to mitigate climate change in the 
section labelled, 'Commercial rationales and risks' (Emerson & Lahn, 2012, p. 24). It states 
that: 'Governments and companies should consider how the drive to develop Arctic oil and 
gas exploration will align with international action on climate change mitigation.' (Id) 
However, the report does not specify how (if at all) these commitments will affect the future 
of Arctic oil and gas development (Id). A report prepared by the Arctic Monitoring and 
Assessment Programme (AMAP) paints a comprehensive picture of 'potential effects' 
related to oil and gas development in the Arctic spanning environmental, social, and 
economic dimensions (AMAP, 2010, Sec. 2.6, 2.7, 2.8, Ch. 3.). 
Even though most sources that I reviewed emphasise an oil spill as the principal 
environmental risk in connection with hydrocarbon development, a fair number of sources 
include other potential impacts on the physical environment to this risk category. Yet some 
reports go even farther and extend the reach of environmental risks to economic and social 
wellbeing of affected communities ( e.g. impact on subsistence activities) and the societies at 
large ( e.g. climate change). The majority of sources note the complexity of environmental 
risks arising out of oil and gas activity in the Arctic and highlight the high level of uncertainty 
due to the lack of knowledge and the rapidly changing environment. 
Although the reports provide a comprehensive picture of different sources from which risks 
posed by oil and gas development arise, a disparity exists in what is understood and described 
as a risk. More importantly, the reports do not appear to agree on the typology of the 
approaches to handling it. Related but distinct terms as 'risk analysis', 'risk assessment', 'risk 
governance', and 'risk management' are often used interchangeably (Emerson & Lahn, 2012, 
pp. 48-53). This disparity is troubling- it not only creates barriers to developing an in-depth 
picture of the risks associated with oil and gas activities in the Arctic, but it also influences 
what decision-makers and societies at large do about the risks while developing policies to 
unlock the ostensible benefits. 
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1.2. Research question, scope, aims, and contribution of the study 
1.2.1. Ontological and epistemological foundations of the study 
This study is about risk governance. My primary objective is not to determine what 
constitutes risk conceptually or to provide a detailed examination of risks arising in 
connection with oil and gas activities in the Russian North. Instead, the primary objective of 
this study is what decision makers and societies at large do about the risks arising in 
connection with oil and gas development in the region. 
Therefore, it is only logical to conclude that what people do about risk cannot be understood 
outside the social context. Studying risk governance is similar to studying virtually any 
collective decision-making process. It involves collecting data about how the decisions are 
made and implemented, as well as systematizing and analysing the data. And every step 
inherently involves making 'observer relevant' assumptions, choices, and interpretations 
(Searle, 1995). Moreover, such studies often feature concepts such as law, power, and many 
others. 
As I show in Chapters 4, 5, and 6, there is no universal definition of concepts such as law, 
power, and governance. In fact, I dedicate a fair amount of space to explaining what I mean 
by these concepts before I connect them with the data. Furthermore, before I commenced 
data collection, I also made certain choices based on my prior research experience, research 
skills, and educational and professional background, the attributes that I obtained and 
developed by virtue of being part of social institutions. I did not simply dive into the ocean 
of data, determined to make a discovery. Rather, I had a general idea where to look and what 
to look for. Whilst analysing the data, I relied on my understanding of law and power 
( developed through literature) to construct what I understood as an accurate representation 
of the risk governance state in the Russian Federation. 
In other words, I did not approach the data collection and data analysis in a 'mind-
independent' manner (Boghosian, 2006). Correspondingly, I did not consider the risk 
governance process that I studied as existing independently of my understanding of it. 
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Neither was my approach guided by a universal objective standard and the results of my 
investigation thus constituted a universal truth. There is no single approach to studying risk 
governance as a collective decision-making process, because there is little agreement as to 
what constitutes risk or governance or virtually any other relevant concept (Rosa et al., 2014). 
The 'truths' about these concepts must be socially negotiated in the academic discourse. (Id.) 
Therefore, this study has a constructivist ontological and epistemological foundation. 
Not all scholars share the view of studying risk in the context of collective decision-making 
as a social construct. As I elaborate in more detail in Chapter 3, there is a strong realist 
tradition in risk theory (Adams, 1995). According to the realist tradition, risk is an objective 
concept expressed in 'the probability of an adverse future event multiplied by its magnitude' 
(Id., p. 69). Therefore, risk analysis constitutes an objective process that is a prerogative of 
the so-called risk professionals (risk experts) who are capable of rendering a universal truth 
about a particular risk (Id.). 
As I show in Chapter 3, the ontologically and epistemologically realist approach to risk runs 
into a host of theoretical and empirical problems. 7 Realist epistemology appears particularly 
susceptible on the grounds that placing values on the magnitude of an adverse event is an 
inherently subjective process. This prompted some scholars such as Crawford-Brown (1999) 
to take a placatory agnostic approach premised on the possibility of coexistence of the 
objective and subjective risk concepts. I found this approach initially persuasive, mainly 
because I intended to focus on the collective decision-making part of risk governance and not 
on the concept of risk itself. 
The realist ontology, constructivist epistemology approach taken by Rosa, Renn, and 
McCright (2014) proved to be particularly compelling. These scholars, unlike Crawford-
Brown (Id.) or Sjoberg and Boholm (Oltedal, et al., 2004), provide a conceptual dualistic 
foundation for the combined approach. They point out that all the attributes assigned to risk, 
such as probabilities and likelihoods, are products of human invention and are thus social 
constructions representing uncertainty (Rosa, et al., 2014, pp. 22-23). Rosa, Renn, and 
7 
I urge the reader to not view this section as a duplication of Chapter 3. In Chapter 3, I discuss approaches to defining risk in light of policy implications of the expert versus lay people debate. 
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McCright's argument for realist ontology, however, is less compelling. They maintain that a 
per on is at risk not due to a social construction, but because he or she is in 'a state of the 
world ' where conditions are uncertain or circumstances unknown, and yet decisions must be 
made (Id.) However, the opposite might be true if there is no real risk, yet the person is 
deemed to be in such a state. Based on this logic, this person is simultaneously in two states 
of the world in relation to the same potential event - at risk and not at risk. This analysis 
exposes a flaw in Rosa, Renn, and McCright - the conflation of an event and a possibility 
thereof. 
Although I remain convinced that a constructivist approach to studying risk governance is 
suitable for risk agnostics, I no longer designate it as the working approach for this thesis. 
Therefore, ontologically and epistemologically I view risk and risk governance as social 
constructions. 
1.2.2. Research question and scope of the study 
Based on the reasons outlined above, this study aims to answer the following research 
question: 
In what ways and to what extent is risk governance of oil and gas activities in 
the Arctic and Subarctic region mandated and/or allowed by the Russian 
policy, legal, and regulatory regime? 
The first key element in the research question is risk governance. Rosa, Renn, and McCright 
(2014) view governance as an approach and an observation. The former normative definition 
sees governance as 'a model or framework for organizing and managing society' (van Asselt 
& Renn, 2011, p. 435). Under the latter descriptive definition, governance comprises 
'structures and processes for collective decision-making involving governmental and non-
governmental actors' (Jd.) (Hagendijk & Irwin, 2006). In this study, I embrace both 
definitions in the manner consistent with a Weberian ideal type analysis (Kalberg, 2011). On 
the one hand, I use the concept of risk governance to identify the scope of the empirical field 
and categorize the relevant processes and structures. On the other hand, I utilize the texts of 
laws, regulations, and official policies, as well as official government and policy discourse 
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data, to critique and hopefully to contribute to the development of the risk governance theory. 
This study does not single out any particular type of risk, environmental risks for example. 
Rather, it embraces all potential risks, including systemic risks posed by oil and gas 
development in the Russian Arctic and Subarctic. However, because environmental risks 
dominate the discourse, the discussion often gravitates towards risks to the environment. 
Oil and gas activities occurring in the Russian Arctic and Subarctic is the second key element 
of the research question. With 77% of oil and 95% of natural gas production in Russia 
occurring in the Arctic and Subarctic, the region is representative of the entire Russian oil 
and gas sector. As I noted above, oil and gas activities occurring in the Arctic are connected 
to oil and gas activities occurring in the Subarctic through energy infrastructure, 
management, and ownership. The same ties connect activities occurring in the combined 
(Arctic and Subarctic) region to oil and gas activities occurring in the rest of Russia, as well 
as beyond its borders. For this reason, my analysis includes up- (exploration, development, 
and extraction), mid- (transportation), and downstream (refining and distribution) oil and gas 
activities in the non-Arctic and non-Subarctic parts of Russia. 8 Because Russian oil and gas 
constitutes a critical component of the global energy system, I also venture outside Russia to 
highlight such connections. I do not rely on any particular oil and gas project as a case study. 
However, I use the Prirazlomnoe field in the Pechora Sea, the Yamal LNG project, and the 
Power of Siberia pipeline as examples throughout the thesis to illustrate my points. 
The third key element in the study's research question is the Russian policy, legal, and 
regulatory regime. I have already highlighted the qualities of the empirical data from Russia 
above. In addition, as I outline below, the theory of risk and risk governance has been 
premised on Western data and philosophies. Considering the theory's claim to universal 
applicability, this is a significant limitation that this study will help to reduce. The policy, 
legal, and regulatory refers to the types primary sources upon which the study relies: (i) policy 
statements; (ii) acts enacted through a legislative process (laws); and (iii) acts promulgated 
by administrative agencies (regulations). In this sense, the term 'regulation' is distinct from 
the definition prevalent in the economic literature that sees regulation as the act of 
8 
Because of the importance of the upstream and midstream sectors for the Russian economy, I examine the 
downstream sector only tangentially. 
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regulating.9 The word 'Russian' in the 'regime' means the study's emphasis on state 
(government) governance ofrisk. The phrase 'mandated and/or allowed' refers to the amount 
of discretion that actors have in governing risks under the Russian national policy, legal, and 
regulatory regime. 
'Ways' and 'extent' represent the fourth and final element of the research question. As I 
explain later in this chapter and in Chapter 4, most if not all significant decisions regarding 
up-, mid- and downstream oil and gas projects are either made in or approved by the Kremlin. 
Hence, the study focuses on the ex-ante processes leading up to threshold decisions. 
Correspondingly, this study centres on the risk pre-assessment (PA) and risk categorization 
and evaluation (C&E) phases of the risk governance framework. 10 These risk governance 
phases provide ample breadth while maintaining sufficient depth required for answering the 
study's research question. 
Therefore, in the simplest terms, this thesis is about the policy, legal and regulatory setting 
of risk governance of oil and gas activities in Russia. The applicable Russian policy, legal, 
and regulatory regime serves as the case study. As I will show throughout the thesis, this 
setting is best understood through the lenses of the social concept of power. 
1.2.3. Study objectives 
On 13 January 2016, I attended an event hosted by Queen Mary University of London and 
Clifford Chance, a large multi-national law firm. The event gathered a wide array of 
participants ranging from oil and gas executives to environmental law professors and from 
renewable energy professionals to energy analysts. The main feature of the event was an 
address by Sir David King, a Special Representative for Climate Change. In his address, 
entitled 'Climate Change: Post-Paris Energy Transition', Sir David King made the following 
remark: 'Oil and gas companies need to change or they will not be.' 
9 
Because the term 'regulation' used in the economic literature overlooks important legal differences, I prefer 
the more encompassing term 'intervention'. (Fung, Weil, & Graham, 2007) 
10 
I elaborate on each step ofrisk governance in Chapter 3. 
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Sir David's statement articulated some of the consequences of the decarbonisation effort 
exemplified by the U.N. Convention on Climate (Sidortsov, 2012). However, this is not how 
Exxon Mobil' s CEO feels about the possibility of a change in his company's business model: 
AP: Environmentalists would also say that it's one of the last few places left that 
are unspoiled. Why not leave it alone? 
Tillerson: Because eventually we are going to need it. It's back to that insatiable 
appetite that the world has for energy. Oil demand is going to continue to grow 
as population grows. If you look out 25 years from now we are going to have 
another couple of billion people on the planet, we're going to be at 9 billion 
people. Something like 3 billion people are going to move from poverty into 
middle class status. When they do that, the energy demand goes up enormously. 
As we move out into the middle of this century our outlook shows you are going 
to need those resources even with a lot of other alternative forms of energy 
continuing at a fairly aggressive growth rate (AP, 2015). 
Although Mr. Tillerson ' s comments offer several insights, I will focus on one - that the oil 
and gas industry has and will continue to pose a significant obstacle to qualitative and 
quantitative changes to the global energy system. 11 Therefore, the policy objective of this 
study is to identify encompassing and transcending characteristics of the oil and gas sector 
and to develop a comprehensive analytical framework, which I term the Risk Governance 
Power Framework (RGPF) to better understand the challenges that the industry poses in 
response to state actions that are contrary to the industry's current objectives and self-
perceived interests. 
A meaningful conversation about risk governance, including the governance of oil and gas 
activities, should include considerations of the social concept of power. Although these two 
concepts 'are inextricably linked', they have not been consistently discussed as such in the 
literature (Barnett & Duvall, 2004). Meanwhile, according to Russel (1937), power is the 
most fundamental concept in the social sciences. It thus lies at the foundation of governance 
and serves as the basis of an in-depth analysis of risk governance frameworks. 
11 er 1mate change concerns indeed occupy the top of the list of reasons for the transformation of the current 
global energy system. This list includes adverse environmental ( other than climate change-related), social, 
economic, and political impacts. My co-authors and I explored these reasons through the lenses of justice in 
Energy Security, Equality, and Justice. (Sovacool, et al. , 2013) 
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Therefore, the main academic objective of this study is to develop an analytical framework 
of power relations in risk governance of the oil and gas sector. By reaching the main 
objective, I hope to contribute to the development of risk and risk governance theory, 
especially its socio-legal context. I also hope to contribute to the fields of Russian and energy 
studies, particularly to better understanding of the decision-making processes in the Russian 
oil and gas sector. 
t.2.4. Limitations of research 
This study aims to answer a broad research question. Although risk governance narrows the 
theoretical scope of this study from a broader and more inclusive risk theory, it also calls for 
input from more than one discipline. This opens the door for a multitude of literatures, 
conceptual frameworks, and methodologies. Limiting the disciplinary reach of this study to 
one discipline - law, for example - is theoretically possible. However, as I explain below, 
because the legal method is limited in explaining how law and policy are implemented and 
enforced, utilizing only one discipline would be at the expense of obtaining a comprehensive 
picture of the aforementioned setting in which risk governance of oil and gas activities 
occurs. Because I attempt to answer a broad research question whilst utilising literatures and 
methodological and theoretical frameworks from a few disciplines within the boundaries of 
a PhD study, my research comes with limitations, which I discuss below. 
There is a multitude of potentially relevant and applicable social theories capable of 
explaining the data. For instance, I conducted a cursory review of literature on the three 
theories capable of conceptualising, encompassing, and transcending the characteristics of 
the oil and gas sector. These theories are resource curse, path dependence, and social network 
theories. 
Karl (2007, p. 1) defines resource curse as 'the negative growth and development outcomes 
associated with minerals and petroleum-led development. In its narrowest sense, it is the 
inverse relationship between high levels of natural resource dependence and growth rates.' 
A particular case of resource curse is the so-called 'Dutch disease', which was named after 
the negative impacts of the North Sea oil development on the Dutch economy. Rise of real 
exchange rates and migration of capital and labour to the booming extraction sector resulted 
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in reduced competitiveness of other economic sectors (/d.). The resource curse concept 
brings valuable insight into the effect on an economy when the oil and gas sector dominates. 
I chose not to make this theory the centrepiece of my analysis, because in my cursory review 
I concluded that it might not provide sufficient insight into the mechanism by which the 
extractive sector 'crowds' other economic sectors, overcomes institutional controls, and turns 
political, social, and economic institutions into rentier structures. However, my review was 
limited to an overview of the concept and did not include investigations rich with societal 
context. 
Path dependence, also known as inertia, stickiness, and lock-in, means in the simplest terms 
that the 'past determines the future' (Mahoney, 2000, p. 507). Puffert (2015) defines path 
dependence as follows: 
Path dependence is the dependence of economic outcomes on the path of previous 
outcomes, rather than simply on current conditions. In a path dependent process, 
"history matters" - it has an enduring influence. Choices made on the basis of 
transitory conditions can persist long after those conditions change. Thus, 
explanations of the outcomes of path-dependent processes require looking at 
history, rather than simply at current conditions of technology, preferences, and 
other factors that determine outcomes. 
Perhaps the most recognizable form of path dependence in the energy sector (the most 
'uninteresting' to Puffert) is known as sunk costs. This form is based on the longevity of 
capital-intensive equipment. Thus, according to Puffert (2015), ' [ o ]bsolete, inferior 
equipment may remain in use because its fixed cost is already "sunk" or paid for, while its 
variable costs are lower than the total costs of replacing it with a new generation of 
equipment.' I decided against conducting a more in-depth literature review of the path 
dependence theory because of its overall deterministic nature. However, my review did not 
encompass path dependence literature regarding social capital, which might have contained 
the necessary insight regarding agency. Nonetheless, I found the concept of path dependence 
invaluable for understanding the ontologies of the actors and groups of actors centred on oil 
and gas and their related activities. 
The network concept is a logical approach to analysing the social reality powered by Russian 
oil and gas, as it is an organised compilation consisting of different actors (Moulaert & 
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Cabaret, 2006). To borrow from Scott (1988), these actors are 'tied to one another by invisible 
bonds which are knitted together in a criss-cross mesh of connections, much as a fishing net 
or a length of cloth is made from intertwined fabrics.' In light of such a powerful statement, 
it is hard to disagree with Scott's description of a social network as capable of providing a 
'powerful image of social reality' (Id.). In analysing the web of social relations, I found the 
Actor Network Theory (ANT) to be a particularly intriguing branch of social network theory. 
ANT's focus on non-human actors and their agency appeared to be a valuable pathway of 
conceptualizing the central role of crude oil and natural gas in the web (Latour, 2007, pp. 46-
50). A historic analysis of crude oil - from its days as a whale oil competitor to its modem-
day domination of the transportation sector as a jack-of-all-trades fuel - has the potential to 
generate a great deal of insight for energy policy. In this sense, it would be similar to Bruno 
Latour's examination of the diesel engine's history and its contribution to understanding of 
technology development in modernity (Chiu, 2008, p. 17). 
Social science network theories are often criticised for providing a rather static snapshot of 
social reality and failing to fully reflect the complexity of dynamic processes - interactions 
and institutionalizations - within and among different networks (Moulaert & Cabaret, 2006, 
p. 52) (Grewal, 2008). This is not to say that some ANT scholars have not recognised and 
remedied this problem. For instance, Law's (1992) advancement of ANT alleviates one of 
the sharpest reproaches of social network theories centred on the absence of the role of power 
relations in the analysis (Moulaert & Cabaret, 2006, pp. 53-54). His idea of ordering takes 
ANT out of a static realm and brings much-needed dynamism to the concept. Therefore, it is 
conceivable that a more in-depth look into ANT and ordering provided a better conceptual 
foundation for my analysis than Grewal's theory of network power. 
This study relies on four data sources: (i) observations obtained during fieldwork, including 
data from semi-structured interviews; (ii) texts of relevant programmatic policy statements, 
laws, and regulations; (iii) transcripts of presidential meetings, press conferences, addresses, 
and speeches; and (iv) energy statistics and results of public polls. This variety of data sources 
provides the necessary breadth for answering a broad research question. However, its breadth 
also raises concerns about the depth limitations. 
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As I explain later in this chapter, my original plan was to use participant observation and 
semi-structured interviews data with legal sources. However, because of the difficulties in 
gaining access, I supplemented these two sources with official transcripts and statistics. This 
relegated participant observation and semi-structured interviews to experiential data. 12 Even 
though this data source became of secondary importance, I would have benefited from a 
greater diversity of interviewees. For example, I did not find opportunities to interview 
Russian government officials. 
The legal data source benefits from a comprehensive universe of federal programmatic policy 
statements, statutes, and regulations. However, with the exception of one regional statute, 
this group does not include regional and municipal sources. This shortcoming is partially 
compensated by the superior legal authority of federal law. However, including regional and 
municipal sources into the analysis would have provided an additional spatial nuance. Laws 
and regulations are subject to change, and, as I show in Chapters 4, 5, and 7, in Russia, these 
changes can be rapid and significant. Therefore, the conclusions drawn based upon legal data 
need to be revisited every time programmatic policy statements, statutes, and regulations 
undergo a significant change. 
All of the official transcripts used in this study came from the executive branch of the Russian 
government. Moreover, all them came from the Office of the Russian President. This 
excluded not only regional and municipal decision makers but also key federal agencies and 
business entities involved in oil and gas policy-making, implementation, and enforcement. I 
partially controlled for this limitation through including statements by regional and municipal 
officials, and oil and gas companies' heads made at various presidential meetings. Also, I did 
not have access to meetings held off the record. In addition, it is possible that some of the 
transcripts were altered by Kremlin staff. I was able to verify the accuracy of several but not 
all transcripts by watching some available videos of the meetings. 
The biggest limitation of energy statistics and results of public polls is the non-originality of 
the data. Although the International Energy Agency (IEA), U.S. Energy Information 
12 
Strauss (1987, p. 20) defines experiential data as "'data in the head'" , drawn from the researcher's personal, research, and literature-reading experiences'. 
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Administration (EIA), and British Petroleum (BP) are highly respected in the energy world 
in terms of the statistics that they collect, I had no way of verifying this data. The same is 
true for the public polls data that came from the Moscow-based Levada-Centre, an 
organization with a stellar international reputation (Levada-Centre, 2016). 
In addition, all the aforementioned data came from the Russian Federation. This limited the 
scope of knowledge claims resulting from the study to one country. To mitigate this 
shortcoming, I highlight throughout the thesis the currently indispensable role of the Russian 
oil and gas sector in the global system. I also use several international examples, particularly 
from Norway and the United States, to show potential applicability of this study's knowledge 
claims beyond Russia's borders. In addition, I justify this in-depth, single-country study by 
the data-rich discourse policy discourse in Russia. Yet, as I acknowledge in the conclusion, 
such application would require additional research. 
This study aims to propose the RGPF, a comprehensive analytical framework for analysing 
power relations in the risk governance of the oil and gas sector. Yet this study relies only on 
qualitative methods to achieve its objective. Such methods are essential for developing 
qualitative categories such as analytical steps and framework elements (Babbie, 1999). 
However, qualitative analysis does not provide tools for measuring these categories. As a 
result, the use of the framework is likely to be limited because of the lack of tools for 
quantitative assessment of the power relations (Jorgensen, 1989). Therefore, due to the 
limitations posed by the lack of quantitative methods in this study, the word 'comprehensive' 
above should be understood as limited to the elements and analytical steps of the RGPF. 
1.2.5. Positionality 
Merriam et al. (2010, p. 411) note that 'positionality is .. . determined by where one stands 
in relation to "the other"'. This observation sets forth the insider-outsider research role 
dichotomy (Jorgensen, 1989). 'An outsider ... gains a more advantageous location, yet under 
most circumstances he or she still lacks the familiarity with what goes on within the setting' 
(Id. p. 56). In contrast, an insider is given a role presented by the setting but this role provides 
an ultimate insight into a social reality being investigated (Jorgensen, 1989). Assuming an 
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outsider or insider position also extends beyond data collection impacting how data is 
categorised and analysed. 
Being an insider does not necessarily translate into an advantage. For example, Herod ( 1999) 
concludes that his position as an outsider was more beneficial than that of an insider in the 
research of Czech trade union elites. Richardson (2014) makes the same observation 
regarding his research of Russian elites in the country's Far Eastern region and Moscow. 
Jorgensen (1989 p. 61) notes that, '[t]he performance of multiple roles offers the distinct 
advantage of providing access to different standpoints and perspectives'. Yet gaining insider 
access and perspective takes time and effort. Doing so in a foreign country further 
complicates the process (Jorgensen, 1989). In this study, I found myself in a very fortunate 
position as having several insider and outsider perspectives. Yet this multirole ability came 
with a burden of multiple biases, which I made a conscious effort to control. 
I was born and raised in the city of Irkutsk, located in Eastern Siberia. I obtained my first law 
degree in 1999 from Irkutsk State University (ISU). 13 I had the privilege of studying law in 
Russia during one of the most exciting times in the nation's history. As the country was 
transitioning from totalitarian rule and a planned economy, it was also changing its legal 
system. I commenced my studies in the autumn of 1994, only nine months after the current 
Russian Constitution was adopted. Over the next few years, Russia adopted the majority of 
its foundational laws, such as the Civil Code, 14 the Criminal Code, 15 and the Tax Code. 16 It 
also enacted some of the laws that are critical to this thesis, such as 'On Environmental 
Review' (Law NI 75-FZ, 1995) and 'On the Continental Shelf (Law N187-FZ, 1995). 
Most of my textbooks during that time were obsolete because they were based on old Soviet 
laws, some of which had already been replaced and some of which were on their way out. As 
a result, my classmates and I relied on the texts of existing and forthcoming laws published 
in the Russian Gazette (Rossiyskaya Gazeta), an official source for newly adopted Russian 
13 
According to World Education Services, an international educational certification organization, my ISU degree is a combined bachelor' s and master's degree in law. 14 
Part I was adopted in 1994 (Law N51-FZ, 1994) and Part II in 1996 (Law Nl4-FZ, 1996). 15 Adopted in 1996 (LawN63-FZ 1996). 16 ' Part I was adopted in 1998 (Law NI46-FZ, 1998) and Part II in 2001 (Law NI 17-FZ, 2000). 
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Jaws. Most of the scholarly works regarding new laws were mere regurgitations of text, 
offering little in terms of in-depth analysis. As a result, I learned to rely on my own analysis 
of a legal text. 
After a strong academic performance during my first year at ISU, an instructor invited me to 
join his firm as a law clerk. Because some of the firm's clients were involved in privatization 
disputes, I was able to get a glimpse of one of the largest transfers of wealth in the world's 
history. I recall reviewing an addendum to a document capturing the results of a privatization 
auction and seeing the laughable amount that the lucky winner paid for the equipment, 
materials, and other assets. For example, the Russian government received an equivalent of 
$20 for a fairly new ZIL-130 medium lorry. 
Narayan (1993 p. 671-672) notes that '[[]actors such as education, education, gender, sexual 
orientation, class, race, or sheer duration of contact may at different time outweigh the 
cultural identity we associate with insider or outsider status' . Although my Russian legal 
education enabled me to read Russian legalese and growing up during the tumultuous 1990s 
provided me with the insight to the current government and corporate culture, it also had an 
impact on how I see the current regime and the circumstances that lead to its rise. 
For example, the effects of socio-economic changes in the Russian society, marked by the 
new policy, legal, and regulatory regime and redistribution of Soviet state assets, made a 
lasting impression on me. My father began the 1990s as one of the most skilled and respected 
workers at his industrial plant. 17 By the mid-1990s, he found himself ousted from the plant, 
along with the vast majority of other workers, because the plan had no orders. Already a 
heavy drinker, my father fell into a deep depression and died from a massive heart attack in 
December 1998 at the age of 54. He joined millions of Russians, predominately men, who 
were decimated by the changes that hit the country (Dawisha, 2015). 
17 
I witnessed the respect with which my father's colleagues treated him because I spent two summer months working as a courier at the plant. 
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My personal experience with the socio-economic and legal contexts in which the new 
Russian laws were implemented served as an important foundation for this study. But I also 
had to be cognizant of my bias against the ruling government and corporate elites. 
I began forming my outsider Western researcher perspective through obtaining a Juris Doctor 
degree from Vermont Law School (VLS) in the United States. After practicing law as a 
transactional attorney at a U.S. law firm for two years, I returned to VLS in the autumn of 
2010 to pursue an LL.M in environmental law and policy and to serve as a research associate 
and global energy fellow at the Institute for Energy and the Environment (IEE). 18 
Because of my background in Russian law, Professor Betsy Baker invited me to become a 
team leader in analysing the Russian national legal and regulatory regime governing oil and 
gas development in the Arctic for the Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC). The project's primary 
goal was to educate the ICC leaders on the intricacies of complex national legal frameworks 
and thus enable these leaders to intervene in the regulatory process and enforce their rights. 
We accomplished this goal by presenting ICC with a white paper that, in my view, remains 
the most comprehensive English-language source on the Russian law pertaining to offshore 
oil and gas activities (Baker, et al., 2011 ). 
Working on the ICC project presented me with an opportunity to combine the insider and 
outsider perspective in collecting and analysing Russian legal data. Diving into Russian law 
after maintaining a largely U.S. legal perspective for nine years reminded me of its great 
epistemic value for developing legal and social-science concepts that are deemed to have 
global application. I found the public and policy discourses on the topic of Arctic oil and gas 
development in Russia extremely rich. At the same time, I found the deficiencies and gaps in 
the legal and regulatory framework and the conflict of interest between government and non-
government actors less disguised than in other Arctic nations. 
My work on the ICC project was recognized by the Department of Energy in the form of an 
invitation to participate in the U.S.-Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission's Energy 
Scholarship Working Group, to which I committed prior to being accepted into my PhD 
18 
I received my juris doctor degree from VLS in 2008 and became a member of the Vermont Bar in March 
2009 after passing the bar exam in July 2008. 
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course. Participation in the working group enabled me to travel to Russia as a member of 
U.S. energy law and policy academic community and collect data relevant to this study. 
Merriam et al. (2010 p. 411) pose an important clarifying question regarding insider status: 
'What is it that an insider is insider of?' As I elaborate in more detail below, participation in 
the working group put me in the role of insider as part of the international academic and 
policy research community working on energy issues. Although I made strides toward 
becoming a member of the Russian energy law and policy research community, political 
complications after the annexation of Crimea by Russia in March 2014 precluded me from 
gaining this insider role. 
My participation in the working group also exposed a shift in what I saw as my insider 
Russian-educated legal expert perspective. Because I left Russia in January 2001, I did not 
fully experience Vladimir Pu tin's Russia. I was able to compensate for this shortcoming by 
regularly talking to my family and friends about the new regime and reading Russian 
newspapers and watching Russian TV. Because of lack of practice, my ability to converse 
and communicate freely in Russian legalese also diminished. Fortunately, I recognized this 
problem before it manifested in my research and remedied it with additional preparation. 
Despite the aforementioned difficulties, I was able to utilise the insider-outsider dualism to 
my advantage and approach this study with a view not limited to a single country. 
1.2.6. Prior research and scholarly endeavours 
r was able to locate only one risk governance study involving the Russian oil and gas sector. 
In this study, Nazarova (2016) applies the concepts of risk governance and risk management 
to the activities of a Russian oil company in the Arctic. Nazarova premises her finding on 
interviews conducted with the company's employees in a wide range of occupations, such as 
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health, safety, and environmental (HSE) specialists to senior managers responsible for the 
company's oil transportation activities. 19 
Sirina and F ondahl' s (2006) study of perceived risks posed by the East Siberia Pacific Ocean 
(ESPO) pipeline contributes to the development of risk perception theories. However, the 
authors focus on concerns about the gap between formally granted indigenous rights and the 
realities of a powerful state company disrupting their hunting grounds. My collaboration with 
Stammler and Ivanova resulted in a study in which my co-authors and I explore the local 
approach to handling risk arising out of industrial projects in Sakha (Yakutia). In this study, 
we used the Power of Siberia pipeline system as a case study, and compare and contrast the 
local approach to handling risk to that prescribed under the federal law 'On Environmental 
Review' (Law NI 75-FZ, 1995) and the Sakha (Yakutia) law 'On Ethnological Review in the 
Areas Traditionally Occupied and Utilized by Indigenous Small-numbered People of the 
Republic Sakha's (Yakutia) North' ('On Ethnological Review') (Law 820-Z N537-IV, 
2010).20 In the resulting article, we did not provide a comprehensive analysis of the policy, 
legal, and regulatory mechanisms responsible for governance of risks in the Russian oil and 
gas sector. In addition, we concentrated on a single natural gas project and forewent 
exploration of foundational underpinnings of the risk governance concept. 
Because of the scarcity of prior studies directly on this thesis's topic, I provide a brief 
overview of scholarly efforts on the following related topics: the socio-legal side of risk, risk 
governance of the energy sector, and energy policy-making, environmental assessment (EA) 
and ethnological assessment (ER) in the context of oil and gas development in Russia. 
It would be incorrect to say that there is no research targeting the legal aspect of risk 
governance. There are entire academic journals devoted to the legal side of risk. Yet the vast 
majority of such scholarship is focused on technical risk assessment and the rules that govern 
19 
This article appeared in the special issue of Energy Research and Social Science (ERSS) entitled 'Arctic Energy: Views from the Social Sciences', for which I served as the editor. The author utilized the risk govemance concept pursuant to my advice during the article review process. 
20 
We published the results of our study as an article entitled 'Localizing Governance of Systemic Risks: A Case Study of the Power of Siberia Pipeline in Russia' in the aforementioned special issue. (Sidortsov, et. al. , 2016) 
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it. The same is true for risk regulation scholarship, an area that straddles law and economics, 
and which often finds inspiration and purpose in the aforementioned laypeople-versus-
ex.perts debate. Correspondingly, much of the literature on regulation of risk is concerned 
with the protection of the regulatory process from the erroneous fears of the citizenry rooted 
in so-called cognitive heuristics (MacGillivray, 2013). The work ofSunstein exemplifies this 
trend in the risk literature (Id.). This is not to say that such investigations are not important 
or not valuable. For many academics and practitioners, they are intellectually enriching and 
useful for the practice of law. However, equating the legal side of technical risk assessment 
with the legal side of risk governance is problematic. 
On the other side of the scholarship spectrum is what Callon, Lacoumes, and Barthe (2011, 
p. 226) call 'Grand Narratives' associated with the works of Beck. It would not be completely 
appropriate to critique the scholarship of Beck based on the standards applied to legal 
scholarship, as he is a theoretical sociologist. Yet he frequently refers to law and what the 
law does in relation to risk while constructing his grand narratives and making far-reaching 
pronouncements. What he lacks is both theoretical and empirical specificity of the extent and 
ways in which law is applied to risk matters. The lack of empirical grounding is typical and 
expected from his work - after all, Beck is a theoretician. However, his general oversight of 
important conceptual issues such as jurisdiction and legal authority begs for further 
clarification and better placement in the context of legal theory. 
The literature regarding the socio-legal aspect of risk governance is scarce but growing. The 
concept's broad reach allows scholars to branch out of technical regulating, standardization, 
administrative rulemaking, and other narrow areas traditionally associated with legal research 
of risk. I underscored the need, rationale, and outlined agenda for developing the socio-legal 
aspect of risk governance in an article entitled 'Reinventing Rules for Environmental Risk 
Governance in the Energy Sector' published in Energy Research and Social Science in 2014. 
A recent collective volume edited by Lindoe, Baram, and Renn (2014) entitled 'Risk 
Governance of Offshore Oil and Gas Operations' consists of chapters covering largely 
traditional risk areas, such as risk management in HSE regulations. To its credit, the volume 
al o incorporates several atypical pieces: a chapter on values and norms as a foundation for 
36 
ri k-oriented regulatory culture (Mearns, 2014), a chapter on legitimacy and accountability 
in risk regulation (Kring en, 2014 ), and a chapter on an institutional foundation of inclusive 
ri k governance (Rosness & Forseth, 2014). Yet the volume largely ignores some of the 
critical issues associated with risks posed by offshore oil and gas development. These issues 
tnclude climate change risks associated with typically long-term, capital-intensive offshore 
project and social risks associated with hydrocarbon production-dependent economies. 
The risk governance framework developed by the International Risk Governance Council 
IRGC) and on which I rely throughout the thesis has been utilized to assess policies in 
eral areas of the energy sector. These assessments include a study on risk governance of 
bioenergy policies, (IRGC, 2007) critical infrastructure in the energy sector (AEA, 2009), 
and i ue surrounding carbon capture and sequestration (IRGC, 2008). 
en and Renn (2012) use the IRGC framework to examine issues related to oil and gas 
activit1e in the Norwegian sector of the Barents Sea (Aven & Renn, 2012). This is the only 
holarly study that I was able to locate in which the authors utilized the entire risk 
governance framework as an approach for analysing and critiquing the ways in which 
orway handles risk in the Arctic and Subarctic. 
mentioned above, the third group includes concepts that are tangential to risk governance 
in the context of oil and gas development in Russia. Below, I list a few examples that 
pitomi e this subgroup. 
The fir t subgroup comprises the academic and analytical literature regarding decision-
making in the oil and gas sector in Russia. Gustafson's (2012) 'Wheel of Fortune' offers 
perhap the most comprehensive and detailed account of the modem history of the Russian 
al and gas sector. Goldman's 'Petrostate' (2010) is similar to Gustafson's work, but it is not 
detailed and nuanced. Paik, whose 'Sino-Russian Oil and Gas Cooperation: The Reality 
and Implications' I reviewed for Pacific Affairs, analyses energy policy-making by the 
Ru sian government from the standpoint of Russia's relationship with its south-eastern 
neighbour. Although all three authors refer to risk as a consideration used during the policy-
lllaking process, they do not make it a feature of their investigations. In addition, all three 
vour law and economics as their main discipline and focus on the macroeconomic effect of 
37 
risk-oriented regulatory culture (Mearns, 2014), a chapter on legitimacy and accountability 
in risk regulation (Kring en, 2014 ), and a chapter on an institutional foundation of inclusive 
risk governance (Rosness & Forseth, 2014). Yet the volume largely ignores some of the 
critical issues associated with risks posed by offshore oil and gas development. These issues 
include climate change risks associated with typically long-term, capital-intensive offshore 
projects and social risks associated with hydrocarbon production-dependent economies. 
The risk governance framework developed by the International Risk Governance Council 
(IRGC) and on which I rely throughout the thesis has been utilized to assess policies in 
several areas of the energy sector. These assessments include a study on risk governance of 
bioenergy policies, (IRGC, 2007) critical infrastructure in the energy sector (AEA, 2009), 
and issues surrounding carbon capture and sequestration (IRGC, 2008). 
Aven and Renn (2012) use the IRGC framework to examine issues related to oil and gas 
activities in the Norwegian sector of the Barents Sea (Aven & Renn, 2012). This is the only 
scholarly study that I was able to locate in which the authors utilized the entire risk 
governance framework as an approach for analysing and critiquing the ways in which 
Norway handles risk in the Arctic and Subarctic. 
As mentioned above, the third group includes concepts that are tangential to risk governance 
in the context of oil and gas development in Russia. Below, I list a few examples that 
epitomise this subgroup. 
The first subgroup comprises the academic and analytical literature regarding decision-
making in the oil and gas sector in Russia. Gustafson's (2012) 'Wheel of Fortune' offers 
perhaps the most comprehensive and detailed account of the modem history of the Russian 
oil and gas sector. Goldman's 'Petrostate' (2010) is similar to Gustafson's work, but it is not 
as detailed and nuanced. Paik, whose 'Sino-Russian Oil and Gas Cooperation: The Reality 
and Implications' I reviewed for Pacific Affairs, analyses energy policy-making by the 
Russian government from the standpoint of Russia's relationship with its south-eastern 
neighbour. Although all three authors refer to risk as a consideration used during the policy-
making process, they do not make it a feature of their investigations. In addition, all three 
favour law and economics as their main discipline and focus on the macroeconomic effect of 
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Russian oil and gas policies without noting the societal changes brought by the revival of the 
oil and gas sector during Vladimir Putin's first presidency. 
The second subgroup comprises academic and popular literature on the state of political and 
economic affairs in the Russian Federation. This literature does not specifically target risk 
and/or oil and gas sector. However, because of the sector's dominance in the Russian 
economy and society, this literature is full of insightful commentary and analysis of the 
decisions that involve exploration, extraction, and transportation of oil and gas. Dawisha 
(2015) tracks the rise of Vladimir Putin from a KGB officer to the head of the Russian state. 
Her investigation is full of references to the Russian President's involvement in the 
governance of the energy sector. Hoffman' s (2011) historic inquiry into the rise of private 
actors in post-Soviet Russia includes several detailed accounts featuring the oil and gas 
sector. Although Dawisha, Hoffman, and several other authors from this subgroup intend 
their investigations for both academic and general audiences, I found their accounts helpful 
in examining the role that risks and benefits to individual actors play in the decision-making 
processes. However, this body of literature does not address the topic of risk governance of 
oil and gas activities in a comprehensive manner. 
The third subgroup consists of literature that touches upon risk in relation to ER and EA of 
individual oil and gas projects in the Russian Arctic and Subarctic. This body of literature is 
particularly helpful for understanding how risk governance mechanisms under ER and EA 
are implemented on practice. However, none of the authors listed below ties his or her 
analysis to the risk concept, let alone provides a comprehensive account of risk governance 
of oil and gas activities under the Russian policy, legal, and regulatory regime. Murashko has 
been on the forefront of effectively assessing risks posed by oil and gas development to 
indigenous communities of the Russian North. She was one of the first scholars to introduce 
ethnological review (ER) into academic Russian literature (Murashko, 2006). She has also 
carried out ERs (Dallman, et al., 2010) (Dallman, et al., 2011). Novikova, with whom I also 
had the privilege to collaborate frequently, conducted such reviews upon requests from oil 
and gas companies (Novikova & Martynova, 2011). Yakovleva (2011) (201 la) (2014) 
provides valuable insight on the impact of ESPO construction on the indigenous peoples of 
Sakha (Yakutia) in the context of both legal and implementation gaps of the applicable 
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federal law. Ivanova (2007) highlights the need for regional ER legislation to address the 
concerns over cultural, social, and economic impacts during the ESPO construction in Sakha. 
Stammler and Ivanova (2016), recently produced a study in which they outline the difficulties 
of finding a mutually acceptable solution in the cases of oil and gas development in two 
remote Russian regions. 
It is important to note the extent to which I was able to utilize Russian-language sources. 
Based on my engagement with Russian scholars through conversations, research 
collaboration, and editorial work, I have become aware that Russian social science and 
humanities research, including legal research, has seen better days. 21 Ledyaev, whose work 
on the concept of power I found very helpful, does not include any Russian and Soviet 
scholars into his thorough review of power, citing the scarcity and originality of their work 
(Ledyaev, 2001, p. 56). 
Fortunately, there are exceptions. I found insightful Russian legal commentary regarding 
environmental protection (Ignatyeva, 2013), pipeline transport (Perchik, 2005), and 
ethnological assessment (Sleptsov, 2013), as well as Ledyaev's work on the social concept 
of power. 
Based on the above review, this study represents a novel endeavour that aims to bridge an 
obvious gap in the existing risk governance scholarship. Unlike previously conducted studies, 
this study targets the top of the decision-making pyramid in relation to oil and gas 
development in the Russian Arctic and Subarctic and employs the risk governance theory in 
a comprehensive manner. 
It accomplishes this goal so by asserting that risk governance of oil and gas activities is 
shaped by power relations that can be analysed through the RGPF. Furthermore, it views risk 
governance as an inherently adversarial process between the network power behind the 
hazardous activity and the sovereign power of government structures and agents. The 
network power of the oil and gas sector, or as I term it, the Oil Standard, is premised on three 
dependences: technological, socio-economic, and political. The analysis of the spatial and 
21 
I have served as a permanent editor for ERSS since January 2014. 
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temporal allocation of individual and public risks and benefits can be used to evaluate the 
incentives for prompt, comprehensive, and inclusive risk governance. A power relations 
analysis is particularly important at the risk PA and risk C&E phases of the IRGC framework. 
These contributions to the risk governance literature also enrich the social concept of power 
literature by providing the risk and risk governance context. In addition, this study contributes 
to academic and analytical literature on Russian oil and gas law and policy. In particular, it 
shows the importance of a three-dimensional analysis of the Russian oil and gas sector. It 
identifies the scope of the Russian policy, legal, and regulatory regime responsible for risk 
governance and the dominant (prescriptive) approach to handling risk. Finally, it 
demonstrates how law- and rule-making processes can be used to forecast the changes in 
organizational and institutional capacity to govern risks. 
1.3. Disciplinary orientation, data sources, methods, and key concepts 
1.3.1. A note on interdisciplinarity of the study 
Because this thesis examines the Russian policy, legal, and regulatory regime in the societal 
context, it belongs to the category of socio-legal studies (The British Library, 2016). This 
designation also makes this thesis an interdisciplinary study, which '[i]n the simplest terms' 
means 'a mode of research that transgresses traditional disciplinary boundaries' (Rhoten & 
Pfirman, 2007). Sime and Horlick Jones (2004) argue that constraining a study of risk by 
disciplinary boundaries has a perverse reductionist decontextualizing effect. More 
importantly, it reduces the options for targeting a real-life problem clad in rich context. 
This study combines literature and methodology from several social science and humanities 
fields under the risk governance approach. For example, the theoretical analysis of risk is 
based on the works of anthropologist Mary Douglas, psychologist Paul Slovic, and 
sociologists Ulrich Beck and Ortwin Renn, among others. To corroborate my analysis of 
empirical data I rely on accounts of contemporary governance in Russia by political scientists 
such as Karen Dawisha and economists such as Clifford Gaddy. To verify my analysis of 
laws and regulations I employ specialized legal literature in both Russian and English. To 
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distil the concept of power into the study's context, I utilize works of perhaps the widest 
range of authors, from Max Weber and Bertrand Russell to contemporary legal scholar David 
Grewal and political and social theorists Michel Foucault and Steven Lukes. More 
importantly, it targets a real-life problem as application for this study's outcome. Therefore, 
this study firmly belongs in the interdisciplinary category. 
1.3.2. Sources and methods 
1.3.2.1. Overall methodologv 
This is a qualitative study that uses a combination of discourse analysis and legal analysis 
methods. The overall methodology of the study is premised on Grounded Theory (Strauss, 
1987). Grounded Theory is inductive in nature and thus 'grounds' the developed theory in 
data (Id.). This is a 'constant comparative method' of analysis that involves the following 
steps: (i) comparing the relevant data to each theoretical category; (ii) incorporating the 
categories and their properties; (iii) identifying the limits of the emerging theory; and (iv) 
writing up the theory (Glazer & Strauss, 1967). 
I received a great deal of help from the experiential data. This data comprised the following 
sources. First, the knowledge and experience that I obtained while studying and practicing 
law in Russia, as well as conducting extensive research on Russian energy law and policy 
after moving to the United States. Second, the participant observation and semi-structured 
interview data that I collected between March 2013 and March 2014. This data, combined 
with the knowledge gained through a literature reviewed conducted during the first year and 
a half of my PhD study, provided enough foundation for the development of the conceptual 
categories in risk governance - power and knowledge. I also hypothesised that the power 
relations impacting risk governance may vary depending on the nature of a hazardous activity 
from which risks arise, the government's capacity for risk governance, and allocation of risks 
and benefits within the society. 
My next step was to compare the data from my main sources, the official transcript and legal 
texts, to each conceptual category and sub-category. An analysis consisting of coding, further 
sub-categorization, and further conceptualization enabled me to incorporate each category 
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and subcategory with its properties. At this stage I also confirmed the critical importance of 
the social power concept for this study. At the following stage, I identified the limits of the 
RGPF by examining the data in light of the following inquiries: (i) whether the framework 
can be applied across other sectors of Russia's economy; (ii) whether the framework is 
limited to the Russian North; and (iii) whether the framework can be applied to other national 
regimes. After designating the framework to the Russian oil and gas sector, regardless of the 
geographic location of the underlying activities within the country's boundaries, I moved to 
the final stage. The writing stage revealed only minor, clarifying changes to the analytical 
framework. 
1.3.2.2. Texts of relevant programmatic policy statements, laws, and regulations 
In order to answer the main research question of this study, I had to be strategic in selecting 
the level of the Russian policy, legal, and regulatory regime. Russia is a federal state 
consisting of eighty-five constituent entities or subjects of the federation (subyekty federatsii) 
(Constitution, art. 65). In addition to the federal and regional levels, Russia's local affairs are 
administered by municipal governments, or as it is known in Russia, local self-rule (mestnoe 
samoupravlenie) (Constitution, art. 72). Therefore, including policy, legislative, and 
regulatory acts from all three levels would have been impossible within the bounds of this 
study. As mentioned above, based on my expertise in the Russian legal system, I chose to 
concentrate on the federal level in order to produce the most comprehensive answer to the 
research question. 
I narrowed down the scope of the initial review to the policies, laws, and regulations on the 
following matters: strategic energy planning, distribution and management of onshore and 
offshore mineral resources, environmental protection, petroleum taxation, protection of 
small-numbered indigenous people, and construction of energy infrastructure. The second 
stage of the analysis involved a more in-depth examination of the most pertinent sources, the 
full list of which can be found in Appendix I. I obtained the sources through the Russian legal 
database ConsultantPlus (2016), which along with the Garant (2016) database is considered 
the most comprehensive and current legal depository in Russia. As noted above, I have run 
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database searches throughout the study to incorporate all of the legislative and regulatory 
changes. I conducted the last update on 10 June 2016. 
1.3.2.3. Official transcripts 
Legal analysis of policies, laws, and regulations, which at its core is analysis of 'law as 
written', has significant limitations. However, these sources alone are unlikely to provide a 
comprehensive picture of the setting in which risk governance takes place because they are 
silent on the extent to and ways in which they were implemented. I utilised transcripts of 
official meetings to remedy this shortcoming of the above data source. 
In selecting the level and the most appropriate branch of the government I turned to the court 
system, a forum favoured by legal anthropologists (Roberts, 1979) (Bohanan, 1989). There 
is little doubt that Russia has a functioning judiciary ( although many doubt its independence). 
However, one should not look to it as a primary source of relevant discourse, as my cursory 
review of applicable court decisions did not identify a single successful challenge to large oil 
and gas projects in the Arctic or Subarctic based on the alleged risks and impacts these 
projects pose. My second stop was the State Duma (Gosudarstvennaya Duma), the lower 
house of the Russian Parliament where federal legislation is made. However, for reasons 
described in Chapter 4, I found the State Duma to be a de facto rubberstamping extension of 
the executive branch of the Russian Government. 
My research lead me to conclude that the RF Government and the President are the most 
appropriate parties to examine when researching the ex-ante processes that result in threshold 
decisions regarding oil and gas development in the Russian Arctic and Subarctic. 22 Because 
publicly available records are scarce within the RF Government, and because the President 
holds a superior position in the Russian State hierarchy, I turned my attention to what is 
known as the 'heart of Russia' - the Kremlin. I utilized 105 transcripts of Presidential 
meetings, press conferences, addresses, and speeches. I found meetings of presidential 
commissions especially informative, as well as those of ad-hoe consultative and coordinating 
22 
The Government of the Russian Federation or Pravitel 'stvo Rossiyskoy Federatsii is a mega-agency that 
consists of many sub-agencies. For the sake of clarity, in this thesis the term 'RF Government' refers to this 
mega-agency. 
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bodies. In fact, on many occasions, by merely examining a meeting transcript, I was able to 
track the entirety of a substantive decision-making process that resulted in a policy or 
legislative change. In addition, I was able to obtain a surprisingly accurate assessment ( as 
corroborated by other evidence) of a particular policy issue. 
Initially, I was sceptical as to the veracity and credibility of their content but I quickly 
discovered that leading Russian analysts, such as Mitrova, treat these presidential meetings, 
addresses, and speeches as official policy statements (Mitrova, 2015). After conducing an in-
depth review of several transcripts, I was pleasantly surprised by their content. Information 
that I expected to be redacted by Kremlin censors appeared to be intact. Nevertheless, while 
the Administration of the President of the Russian Federation has been conscientious in 
documenting the activities of Presidents Pu tin and Medvedev since 2008, it is very likely that 
not all official conversations and remarks are made available to the public. 
At the initial stages of my research, I searched the Office of the Russian President's official 
online transcript database for the terms 'environment', 'energy', 'oil and gas', and 'risk' (in 
Russian) and manually reviewed the returned records (President of Russia, 2016). The 
transcripts span from June 2003 to April 2015, with only a few transcripts dated prior to 
2008. I selected 105 relevant transcripts for a more in-depth discourse analysis, which I 
describe below. A full of list of transcripts can be found in Appendix II. 
1.3.2.4. Observations obtained during fieldwork, including data from semi-structured 
interviews 
According to Jorgensen, participant observation helps to obtain a valuable 'insider 
viewpoint' (Jorgensen, 1989, p. 15). Skinner (2012) points out that semi-structured 
interviews serve as a great complementary tool to participant observation. For example, 
LaBelle (2012) used a similar two-round approach in his study of post-carbon institutions in 
the EU. Therefore, my strategy of combining 'law as enacted' and 'law as implemented' 
appeared especially appropriate in the comparative context, as it 'guard[s] against the 
possibility of our domestic preconceptions creeping into our understanding of other 
societies.' (Roberts, 1979, p. 18) 
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Because the oil and gas sector is considered a strategic industry of the Russian Federation, it 
makes for a sensitive discussion topic. I recognized this fact, and from the time I embarked 
on my first fieldwork trip in September 2013, I paid particular attention to ethical 
considerations. Pursuant to a discussion with my supervisor, I followed the Ethical 
Guidelines for Good Research Practice adopted by the Association of Social Anthropologists 
of the UK and the Commonwealth (ASA). I clearly disclosed my purpose and background 
before engaging in a research activity and only proceeded after receiving express consent. 
Because of the sensitivity of the subject, I honoured all confidentiality requests. I preserved 
the anonymity of every interviewee and entity unless I received expressed consent not to. 
I have conducted 21 semi-structured, open-ended interviews in person at conferences, 
workshops, lectures, and meetings, as well as eight semi-structured interviews via Skype and 
phone. The full list of interviews, their locations, and topics discussed can be found in 
Appendix IV. I also lectured at an industry workshop in Oslo in September 2013 and at a 
Russian university in Moscow in February 2014. Participation in the U.S.-Russia Bilateral 
Presidential Commission's Energy Scholarship Working Group and my affiliation with the 
IEE as a Senior Global Energy Fellow gave me 'insider' status within the international 
academic and policy research community. As a result, other workshop participants and 
lecture attendees were more willing to talk to me because they were interested in what I 
thought of their ideas as a peer or because they wanted to know more about the topic on 
which I presented. 
The sensitivity of the topic prevented me from making audio or video recordings. As a result, 
I took written notes during or shortly after an interview or participation in a data-rich activity, 
such as group discussion. When necessary and possible, I reached out to the interviewees 
with follow-up questions. 
1.3.2.5. Statistics 
Energy statistics and results of public polls conducted in Russia were the last data source 
utilized in the study. The vast majority of energy statistics came from two most respected 
public sources, the IEA and the U.S. EIA. I also utilized BP Annual Statistical Review, which 
is one of the most esteemed private sources of energy data. 
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I have also reviewed over 50 public polls conducted by the Moscow-based Levada-Centre 
on a variety of topics ranging from Russian citizens' perception of the 2013 Greenpeace 
protest to their view of Russia's model of governance. Levada-Centre is a reputable source 
often used by respected international organizations such as World Bank (Levada-Centre, 
2016). 
1.3.2.6. Data Analysis 
As stated above, I used the texts of relevant programmatic policy statements, laws, and 
regulations, as well as transcripts of official presidential meetings, addresses, and speeches 
on matters relevant to oil and gas development, as my main data sources. The analysis that I 
performed in relation to these two data sources can be categorized as a mixture of discourse 
and legal analysis. 23 I performed the former to put the data in the context of power relations 
in risk governance of oil and gas activities in Russia. I utilized the latter to focus in on 
particularly important substantive points in conjunction with the discourse analysis (Babbie, 
1999). 
Originally, I had planned to conduct a study comparing the relevant Russian and Norwegian 
policy, legal, and regulatory regimes. Both regimes were going to be evaluated in terms of 
their functions in the risk governance process. For this reason, I utilized the functional legal 
method, which focuses not on the legal rules and doctrinal structures, but on their effects and 
function in society (Michaels, 2006). When I chose to focus exclusively on Russia, I did not 
have to change my legal methods because I had concentrated from the beginning on finding 
functional equivalents of Russian policies, laws, and regulations in the IRGC risk governance 
framework. 
Because a legal and regulatory framework is rarely static, especially in Russia, I conducted 
legal analysis throughout the study to ensure that the discourse analysis remained in the 
context of policies, laws, and regulations that are currently in effect. Because I came to 
Cambridge with a sufficient understanding of the relevant Russian legal and regulatory 
23 
Legal analysis is performed by using the legal method or methods. It serves as a cornerstone oflegal education that aims at training prospective lawyers, researchers, and other professionals that engage in legal research how to decipher the meaning of legal text. (Strauss, 2008) 
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landscape, I centred my analysis on the changes in the policy, legal, and regulatory regime 
since autumn of2012.24 Therefore, I conducted the discourse analysis of the official transcript 
data and the legal analysis of the relevant policies, laws, and regulations in a cross-
complementary and cross-corroborative manner (Shuy, 2003). 
I did not use special software to analyse legal data, because I found thematically organised 
excerpts in a word document manageable. However, I used the Atlas.ti software to analyse 
the official transcripts. 25 Atlas.ti proved to be indispensable for managing voluminous 
transcript texts and numerous quotes. I performed several rounds of coding, starting with 
open coding and gradually moving to axial coding, the final version of which can be found 
in Appendix III. Because of the importance of the transcript and legal data, I use it extensively 
in both paraphrased form and the form of quotations throughout the thesis. 
As noted above, my original plan was to rely on legal texts and participant observation and 
semi-structured interviews as two main data sources. After the first year and a half of my 
PhD study, it became apparent that I needed access to top Russian government decision-
makers in order to answer my research question. The already very-slim possibility of gaining 
such access vanished with Russia's annexation of Crimea and escalation of the political 
situation in Ukraine. Unfortunately, not long after, most of my interviewees stopped 
responding to my correspondence. As a result, I had to substitute semi-structured interviews 
and participant observation with the official transcript as my main discourse data source. 
Yet this data source provided important contribution to this study. It served as part of the 
experiential data that helped me to form the initial hypothesis. I also use it to contextualise 
findings derived from legal statistical data sources. In fact, for this reason, I reached out to 
the informants who were still willing to speak with me to ask for their opinion on a particular 
issue. For example, in June 2015, I asked my former classmate in Russia and elected 
municipal official to comment on the use of outdated oil and gas equipment. In November 
2014, I interviewed my former oil and gas professor about her experience in dealing with 
24 
This proved to be a correct approach as the Russian national legislature enacted several significant changes, 
~hich I review throughout the thesis. 
5 
Atlas.ti is a qualitative data research software that is particularly suited for systematic analysis of large 
unstructured texts and multimedia (Atlas.ti, 2016). 
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Soviet-era oilmen in the 1990s. In February 2016, I sat down with my co-authors, Stammler 
and Ivanova, to talk about their investigation of public hearings in connection with the Power 
of Siberia pipeline. I chose to use quotes from these interviews to emphasise an important 
contextual point. 
I provided further context by incorporating energy statistics and results of various public 
polls in my overall analysis. I faced similar challenges to those with legal sources, as energy 
data changes frequently and sometimes drastically. When needed, I performed simple 
mathematical calculations to determine averages and totals, and to convert various units of 
energy. However, these calculations were minimal and thus did not affect the qualitative 
nature of this study. 
1.3.3. A note on power and knowledge as key concepts 
I have noted above that in addition to risk and risk governance, power serves as a key concept 
in this study. Another such concept is knowledge. Because of the enormity of literature on 
these two concepts, I deemed it appropriate to elaborate on the extent to which I examined 
knowledge and power. 
Prompted by the question of what is knowledge in the context of risk, I began my 
investigation with a review of the relevant philosophical literature. I attempted to cast a wide 
net by largely disregarding the contextual qualifier, only to realise that I was staring at an 
ocean ofliterature with no means by which to cross it. After all, we can trace well-reasoned 
attempts to answer this question to Plato's Meno and Theaetetus (Plato, 399 BCE). To avoid 
being consumed by an epistemological quicksand, I remained focused on the prevalent 
conceptual theme of this study - power relations - and decided to forego using general 
epistemology literature as a departure point. This choice prevented me from investigating the 
risk concept within the classic Justified True Belief (JTB) framework, as well as the 
challenges to it. 26 Instead, I focused on the literature dedicated specifically to the origins of 
risk knowledge while using elements of the JTB framework in a descriptive manner. 
26 
My brief excursion into this topic did, however, provoke ideas for future research. (Gettier, 1963) (Lehrer & 
Paxson, 1969) 
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Paradoxically, the literature on this issue is rather scarce. This is not to say that all scholarship 
on risk epistemology is underdeveloped - there is plenty of literature on the applied side of 
risk. 27 It is the investigations into the essence of risk knowledge that lag behind. Beck ( 1992), 
Weinberg (2001), Douglas and Wildavsky (1982), Giddens (1991), and Luhmann (1990) all 
cover this subject in their well-received works. However, Hansson's (1996) take on the 
origins of risk knowledge is particularly interesting, as he approaches it in light of one of the 
most fundamental philosophical questions. For this reason, I structure the discussion of 
knowledge about risk in Chapter 3 around his work. 
Before undertaking this study, I was rarely tempted to inquire as to what a speaker or author 
meant when referring to 'power relations'. My law background oversimplified my perception 
of what constituted social power - it had to be something obvious, direct, and palpable. This 
was hardly surprising, as often a legal statute or case specifies what power is by describing 
powers of a certain actor or a group of actors. 
'Power is everywhere; not because it embraces everything, but because it comes from 
everywhere.' This frequently used quote from Foucault's The History of Sexuality rings true 
on more than one level (1980, p. 93). First, the scholarship on the social theory of power is 
vast and diverse, with many scholars offering divergent views on what constitutes power in 
the social context (Morris, 2012, p. 1). Second, it is hard to disagree with Russel (1937, p. 
10), who identified power as 'the fundamental concept in social science' and compared its 
importance to that of the concept of energy in physics. Indeed, my first significant foray into 
the social theory of power proved to be both humbling and overwhelming. 
I faced a similar challenge in sorting through over two millennia worth of scholarship on the 
subject as with the concept of knowledge. Thus, a comprehensive literature review did not 
appear to be an acceptable option because of the sheer volume of scholarship on the subject 
and the page limit of this thesis. Thus, I chose to review meta-studies conducted by prominent 
power scholars to identify key categories as well as forms and mechanisms of power. When 
27 
There are entire journals dedicated to this aspect of risk, Law, Probability & Risk, for example. (Law, 
Probability & Risk, 2016) 
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my data analysis required an in-depth examination of certain categories, I utilized works with 
the utmost relevance and explanatory capacity. 
One such examination occurred with Ledyaev's work (2001), which provides perhaps the 
best example of the value that the Russian-language sources bring. He notes that the Russian 
language provides one of the sharpest contrasts between two words 'vlast" and 'sila' that 
can be translated into English as 'power'. Vlast' originates from the Church Slavonic's 
'volost'', which means 'a region, territory, government, or power' (Ledyaev, 2001, p. 92). 
Thus, vlast' not only implies some kind of legitimized or formalized power, but it also 
suggests that this power is over a territorial unit. On the other hand, the Big Dictionary of the 
Russian Language lists the most common meaning of sila as physical force or strength of an 
animate subject or inanimate object (Kuznetsov, 2014). The dictionary also lists a less-
frequent use of sila as a legal or financial power (Id.). In addition, the first subtitle of a 
Russian legal statute is when it goes into effect or 'vstupaet v silu'. 
1.4. Roadmap of chapters 
Chapter 2 provides an overview of the basic characteristics and trends of the Russian oil and 
gas sector and its place in the global energy landscape, as well as the analysis of its 
penetration into the country's political, social, and economic life. Chapter 3 elaborates the 
theories of risk and risk governance in the context of the global energy sector. Chapter 4 
transitions to the socio-legal context of risk governance and analyses what government 
policies, laws, and administrative regulations actually govern risk posed by oil and gas 
activities in Russia. Chapter 5 commences with a study of the Power of Siberia natural gas 
pipeline and develops the conceptual common denominator for analysing the dynamic 
between the principal parties in risk governance - the social concept of power. Chapter 6 
homes in on particular challenges of risk governance of the oil and gas sector through the 
concept of network power begins the development of the RGPF. Chapter 7 continues the 
Power of Siberia analysis of sovereign power structures responsible for governing risk posed 
by oil and gas activities on a macro-level and concludes with an investigation of spatial and 
temporal allocation of such risks and benefits in Russia's 'Petrostate'. This concludes the 
RGPF development. The thesis closes revising the research question, restatement of 
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knowledge claims and literature contributions, description of the RGPF as a whole, and a 
brief agenda for future research. 
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2. Oil and gas: Russia's Sacred Cow 
2.1. Physical and technological dimensions of Russia's oil and gas sector 
I commence this thesis with a statistical overview of the Russian oil and gas sector in the 
context of the global energy landscape. However, energy numbers, averages, ratios, 
percentages, and project examples alone do not reveal perhaps the most important part of the 
story - the qualitative penetration and systemic effect of oil and gas activities on the Russian 
economy, society, and politics. In particular, they do little to unveil and elaborate on the 
relationships among a multitude of actors who are directly and indirectly connected to oil and 
gas activities in Russia. To remedy this shortcoming, in the second half of the chapter I 
examine the political and geopolitical dimensions, as well as the social and economic 
dimensions, of the Russian oil and gas sector as described by such key actors and regular 
Russians. 
Therefore, the objective of this chapter is two-fold. First, it is to provide the necessary 
background regarding the Russian oil and gas sector for ensuing chapters that tie together the 
sector's technological and physical side, its political and policy decisions, and the society 
affected by these decisions. Second, it is to contribute to bridging the gap in the academic 
and analytical literature on the Russian oil and gas sector that frequently portrays the sector 
through statistical averages or through actions by the key government and business actors. 
2.1.1. Russia's oil and gas sector: statistics and trends 
According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), in 2014 Russia ranked first 
in the world in crude oil production (including condensate) and second in dry natural gas 
production (EIA, 2015). Shortly after the collapse of the Soviet Union, natural gas production 
experienced a steep decline, hitting the lowest point in 1997 at 19,257 bcf, a nearly 3,000 bcf 
drop from 1992 (Figure 5). 
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Figure 5: Historic natural gas production in Russia 1992-2012 (EIA, 2016) 
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Oil and refined petroleum products output declined in a similar fashion, with the former 
hitting the lowest point in 1996 at 6,017,000 b/d and the latter in 1998 at 3,376 b/d (Figure 
6). 
Figure 6: Historic oil and petroleum products output in Russia 1992-2014 (EIA, 2016) 
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However, as Figures 5 and 6 show, production of both oil and gas rose steadily between 1998 
and 2008, contributing to the so-called Russian oil miracle (Gustafson, 2012). 
As noted in the introduction, since the late 1970s, the bulk of Russia's oil production has 
occurred in the Arctic and Subarctic fields of Western Siberia. To transport such significant 
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quantities of hydrocarbons to refineries, export terminals, and to domestic and international 
customers, some of which are located thousands of miles away, Russia relies on a vast 
network of pipelines. Russia's longest pipeline, Druzhba (Friendship), is a staggering 2,400 
miles in length and capable of delivering two million b/d to customers in Belarus, Poland, 
Germany, Ukraine, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, and Hungary through its Northern and 
Southern Routes (EIA, 2015). 
Table 4: Russia's Oil Pipelines (EIA, 2015) 
Pipeline Route Length Capacity 
(miles) (million b/d) 
Druzhba Northern Route: Belarus, Poland Germany; 2,400 2 
Southern Route: Belarus, Ukraine, 
Slovakia, Czech Republic, Hungary 
Baltic Pipeline Timan Pechora to Primorsk Terminal 730 1.5 
System 1 
Baltic Pipeline Unecha to Ust-Luga Terminal 620 1 
System 2 
Northwest Polotsk to Butinge and Ventspils 500 0.3 
Pipeline System 
Caspian Pipeline Tengiz (Kazakhstan) to Russian Black Sea 940 0.7 
Consortium port ofNovorossiysk 
(CPC) 
Baku- Sangachal Terminal (Azerbaijan) to 830 0.1 
Novorossiysk Russian Black Sea port ofNovorossiysk 
Pipeline 
Eastern Siberia- Taishet-Skovorodino-Kozmino Bay (with a 270 0.6 
Pacific Ocean 60-mile spur running from Skovorodino to 
(ESPO) Pipeline Daqing in China) 
Purpe-Samotlor Oil fields in the Yamal-Nenets and Ob 266 0.5 
Pipeline Basin (including Vankor field) to the ESPO 
Pipeline 
Zapolyarye-Purpe Oil fields in the Zapolyarye region and new 310 0.9 
Pipeline fields in Yamal-Nenets region to the ESPO 
(planned) and Purpe-Samotlor Pipelines 
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Expansions are planned for the CPC (to 1.4 million b/d) and Baku-Novorossiysk (to 0.3 
million b/d) pipelines. However, even more significant is the new Zapolyarye-Purpe pipeline 
that will link new Arctic oil fields in Western Siberia to the ESPO pipeline serving China 
and Southeast Asia. As the Transneft's map (Figure 7) depicts, the geographic reach of 
Russian pipelines is expansive and multidirectional, enabling producers to adjust to market 
demands. 
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Rail has been important for establishing Russian oil markets. For example, Rosneft ' started 
shipments via rail before ESPO became operational (Paik, 2012). The most important link in 
delivering oil and petroleum products to Russia's overseas customers are the 18 ports that 
serve as export outlets. The seven ports listed in Table 5 are of the utmost significance for 
Russia' s oil exports (EIA, 2015). 
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Table 5: Russia's main oil exporting ports (EIA , 2015) 
Port Location Capacity 
Primorsk Near St. Petersburg 1,500,000 b/d 
Kozmino Bay Primorsky Krai 300,000 b/d to be 
expanded to I million 
b/d 
Novorossiysk Black Sea 950,000 b/d 
Tuapse Black Sea 350,000 b/d 
De-Kastri Tatar Strait, Far East 250,000 b/d 
Prigorodnoye Aniva Bay, Sakhalin Island I 00 Aframax, 160 
LNG vessels per year 
Varandey Offshore, Barents Sea 240,000 b/d 
Russia's total refining capacity is approximately 5.5 million b/d (EIA, 2015). It comprises 50 
refineries, including 31 major refineries with an annual capacity of over one million tonnes 
(7.33 million bbl). During the last ten years, the refining capacity grew at a faster rate than 
production, creating market opportunities for the expansion of the upstream sector (EY, 
2014). 
The Arctic and Subarctic are even more important for Russia's natural gas production than 
for that of oil, as nearly 95% of it is extracted in Siberia and the Far East. The extracted gas 
flows through the Unified Gas Supply System of Russia (UGSS) that includes ten major trunk 
pipelines, eight of which are used for exports. 
Table 6: Russia's Major Natural Gas Export Pipelines (EIA, 2015) 
Pipeline Route Length Annual 
(miles) Capacity 
(bet) 
Yamal-Europe I To Poland and Germany via Belarus 1,300 1,200 
Blue Stream To Samsun, Turkey via the Black Sea 750 560 
North Caucasus To Georgia and Armenia 620 350 
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Pipeline Route Length Annual 
(miles) Capacity 
(bet) 
Yamburg- To Western Europe, predominately NIA 700-1,000 





Gazi-Magomed- To/from Azerbaijan 400 200 
Mozdok 
Nord Stream To Greifswald, Germany via Baltic Sea 760 1,900 
( from Vyborg) 
Russia has been active in expanding its gas export pipelines to existing and new markets. 
While scrapping the South Stream pipeline, which would have delivered Russian gas to 
Southern Europe via the Black Sea and Bulgaria, Gazprom signed a memorandum of 
understanding to build a pipeline accessing South Europe via Turkey (Korsunskaya, 2014) 
(Gazprom, 2016h). However, due to recent tensions between Russia and Turkey over the 
downing of a Russian military plane, the project's future is uncertain (Pinchuk & Astakhova, 
2015). 
However, the most significant expansion of the UGSS is set to occur in the East. As Figure 
8 shows, although it does with oil, Russia currently does not have gas pipelines connecting 
its giant West Siberian fields with new markets in China and South Eastern Asia. On 21 May 
2014, Gazprom CEO Alexey Miller and Zhou Jiping, the Chairman of China National 
Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), signed an agreement for Gazprom to supply 38 bcf of 
natural gas per year to China via a pipeline for 30 years (Gazprom, 2014). Gazprom will tap 
into the Kovyktinskoe field in the Irkutsk Region with natural gas reserves of 1.5 tern (24 
tcf), and the Chayandinskoe field in the Sakha (Yakutia) Republic with natural gas reserves 
of 1.2 tern (19 tcf) (Gazprom, 2016e). Gazprom and CNPC are in the process of building the 
Power of Siberia unified gas transmission system (GTS), spanning about 4,000 kilometres 
2 
These four pipelines appear on the Gazprom map of the UGSS, but are not listed among individual current 
and planned pipelines. (Gazprom, 2016c) 
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and capable of delivering 61 hem per (978 bcf) per year. 29 Although the Power of Siberia 
discourse has focused on the 30-year deal with China, the GTS is presented by the Gazprom 
leadership as part of the state's Eastern Gas Program. The Russian leadership tends to stress 
the overall economic development of the region, and its gasification in particular, as one of 
the main goals of the Eastern Gas Program. However, the fact that the region comprises 60% 
of Russia's territory and is home to only 10% of Russia's population indicates that the 
overwhelming goal of the Eastern Gas Program is to create a resource base and transport 
infrastructure for exports to China and Southeast Asia. 30 (Gazprom, 2016b) 
Yet it is not only the Power of Siberia GTS, with its mega distances and mega contract, that 
holds the Russian leadership's attention. The planned Altai Project or Zapadny Marshrut (the 
Western Route), if implemented, will connect operating and emerging fields in Western 
Siberia to the Chinese West-East Pipeline superhighway (Paik, 2012). The Western Route 
will then enable Russia to become a swing supplier to Europe and China, thereby solidifying 
its role as the world's leading natural gas producer and exporter (Gazprom, 2016a). 
29 
I elaborate on the details and significance of these planned projects throughout this thesis. 30 
Historically, Eastern Siberia and the Far East include the following Russian administrative units from the 
Siberian Federal Circuit: Republic of Buryatia, Republic of Tyva, Republic of Khakassya, Krasnoyarskiy 
Province, Zabajkalskiy Province, and Irkutsk Region; and the following administrative units from the Far 
Eastern Federal Circuit: Republic of Sakha (Yakutia), Kamchastskiy Province, Primorskiy Province, 
Khabarovsk Province, Amur Region, Magadan Region, Sakhalin Region, Evrejskiy Autonomous Region, and 
Chukotskiy Autonomous District. (Federal Statistics Agency, 2014) 
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Figure 8: Unified Gas Supply System of Russia (Gazprom, 2016c) 
This brief description of the Russian natural gas sector would not be complete without 
mentioning liquefied natural gas (LNG), the technology that can move Russian gas beyond 
pipelines. Currently, Russia has only one LNG plant, which is part of the Sakhalin II project 
located in the country's Far East region ('Sakhalin LNG'). 31 (Gazprom, 2016f) Sakhalin 
LNG serves the South Asian market, with Japan receiving 76%, South Korea 20%, China 
3.4%, and Taiwan 0.6% of the plant's output (EIA, 2015). In 2013, Sakhalin LNG produced 
10.8 Mt, the equivalent of 14.9 bcm or 526.2 MMcf of natural gas from the Piltun-
Astokhskoye and Lunskoye fields (Gazprom, 2016f). 
Sakhalin LNG effectively amounts to about 3.6% of global LNG exports. Thus, the Russian 
leadership hopes this is only the beginning of the LNG story in Russia, as two other Russian 
companies are currently working on the expansion of the country's LNG export capacity 
(President, 13 February 2013). Gazprom plans to build on Sakhalin II by adding an additional 
LNG train to the existing two and connecting the plant to the Kirinskoye Block in Sakhalin 
III (EIA, 2015). In addition, Gazprom is currently working on two LNG export projects: 
31 
This project is better known in the West as the Sakhalin Energy LNG plant. 
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Vladivostok LNG and Baltic LNG. According to the company, the projects are to have the 
annual capacity of 15 and 10 Mt, respectively ( or 731 and 487 MMcf of natural gas, 
respectively) (Gazprom, 2016d). Rosneft' is currently working on the Far Eastern LNG 
project (Dalnevostochny SPG), and plans to start LNG production in 2018-2019 (Rosneft', 
2016). Yet perhaps the most interesting and ambitious LNG project in Russia is Yamal LNG. 
Developed by Novatek, Yamal LNG will include three trains having an annual capacity of 
5.5 Mt each, with the first LNG train becoming operational in 2017. Novatek claims to have 
placed long-term contracts for 95% of the project capacity with customers in both Europe 
and Asia (Novatek, 2016). 
One way to appreciate the magnitude of these numbers is to envision them in terms of the 
infrastructure that they represent. For example, to move 80% of oil extracted in Russia, 
Transneft' relies on 70,000 kilometres of trunk pipelines, 500 pumping stations, and 22 
million cubic meters of storage tanks (Transneft', 2016). Gazprom's hardware is equally if 
not more impressive: 170,700 kilometres of pipelines, 250 compressor stations featuring 
3,825 compressor units, and 26 underground storage facilities totalling 71.1 hem in storage 
capacity (Gazprom, 2016g). 
However, this is just the very tip of the oil and gas infrastructure iceberg. Above-the-water 
assets directly involved in oil and gas exploration, production, and processing include oilrigs, 
tankers, and refineries. Less visible are the machinery and personnel that are not directly 
involved in these activities but are nonetheless critical for getting oil and gas out of the ground 
and to the market. These assets are quantitatively and qualitatively vast and range from spare 
parts for helicopters that service remote oil and gas fields to special modelling software used 
to educate future petroleum engineers. 
Many of these assets are capital intensive. For example, the Russian leadership estimates the 
cost of the South Kara licence blocks development to be around $500 billion (Humber & 
Bierman, 2011). Most of the new capital-intensive assets need to be financed with repayment 
periods over 10, 20, and even 30 years. However, when paid in full, drilling rigs, pipelines, 
and loading terminals do not magically vanish. They often remain in service well beyond 
their full accounting depreciation. For example, my high school chemistry teacher marvelled 
60 
over the fact that the Angarsk Refinery was using a German distillation column taken as part 
ofreparations in the aftermath of World War II. While I was unable to confirm officially this 
rather puzzling piece of Siberian trivia, a brief Internet search through Angarsk auto forums 
revealed several car owners' complaints about the poor quality of gasoline and motor oil due 
to the use of trofeynoe faschistskoe oborudovanie (captured fascist equipment) (Drom.ru, 
2008). When I asked for comment from my Irkutsk State classmate, a former member of the 
Angarsk City Council, he replied: 'One column? Half of the refinery was requisitioned in 
Germany and a lot of it is still in use.' ( Classmate, 2015) 
Russia's massive up-, mid-, and downstream oil and gas infrastructure sits on top of one of 
the largest hydrocarbon resource bases in the world. The country has the largest proved 
natural gas reserves in the world with 680 trillion cubic feet (IEA, 2015). The EIA lists 
Russia's proved oil reserves at 80 billion barrels of oil (bbo), which places it eighth in the 
world.32 (EIA, 2015) BP Statistical Review of World Energy lists Russia's proved oil 
reserves at 103.2 bbo. However, BP includes gas condensate and natural gas liquids (NGLs) 
in addition to crude oil, whereas the EIA appears to limit its data to crude oil (BP, 2015, p. 
6). Despite this statistical bump, Russia's reserves are declining. In fact, the review authors 
singled Russia as the country with the largest decline in oil reserves in 2014, 1.9 billion bbo 
(BP, 2015). In contrast, according to BP, Russia added the most natural gas reserves in 2014, 
0.4 trillion cubic meters.33 
As I elaborate in greater detail in the forthcoming sections, the Russian leadership's concern 
over the seemingly dwindling oil resources is well founded. Despite the largesse of the 
natural gas infrastructure, reserves, and output numbers, oil remains the lifeblood of the 
Russian economy. In 2010, the revenue from the two main taxes on oil and gas, the Mineral 
Extraction Tax (MET) and Export Duty (ED), was allocated as depicted in Table 7. 
n I discuss the issue of relatively low proved oil reserves, as compared to other oil producers, at several points below. 
33 
Interestingly, the disparity between the EIA and BP's data regarding Russia's natural gas reserves is even more significant, as the British oil and gas giant lists Russia's proved reserves at 1152.8 tcf. 
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Table 7: Revenues from the Mineral Extraction Tax (MET) and Export Duty (ED) in 2010 (Paik, 
2012, p. 22) 
MET 
Crude oil 1,266.8 billion rubles 
Natural gas 85 .1 billion rubles 
Gas condensate 9 .4 billion rubles 
ED 
Crude oil 1,672.4 billion rubles 
Oil products 603.8 billion rubles 
Natural gas 193 .3 billion rubles 
The shares of the oil and gas budget revenues in Russia's GDP is even more telling. In 2010, 
only through the MET, ED, and excise tax, the oil sector contributed 3,713.3 billion rubles 
or 8.4% of Russia's GDP. In contrast, the natural gas sector revenues from these three taxes 
amounted to 278.4 billion rubies or 0.6 % of Russia's GDP (Paik, 2012, p. 22). According to 
Marshall Goldman (2010, p. 91), oil served as the financial foundation for the Russian state 
during the 2000s. This statement is hardly surprising given the ascent of oil prices between 
1998 and 2008 (Figure 9) and the ratio of domestic oil consumption vis-a-vis export (Figure 
10) (EIA, 2015). 
Figure 9: European (Brent) spot prices 1985-2015 (EIA, 2016) 
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Figure 10: Russia's oil export capacity (EIA, 2015) 
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Collectively, oil and gas accounted for 70% of Russia's export and 52% of its budget revenue 
in 2013 (EIA, 2015). In fact, the rise of the oil and gas sector in the Russian economy is 
generally attributed to the re-emergence of Russia as a major world economy. This in tum 
corresponded to the rise of oil and gas exports from $27.9 billion in 1998 to $301.1 billion in 
2008 (Paik, 2012, p. 21 ). 
This brief statistical overview leaves no doubt as to the critical importance of oil and gas for 
Russia and for Russia's status as a global energy superpower. The Russian oil miracle that 
culminated with energy superpower status would not have been possible without the demand 
for hydrocarbons. In the next section, I briefly explore the source of this demand. 
2.1.2. Where do Russian oil and gas go? 
The global economy runs on oil. This rather overused sentence has a deeper meaning than it 
might appear at first glance. Oil is absolutely essential for human mobility, with nearly 93% 
of all transport literally running on oil (IEA, 2015a, p. 33). In addition, oil and oil products 
are traded on a global market, which at a time of high demand has little spare capacity 
(Yergin, 2011 ). 
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Table 8: Transportation Sector Fuel Mix (!EA, 2015a) 
1973 2013 
Transportation Fuel 
Mtoe Percentage Mtoe Percentage 
Coal 31.96 2.96% 3.22 0.13% 
Crude Oil and Oil 
1020.82 94.40% 2373.68 92.60% Products 
Natural Gas 17.72 1.64% 96.22 3.75% 
Biofuels and Waste 0.24 0.02% 64.52 2.52% 
Other Sources 10.6 0.98% 25.86 1.01% 
Total 1081.34 2563.5 
As Table 8 shows, there has not been a significant change in the transportation sector's fuel 
mix since 1973. Oil remains king, outgaining the next most prevalent fuel, natural gas, by a 
factor of 25. Nearly 64% of all oil is consumed by the transportation sector, up from 45% in 
1973 (Id.). Although oil's share in primary energy production dropped from 46.2% to 31.1% 
in 2013, the total production grew from 2938.38 Mtoe to 4215.64 Mtoe in the same time span 
(Id. pp. 6, 36). 
These numbers translate into trillions of dollars worth of transportation infrastructure, 
ranging from petrol stations to airplanes and from personal automobiles to refineries. For 
example, in 2010, in the European Union alone there were 239 million light duty and 35 
million heavy-duty vehicles (ICCT, 2013). All of this infrastructure comes with a human 
dimension: petrol station owners and employees, grandparents travelling to their 
grandchildren's graduations, commuters and car enthusiasts, and engineers specifically 
trained to design, construct, and operate refineries. 
During a time of extreme oil price highs and lows, it is not uncommon to see mass media 
stories elaborating on the fact that people do not travel significantly less when the price of 
petrol doubles and more when it is slashed by half (Id.). For example, in the United States, a 
25 to 50% decrease in the price of petrol leads only to a 1 % increase in the distance travelled 
by motorists (EIA, 2014a). The lack of notable elasticity of demand in personal automobile 
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,ransportati n is not found in leisure air travel. According to the U.S. EIA, a 10% increase in 
the cost of air travel leads to a greater than 10% decrease in miles travelled to and from 
oJiday destinations (Id). 
The quantitative difference between these two levels of elasticity is prompted by the 
Iitative difference behind the factors that drive the demand. The U.S. transportation 
tern is built around the personal automobile. With the exception of a few large cities, 
ericans often do not have a choice but to drive to work, school, or the store. Many cities 
and town lack effective public transit and many roads do not even have sidewalks or 
kable shoulders. Thus, the decision of whether to drive is not just about one's lifestyle, it 
about one ability to earn a living. 
The United States provides the most vivid example of addiction to the personal automobile, 
"th 250 million light-duty vehicles on the road, amounting to approximately three cars or 
pickup trU ks per four Americans (ICCT, 2016) (The World Bank, 2016). However, the more 
ped trian- cyclist-, and public transit commuter-friendly European Union is not drastically 
behind, with one car per two E.U. citizens (ICCT, 2013). Yet a few recent studies concluded 
lhat some advanced economies have reached 'peak car' as evidenced by, among other factors, 
decline in personal car ownership and the number of new registered drivers (IEA, 2013, 
51 4). Remarkably, the studies failed to produce a coherent economics-centric explanation 
behind the 'deautomobilization', citing a plethora of behavioural and cultural reasons that 
might be at play. Also unsurprisingly, the deautomobilization trend in Organization of 
onomic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries has been offset by the 4.3% 
Wth of personal automobile fleets in non-OECD countries (Id). 
et the complexity of these socio-technological dynamics does not end there. Unlike 
tricity, for example, oil is not a homogenous commodity. The chemical composition of 
I from one deposit differs from the chemical composition of oil extracted from another 
sit, and at times quite significantly (Gordon, 2012). As a result, refineries are usually 
figured to process oil of a particular range of viscosity and sulphur content (Yergin, 2011). 
0 
hlake matters even more complex, sometimes the deposit where a particular type of oil is 
lracted lies many thousands of kilometres away from where this type of oil is processed. 
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transportation is not found in leisure air travel. According to the U.S. EIA, a 10% increase in 
the cost of air travel leads to a greater than 10% decrease in miles travelled to and from 
holiday destinations (Id.). 
The quantitative difference between these two levels of elasticity is prompted by the 
qualitative difference behind the factors that drive the demand. The U.S. transportation 
system is built around the personal automobile. With the exception of a few large cities, 
Americans often do not have a choice but to drive to work, school, or the store. Many cities 
and towns lack effective public transit and many roads do not even have sidewalks or 
walkable shoulders. Thus, the decision of whether to drive is not just about one's lifestyle, it 
is about one's ability to earn a living. 
The United States provides the most vivid example of addiction to the personal automobile, 
with 250 million light-duty vehicles on the road, amounting to approximately three cars or 
pickup trucks per four Americans (ICCT, 2016) (The World Bank, 2016). However, the more 
pedestrian-, cyclist-, and public transit commuter-friendly European Union is not drastically 
behind, with one car per two E.U. citizens (ICCT, 2013). Yet a few recent studies concluded 
that some advanced economies have reached 'peak car' as evidenced by, among other factors, 
the decline in personal car ownership and the number of new registered drivers (IEA, 2013, 
p. 514). Remarkably, the studies failed to produce a coherent economics-centric explanation 
behind the 'deautomobilization', citing a plethora of behavioural and cultural reasons that 
might be at play. Also unsurprisingly, the deautomobilization trend in Organization of 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries has been offset by the 4.3% 
growth of personal automobile fleets in non-OECD countries (Id.). 
Yet the complexity of these socio-technological dynamics does not end there. Unlike 
electricity, for example, oil is not a homogenous commodity. The chemical composition of 
oil from one deposit differs from the chemical composition of oil extracted from another 
deposit, and at times quite significantly (Gordon, 2012). As a result, refineries are usually 
configured to process oil of a particular range of viscosity and sulphur content (Yergin, 2011 ). 
To make matters even more complex, sometimes the deposit where a particular type of oil is 
extracted lies many thousands of kilometres away from where this type of oil is processed. 
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Thus, a relatively numerically insignificant disruption ( on a global scale) m supply, 
transportation, or refining may lead to significant global consequences. 
The disruption in the supply of Libyan oil due to the military conflict in this country in 2011 
serves as a vivid illustration of the global oil cycle. Prior to the conflict, Libya supplied 1.6 
million b/d. This figure represented approximately 1.8% of all global oil production in 2011, 
which amounted to 88.53 million b/d (EIA, 2016). Yet as a result of this visibly insignificant 
drop in production, the price of Brent crude oil, to which Libyan oil is usually pegged, surged 
from $95 per barrel in December 2010 to $120 per barrel in April (Morse & Lee, 2011). The 
impact of the price hike forced the IEA to release its strategic reserves, a move the agency 
uses only in extraordinary circumstances (Id.). 
The reason behind the price surge and the subsequent emergency measures is two-fold. First, 
Libyan oil is the light sweet kind, meaning that it has low viscosity and low sulphur content. 
These qualities normally translate into lower costs of refining, as light sweet crude does not 
require additional energy and extensive equipment for removal of sulphur and other 
impurities. Second, the demand for light sweet oil at that time was even higher than usual 
due to its increasing use in the transportation and electrical power sectors in Southeast Asia 
(Id.). 
Despite being by far the largest consumer, the transportation sector is not the only consumer 
of oil. Currently, 16.2% of all oil is allocated to non-energy use, usually as the feedstock for 
various petrochemical products (IEA, 2015a, p. 33). The remaining share is used for other 
energy applications in the industrial, agricultural, commercial, and residential sectors. The 
share of oil in electricity generation dropped from the second largest (behind coal), 24.8% in 
1973, to the smallest, 4.4%, behind non-hydro renewable sources in 2013 (Id. p. 24). 
However, the overall production of electricity surged from 6,131 TWh to 23,322 TWh (Id.). 
Thus, despite the significant percentage drop, the total production only decreased by one 
third. This effectively means that outdated coal-fired plants and diesel generators are still 
widely used, especially in island and ( or) remote locations, as well as for peak generation. 
For example, Japan, the world's third largest oil exporter, relies on oil for 14% of its 
electricity generation. This figure doubled in the aftermath of the Fukushima accident as the 
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Japanese government began replacing nuclear power with electricity derived from 
combustion of natural gas, coal, and oil (EIA, 2015a). 
In contrast to oil, natural gas has been one of the fastest growing fuels in electricity 
generation, second only to non-hydro renewable sources (IEA, 2015a, p. 24). This trend, 
combined with the use of natural gas-fired peaker generators to meet daily load fluctuations, 
has caused some scholars to start using the term convergence to describe the intertwined 
relationship between electricity and natural gas markets (Bosselman et al., 2010, p. 530). The 
global energy system added 4319.02 TWh of electricity from combustion of natural gas from 
741.85 Twh in 1973 to 5060.87 TWh in 2013, thereby increasing natural gas's share in the 
global electricity mix by 9 .6% to 21. 7% (IEA, 2015a, p. 24). The share of natural gas in the 
global primary energy mix had risen by 5.4% between 1973 and 2013, from 16% to 21.4%, 
whilst the total volume had tripled from 976 Mtoe to 2897.77 Mtoe (Id). 
The last decade has been especially eventful for natural gas producers. Proliferation of 
hydraulic fracturing and horizontal ( directional) drilling in the United States has lead to 
unlocking natural gas from previously commercially inaccessible geological formations 
(Yergin, 2011 ). The so-called shale gas revolution has transformed the global energy 
landscape by turning the United States into the world's largest natural gas producer, with an 
output of 730 bcm and accounting for one fifth of all global production (IEA, 2015a, p. 13). 
This surge in natural gas production, along with the promise presented by the aforementioned 
technologies, made the IEA label the current energy era as the 'Golden Age of Gas' (IEA, 
2012). 
While the United States remains a top ten net importer of natural gas, requiring 33 bcm per 
annum to meet its domestic demand, the global natural gas flows and regional price dynamics 
have changed drastically. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the price for natural gas in the 
United States hovered around $5 per MMBtu, above the European and slightly below the 
Japanese prices (IEA, 2013, p. 134). Demand was projected to grow significantly due to the 
displacement of old coal-fired power plants with natural gas-fired generation. Additionally, 
domestic conventional natural gas reserves were around 3% of the global total. Thus, 
importing natural gas en masse seemed inevitable. In fact, the Federal Energy Regulatory 
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Commission, Maritime Administration, and the U.S. Coast Guard received 128 permitting 
applications to construct LNG de-liquefication terminals intended to compensate for the 
projected loss in domestic supply (Id.). In 2012, natural gas prices in the United States were 
roughly one quarter of the European price and almost one sixth of the Japanese price. Out of 
128 planned LNG import facilities, only three were actually built. In fact, the LNG pendulum 
swung in the opposite direction, with only four export projects approved and 28 others 
waiting for approval in 2013 (IEA, 2013). 
These numbers and examples explain the qualitative difference between where the demand 
for oil and the demand for natural gas come from, and how the demand for these two similar 
commodities is met. Because energy use of natural gas is confined predominately to the 
industrial, electrical power generation, and residential (heating) sectors, the social relations 
regarding the transportation, processing, and end use of natural gas differ from those of oil. 
A European city dweller might not have the same kind of personal attachment to his gas 
furnace as to his Mercedes, but during a January cold spell, he is likely to be more reliant on 
it than on his beloved automobile. Because of the difference in their physical qualities, natural 
gas is more problematic to transport and store than oil. The traditional way of transporting 
natural gas is via pipeline, which all but limits the intercontinental linkages between 
producers and consumers. This is the main reason for differences in the regional price of 
natural gas and the absence of a truly global market for natural gas. 
LNG is supposed to serve as a primary means of achieving another convergence of natural 
gas markets - convergence of regional prices (IEA, 2013, p. 133). Yet the proliferation of 
LNG requires substantial capital investments and several years to permit and construct the 
necessary infrastructure, as demonstrated by the U.S. LNG import terminals. As a result, the 
apparent demand for LNG usually needs to be secured by a long-term contract for large 
quantities of natural gas. This effectively means that meeting projected demand might never 
move beyond the project-planning stage. For example, despite the ongoing difference in 
regional natural gas prices, as of autumn 2015 the prospects for new LNG projects appeared 
to be marginal because of the scarcity of buyers willing to take on 10- to 20-year-long 
contractual commitments (Fesharaki, 2015). 
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Therefore, ifwe return to the question asked by the title of this section - Where does Russian 
oil and gas go? - the answer would be as follows: Russian natural gas goes almost exclusively 
where Gazprom pipelines take it and Russian oil goes to the global market. This effectively 
means that Russian oil is traded globally. However, it flows from Russia through established 
routes, pipelines, rail, and sea tankers to the refineries that are configured to process Russian 
oil grades. Although certain grades and refineries are interchangeable, the flexibility is far 
from absolute. With approximately 30% of Europe's oil coming from Russia and 72% of 
Russia's oil going to European countries, a sudden interruption of the flow will undoubtedly 
lead to catastrophic consequences for the Russian and European economies. As Figure 11 
shows, Asian countries are not as dependent on Russian oil because only a quarter of Russian 
oil exports head east and southeast. 
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Some European countries are more dependent on Russian oil than others. Finland, Poland, 
and Hungary, for example, have nearly 70% dependence. Although Europe's dependence on 
Russian gas is at the same level as that on Russian oil, countries like Lithuania, Estonia, 
Finland, and Latvia are nearly 100% dependent on Russian natural gas (EIA, 2015). It is 
important to note that the three former Soviet Baltic republics have had deep political 
disagreements with the current political regime in Russia (Borger & Harding, 2014). They 
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have also drawn the Russian leadership's ire for allegedly persecuting the Russian-speaking 
minority and proliferating Neo-Nazism (INTERFAX, 2015). 
Figure 12: Russia's natural gas exports in 2014 (EIA, 2015) 
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Until just a few years ago, virtually all of Russia's natural gas was delivered to customers in 
Europe. The situation changed when the Sakhalin II LNG project came online. In 2014, for 
example, approximately 10% of all Russia's natural gas exports went to Asia, with 6% going 
to Japan (EIA, 2015). 
As mentioned above, the global economy runs on oil. With the proliferation of natural gas in 
the electrical power, industrial, and transportation sectors, a significant portion of it is 
powered by natural gas. Due to its massive hydrocarbon resources and energy infrastructure, 
Russia is an important and, in some instances, indispensable hub in the global technological 
network built around oil and gas. 
2.2. Political and geopolitical dimensions of Russian oil and gas 
2.2.1. Oil and gas sector politics or just politics? 
One would be hard-pressed to find a national leader who spoke on energy issues as much as 
the two Russian presidents of this century. Russian presidents, their ministers, advisers, and 
governors appear to be very knowledgeable and articulate on the subject. While their apparent 
knowledge might be due to the efforts of their research and speechwriter staffs, the amount 
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of attention that the Russian leadership pays to the energy sector reveals a more illuminating 
indicator of the role that oil and gas play in Russian politics. 
The Russian leadership's statements, as well as the opinions and attitudes of ordinary 
citizens, reflect the deep, wide, and robust intranational socio-economic dependencies 
premised on oil- and gas-related activities. This intranational bundle of dependencies is 
closely connected with the international 'bundles' of interconnectedness, which is centred 
more on consumption rather than production of oil and gas. 
The Russian leadership has frequent meetings with oil and gas executives spanning the entire 
sector: Russian national oil and gas companies (NOCs), domestic private companies, foreign 
majors, service companies, fully integrated companies, and companies that specialize on 
transporting oil and gas (President, 4 June 2014) (President, 23 March 2010). Russian NOCs 
Rosneft' and Gazprom enjoy special attention from the President. The heads of these 
companies, Igor Sechin and Alexey Miller, or as Dawisha (2015) calls them, Putin's energy 
lieutenants, attended every single non-individual meeting related to the oil and gas sector, the 
transcripts of which I reviewed. It is not uncommon for the President to sit down with either 
Sechin or Miller tete-a-tete (President, 17 September 2014) (President, 22 October 2012). 
For example, according to Dawisha (2015, p. 318), Miller and Putin met over 100 times 
between 2001 and 2014, including at least a dozen times individually. Figure 13 is a photo 
of a meeting between Vladimir Putin and Igor Sechin regarding the $55 billion deal 
concerning Rosneft' and British Petroleum (BP) in which the Russian NOC acquired BP's 
share in TNK BP, BP's joint venture with a group of Russian billionaire oligarchs. As a result 
of the deal, BP netted $12.5 billion in cash and 19.75% of Rosneft's stock (Shiryaevskaya, 
2013). 
71 
Figure 13: Vladimir Pu tin and Igor Sechin discuss the Rosneft '-British Petroleum deal on 22 
October 2012 (President of Russia, 2016) 
The tone of the exchange between Mr Sechin and Mr Putin is particularly interesting, as it 
resembles a meeting between a supervisor and a subordinate. For example, Sechin begins 
with 'today I would like to report to you, Vladimir Vladimirovich . . . . ' (President, 22 
October 2012) Throughout the conversation, he notes that the deal is in furtherance of Putin's 
order to lower the Russian government's stake in oil and gas enterprises. In exchange, the 
Russian President thanks Sechin for a 'job well done' (Id). 
The extent of Mr Putin and Mr Medvedev's interactions with Gazprom and Rosneft's bosses 
exceeds what is accessible from publicly available sources. Both Mr Miller and Mr Sechin 
are long-term friends of Mr Putin, dating back to his tenure as an official of the St. Petersburg 
government. Dawisha (2015) describes Igor Sechin as one of Putin's most loyal captains who 
has the Russian President's nearly unconditional trust. Although Putin's relationship with 
Alexey Miller does not appear to be on the same level as with Mr Sechin, the tone of his 
meetings with the head of Gazprom leaves little doubt as to the Kremlin's oversight if not 
control over the NOC's affairs. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that Rosneft' is Russia's top oil producer (Table 9) and 
Gazprom its largest natural gas producer (Table 10). The latter's dominance of natural gas 
production is astonishing - Gazprom produces eight times more natural gas than the second 
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largest natural gas producer, Novatek. Indeed, Gazprom is the successor of the 'Gazprom 
State Gas Concern', which was a successor of the Soviet Gas Industry Ministry (Gazprom, 
2016i). Rosneft', on the other hand, was a minor player until 2003, when it received the 
majority of Yukos's assets after its takeover and eventual dissolution by the government 
(EIA, 2015). 
Table 9: Russia's Top Oil Producers, 2013 (EIA, 2015) 














Table JO: Russia's Top Natural Gas Producers, 2013 (EIA, 2015) 









PSA operators 2.7 
Others 1.8 
Total 64.6 
The Russian government's influence over Rosneft' and Gazprom translates into direct control 
of 50% of the country's oil and near 80% of its natural gas production (Gazprom, 2016k) 
(Rosneft', 2016a) (EIA, 2015). The Russian government also controls Transneft', which has 
a monopoly over transportation of oil via pipelines (EIA, 2015). By virtue of controlling 
Gazprom and its monopoly over natural gas pipelines, the Russian government exercises 
100% control of natural gas export pipeline infrastructure (Gazprom, 2016g). As I elaborate 
in Chapter 7, Novatek's right to export natural gas is limited to a single project, Yamal LNG. 
The government's grip on the refining sector is significant but not as overwhelming as it is 
in the upstream sector. Rosneft' is the single largest owner and operator with nine refineries 
and Lukoil is the second largest with four. This anomaly in the Russian oil and gas sector is 
partially due to historic reasons. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, oil producers had to 
rely on government-owned export pipelines to access the export market. In contrast, 
petroleum products could be moved by rail, water, and, in the case of mini (usually illegal) 
refineries, truck (Gustafson, 2012). In addition, petroleum products could be marketed 
domestically, whereas domestic refineries were awash in cheap oil. For this reason, the 
downstream sector served as a low-hanging fruit to whomever had the ability to seize the 
assets, frequently by physical force. With often weak or non-existent law enforcement 
agencies, refineries were taken over by criminal gangs that at times would wage turf wars 
over them (J d.). 
Contrary to Mr Putin's statement that Russia hosts many 'purely private companies', 
(President, 19 December 2013) independent oil and gas companies represent a definite 
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minority in the Russian oil and gas sector. The two largest independents, Lukoil and Novatek, 
might be independent in terms of direct ownership by the Russian government, but they are 
not completely independent in terms of the control that the Kremlin exercises over their 
affairs. Heads of both Lukoil and Novatek have private meetings at the Kremlin '(President, 
10 October 2013) and serve as permanent members of the Presidential TEK Commission 
(Order N859, 2012). More importantly, the heads of both companies act in a manner similar 
to Mr Sechin and Mr Miller, often reporting on the implementation of presidential 
'directives', even though they are under no formal obligation to do so (President, 31 October 
2014). Their 'yes, sir' behaviour is not a complete surprise, considering the support they 
receive from the Kremlin in the form of preferential access to mineral deposits, export 
opportunities, and taxation. 
Figure 14: Vladimir Putin and Vagit Alikperov discuss Lukoi/'s activities in the foreign markets 
(President of Russia, 2016) 
The Russian leadership is equally as open to meeting with foreign oil and gas executives as 
it is to meeting with Russian oilmen. For example, Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev 
have had numerous meetings with the leadership of ExxonMobil (President, 9 August 2014) 
and Total (President, 2 March 2011). In fact, it appears that the Russian leadership has forged 
particularly strong ties with the French supermajor. Vladimir Putin sent French President 
Frarn;ois Hollande official condolences when Total's CEO Christophe de Margerie died in 
an airplane crash at the Moscow Vnukovo airport in October 2014 (BBC, 2014). The Russian 
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President also awarded the late CEO with the Order of Honour and promised to name 'large 
sea ships' after him (President, 28 November 2014). 
Figure 15: Dmitry Medvedev and the late Christophe de Margerie discuss Total's investment 
projects in Russia in 2011 (President of Russia, 2016) 
Some oil and gas companies have had a presence in Russia for many decades. For example, 
Schlumberger, one of the largest service companies, first ventured to the Soviet Union in 
1929 (Schulumberger, 2016). After the Soviet Union's collapse, majors and foreign 
independents flocked to Russia only to encounter what Gustafson (2012, pp. 177-181) calls 
'Russian Risk'. Unpredictable carryovers from the Soviet era, known as oil generals, and an 
ambiguous and unstable legal framework made it particularly difficult to start projects in 
Russia. However, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, three projects were launched 
pursuant to internationally accepted production sharing agreements (PSAs) - one with Total 
in northwest Russia and two in Sakhalin with Exxon and Shell (Gustafson, 2012, p. 180). I 
witnessed the excitement that PSAs brought to Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk when I travelled there on 
a business trip in the autumn of 1999. Foreign oil and gas companies took over perhaps the 
only suitable office building in the city, with Exxon, BP, and Shell occupying entire floors. 
The building's roof was dotted with satellite dishes and its interior resembled a typical 
Western office space. The building even had an American-style cafeteria that served fried 
chicken with boxed mashed potatoes. 
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These three projects represent the extent to which PSAs have been used in the Russian oil 
and gas sector. 34 Instead, foreign oil and gas companies formed alliances with their Russian 
counterparts under less transparent and internationally accepted arrangements resulting in 
different levels of success. TNK-BP and Sakhalin, proved to be successful, (Kramer, 2012) 
(Sakhalin Energy, 2016) whereas a few others, like much touted Shtockman LNG flopped 
(EIA, 2015). In the summer of 2012, Vladimir Putin bragged on a few occasions that 25% of 
all oil production in Russia was done by companies with foreign participation (President, 21 
June 2012) (President, 10 July 2012). He attributed the high level of penetration to the 
Russian oil and gas sector's policy of liberalization (Id.). As I will show in the remainder of 
this thesis, this statement is simply not true. The level of government control over the oil and 
gas sector remains very high, whereas the list of risks that foreign energy companies face in 
Russia has become longer. In response to Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014, the United 
States and European Union imposed economic sanctions that effectively stopped joint 
projects that required innovative technology and expertise, including ExxonMobil-Rosneft's 
offshore exploration in the South Kara Sea (EIA, 2015). 
2.2.2. Energy geopolitics - Kremlin style 
2.2.2.1. Kremlin 'krysha' 
Hydrocarbon exports play a vital role in the Russian economy. They are as critical for Russia 
as oil and gas imports are for the European Union. Thus, for Russia, energy security is a 
security of demand. Unsurprisingly, the Russian leadership does not shy away from acting 
as the Russian oil and gas sector's 'krysha' (protection) by promoting and defending it in 
foreign markets. 
It is not uncommon for the Russian leadership to appeal to reason while persuading its 
audience of the mutual benefits of oil and gas cooperation. The following excerpt from 
Vladimir Putin's statements at a 2008 press conference serves as a representative example of 
this narrative: 
34 
I elaborate on the reasons for such a lack of popularity in Chapter 7. 
77 
Finland receives energy resources almost exclusively from Russia, over 70% of 
oil and 90% of natural gas. Is Finland suffering from this? On the contrary, the 
Finnish economy has a long-term supply guaranteed by legal contracts that are 
strictly performed. I must assure you that I will act in a similar manner with other 
European partners (President, 14 February 2008). 
At the same press conference, the Russian leader made statements about the United States 
pressuring some European countries to refrain from acquiring Russian energy resources and 
to find transportation routes around Russia's territory. Mr Pu tin called such a policy incorrect, 
unwise, and unprofessional, adding that it was based on politics and not reason. He concluded 
that European nations do not have a rational choice other than relying on the Russian supply: 
I have said it again and the Europeans know this very well - the British resources 
have been almost exhausted and the Norwegian resources are running dry. Where 
would one replenish them? In Germany, for example, a decision has been made 
on the closure of nuclear power plants; they do not want to develop coal because 
it is dirty. You are left with natural gas. Where will you get it? You can get some 
from Algeria and Qatar, but there the exports are oriented toward the North 
American market with a possibility for more demand. It is uncertain what will 
happen with Iran; there are all sorts of problems around Iran. Every year [Iran] 
interrupts exports to Turkey, for example; but we honour our obligations fully and 
did so this year. Central Asia had an abnormally cold year and we solved this 
problem without making noise and engaging in political pandering (Id.). 
As a general rule, President Putin's statements about not mixing business with politics are 
directed only to people, companies, and states that disagree with Russia's foreign energy 
policy. This enables him to separate the otherwise inseparable Russian state from the oil and 
gas industry, and invoke the rational market argument that is popular among foreign business 
leaders. 
Yet appeal to reason is not the only persuasion technique that the Russian leadership uses. 
Appeal to values, albeit frequently in crude form, is also in the Kremlin's public speaking 
arsenal. During his speech at the Valdai discussion club in October 2014, Mr Putin accused 
the United States of hypocrisy for not imposing sanctions on countries that purchase oil from 
the Islamic State (President, 24 October 2014). In the same speech, the Russian President 
chided the European Union for potential plans to import American shale oil and gas: 'I don't 
know what kind of colony it should become to do something like this!' (Id.) 
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Although environmental values do not appear to be high on the Russian leadership ethics 
chart, it is not afraid to use them to promote Russian oil and gas abroad. For example, Mr 
Putin added environmental considerations to mutual energy security (security of demand for 
Russia and of supply for Europe) and sensible economics to the list of reasons why Russian 
gas should be a natural choice for European customers. Interestingly, he did so by questioning 
the decisions ofE.U. energy planners to subsidize renewable energy and import inexpensive 
U.S. coal (President, 13 February 2013). 
When the going gets especially tough, the Kremlin deploys its entire persuasive arsenal. In 
the wake of the annexation of Crimea, many started questioning Europe's dependence on 
Russian oil and gas. Correspondingly, the Russian leadership intensified statements 
persuading European nations to stick with the ostensibly reliable and affordable Russian gas. 
Similar to his February 2008 statement, Mr Putin dismissed concerns as 'stupid' on the 
grounds that the dependence is mutual and thus contributes to global economic stability 
(President, 24 May 2014). He also added some statistics that were sobering for proponents 
of European energy supply diversification: in 2013, Russian natural gas exports grew by 10% 
in comparison to 2012 (Id). It appears that the Russian President capitalized on virtually every 
opportunity to remind the European audience that Russia has been a reliable energy trading 
partner (Id.) (President, 24 October 2014). 
2.2.2.2. Leaning on a pipeline 
The flow of political capital between the Kremlin and the Russian oil and gas sector is not 
one-directional. The Russian leadership uses its sacred cow and the public perception thereof 
to gain popularity when Russian citizens start questioning Kremlin policies. The public 
relations campaign launched in the aftermath of the aforementioned deal to construct the 
Power of Siberia natural gas transportation system serves as a case in point. 
Amidst the calls to scale down Europe's dependence on Russian energy, the Russian 
leadership has turned east, accelerating Gazprom's negotiations with the China National 
Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) for a long-term natural gas deal. After the sides reached an 
agreement on 21 May 2014, the Russian leadership did not waste any time in parading the 
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deal as a sign of success for Russia's foreign energy policy and a bright future for the Russian 
hydrocarbon-driven economy (Weitz, 2014). 
The deal with China served as a launch pad for many of Mr Putin's remarks during the St. 
Petersburg Economic Forum that took place only two days after the signing of the agreement. 
The Russian President emphasized, on multiple occasions, the size ($400 billion) and the 
longevity (30 years) of the contract, as well as the size of the reserves (3 tern) contained in 
the Chayandinskoe and Kovyktinskoe fields (President, 23 May 2014) (President, 24 May 
2014a). He juxtaposed Europe's 'stupid' concerns regarding excessive dependence on 
Russian gas with the 'higher level' and 'exclusively partner-like' bilateral relationships 
between Russia and China (President, 24 October 2014). At some point, Mr Putin struck a 
romantic cord, noting that, 'we never think about imposing conditions on each other', and 'it 
is natural that we complete each other' (Id). 
As the leadership touted its newfound 'complete relationship', the Russian media rejoiced. 
Ros Biznes Konsulting, or RBK, called the deal 'Europe's nightmare' (RBK, 2014); RIA 
Novosti utilized the Peter the Great 'window to Europe' analogy and described the result of 
the negotiations as 'cutting a gas window into Asia' (RIA Novosti, 2014).35 Komsomolskaya 
Pravda labelled the deal a 'Russo-Chinese Victory' (Baranchik, 2014). 
However, a closer look at the deal's economics raised serious questions about its benefits for 
Russia. In fact, after obtaining more details about the terms of the agreement, Morgan Stanley 
downgraded Gazprom's stock 'to reflect the signing of the deal with China' (Treadgold, 
2014). James Sherr, a former head of Chatham House's Russia and Eurasia Program valued 
Russia's ultimate return from China as 'tea and sympathy' (Chatham House, 2015). 
Vladimir Putin's performance in St. Petersburg, together with the jubilant reaction from the 
Russian media, prompted questions as to the real reasons behind the 21 May agreement. 
Russia and China reached the agreement after 22 years of negotiations (Paik, 2012) and just 
two days before a large two-day public event full of foreign investors, business leaders, and 
35 
In Russia, the result of Peter the Great's West-oriented reforms is commonly referred to as "window to 
Europe". 
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media. Such international public outreach events had become more rare after the annexations 
of Crimea. This suggests that the Russian leadership needed its oil and gas sector to create a 
sense of stability after the West's response to the annexation, conflict in Eastern Ukraine, and 
downing of the Malaysian Airlines plane in July 2014. Mr Putin needed and ultimately 
created an opportunity to assure Russia and the world of the Kremlin's control over the 
country's socio-economic present and future. 
Although the 21 May agreement captured the hearts and minds of the Russian media, the 
Russian leader made sure to mention the Western Route in his remarks in St. Petersburg 
(President, 23 May 2014) (President, 24 May 2014a). He left little doubt about Russia's plan 
to expand its already vast natural gas system: 'We will have a unified gas supply system that 
will fundamentally and substantially improve gasification in Russian territories and will 
enable us to diversify the exports - when it is needed, in the Western direction, and when it 
is more lucrative, pursuant to global demand, in the Eastern direction.' (President, 23 May 
2014) 
Accessing the Southeast Asian market by way of becoming a swing supplier appears to be 
one of the main economic goals of the Kremlin. Vladimir Putin noted the 'sizable economic 
advantages' of becoming a swing supplier during his meeting at the Northeastern Federal 
University in Yakutsk on 1 September 2014 (President). He singled out the expansion of the 
supporting infrastructure as the 'priority objective' at the 4 June 2014 Energy Commission 
meeting (President, 4 June 2014). He noted the 'easier implementation' of the Western Route 
during his meeting with Gazprom's CEO Alexey Miller (President, 17 September 2014). 
Finally, during his remarks at the Investment Forum that took place in Moscow on 2 October 
2014, the Russian President emphasized that increased energy cooperation with China and 
Southeastern Asia is part of a larger international cooperation effort intended to bring 
geopolitical balance to the U.S. and E.U. power (President, 2 October 2014). 
81 
2.3. Social and economic dimensions of Russian oil and gas 
2.3.1. Social stability, dwindling reserves, and the Arctic 
Although extensive energy infrastructure and hydrocarbon reserves are critical for the 
foundation of a petroleum-producing state, it is hardly sufficient for ensuring its existence. 
According to the Russian leadership, the oil and gas sector needs to maintain its geographic 
reach and quantitative share in the existing markets. In addition, it needs to grow and capture 
new markets in places currently outside its reach. Because of the limitations of the stagnant 
domestic demand, the Russian oil and gas sector needs demand from abroad (Mitrova, 2015). 
To survive it needs a stable interdependency relationship with European natural gas 
consumers and global oil consumers. To grow and prosper it needs to find new foreign 
markets, which the Russian leadership believes are in China and Southeast Asia. 
The stability of a house starts with a foundation. The foundation of House Russia is oil and 
gas. Oil and gas provide, among other things, the wherewithal for the house to sustain its 
lifestyle, a geopolitical tool to demand respect from its close and distant neighbours, and a 
public relations tool to boost its leadership's domestic popularity during challenging times. 
As noted in the preceding section, the relationship between the foundation and the house is 
not one-directional. The foundation needs to be protected, repaired, and extended. The 
Russian leadership accomplishes this objective by vehemently protecting the current 
interdependence, taking the lead in expanding it by advocating for new interdependence, and 
providing the space and the resources for expansion projects. 
The Kremlin often uses energy statistics in official meetings to underscore the importance of 
oil and gas development for the country's stability. However, the context in which such 
remarks are used are not always the same. For example, on 10 December 2010, President 
Medvedev noted that Russia provides 12% of the world's oil and 25% of the world's gas 
supply, thereby emphasizing Russia's indispensable place in the world economy (President, 
l3 December 2010). Mr Medvedev displayed his keen knowledge of world energy statistics 
by implying that 'the world goes as Russia goes' during an upward swing of oil and gas 
prices. He noted that Russia was not interested in 'monopoly-like high energy prices but 
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rather in stable, predictable, and reasonable prices (Id). During the 21 June 2012 (President) 
meeting with energy companies, President Putin stressed the fact that in 2011 Russia became 
the world's leading producer of oil by publicly traded companies. Mr Pu tin made the remark 
to ensure the meeting participants of a stable business environment in Russia (Id). In June 
2014, in the aftermath of the annexation of Crimea and the first round of sanctions, Vladimir 
Putin tied the need for further development of Russia's energy infrastructure to the need to 
protect the state from 'crisis events in global markets and ensuing volatility' (President, 4 
June 2014). 
'Anchor' and 'system-forming' are the adjectives that the Russian leader used to describe the 
place that the oil and gas sector has in the Russian economy (Id). The 'system-forming' 
sector sits on Russia's hydrocarbon reserves, which Mr Putin described as 'our competitive 
advantage' and 'national heritage' (Id.). Maintaining this competitive advantage is a national 
policy objective. Another national objective is becoming one of the leaders of the 
'qualitatively transforming global economy' (President, 24 May 2014). According to the 
Russian President, oil and gas appears to be an integral part of the new global economy 
vision, as the European energy policy is unreasonably skewed toward supporting 'crony' 
renewable energy. This policy leads to market distortions and harms whole other economic 
sectors (Id). 
The expansion of Russian oil and gas to new foreign markets would be impossible without 
ensuring that there is a resource base to support such an expansion. As noted above, Russia 
has been adding natural gas reserves, whereas the reserves of its primary source of revenue, 
oil, have been declining. 'Expansion of the resource base' (rasschirenie syr"yevoy hazy) has 
been one of the main economic objectives of the Russian government, with the Arctic and 
Subarctic serving as the priority regions for expansion (President, 21 June 2012). 
Prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union, the government put significant resources into oil 
and gas prospecting and exploration. Petroleum geologist was a well-paid and well-respected 
job. It also came with a certain flair of romanticism, popularized in books, newspaper articles, 
and films. Exploratory drilling was prevalent but often wasteful, as Soviet Ministry of Energy 
drillers set quantity of wells drilled, not quality, as the main objective. Nonetheless, quantity 
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at times led to quality and drillers made new discoveries. Whereas the vast majority of the 
current production is occurring from legacy fields, the vast majority of recently and soon 
commissioned fields are the byproduct of 'legacy discoveries' (Gustafson, 2012). For 
example, Russia's only Arctic offshore field, Prirazlomnoe, was discovered in 1989 
(Gazprom, 2016j). 
After the Soviet Union's collapse, the oil and gas industry went into survival mode, and 
prospecting and exploration went virtually extinct. Despite production climbing back to 
Soviet levels, exploration is yet to do so. For example, according to Sergey Kudryashov, a 
former deputy Energy Minister and, as of the writing of this thesis, the head of state-owned 
oil company Zarubezhneft' , only six or seven wells are drilled on the Russian continental 
shelf each year, as compared to 19 per year during the Soviet period (President, 13 February 
2013). Russia was expected to reach the vicinity of Soviet levels by 2020 (Id). 
However, it is not necessarily the scope of the planned resource base expansion but its 
geographic location that is likely to have a larger impact on the global energy landscape. The 
Arctic, particularly the Arctic continental shelf, is the area that, according to Vladimir Putin, 
will be responsible for the growth of Russia's wealth: 
Lomonosov once said that Russia will grow through Siberia - he was right, it is 
already happening. However, it will certainly grow through the Arctic. And not 
just because of its gigantic - global, I would say - all-planet mineral resources. I 
am talking about oil, gas, and metals also, because this region is very suitable for 
developing a transportation infrastructure. 36 (President, 29 August 2014) 
Russia made its Arctic intentions known in 2007 when it placed a plaque on the ocean floor 
at the North Pole (Parfitt, 2007). The Kremlin was quick to dismiss any land claims. When 
asked by a foreign journalist whether Canada needs to worry about Russia's plans to 
appropriate the North Pole, President Putin jokingly responded that such worries would be 
tantamount to concerns over the United States claiming ownership of the moon after placing 
its flag there (President, 14 February 2008). Putin's remark was only a half-joke. In February 
2016, Russia submitted a revised claim to extend the boundaries of its Arctic continental 
36 
The Russian President slightly misquoted Mikhail Lomonosov, the 'father' of Russian science, who is 
believed to once have said: 'The wealth of Russia will grow through Siberia.' [emphasis added] 
84 
shelf beyond 200 nautical miles (Kramer, 2016). According to Sergey Donskoy, the Minister 
of the Environment and Natural Resources, the planned application is 'the most important, 
the largest, and the most economically valuable' (President, 4 April 2014). 
According to the Russian President, Russia's economic interests in the Arctic need to be 
protected, for instance, from U.S. nuclear submarines patrolling Arctic waters off the 
Norwegian shore. Protection of Russian interests justifies the build-up of the Russian nuclear 
icebreaker fleet and the return to some of the abandoned Soviet military bases located on 
Arctic islands. Mr Putin's message about Russia's increasing ambitions in the Arctic is a 
mixture of aggressive overtones and righteous justification of Russia's position. On the one 
hand, he claimed that missiles from U.S. submarines located in the Arctic can reach Moscow 
in 15-16 minutes (President, 29 August 2014). He also noted that the recent landings on 
Russia's Arctic islands were part of a military operation. On the other hand, he stated that the 
troops had a peaceful mission and added that the resurrection of the military and search and 
rescue infrastructure is intended to ensure the security of navigation (Id.). Finally, he 
proclaimed that all of Russia's actions would aim at reaching a compromise with other 
nations while fully complying with the norms of international law (Id.). Judging by Mr 
Putin's high approval ratings, his strategy of appealing to 'hawks', 'doves', and everybody 
in between has been an example of successful persuasion (Levada-Centre, 2015). 
As noted above, the Russian leadership often emphasizes the size of Arctic hydrocarbon 
resource potential. 'Colossal', 'globally significant', and 'massive' are the adjectives used to 
describe the magnitude of Russia's unexplored and undeveloped resource base (President, 23 
May 2014). Such statements are frequently made and used with an ulterior motive. For 
example, former Energy Minister Kudryashov noted the deficiencies of the licensing process 
for the continental shelf as one of the barriers to developing the resource base. Mr 
Kudryashov stated that out of 6 million square kilometres of the Russian continental shelf, 
only 8% were enrolled in the licensing program in 2012 (President, 13 February 2013). 
Arkticheskiy kontinental 'ny she! J (the Arctic continental shelf) has become a permanent 
feature of the energy policy discourse in Russia. Every presidential non-individual meeting 
or press conference, the transcripts of which I reviewed, contained some discussion regarding 
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the Arctic continental shelf. However, the discourse has not been limited to acknowledging 
Russia's hydrocarbon potential in the Arctic and calls for realizing its potential (President, 
10 July 2012) (President, 21 June 2012). The discourse also features restatements of what 
various actors have done to expand the Arctic resource base, policy pathways for the 
expansion, which often double as lobbying efforts, and explanations of why certain policy 
pathways benefit the Russian economy and society. For example, during his meeting with 
Vladimir Putin, Russian Energy Minister Alexander Novak highlighted the increased 
offshore oil production in 2014 (1 million tonnes), including 300,000 tonnes from the Arctic 
Prirazlomnoe field. He also mentioned the existence of a special tax stimulus plan to ensure 
that the production from Russia's Arctic offshore fields continues to rise (President, 2 March 
2015). 
Development of Arctic offshore natural gas fields is linked with another strategic goal 
discussed above, namely turning Russia into a swing supplier of natural gas. While obliquely 
lobbying for demonopolization of the LNG export market, Mr Kudryashov noted that the 
development of natural gas fields and LNG facilities in the Russian Arctic 'also solves 
diversification of supply routes for Russian gas, creates a multiplication effect for the Russian 
industry, and increases the robustness of the whole system .... ' (President, 13 February 
2013) Following Mr Kudryashov's presentation, Igor Sechin said: 
Development of economic and regulatory stimuli for the LNG production from 
offshore fields is not only a question of the growth of the natural gas sector, it is 
also a question of the effectiveness and the advisability of the Russian continental 
shelf development. In the end, it is a question of the future of our energy sector 
and the growth of our nation's economy (Id.). 
According to President Putin, the future of the Russian oil sector is in the Arctic, in the 
development of new fields, the continental shelf, and large projects. In his speech at the 21st 
World Oil Congress, the Russian leader acknowledged the capital intensive nature of such 
undertakings and called for 'the improvement of the applicable international legal 
framework, widening mutually beneficial asset and technology exchanges, integration of 
energy-saving systems, and lowering of environmental risks.' (President, 16 June 2014) 
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2.3.2. Oil price as a magic number for Russian society and economy 
Unsurprisingly, the global price of oil is of particular importance to the Russian Federation. 
While, it measures the value of Russia's two most important export commodities, oil and gas, 
its importance does not end there. 37 Oil price is yet another indicator of the qualitative 
penetration of oil and gas in the Russian economy and society. 
The RF Government uses oil price as the benchmark to calculate its national budget. Russia 
is not alone in this practice - many oil-producing states tie their national budgets to oil price 
(Lam, 2015). Table 11 depicts the threshold oil prices at which OPEC nations' budgets (with 
the exception of Ecuador) start running deficits (Fahey, 2015). For 2015, 2016, and 2017, the 
RF Government calculated the federal budget based on the oil price of $96 per barrel with 
the budget deficit of 0.5 - 0.6% of its GDP. This places Russia roughly between Iran and 
Algeria in the 'oil budget deficit' list (President, 2 October 2014). 
Table 11: OPEC Nations Budget Deficit/Surplus Thresholds Expressed in Oil Price (Fahey, 2015) 







Saudi Arabia $105.60 
Angola $110.00 
Venezuela $117.50 
37 Oil price is often used as the baseline for natural gas contracts. For example, it is common to tie the price of natural gas in contracts for delivery ofLNG to the so-called Japan Crude Cocktail (JCC), which represents the average price of crude oil imported to Japan. For example, the JCC-based formula is used for Yamal LNG contracts. (Lunden & Fjaertoft, 2014) 
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Country Oil Price (per barrel) 
Nigeria $122.70 
Libya $269.00 
As the Figure 16 examples demonstrate, the only certainty about oil and gas prices is their 
volatility. Paradoxically, the Russian leadership touted the stability of the $96 per barrel 
figure (President, 24 May 2014). President Putin was especially bullish when oil prices were 
soaring, remarking on the cushion that Russia was enjoying during a time of economic 
uncertainty (President, 22 April 2013). In June 2014, Sechin was one of the first key Russian 
decision makers to contemplate the possibility of oil price decrease in the short- and medium-
term due to manipulations caused by 'concentrated and deliberate' actions (President, 4 June 
2014). 
Figure 16: Europe Brent spot price FOB (1990 - 2016) and Henry Hub natural gas spot price 
(1998 - 2016) (EIA, 2016) 
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Yet President Putin remained unconvinced insisting at the same meeting that the oil and gas 
sector should serve as the Russian economy's anchor due to the 'real and sustainable demand 
for oil and gas' (Id.). By October 2014, as the oil price started declining from an annual high 
of $111 per barrel in June to $87 per barrel, the Russian leader acknowledged its lack of 
predictability while still defending the RF Government's decision to calculate the budget 
based on the $96 per barrel figure (EIA, 2016) (President, 2 October 2014 ). 
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In November, when the price of oil dropped to $79 dollars per barrel (EIA, 2016), Vladimir 
Putin was asked during an interview with the Chinese press a three-part question about his 
view on the causes behind the oil price decline, the effect of the decline on the Russian 
economy, and the steps that the Russian leadership was taking to remedy the negative effect 
(President, 6 November 2014). For the first part of the question, the President identified only 
external causes of the price decline, such as the glut of the global supply, slowing global 
economy and demand, technological advances, and, most importantly, geopolitical and 
market manipulations. He limited his answer to the second part of the question to the 
following statement: 'We cannot ignore the current oil market situation given the importance 
of the energy sector products for the budget' (Id). His response to the third part could not 
have been more general. Mr Putin assured the Chinese journalists that the Russian leadership 
is implementing comprehensive and long-term measures aimed at further diversification of 
the budget revenue sources, including diversification of Russia's export markets away from 
Europe and toward the Asia Pacific region, as well as optimization of the budget, financial, 
and tax policies (Id). 
Vladimir Pu tin spent the lion's share of his answer elaborating on the causes of a trend that 
is potentially devastating for the Russian economy, while downplaying and not accepting any 
responsibility for the potential adverse consequences (Id). This demonstrates that his answer, 
although addressed formally to the Chinese press, was directed predominately at an audience 
deeply concerned with the health of the Russian economy - Russian citizens. 
As noted above, prior to the oil price collapse, Mr Putin used the 'stable' oil price to assure 
the people that the country was on the right course under his leadership. For example, he 
remarked that the 'stable' $96 per barrel would all but guarantee the stability of all social 
programs under the 2015-2017 federal budgets (President, 24 May 2014). Thus, 
unsurprisingly, the Russian leader chose to distance himself from oil price, a public relations 
friend turned foe. 
It would be an understatement to say that Russian citizens were concerned about the declining 
price of oil. According to a Levada-Centre poll, Russians named it the fourth most important 
event of 2014. The importance of this ranking is amplified by the fact that 2014 was one of 
89 
the most eventful years in Russia's modem history. The declining oil prices were superseded 
by Russia's first ever hosting of the winter Olympics, the first sharp drop in the ruble 
exchange rate since the 20th century, and the first annexation of a formerly foreign territory 
(the Crimea peninsula) since World War II (Levada-Centre, 2015, p. 9). 
The reason behind the ranking is clear - Russian citizens firmly believe that the oil price drop 
is directly responsible for the downturn of the national economy and the decrease in the 
quality oflife for average Russians. For example, according to another Levada-Centre public 
poll, 3 7% of the respondents listed the drop in oil price as the main reason behind the rise in 
prices for groceries, consumer goods, and essential services (Levada-Centre, 2015). This 
answer was second only to the devaluation of the ruble. Unsurprisingly, 51 % of the 
respondents tied the devaluation to the decline in oil prices (Levada-Centre, 2015, p. 56). 
Judging by the September 2015 Levada-Centre public poll, the Russian leadership strategy 
of assigning blame for the country's economic woes to external factors, particularly the 
decline in oil prices, has worked. Thirty-four per cent of the respondents believed that was 
the case. In contrast, only 26% thought that the economic crisis emerged due to the 
deficiencies in the structure of the Russian economy, excessive government involvement, 
and poor decision-making by government officials (Levada-Centre, 2015a). 
It is not uncommon for a story about oil price to grace the front page of the Russian printed 
and electronic media. A typical article usually commemorates a pricing milestone of the 
commodity and discusses what this milestone means for Russia (Gazeta.ru, 2016). This topic 
has entered the art and popular culture domain where, as the song below by Russian bard 
Semyon Slepakov shows, it has been insightfully and eloquently framed and narrated: 
I am a simple tractor factory worker 
My surname is Sinitsyn, first name Volodya 
Every morning I go to the factory 
And this is the 25th year of this happy life 
I am working a lathe and making components 
To be assembled into pedals 
I am paid zilch 
But I am not complaining as the entire town lives like this 
However, recently some hubbub happened 
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Money started disappearing twice as fast 
Prices in shops went through the roof 
And I am unable to support my less-than-ideal life 
I started worrying - what is up? 
Luckily, TV explained things well 
It happens that America treacherously screwed us over 
And as a result, the price of our oil fell 
But this is an artificially composed act 
Everything will soon change, it's a definite fact 
No longer those faggots will be bending us over 
The price for our mother oil will rise again 
Things will go back to normal, we will be prospering 
And I will be able to support my less-than-ideal life 
I really liked what the TV announcer said 
But I still have a little burning question: 
Chorus: 
I am of course very happy that oil will go up in price 
But what if it fucking does not? But what happens ifit does not? 
I understand that everything will get better when oil goes up in price 
But what if it fucking does not? Just does not and that's it? (Slepakov, 2015) 
2.4. Conclusion 
Yer gin (2011) argues against designating Russia as a 'Petrostate'. He contrasts it with 
Venezuela and Nigeria and highlights, among other things, the higher percentages oil and 
gas revenues in these nations' GDPs. Yet Yergin' s argument does not factor in the vital role 
that oil and gas play in the Russian leadership's political grip on the country and its 
geopolitical ambitions abroad. It also discounts the qualitative penetration of the oil and gas 
sector in the national economy and the social life the Russian state. In addition, the argument 
overlooks the least transparent but perhaps the most defining criterion of a petrostate - the 
perception of oil and gas's importance among Russian citizens for their well-being. 
Although the primary goal of this chapter was to provide the necessary background and 
foundation for further analysis, the dimensionality of the Russian oil and gas sector explored 
above helps to close the gap in the literature regarding the societal processes influenced by 
the country's economic dependence on oil and gas. Petrostate is not only a state of an 
economy expressed in statistical averages, it is also a state of mind of those directly involved 
in and impacted by the economy. The Russian leadership pays close attention to the public 
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perception of the critical role that the national oil and gas plays in the lives of ordinary 
Russians and it exploits this perception for political gain. This, in tum affects the current and 
future state and the size of the oil and gas infrastructure. The physical and technological, 
political and geopolitical, social and economic dimensions of the Russian oil and gas sector 
interlock in a feedback loop. The academic literature and energy analytics that fail to 
recognize this feedback loop are unlikely to depict an accurate picture of the Russian oil and 
gas sector, or to render a well-supported projection of its future. In addition, as I show 
throughout the thesis, the interlocking of these dimensions contributes to challenges that the 
Russian oil and gas sector poses for risk governance, the mechanics of which I examine in 
the next chapter. 
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3. Risk and its Disguises: Theoretical Framework 
3 .1. What is risk? 
In this chapter, I review the key risk and risk governance concepts and theories in the context 
of the energy sector, and more specifically, in the context of oil and gas development. 
Therefore, the overarching objective of this chapter is not to add to the crowded field of risk 
definitions. Rather, ,it is to identify a set of theoretical tools wielding the greatest explanatory 
power for the ensuing data analysis whilst noting potential gaps and shortcoming in the risk 
and risk governance literature. 
It is impossible to discuss risk governance without defining risk first. Aven and Renn (2012) 
identify more than ten definitions of risk in the academic literature. Rosa, Renn, and 
McCright (2014, p. 20) describe the 'net result' of such plurality 'is not clarification of key 
terms but befuddlement'. Practitioners, even those who work for the same government 
agency, cannot seem to reach consensus either. 
Because I targeted risks to the environment as one of this study's focus areas, I decided to 
consult the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to see how it defines risk (EPA, 
2016). I was surprised to see fifteen different definitions of the term risk alone. In addition, I 
discovered four different definitions of environmental risk and four definitions of acceptable 
risk, and many other definitions of terms that included the word risk. Most definitions, which 
can be found in Appendix VI, may appear substantially similar, but each offers a different 
approach or emphasis, thus warranting a distinct entry (Id.). 
All the EPA definitions of risk that I reviewed include a term implying the probability of an 
event or occurrence. These terms range from 'chance' to the nearly certain 'expected 
frequency'. The second common feature is the event or occurrence's adverse nature. Some 
definitions make it rather opaque by disguising it, for example, in a negative connotation 
commonly associated with injury, disease, and death (Id.). 
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However, all the definitions unequivocally indicate that the 'term' risk implies what Callon, 
Lacoumes, and Barthe (2011, p. 19) describe as 'well-identified danger associated with a 
perfectly describable event or series of events'. This kind of quantitative grasp on an event 
or occurrence is what the authors believe sets risk and uncertainty apart, making the former 
a tamer version of the latter. The scholars point to a frequent interchangeable use of the terms, 
which often leads to muddling of 'very different realities' (Id. p. 19). The argument put forth 
by Callon and his co-authors is not without merit. However, as I elaborate below, for the 
purposes of this thesis, I use the term uncertainty as one of the characteristics of systemic 
risks. 
Similar to risk and uncertainty, risk and hazard are used interchangeably (Barents 2020, 2012, 
p. 110). Even though some theorists understand risk as hazard (i.e. danger 'related both to its 
probability and to the magnitude'), some mark a difference (SCOPE 15, 1980, p. 1). 
According to the International Risk Governance Council (IRGC), 'hazards characterize the 
inherent properties of the risk agent' [emphasis added] (IRGC, 2005, p. 19). Conversely, 
risks 'describe the potential effects that these hazards are likely to cause on specific targets' 
[ emphasis added] (Id.). These targets include 'buildings, ecosystems or human organisms 
and their related probabilities' (Id.). 
In addition, when gathering data about the ever-changing technological and geographic 
dimensions of energy, reducing an activity or event to its properties (hazardous, dangerous) 
may be rather limiting. This is especially the case when obtaining empirical data by engaging 
a wide range of stakeholders who are mostly familiar with the adverse effects of an activity, 
but not necessarily with the activity itself. For example, some stakeholders, indigenous 
communities, and marine scientists are unlikely to understand the details of offshore oil and 
gas development. However, members of an indigenous community may be well familiar with 
routine spills and seepages because of the fishing activities in which they are engaged. 
Similarly, marine scientists would be knowledgeable on issues such as the increasing acidity 
of the ocean (Cappa, 2010), while members of the oil and gas industry or a permitting agency 
could thoroughly explain the dangers of offshore drilling (Sidortsov, 2014). 
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However, one gains both wider and deeper insight when shifting the definition of risk from 
the activity itself to the effect of that activity. Ifwe classify exploratory drilling as the hazard, 
oil exploration becomes the source of the hazard, and oil spills are one of the associated risks 
(uncertain adverse consequences). To take this a step further, if one were to depart from the 
'conventional' risks associated with oil and gas development, and giving consideration 
instead to climate change, climate change would be the hazard; oil exploration its source, due 
to direct emissions from exploratory activities and the ensuing emissions from the 
combustion of extracted hydrocarbons; and ocean acidification would be one of the risks 
(Sidortsov, 2012a). Thus, a catastrophic oil spill ceases to be the only severe risk associated 
with oil exploration. 
Overlooking this seemingly academic typology can have far-reaching policy consequences. 
If, for example, oil spills are viewed as the sole or chief risk of oil and gas activities, any risk 
analysis would likely focus on their prevention and containment. Yet the adverse 
consequences of an oil spill, especially a major one, do not end with coastal land and sea 
birds covered in oil. During the Deepwater Horizon disaster, for instance, the livelihoods of 
millions of U.S. households were placed in jeopardy as the economy of several states ground 
to a halt. The spill impacted Floridians, Alabamians, Louisianans, and Texans of many 
different occupations and trades, ranging from tourist-shop owners to helicopter pilots and 
from fishermen to restaurant employees (National Commission; 2011). The oil and gas sector 
itself experienced a shutdown, due to the moratoria imposed on offshore oil and gas activities 
(Id). Thus, how one defines risk determines which adverse consequences will be included in 
the scope of risk analysis. 
This consideration is especially important for Russia, whose economy is built on oil and gas. 
A failure to recognize environmental risks as having far-reaching economic and social 
implications, and more importantly to handle such risks accordingly, could bring the entire 
country to a standstill. As I explore in more detail below, the Russian leadership made this 
critical connection, but ultimately failed to act upon it. 
Also essential to a conceptual understanding of risk is recognizing the difference between 
objective risk and subjective (perceived) risk. The policy implications of this theoretical 
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divide are vast, as they extend to the question of who makes decisions about risk, including 
the rules for determining it. 
Beck (2006, p. 330) notes that risk 'does not mean catastrophe. Risk means the anticipation 
of catastrophe.' According to this narrative, the extent to which a risk is anticipated 
determines its likelihood of 'becoming real' (Id.). Adams (1995, p. 8) takes this a step further, 
observing that the key difference between objective and subjective risk stems from who 
anticipates the 'catastrophe'. He bolsters this assessment by citing the Royal Society's 1983 
report entitled 'Risk Assessment' (Id.). This report identified objective risk as the prerogative 
of 'the experts', while subjective or perceived risk was classified as the product of lay-
people's anticipation of an adverse event (Id.). Correspondingly, it is the objective view of 
risk as 'the probability of an adverse future event multiplied by its magnitude' that dominates 
the safety literature (Adams, 1995, p. 69). 
Subjective or perceived risk is based on how an individual perceives a potential adverse effect 
(Oltedal, et al., 2004, p. 11). One's specific understanding of risk may be influenced by a 
number of different factors, including familiarity with the hazard, level of control over the 
situation, and commonality of the event (Id.). Some proponents of the subjective view deny 
the very possibility of objective risk. This denial is premised on the belief that as long as 
humans are the party appraising the risk (at any time, and in any shape or form), the risk 
cannot by definition be objective (Beck, 2006, p. 333). On the other hand, according to 
Brehmer, a human cannot perceive risk because there is nothing 'out there' that can be sensed 
and called 'risk' (Oltedal, et al., 2004, p. 11 ). 
Sjoberg and Boholm take a reconciliatory position and concede that 'real' and 'perceived' 
risks can coexist (Id.). Similarly, Crawford-Brown concludes that '[t ]here is no way to decide 
which definition of risk is correct.' (Crawford-Brown, 1999, p. 12) Putting the 
subjectivity/objectivity of risk question into the context of a decision-making process, he 
notes that although risk assessment can be done according to an objective standard, risk 
management must have a subjective element, as managers are people, not machines. Rosa, 
Renn, and McCright (2014, p. 21) arrive to a similar reconciliatory position via a different 
route. As noted in the introductory chapter, they lay a meta-theoretical foundation for the risk 
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concept by contrasting the two main epistemological approaches: realism and constructivism. 
The three scholars elucidate this coexistence by recognizing the ontological and 
epistemological dimensions of states of risk. This approach does not discard the possibility 
that events and situations occur independently of human perception or cognition. It also 
recognizes that once an event or occurrence is deemed to be of human value, it ceases to be 
an objective notion (Rosa, et al., 2014, pp. 20-22). 
Further investigation of this question has been the subject of many scholarly debates not 
limited to the risk theory (Id.). The principal goal of this study is not to contribute to this 
discourse, and committing to either end of the spectrum is not instrumental to answering this 
study' s research question. Yet, I remain committed to the epistemological view of risk as a 
social construction. Accordingly, I adopt the following working definition of risk offered by 
Rosa: 'Risk is a situation or an event where something of human value (including humans 
themselves) is at stake and where the outcome is uncertain.' (Rosa, 1998) 
3.2. Risk perception theories 
Certainly, if one rejects the notion of subjective or perceptive risk, and the definition ofrisk 
is limited to the probability of an adverse consequence multiplied by its severity, there would 
be no need for inquiry into the theories of risk perception. However, because my working 
definition of risk is premised on the constructivist approach, such a review is both warranted 
and necessary. 
Wildavsky and Dake (1990, pp. 42-44) identify six rival social science theories of risk 
perception. Knowledge theory is based on the premise that people believe or know 
technologies to be dangerous and thus perceive them as such. Personality theory focuses on 
the individual propensity to take or avoid risk. Economic theory has two versions, the first of 
which asserts that affluent people are more tolerant to risks stemming from new technologies 
because they benefit more from and are better insulated from them due to economic status. 
The second version, known as 'post-materialist' theory, is the reverse - that indigent people 
are willing to take more risks ( and otherwise do whatever it takes) to become wealthier. 
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Political theory uses the struggle over political interests to explain differences of risk 
perception, and finally, cultural theory connects cultural biases to risk taking/avoiding (Id.). 
Remarkably, the cultural and psychometric theories of risk perception have been at the centre 
of the risk perception debate, along with another set of theories that Wildavsky and Dake 
failed to mention - rational actor theories. The basic principle of rational action is premised 
on the notion that 'human beings are capable of acting in a strategic fashion by linking 
decisions with outcomes.' (Renn, et al., 2001, p. 4) The Rational Action Paradigm (RAP) 
takes a more sophisticated view, resting on the following assumptions: (1) every action is an 
individual choice; (2) people and institutions have the ability to separate the ends from the 
means; (3) people seek to meet objectives when making choices; (4) the ultimate driver in 
making decisions is personal satisfaction; (5) people recognize the likely outcomes of their 
decisions; (6) people's preferences are based on values and expected benefits; and (7) if 
subjective knowledge and preferences are known, a person's actions are predictable (Id.). 
Regarding collective behaviour, RAP assumes that people select the option that will likely 
result in the biggest payoff, thereby maximizing their utility (Id.). 
Empirical evidence indicates that people are more likely to violate than follow the rules of 
rational action (Id. p. 8). Such evidence serves as a significant crack in RAP's empirical 
foundation and has led to criticism for RAP-based individual choice theories. RAP is also 
criticized as a basis for collective choice because it does not extend its assumptions from the 
individual to the collective level (Id. p. 11 ). According to Renn and his co-authors, RAP 
proponents have treated empirically sound challenges on both the individual and collective 
levels as a nuisance, while simultaneously failing to adequately respond to them (Id. p. 8). 
The psychometric theory centres on cognitive factors that influence a person's perception of 
risk. This theory developed out of empirical studies measuring people's aversion to and 
acceptance of risks, as well as the differences in perception of risk between the layperson and 
the expert (Slovic, 1987). Slovic, who is widely considered the father of the psychometric 
theory, and his colleagues concluded that people's perception of risk is dominated by both 
the dread risk factor and the unknown risk factor (Id. p. 281 ). 
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Though rooted in behavioural psychology, the psychometric theory fails to explain the 
differences in risk perception among ethnic and socio-economic groups (Rippl, 2002, pp. 
148-149). Slovic does identify cognitive factors, but these do not explain why one society is 
more accepting ofrisk than another (Id.). Indeed, critics of the psychometric theory cite issues 
of empirical support as one of its weaknesses. Sjoberg (2002, p. 443) conducted a study 
similar to Slovic et al. 's foundational nuclear waste study, but arrived at different results. In 
addition, Sjoberg, Gregory, and Mendelsohn (1993) had problems with understanding the 
qualitative characteristics that psychometric theory employs. They note that risk 
professionals oppose the theory due to difficulties with incorporating it into risk management 
practices (Id. p. 259). 
The psychometric theory's inadequacies opened the door for anthropologists and sociologists 
to contribute to risk perception theory (Wildavsky & Dake, 1990, pp. 42-44). In their book 
Risk and Culture, Douglas and Wildavsky (1982) argue that each culture, with its specific 
set of shared values and supporting social institutions, emphasizes certain risks and 
downplays others. Because people are creatures of social culture, individual perception of 
risk is shaped by cultural values, views, and attitudes (Ripp!, 2002, p. 149). Douglas and 
Wildavsky proposed the so-called grid/group typology as a means of describing different 
types of cultures, wherein grid refers to the level of social control while group refers to the 
level of social commitment. Correspondingly, the following four cultural patterns 
materialize: (1) hierarchy (high grid/group); (2) egalitarianism (low grid, high group); (3) 
individualism (low grid/group); and ( 4) fatalism (high grid, low group) (Id.). 
Like the opponents of psychometric theory, critics of cultural theory focus their arguments 
on lacking empirical support. Oltedal et al. (2004, p. 5) cite Sjoberg, Boholm, and Raynes, 
who note that the 'empirical support for this theory has been surprisingly meagre.' Boholm 
notes that the paltry empirical support stems from the theory's structural flaw in that it rejects 
personality as a basis for explanation of individual behaviour, yet it 'clearly is related to 
personality as an explanatory concept.' (Id. p. 6) Additionally, the 'meagre' empirical support 
may also be a result of the 'instrument' used to measure culture. According to Sjoberg (1998), 
although Dake and Wildavsky's World View scales produced favourable outcomes in the 
United States, empirical studies in Europe failed to reproduce such results. There is reason 
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to believe, however, that more reliable scales would have resulted in only marginal 
improvement (Id.). In responding to criticism of the cultural theory of risk perception, Rippl 
(2002, p. 149) concludes that a 'theoretically conforming measurement of cultural biases is 
possible.' 
3.3. Conceptualizing risk as knowledge 
Regardless of who perceives the risk, in the simplest terms, risk analysis aims at creation of 
new knowledge. There is something uncertain about a potentially adverse event or 
occurrence, something that we do not know. That knowledge gap about something uncertain 
needs to become more manageable, and this can be achieved by obtaining new knowledge 
about the uncertain event or occurrence. Correspondingly, Hansson views reduction of 
epistemic uncertainty as the main goal of risk knowledge. In the case of collective decision-
making, or as Hansson puts it, policy-relevant cases, the effects of the decisions are of value 
and cannot be ignored, whereas the knowledge about them is lacking (Hansson, 1996, p. 
170). For example, knowing with 100% certainty that offshore oil exploration will result in 
a catastrophic oil spill would make a regulator's permitting decision much easier. 
Hansson sees the origin of this knowledge gap in the ability of human cognitive powers. 
Rosa, Renn, and McCright join Hansson while stressing the importance of his observation: 
Because it cannot be overstated, we have repeatedly pointed out that human 
perceptual and cognitive capabilities are inherently limited. As a consequence, we 
can neither generate perfect knowledge about the world-that elusive God's 
view-eye view-nor create a 'true' understanding of our physical and social 
environments, risky ones and otherwise. Facts seldom speak for themselves, and 
ambiguity may surround even the most basic facts (Rosa, et al., 2014, p. 29). 
Thus, reaching the absolute truth is prohibited by the very definition of risk knowledge. After 
all, the very inquiry into percentages and levels of acceptance is premised on the assumption 
that the absolute truth about a future event is unknown. In this sense risk knowledge is in line 
with the notion of truth in Nietzsche's 'On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense', in which 
he saw it as a drive for belief in knowledge and truth (Nietzsche, 2008). 
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Yet uncertainty can be reduced to probability, thereby creating 'a cognitively manageable 
representation of the world' (Hansson, 1996, p. 172). In fact, under the Bayesian ideal 
rationality, all non-logical statements should never be fully believed; rather, they should be 
assigned various probabilities. Thus, the core principle behind the Bayesian approach is the 
variable fallibility of knowledge claims (Id.). 
The first problem into which a strict Bayesian would run is multiple sets of probabilities 
produced by different experts. Particularly steep challenges arise when 'two cultures of risk 
analysis' clash - one represented by social sciences, and the other by the physical sciences 
and engineering (Horlick-Jones & Sime, 2004, p. 446). Reconciling these differences often 
proves an insurmountable challenge. Callon, Lascoumes, and Barthe (2011, p. 19) note, 
'there's always someone more specialist' and, as I noted in the previous section, this 
specialist expert often comes from a different field. In addition, non-experts bring what the 
scholars call 'subjective probability', which despite its quantitative shortcomings brings 
additional qualitative layers into the analysis (Id.). 
The second problem with equivocating risk knowledge with probability is that it ignores the 
fact that people have always lived with some unreduced epistemic uncertainties (Hansson, 
1996, p. 173). Ignorance of this fact leads to an even bigger problem, the loss of the principal 
purpose of risk knowledge, which is to aid people in making decisions that involve 
uncertainty. Sime describes this situation as 'designing [a] "in spite of rather than/or the 
building user'", which in tum results in buildings designed for 'people or ball-bearings' 
(Horlick-Jones & Sime, 2004, p. 446). 
The third problem with strict Bayesianism is that people need to make decisions that are 
based on fully certain or nearly certain beliefs (Hansson, 1996, p. 172). This necessitates a 
different kind of certainty, a certainty that is not based on probabilities. Callon, Lacoumes, 
and Barthe (2011, p. 24) note the existence of 'social uncertainties ' that accompany scientific 
and technical uncertainties. They emphasize the importance of overcoming the former for the 
making of informed decisions as follows: 
However, the controversies engendered by these uncertainties go far beyond 
solely technical questions. One of the central issues in these controversies is 
precisely establishing a clear and widely accepted border between what is 
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considered unquestionably technical and what is recognized as unquestionably 
social. The line describing this border constantly fluctuates throughout the 
controversy. To declare that an issue is technical is effectively to remove it from 
the influence of public debate; on the other hand, to recognize its social dimension 
restores its chance of being discussed in political arenas (Id., pp. 24-25). 
Walsh (2013) calls this kind of certainty 'political'. Political certainty converts what is 
usually a myriad of probabilities and unreduced epistemic uncertainties into a socially 
acceptable decision. In a sense, it enables the lowercase 'truths' to work together in the 
context of a consensus created by the political certainty. 
It is therefore not surprising that generating risk knowledge poses particular problems in the 
context of public policy. Horlick-Jones and Sime (2004, p. 448) suggest two possible avenues 
for overcoming the plurality of objective and subjective probabilities, the self-fulfilling 
tendency of technical risk assessment, and the need for some certainty for collective decision-
making. The first suggestion draws on Rein's value-critical approach and emphasises 'the 
specificity of problem situations rather than adopting a universal "general laws" perspective.' 
The second suggestion seeks to place the process of knowledge creation within the 
boundaries of 'material limits on human sense-making and action' (Id.). Both suggestions, 
while inherently conceptual, recognize the context in which knowledge is created and more 
specifically the limits that the context creates. 
Risk knowledge is not generated in a lab by completely impartial, bias-, agenda-, and 
prejudice-free, acultural risk experts. The initial inquiry does not appear from thin air. It 
comes to a 'risk lab' shaped by the values of those who send it there. The inquiry is sent to 
the lab because something of value is at stake, in the event or occurrence of which the 
outcome is uncertain. Even assuming that the lab is full of impartial risk expert robots ( which 
for obvious reasons is highly unlikely), there is no guarantee that all these human robots have 
been 'programmed' by the same discipline. Thus, a battle of risk expert robots has a much 
higher likelihood of occurring. In addition, what if there is more than one risk lab? It would 
be even more of a stretch to assume that all risk labs employ the same methodology, internal 
procedures, and so on. The knowledge product that comes out of a risk lab or a coalition of 
labs might not sit well with those who have to live with the decision that was made based 
upon said knowledge. Some people might have legitimate concerns about the validity of the 
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knowledge and some might just not trust robots. After all, humans and robots have a rather 
complicated relationship. In addition, there are politicians and interest groups who use risk 
knowledge to further their agendas, risk managers who implement risk-knowledge-based 
decisions, and employees, students, servicemen, and many other categories of people who 
are required to act pursuant to these decisions. 
3.4. Heterogeneity of risks and contexts in the energy sector 
3.4.1. Not all risks are alike 
Each of the three major theories of risk perception reviewed above suffers from the 
shortcomings common to virtually any social theory aimed at universal application. As I 
noted in the previous section, these principal shortcomings can be attributed to a failure to 
recognize the heterogeneity of risks and the contexts in which these risks are handled. 
Simply put, not all risks are created equal, even though many risk professionals and risk 
scholars treat them as if they are. In the 1990s and early 2000s, recognition of systemic risks 
dealt a major blow to the one-size-fits-all approach to understanding risk. Rosa, Renn, and 
McCright (2014, p. 124) associate traditional risks with 'obvious negative physical effects' 
that are 'typically bounded'. They use the risk of a school fire to provide an illustration of 
traditional risks. The scholars note that although the fire might result in direct loss to the 
facility and disrupt children's education, due to modem technology and safety systems in 
place the blaze and economic damage is unlikely to spread beyond the school building: 
When fire breaks out at school, safety equipment, sprinklers, and routine fire drills 
(some of the basic tools of conventional risk management) are likely to be 
effective. With appropriate safeguards in place, the odds are minimal that lives 
will be lost or even than anyone will suffer serious physical harm. What is more 
the economic cost is almost certain to be limited by insurance claims and 
contingency budgets, while disaster planning probably means that the lives of 
teachers and students are disrupted for no more than a few days (2014, pp. 124-
125). 
In contrast, it took an errant spark in Thomas Farriner's bakery on Pudding Lane in 1666 to 
engulf 436 acres within London and destroy 13,200 houses and 87 churches (Museum of 
London, 2016). 
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Systemic risks do not end with a probability of physical damage. According to the IRGC, 
systemic risk is 'embedded in the larger context of societal, financial and economic 
consequences and is at the intersection between natural events, economic, social and 
technological developments and policy-driven actions.' (IRGC, 2008a, p. 4) Kaufman and 
Scott's simple but encompassing definition of systemic risk captures its essence: 'the risk of 
or probability of breakdowns in an entire system, as opposed to breakdowns in individual 
parts or components, and is evidenced by co-movements ( correlation) among most or all 
parts.' 38 (Kaufman & Scott, 2003, p. 372) 
One of the first comprehensive attempts to conceptualize systemic risks is associated with 
the 2003 OECD report entitled 'Emerging Risks in the 21st Century'. The report targeted 
threats to the human and natural environments and identified the following major 
characteristics of systemic risks: (1) complexity, (2) uncertainty, (3) ambiguity, and (4) ripple 
effects (OECD, 2003). Klinke and Renn (2006, p. 3) elaborate that complexity refers to the 
difficulty of 'matching' the overabundance of adverse effects with potentially affected parties 
and objects. This includes the deciphering of casual relationships and identifying feedback 
loops. Uncertainty refers to the evidentiary deficiencies that eventually weaken the cause and 
effect chain. Ambiguity presumes the presence of various legitimate interpretations of the 
same set of data. Finally, 'ripple effects' denote the prospect of secondary impacts that may 
be separated by time and space from the primary consequences; ripple effects may extend 
into political, social, and economic dimensions (Id). 
3.4.2. Risky energy business 
Modem energy systems, from the all-encompassing global energy system to regional and 
sectorial systems, such as provincial electric power grids, constitute breeding grounds for 
systemic risks. There are three main reasons for this. 
38 
Although Kaufman and Scott came up with the definition in the context of risks to financial systems, it cuts across different sectors and disciplines. 
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First, by virtue of being an instrumental good, energy is a prerequisite for the lion's share of 
goods and services produced in the global economy (Sovacool, et al., 2013). For example, 
without electricity, a garment factory in Bangladesh, an auto conveyer line in Germany, and 
a local school in Russia would not be able to stitch a shirt, assemble a car, or provide modern 
education to a student. 
Second, in its current configuration, primary energy is a global but unevenly distributed good. 
Because fossil fuels and nuclear power continue to provide over 86% of the total global 
energy supply, and oil, gas, and uranium are allocated unevenly in the planet's crust, the 
world is divided into primary energy producers and consumers (IBA, 2015a). If we add 
countries that have production but not refining capacity, we end up with a complex and 
interdependent international network, in which energy flows in the most improbable patterns. 
Third, the modern-day global energy system is dominated by centralized infrastructure 
(Sovacool, et al., 2013). The world gets the bulk of its energy from power plants capable of 
providing electricity to entire cities and even countries; extensive power grids and trunk 
pipelines covering millions of kilometres of real estate; and rapidly dwindling giant oil and 
gas fields. Energy planners have been chanting the 'economies of scale' mantra since the first 
wave of electrification. Although the first electrical power stations resembled what is now 
known as 'community' and 'distributed' generation, and despite increasing attempts to revive 
distributed and community generation, 'large' and 'top-down' continue to serve as the energy 
sector's operating terms (Id). 
Energy projects that have over $1 billion in capital expenditures, known in the energy studies 
literature as 'mega projects', epitomize systemic risks arising in the energy sector. 39 This is 
largely due to the amplifying of the centralization effect by enlarging the size, scale, and 
scope of the overarching energy system. For example, ensuring a steady flow of oil through 
the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System (TAPS) has become a central objective of the Alaska state 
government (Baker & Sidortsov, 2014 ). The pipeline's capacity is 2 million barrels of oil per 
day and oil producers had little problem filling most of it when the pipeline began operating 
39 
Van de Graaf and Sovacool designate such a mega projects as 'international' ifit spans over at least three 
countries. (Van de Graaf & Sovacool, 2014, p. 16) 
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in 1977. However, the actual throughput dipped below one million barrels a day in 2003 and 
has been on a steady decline ever since (EIA, 2015b). As a result of the low flow and frigid 
temperatures, TAPS requires frequent and costly maintenance, which in turn affects the 
profitability of the oil it delivers. Meanwhile, state revenues from oil activities, a significant 
portion of which have hinged on the successful operation of TAPS, have accounted on 
average for 85 percent of the total state revenue (Alaska Oil and Gas Association, 2016). 
Thus, should oil stop flowing through TAPS in the foreseeable future, most if not all state 
government services, including education, healthcare, and law enforcement, will be at risk of 
systemic failure. 
Flyvbjerg, Bruzelius, and Rothengatter (2003, p. 3) highlight the mega-project paradox: 
despite all but certain cost overruns and lower than expected return, mega-projects are 
becoming an ever more popular infrastructure solution. As noted above, the Russian 
leadership has been particularly keen on promoting energy mega projects, including those 
located in the Arctic and Subarctic. Consider the costs of the three energy projects used as 
examples in this thes'is listed in Table 12. 
Table 12: Capital costs of the three projects f eatured in the study (Lunden & Fjaertoft, 2014) 
(Chow & Cuyler, 2015) 
Project Cost 
Prirazlomnoe $5.7 billion 
YamalLNG $26.9 billion (estimated) 
Power of Siberia $77 billion ( estimated) 
The figures for the Prirazlomnoe and Yamal LNG projects do not include significant 
expenditures by the Russian government in the form of supporting infrastructure and forgiven 
debts. For example, the total cost of Prirazlomnoe excludes the expenditures incurred from 
the original prospecting and field discovery phase from 1989 through 2002 (Lunden & 
Fjaertoft, 2014). 
The long-term commitment required to bring a mega project online and complete it extends 
the timeline in which adverse consequences can occur. As mentioned above, Prirazlomnoe 
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was discovered in 1989, came online almost a quarter century later in December 1989, and 
will likely remain in production for the next 15-25 years (Sidortsov, 2012). Yamal LNG, 
labelled by one of its participants, Total, a 'mega project' has a shorter development history 
but might extend even father into the future. Although the South Tambeyskoye field was 
discovered in 1974, the investment decision to proceed with the project was only made in 
2013 (Lunden & Fjaertoft, 2014, p. 10). The first LNG shipments are scheduled for 2017 and 
will occur pursuant to 15- to 20-year contracts, similar to the contract with China National 
Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) (Novatek, 2014). The Power of Siberia taps into the 
Kovyktinskoe and Chayandinskoe fields to be developed specifically to serve the Power of 
Siberia. The fields were discovered in 1987 and 1989, respectively, but the investment 
decision to develop them in conjunction with the development of the unified gas transmission 
system (GTS) was not made until 2012 (Gazprom, 2016e). As noted in Chapter 2, in May 
201'4, the Russian leadership announced the signing of a 30-year contract between Gazprom 
and CNPC to deliver 38 hem of natural gas per year to Northern China (Id.). 
Figure 17: Yamat LNG: A mega project (Total, 2016) 
ll-lREE PROJECTS ROll.ED INTO 










The aforementioned financial largesse and long-term commitment do not mean that any risk 
arising out of energy-related activities is of a systemic kind. Moreover, not all risks associated 
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with construction of an energy mega-project are systemic. For example, it appears that most 
of the risks considered as part of the environmental assessment process for waste disposal 
sites serving the Power of Siberia pipeline fall into the traditional risk category. As I explore 
in Chapter 5, these risks do not impact the entire pipeline transportation system. Granted, an 
improperly constructed and operated waste disposal site might impact the local ecosystem, 
but juxtaposed with the school fire example, the existing technologies and safety protocols 
can all but guarantee that such impacts will not come to fruition. 
In contrast, a systemic risk must impact a system as a whole. This does not have to be the 
energy system from which the risk arises. As I show in this thesis, construction of an energy 
project may impact the socio-economic system prevalent in the entire region or even country. 
In addition, because of the instrumentality of energy, the risk may impact a system or systems 
that do not physically interact with each other. In this respect, the farther the risk is located 
in the 'instrumentality chain' the less likely it will impact the system as a whole. For example, 
the systemic risk effect posed by a faulty transformer powering a residential city block is 
very different than that of powering an offshore oil platform in Arctic waters. In addition, the 
more ability a risk has to disrupt the ties between functionally different parts of the energy 
system, the bigger systemic impact it has. For example, a navigation error while crossing the 
Atlantic will likely have a lesser systemic effect than an error made while passing through 
the Strait of Hormuz. As one of the world's main energy choke points, Strait of Hormuz is 
the waterway through which passes approximately 80 percent of Japan's and South Korea's 
oil supply and 40 percent of China's total energy supply (Yergin, 2011, p. 4571). Also, the 
bigger the source from which a risk originates, the more severe and broader the systemic 
effect will likely be. An engineering problem that results in shutting down a community solar 
farm would have a much different systemic effect than a similar problem resulting in the 
shutdown of a 1 GW nuclear power plant. Finally, not all accident-related risks are of the 
systemic kind. A risk does not need to lead to an accident to be considered systemic. Certain 
slow and subtle processes originating in the energy sector have had a much more pronounced 
effect on a variety of systems than the malfunctioning of a nuclear reactor or a minor oil spill. 
Most if not all energy sector undertakings highlighted in Chapter 2, including the three mega 
projects, are complex in nature. Proponents of the development prefer to focus on the net 
108 
positive effect; the distribution of risks rarely becomes a part of the sales pitch. For example, 
construction of an oil pipeline can translate into additional tax revenue for a remote region. 
However, it can also mean a blocked reindeer migration route, ensuing demise of a herd, and 
economic marginalization of the people who rely on it. 
The socio economic impacts of the Russian oil miracle serve as a pnme example of 
uncertainty surrounding risks associated with the energy sector. Russia's return from the 
economic doldrums was attributed to increased production from Siberia's legacy fields in the 
2000s. However, the drop in the price of oil in 2014-2015, and the resulting economic crisis, 
points to a lack of reliable long-term data that can serve as the foundation for comprehensive 
and conclusive analysis. As a result, some commentators celebrate the 'well of stability' 
(CPA, 2013), while others compare the Russian economy's addiction to oil production to that 
of an intravenous drug user (Nikolaev, 2014). Therefore, the same data set are often 
interpreted differently, reinforcing the ambiguity of risks arising in connection with oil and 
gas development in the Russian Arctic and Subarctic. 
Perhaps the most visible characteristic of systemic risks in the energy sector is ripple effects. 
One does not need to look further than the changes in an oil producing state's social fabric 
following a significant drop in oil price. Not just the energy industry, but also all of society 
suddenly looks deflated, discouraged, and otherwise unoptimistic about its future. Dmitry 
Medvedev, while serving as Russia's President, succinctly yet accurately captured the reach 
of systemic risks arising in conjunction with energy sector activities, noting that their effect 
extends well beyond 'bankrupting a company' and can 'bring the entire country to its knees' 
(President, 27 May 2010). 
3.4.3. Different risks - divergent approaches 
Yet despite the vast range and variety of risks, many scholars fail to recognize such apparent 
heterogeneity and diversity. Sunstein (2002) (2003), who is regarded as one of the premier 
legal scholars on the topic of risk and a champion of a 'rational' approach to dealing with 
risk, ignores this rather important detail. Instead, he focuses on quantitative attributes of risks 
and downplays the importance of qualitative categories (Kahan, et al., 2005-2006). Sunstein 
is not alone in this approach. During the course of this study, I spoke to risk scholars and 
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professionals who would only consider a conversation featuring numbers, ratios, and 
percentages to be within the realm of risk. 
Preoccupation with measuring risks is one of many problems related to exammmg a 
particular risk outside of the social, economic, and political contexts in which it arises. For 
example, consider the reoccurring statement that experts rate risks lower than do lay people 
(Sjoberg, 2002). This statement presumes that all risks must be rated. One would argue, 
though, that risks should first be identified, including those that are hard or even impossible 
to measure. The imperative to measure risk, and the corresponding fixation on calculating it, 
is perplexing. Even economists recognize non-calculable forms of contingency. Keynes 
acknowledged that in regard to certain matters, there is 'no scientific basis on which to form 
any calculable probability whatever. We simply do not know.' (Keynes, 1937, p. 114) To 
paraphrase a fundamental legal principle, ignorantiajuris non excusat (ignorance of the law 
is no excuse), ignorance of risk - on the basis of quantification difficulties - does not excuse 
one from the potential adverse consequences. For the reasons stated above, systemic risks are 
particularly difficult to grasp quantitatively, but this does not mean that they do not exist. 
Yet it is the ability of risk experts to 'convert' uncertainty into what Callon, Lacoumes, and 
Barthe (2011, p. 19) call 'objective probability' that serves as the main argument for their 
superiority over lay-people. The shortcomings of this argument were amplified by major 
technological disasters in the 1980s, including several catastrophic accidents in the energy 
sector, and raised a great deal of public scepticism over the dominance of experts in the risk 
realm. For example, in the aftermath of the Chernobyl accident, Beck's Risk Society: 
Towards a New Modernity (1992), which among other things challenges the expert-centric 
status quo, became a bestseller within six months of its release, a rare achievement for any 
scholarlybook(2014,p. 71). 
Two major accidents involving oil and gas activities have ensured that the entire energy 
sector was at the forefront of the debate over lay-people versus risk experts. The explosion 
at the Piper Alpha platform off the coast of Scotland claimed 165 lives (Education Scotland, 
2016), and the grounding of the Exxon Valdez tanker resulted in 257,000 barrels of North 
Slope oil being spilled into Prince William Sound off the Alaskan coast (EVOSTC, 2016). 
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The public concern manifested in protests, which in tum forced governments to make policy 
changes. Sweden, Italy, Austria, and Switzerland opted to phase out their nuclear programs 
(Agarwal, 2003, p. 107). The Piper Alpha accident expanded risk analysis from the purely 
technical realm to management practices, which paved the way for the safety case approach 
to regulating offshore oil and gas activities. The Oil Pollution Act, enacted in the aftermath 
of the Exxon Valdez accident, brought in a new liability regime, thereby changing the 
financial foundation of risk management of offshore hydrocarbon exploration and extraction 
in the United States (Bosselman et al., 2010, pp. 336-340). 
This wave of public outrage brought the two sides of the debate into a dialogue on both the 
policy and academic levels. Yet when the 'risk crisis' passed, public concern over major 
technological risks faded. In addition, the high cost of first attempts to handle risk inclusively 
forced governments to tum back to the 'efficient' experts. These factors all but nullified many 
attempts to achieve a consensus in the expert versus lay-people debate (Rosa, et al., 2014, 
pp. 33-42). Although an occasional major accident, such as the Deepwater Horizon blowout 
or Fukushima-Daichi reactor meltdown, reignites the debate, these isolated 'fires' are yet to 
provoke the public response akin to that of the Risk Society era. As a result, experts appear 
to have a firm grip on the risk steering wheel. 
However, it would be a severe understatement to say that the reconciliatory effort of the 
1980s and 1990s had no effect on how scholars and decision-makers approach handling risk. 
One of the more important realizations was that conventional risk analysis, which consists of 
risk assessment, risk management, and risk communication, lacks the capacity for taking a 
broad view of potential risks (Id). Such a view is necessary even for proponents of risk expert 
supremacy because it creates a forum in which multiple qualitatively divergent data points 
and causal ties and connections can be examined, evaluated, and possibly linked together. As 
a result, different groups of risk experts responsible for creating different data points and 
casual connections lack the ability to reconcile such differences in a transparent, as well as 
socially and politically acceptable, manner. Hence, in the mid-l 990s, a plausible platform for 
handling systemic risks emerged in the form of integrating analysis and deliberation (Id pp. 
139-149). 
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This hastened the arrival of risk governance, a more refined model for handling risks. It 
represented a qualitative step away from the expert-centric version of analysis and 
deliberation model by making non-experts legitimate actors in the process of handling risk. 
Most importantly, risk governance gave risk analysis much-needed social and political 
context, thereby extinguishing the artificial division of the world's population into experts 
and lay-people (IRGC, 2005). 
3.5. Risk governance framework 
Risk governance is based on the concept of collective decision-making. It draws upon the 
participation of a combination of both private and state actors, who are acting pursuant to 
formal and informal rules (Rosa, et al., 2014, pp. 151-159). It coalesces this collective 
decision-making with traditional risk analysis. As a result, risk analysis is integrated into 
applicable political, legislative, administrative, and corporate processes. It thus benefits from 
the additional controls and safeguards built into these processes. Risk governance brings into 
the process actors who can openly question and sometimes overrule experts on non-scientific, 
ethical, political, and legal grounds; it thus ostensibly challenges the hegemony of risk 
experts (Renn, 2006). 
The IRGC has been on the forefront of advancing both the theoretical and applied aspects of 
risk governance. This resulted in a creation of a holistic, flexible, and interdisciplinary risk 
governance framework. The IRGC Framework assigns equal significance to risk 
governance's 'conventional' elements (such as technical risk analysis) and its societal context 
(IRGC, 2005, p. 11 ). The contextual features are separated into two groups. The first group 
encompasses the relationships among and structure of the different actors who 'deal' with 
risks, their perception of such, and the adverse consequences the risks pose (Id.). The second 
group covers the style, culture, capacity, and imperatives of the entities and institutions 
involved in the risk governance process (Id.). The first group is assimilated into the risk 
process's 'conventional' elements, and the second group serves as a set of basic conditions 
for every risk-related decision (Id.). The symbiosis of the 'factual' and 'socio-cultural' 
dimensions of risks, as well as inclusive stakeholder participation lie at the foundation of the 
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IRGC Framework (Id. p. 8). Under the IRGC Framework, the risk process comprises five 
phases: pre-assessment (PA), appraisal (scientific risk assessment and concern assessment), 
characterization and evaluation (C&E), management, and communication (Id p. 5). 
The first phase, risk PA, generally intends to obtain a comprehensive portrait of the risk. The 
following example from the Classical Antiquity that Walsh (2013) uses in Scientists as 
Prophets perfectly captures PA's essence. When a potential danger was spotted, citizens of 
ancient Athens would often consult with the Oracle at Delphi. During the public debate, the 
Athenian citizens would argue whether to ask the Oracle and, if yes, what questions should 
be taken up to Mount Parnassus. As a result, a real-life challenge would be converted into an 
epistemological inquiry and taken to an expert. 
Correspondingly, PA relies on non-experts to obtain the initial snapshot of risk. This phase 
chiefly aims to engage the public 'to capture both the variety of issues that stakeholders and 
society may associate with a certain risk as well as existing indicators, routines, and 
conventions that may prematurely narrow down, or act as a filter for, what is going to be 
addressed as risk.' (IRGC, 2005, p. 13) Groups of actors may differ as to what they perceive 
as a risk. PA includes two sub-phases that are not necessarily sequential: (1) framing risks 
and defining relevant issues, and (2) inventorying institutional and organizational capacity 
(Id.). The first sub-phase identifies, frames (identify dimensions), and discovers the extent to 
which the risks at issue can be identified; it also determines the imminence of existing risk 
indicators. The second sub-phase identifies pertinent institutions, stakeholders, and scientific 
methods, and then identifies their de Jure and de facto role and place in risk PA. It does not, 
however, end after a technology or activity in question is assigned to risk appraisal and 
management. The technology or activity is often "sent back" to PA, thus creating a feedback 
loop (IRGC, 2008a, p. 8). 
The second phase of the risk process under the IRGC Framework- risk appraisal- is divided 
into a 'scientific risk assessment' and a 'concern assessment'. IRGC provides the following 
definition of the former: 'a conventional assessment of the risk's factual, physical and 
measurable characteristics including the probability of it happening.' (IRGC, 2008a, p. 10) 
The IRGC defines the latter as 'a systematic analysis of the associations and perceived 
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consequences (benefits and risks) that stakeholders, individuals, groups or different cultures 
may associate with a hazard or cause of hazard.' (Id) The bifurcation of risk appraisal into 
scientific risk assessment and concern assessment is one of the IRGC's many innovations 
aimed at socializing risk analysis. However, none are more important for the purposes of this 
thesis than risk PA and the third phase of IRGC's risk process, C&E. Together with risk PA, 
risk C&E transforms risk analysis into risk governance. 
The main purpose of risk C&E is to 'ensure that the evidence based on scientific facts is 
combined with a thorough understanding of societal values when making the sometimes 
controversial judgement.' (Id p. 12) Reverting back to the Athenian analogy, whereas during 
PA the Athenian citizens would argue whether to approach the Oracle and what questions to 
ask her, during risk C&E they would debate a threshold question of what to do with her 
(usually cryptic) message (Walsh, 2013). Often they would reach out to the Oracle again, 
asking for additional information or clarification of the previous prophecy. Perhaps the most 
famous example of such a repeated inquiry comes from the events preceding the naval battle 
of Salamis in 480 BC, as described by Herodotus. The Pythia's first prophecy all but 
destroyed Athens' hopes to save their city-state: 
Leave your homes and the lofty heights girded by your city. 
The head is unstable, the trunk totters; nothing-
Not the feet below, nor the hands, nor anything in between-
Nothing endures; all is doomed. Fire will bring it down, 
Fire and bitter War, hastening in a Syrian chariot (Mistriotis, 2014). 
Fortunately, the Athenians asked for another prophecy and received a more encouraging yet 
equally cryptic reply that included references to a wooden wall and retreating from the 
advancing Persian forces before confronting them. After deliberation, the Athenians 
ultimately interpreted the 'wooden wall' as their navy and decided to abandon the city and 
avoid fighting the overwhelmingly superior Persian forces on land. The rest is history, and 
history tells us that the Athenians' effort to characterize and evaluate the Pythia's utterance, 
which they believed was the best evidence they had, was a successful one. Not only did the 
victory at Salamis halt the Persian advance to Greece, but it also resulted in the city-state's 
dominance of the Eastern Mediterranean for the next century (Id). 
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I am yet to see this example given in the context ofrisk governance; even Walsh (2013) uses 
it to illustrate the role of science advisers and only tangentially relates the subject to risk. 
However, at its core the deliberation process in which the ancient Greeks engaged around 
480 BC included at least some of the following questions that the IRGC ascribes to risk C&E: 
• What are the societal, economic, and environmental benefits and risks? 
• Are there impacts on quality of life? 
• Are there ethical issues to consider? 
• Is there a possibility of substitution? If so, how do the risks compare? 
• Does the choice of a particular technology have an impact on the risk? 
How? 
• What are the possible options for risk compensation? For risk reduction? 
• What are the societal values and norms for making judgements about 
tolerability and acceptability? 
• Do any stakeholders - government, business, or other - have 
commitments or other reasons for wanting a particular outcome of the 
risk governance process? (IRGC, 2008a, p. 12) 
A diehard risk 'objectivist' would argue that these questions all but exclude probability and 
severity and are thus hardly relevant to risk analysis. Yet even assuming this is true, these 
questions, especially those that are related to tolerability and acceptability of risk are 
foundational for the overarching purpose of technical risk analysis - making informed 
decisions about matters that are of value to people. 
Finally, regarding the fourth and fifth phases of risk process, risk management and risk 
communication, the IRGC defines them as follows. Risk management 'involves the design 
and implementation of the actions and remedies required to avoid, reduce, transfer or retain 
the risks.' (IRGC, 2008a, p. 13) Risk communication supports risk management by 'creating 
trust' in it (Id. p. 15). 
One of the criticisms of the IRGC framework is its excessive rigidity. Klinke and Renn 
(2012), for example, recognize this shortcoming and offer a more flexible approach. Under 
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their model, there is greater opportunity to adapt to the risk at hand. Their model also allows 
for more integration with available competences to manage the risks. Klinke and Renn 
rename and slightly redefine risk governance phases to further emphasise the social aspect 
of risk. Their framework consists of the following phases, which roughly correspond to the 
five phases identified by the IRGC: pre-estimation, interdisciplinary estimation, C&E, 
management, and monitoring and control (2012). Although the phases are positioned in a 
cyclical sequence, this order is not strict. This means that a risk problem does not have to go 
through all the phases if at a given stage it is determined that a step back to any of the previous 
phases is appropriate. In addition, because all the phases are integrated, some accompany the 
entire process, such as monitoring and control. 
Yet the most welcoming innovation of the modifications Klinke and Renn (2012) offer is 
their emphasis on the capacity for dealing with risk. Such capacity includes institutional 
means, financial and technical resources, human resources, and social capital (Id. p. 58). The 
latter group is especially important for ensuring appropriate integrative capacity to handle 
risk (Rosa, et al., 2014, p. 158). However, as I elaborated above, it is difficult to incorporate 
risk experts representing various disciplines, government officials of different agencies and 
jurisdictional levels, and local and national public into the decision-making process. 
'Difficulties arise when a particular problem framing is presumed in appraisal,' note Owens, 
Rayner, and Bina (2004, p. 1946), 'though it is actually ( or potentially) controversial.' (Id.) 
Certainly, in the world of energy, associated risks are not only complex, but also very 
controversial. For example, the debate over the future of oil and gas development in the 
Russian Arctic featured 30 Greenpeace activists attempting to board the Prirazlomnaya 
production platform. The protesters were arrested by Russian law enforcement officials and 
charged with piracy (BBC, 2013). Indeed, finding an energy sector-related activity, 
technology, or issue that is free from controversy is a difficult task. 
Difficult or not, bringing all relevant actors into the decision-making process is beneficial if 
not necessary. This concept is known in the literature as inclusive risk governance (Renn & 
Schweizer, 2009, p. 174). Inclusive risk governance further undermines the supremacy of 
risk experts, as it varies the typology of actors engaged in risk governance. The concept 
presupposes that relevant stakeholders ( and not risk experts) bring to the process topical 
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knowledge and values that are necessary to an equitable, efficient, effective, and socially 
acceptable decision about risk (Id.). According to Engelen et al. and Rauschmayer et al., the 
interaction among stakeholder groups can lead to 'adequate representation of pluralism of 
perspectives, knowledge, claims, and values' (Id.). 
Renn and Schweizer note that the more controversial an issue is, and the broader it is in both 
geographic scale and substantive scope, the harder it is to reach closure (i.e. a joint statement 
or agreement) (Id.) Owens, Rayner, and Bina (2004, p. 1950) acknowledge the same problem 
with 'deliberative and inclusive processes', stating that they appear 'difficult, expensive, time 
consuming, and (to the discomfort of decisionmakers) potentially inconclusive.' The scholars 
go on to imply that context should govern the choice between or the role of the technical and 
deliberate models (Id. p. 1951). Considering the complex and coercive nature of the risks at 
issue, along with the overarching purpose of risk PA, as well as risk C&E, deliberative and 
inclusive participation appear to be not only appropriate but necessary (Id.). 
Deliberative and inclusive participation in matters determining the fate of energy mega 
projects, akin to those used as examples in this study, pushes the boundaries of risk 
governance into a qualitatively new realm. As Callon, Lascoumes, and Barthe (2011, p. 11) 
state, such threshold matters call for the invention of 'new modalities of democracy that can 
pick up the challenge of the sciences and technologies'. They recognize the importance of 
legitimacy and responsibility when dealing with risk and call for 'democratization of 
democracy', which can ultimately lead to 'the people's control of their destiny'. 
3.6-. Conclusion 
As Renn, et al. (2001, p. 21) note, in the absence of a universal theory of risk, people will 
have to utilize 'a patchwork of different concepts'. Although such an approach might alarm 
academics dedicated to defending their theoretical turf, in a policy setting this can be not only 
an acceptable course of action, but also a preferred one. As I highlighted throughout the 
chapter, academic clashes over what constitutes risk - epitomized in the policy context as the 
expert-versus-laypeople debate - revolve around epistemological certainty. However, even a 
cursory investigation of these debates' circumstances and policy consequences reveals that 
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there is more to it than the question of whose knowledge is superior. The true essence of the 
debate - who is in charge of making decisions about risk - also serves as a pathway into the 
ontology of risk in the context of collective decision-making - the dynamic between power 
and knowledge. Given the particular heterogeneity of risks associated with the global energy 
system, including the presence of systemic risks, the plurality of approaches to handling risks 
is especially important. Risk governance provides a forum for hosting such a plurality while 
steering the process towards an inclusive and comprehensive solution. 
In this chapter, I made the case for a plurality of approaches to handling risk in the energy 
sector, under the umbrella of the risk governance theory. I began with taking the Renn, et al. 
(2001) 'patchwork of different concepts' idea and providing a sectorial example of why a 
single theory of risk perception is unlikely to explain risk governance processes in complex 
environments. I also strengthened Horlick-Jones and Sime's (2004) argument for a 
contextual approach to studying risk in the context of decision-making, and contributed to 
the literature on energy megaprojects risks . I did so by noting the coexistence of simple and 
systemic risks in the energy sector and identifying the following three factors contributing to 
the prevalence of systemic risks: energy as a prerequisite good, uneven geographic 
distribution of primary energy producers and consumers, and high concentration and 
centralization of modem energy systems. In addition, I contributed to the development of the 
risk governance theory in general, and the IRGC risk governance framework in particular, 
by highlighting political certainty (Walsh, 2013) as an essential concept of the risk 
governance process. Most importantly, I laid out a theoretical foundation for the analysis 
contained in the following chapters. 
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4. Rules of Risk Governance: Empirical Framework 
4.1. Governance, government, and law 
In the previous chapter, I stressed the importance of the contextual side of risk governance. 
In this chapter, I explore the socio-legal context in which risks posed by oil and gas activities 
in the Russian Arctic and Subarctic are governed. More specifically, I first establish a 
theoretical connection among governance, government, and the principal means by which 
government operates, law. Second, I match the types of decisions about oil and gas 
development to the risk governance phases during which they occur. Third, I take a broad 
view of the Russian national legal system and determine which parts are primarily utilized in 
handling risks arising during oil and gas activities. Although the overarching goal of this 
chapter is to identify the scope of the applicable policy, legal, and regulatory regime, I also 
aim at contributing to the literature on governance of oil and gas in Russia, as well as to the 
risk governance literature. 
While delivering a keynote speech titled 'Russia in the Arctic' at the January 2014 Arctic 
Frontiers conference, Russia's Ambassador at Large and Representative to the Arctic Council 
Anton Vasiliev paused to comment on the increased use of the term 'governance' in the 
Arctic policy discourse (Arctic Frontiers, 2014). 'In Russian, "governance" means 
"pravlenie" or "ruling"', remarked the Ambassador, 'and no one rules the Arctic alone.' 
(Vasiliev, 2014) According to Vasiliev, the term is synonymous with the word 'government', 
and should thus be deemed redundant. The ambassador attributed the term's rise to academics 
and the media, pointing out that both camps 'create problems where they do not exist' (/d.). 
The concept of governance embraced by academics and the mass media appeared to be a 
particularly sore subject for the ambassador; during the break, I overheard him fuming in 
Russian, 'Dade/at im nechego!' ('They really have nothing better to do!') (Id.). 
It is safe to say that the Ambassador and I are unlikely to become fast friends, as this thesis 
is predominately concerned with governance. The same is true for a growing contingent of 
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social science scholars who are contributing to the development of the governance concept. 
The idea of governance, especially in the context of international relations, is having its 
moment in the academic world. As Barnett and Duvall (2004, p. 1) observe, it has attained 
'near-celebrity status'. 
To a certain extent, though, the Russian diplomat is right. Traditionally, the terms governance 
and government were virtually synonymous. Finer provides the following indicia of 
government: 'the activity or process of governing or governance', 'a condition of ordered 
rule', 'those people charged with the duty of governing or "governors'", and 'the manner, 
method or system by which a particular society is governed' (Rhodes, 1996, p. 652). Yet as 
of late, the term governance has broadened its reach to include corporate governance, socio-
cybernetic systems, and self-organizing networks among other things (Id pp. 652-653). 
The term's assent to popularity began in the 1980s among development practitioners and 
scholars. It reached prominence because of an intellectual revolt against the dominance of 
policy theories built around a central actor: the government or the market. Both of these 
theory streams see power structured in a hierarchical manner, leaving little room for 'odd' 
actors such as inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations, citizen groups and 
movements that are not formally organized, and quasi-governmental private entities (van 
Asselt & Renn, 2011, p. 434). Of course, these actors do not emerge out of nowhere. Various 
political clubs and societies, secret and otherwise, have been involved in deciding collective 
fates since the dawn of times. The Dutch East India Company, for example, formally a trading 
enterprise, had its own army and coined its own money (van Elderen, 2016). However, it was 
not until the 1980s that the social sciences experienced a long-overdue Kuhnian paradigm 
shift and acknowledged the existence of a more horizontal allocation of power in societies 
featuring a multitude of actors (Kuhn, 1962). 
The pendulum swung too far in the other direction, prompting some scholars argue in favour 
of removing government from the concept of governance altogether (Rosenau, 1992) 
(Rosenau, 1995). Although instances of governance without government are possible, one 
should be careful approaching this postulate outside the context of a particular situation. As 
I show throughout this thesis, a meaningful discussion of the governance of virtually any type 
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of business organization must include at least a few remarks about government intervention, 
usually through legal means. Even something as benign as a routine corporate action 
'papered' through a boilerplate resolution cannot violate the laws of a nation in which the 
company in question is doing business. The law of business associations (also known as 
company law, corporate law, and corporations law) provides broad discretion to corporate 
officers, directors, and owners, but it does so within certain limits. And if such an officer, 
director, or owner acts beyond these limits, an interested party, including the government in 
some cases, has the right to employ the judicial and executive machinery to curtail the action. 
Government intervention in matters requiring distribution of resources and/or their 
development all but shatters the myth of 'governance without government' in business 
organizations belonging to the extractive industry. Even in the case of private ownership of 
mineral rights, the government plays a significant role in shaping conditions under which the 
resource is explored, developed, and extracted. For example, in the United States, an oil and 
gas company that just secured the right to a mineral resource via a private lease is still 
required to comply with many government-imposed restrictions, such as mandatory pooling 
and unitization, as well as zoning restrictions (Bosselman et al., 2010, pp. 462 - 465). 
The U.S. example is an exception, as in the vast majority of national jurisdictions, including 
Russia, mineral resources are owned publically (Sidortsov & Sovacool, 2014). In addition to 
protecting the public interest in environmental and socio-economic matters, the government 
also acts as a representative of the state's citizenry in mineral resource distribution and 
allocation. Correspondingly, its role in the governance of oil and gas activities expands 
drastically. Therefore, an argument can be made that resource management could have 
served as a more appropriate theoretical framework for this study. Although this argument is 
not without merit, a governance framework serving as both approach and observation is more 
suitable for this study due to the following two reasons. First, the modem oil and gas 
business, especially in the global energy system context, resembles a complex and closely 
intertwined web of government and non-government actors that act pursuant to norms, some 
of which are adopted and enforced by non-government bodies. Second, selecting a more 
vertical and hierarchical resource management framework would have limited the scope of 
my inquiry into the concept of social power. Third, a resource management approach would 
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have shifted the focus of my analysis from risk PA and C&E that are essential for determining 
the policy, legal and regulatory setting of risk governance of oil and gas activities in Russia. 
Stoker (1998, p. 17) captures the essence of governance as a concept that is 'ultimately 
concerned with creating the conditions for ordered rule and collective action'. In the context 
of resource development, the government assumes the leading role in this process and does 
so via law. The notion of a 'government of laws and not men' serves as the de Jure foundation 
of a modem state. This is not to say that de facto actors, including government officials, act 
at times as if they were above the law. However, even in such instances, the law remains the 
standard by which their conduct is evaluated. Therefore, law should serve as a starting point 
for a conversation about the government's role in the governance of oil and gas activities. 
4.2. Identifying the bounds of risk regimes - applicable policy, legal, and 
regulatory frameworks 
4.2.1. Scoping and scaling risk governance rules 
Thus far, I have been building a case for why law should serve as a starting point for 
investigating power relations in risk governance. In this section, I elaborate on the scope of 
my further investigation by identifying the most relevant aspects of the legal and regulatory 
regime that 'host' various elements and phases of risk governance. 
As I mentioned in the introduction, the literature regarding the socio-legal aspect of risk 
governance is scarce but rapidly developing. Perhaps the most noteworthy example of 
scholarship that aims to place risk governance in the context of a national policy, legal, and 
regulatory regime is the aforementioned Aven and Renn's (2012) study of petroleum 
operations in Norway. The authors use the IRGC framework to examine issues related to oil 
and gas activities in the Norwegian sector of the Barents Sea. They term the endeavour a 
'thought experiment' intended to determine how the 'risk governance process of the year-
around petroleum activities in the Barents Sea' would be different if 'the Norwegian 
government had followed the guidelines of the IRGC' (Aven & Renn, 2012, p. 1573). 
Correspondingly, A ven and Renn utilize all five risk governance phases to assess the steps 
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taken by the Norwegian government to handle risks ansmg out of openmg new 
environmentally sensitive areas to oil and gas development. Aven and Renn's effort is indeed 
commendable, as they are among the first scholars attempting to ground risk governance 
theory in the context of a politically controversial, empirically comprehensive, and 
disciplinarily multi-faceted field. 
However, their work is not without shortcomings. One of the most glaring gaps of Aven and 
Renn's analysis is a very narrow view of risk governance rules. While describing the 
Norwegian government's organizational and institutional capacity to deal with the risks at 
hand during the PA stage, A ven and Renn note the following: 
An important component of the preassessment is the selection of conventions and 
procedural rules needed for the appraisal of the risk (i.e., for assessing the risk 
and the concerns related to it). Of particular importance are conventions that 
govern the risk assessment process. In this case the risk assessments were carried 
out according to fairly standard procedures in the engineering risk analysis 
community (Aven & Renn, 2012, pp. 1566-1567). 
A ven and Renn mention rules for risk appraisal only. Although the risk appraisal phase under 
the IRGC framework includes concern assessment, which is responsible for putting 
probabilities into social context, the rules for handling risk in other largely contextual phases 
are equally if not more important. Risk assessment conventions are instrumental for getting 
the epistemology right, and risk management conventions are important for ensuring that the 
scientific data and findings are applied in an effective and efficient manner. 
Because assessment of organizational and institutional capacity is one of the critical elements 
of PA, the rules governing it set forth the entire policy, legal, and regulatory structure in 
which the entire risk governance process occurs (IRGC, 2008a). In this sense, they act as 
meta-rules for risk governance. These rules also guide the decision-making process in ex-
ante threshold matters and help determine whether a matter even gets to the scientific risk 
assessment stage. In the context of this study, such threshold matters include, among other 
things, opening an area for exploration, granting the right to develop a hydrocarbon deposit, 
negotiating terms of a licence, and extraction. Rules governing categorisation and evaluation 
(C&E) are as important, if not more so, for decision-making in such threshold matters. Risk 
C&E is the phase of risk governance when actors make an informed decision based on the 
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scientific risk and concern assessment. This is when the risk-benefit analysis is performed, 
risk's tolerability is determined, and risk is deemed acceptable or not (Id). In the context of 
oil and gas policy in the Russian Arctic and Subarctic, this is the last opportunity to stop 
before making a multi-billion dollar and multi-year commitment to a project, activity, or 
technology. 
I do not suggest that risk appraisal and management rules are unimportant. After all, 
application of an inadequate standard may lead to a major accident. Rather my main point is 
that the rules governing PA and C&E serve as meta-rules for technical standards and 
conventions. Thus, no matter how adequate a standard or convention is, its adequacy will 
likely not matter if the standard or convention cannot be applied under the 'meta-rules' or if 
a decision is made despite the findings obtained under this standard or convention. 
Recognizing that risk governance rules vary based on scope and scale is essential for 
development of the risk governance concept. Equally important is recognizing that not all 
risks are regulated in a public policy domain. In fact, risk experts employed by the oil and 
gas industry would likely maintain that most if not all handling of risks occurs in a private 
realm (Senior Manager, HSE Russia, 2016). Such a view is understandable - the vast 
majority of integrated and service oil and gas companies assess and manage risk pursuant to 
ISO, API, and NORSOK standards (Barents 2020, 2012). Hood, Rothstein, and Baldwin 
(2003, p. 9) observe that 'many regulatory regimes involve some mixture of public and 
private and semi-public organizations.' In their analysis of nine risk regulation regimes, 
Hood, Rothstein, and Baldwin (2003, p. 11) specify carefully 'what level of"regime" is being 
analysed, and the kind of risk the regime addresses.' 
As I demonstrate in this thesis, most if not all significant decisions regarding up-, mid- and 
downstream oil and gas projects are either made in or approved by the Kremlin. This is not 
to say that federal executive agencies not located at Red Square, regional and municipal 
governments, and other branches of the Russian government play absolutely no role in risk 
governance of oil and gas activities in Russia. They do, but their role is secondary and 
auxiliary. Correspondingly, the scale or level of the policy, legal, and regulatory regime 
examined below is predominately federal. 
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4.2.2. Risk governance in the Russian policy, legal, and regulatory regime 
4.2.2.1. Prescription for risk 
In September 2013, I travelled to Oslo to give a lecture on HSE regulations at a closed 3-day 
industry event. The event brought mid-level engineers, managers, logistics specialists, and 
analysts who worked for two Norwegian companies involved in the oil and gas sector. Its 
main purpose was to increase the competency of up-and-coming decision-makers with the 
expectation that they would be in charge of managing various sides of their companies' 
operations in the Circumpolar Arctic (Oslo Event, 2013). 
My lecture covered three HSE regimes as they relate to offshore oil and gas operations in the 
Arctic: Greenland (Denmark), Norway, and Russia. While planning the lecture, I asked the 
organizers which countries were of the most interest to the participants. The organizers 
unequivocally indicated that they and the participants would very much like me to focus on 
Russia. During the Q&A session that followed my lecture, every single question concerned 
Russia. The participants' inquires ranged from updates on the most recent laws, rules, and 
regulations to issues concerning application of particular HSE provisions. 
In the evenings of days one and two, the participants were asked to work in teams that 
targeted a specific offshore region in the United States (Alaska), Norway (Barents Sea), 
Greenland/Denmark (Baffin Bay), and Russia (Sakhalin Island). 40 The specific location that 
each team focused on indicated that the sponsoring companies did not want the participants 
to concentrate on hypothetical locations. Rather, the organizers and their corporate bosses 
had specific oil and gas projects in mind (Oslo Event, 2013). 
Lecturers invited to the event, including me, were asked to stop by each group's 'war room' 
and answer the participants' questions. Although I was not made privy to the exact task that 
each team had, it became apparent that the teams were asked to develop multi-step business 
plans or strategies for potential oil and gas projects in the target areas. I visited the Teams 
Alaska, Barents, and Greenland, and received only a few clarifying questions. In contrast, 
40 
Geographically, Sakhalin Island is not located within the Arctic Circle. However, due to its severe climate conditions, the northern part of the island and the surrounding waters are deemed to have Arctic conditions. 
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my stop in the room occupied by Team Russia took over an hour. Similar to the Q&A session, 
the team members were interested in virtually every aspect of the licensing and permitting 
process, as well as liability for non-compliance with Russian law and operating requirements. 
Participants' inquiries stemmed from concern over operating in what they saw as complete 
regulatory chaos and lawlessness. In particular, many Team Russia members pondered how 
risk-centric procedures and practices of their Norwegian companies could be successfully 
implemented and complied within such an ambiguous and convoluted regulatory 
environment (Id.). 
The perception of the Russian legal and regulatory regime as a cross breed between the Wild 
West and Al Capone's Chicago is very common among energy professionals. Virtually every 
Norwegian, Swede, or Finn with whom I have spoken during the course of my fieldwork has 
seen corruption, intentional ambiguity, and unnecessary complexity as common features of 
the Russian legal and regulatory system. Risk regulation was a particularly sore subject for 
Norwegians who have worked with Russian companies and governmental officials (Senior 
Manager, Consulting Company, 2013). The collective opinion, comprising many comments 
and remarks (some sharply worded), is that there is very little risk regulation in the Russian 
oil and gas sector (Norwegian Oil and Gas Trade Association, 2013) (Russia Director, 
Consulting Company, 2014). 
Based on my analysis, this collective opinion is only partially true. As I will show throughout 
the remaining chapters, there are significant gaps in regulation of risk in connection with oil 
and gas activities in Russia, especially in comparison to the risk-based Norwegian regulatory 
system (Lind0e, Baram, & Paterson, 2012). Yet, according to a Russian-born and trained 
upper level manager at a Norwegian research and consulting company (the 'HSE Manager'), 
the main reason behind the collective opinion lies in the question of who regulates risk 
(Senior Manager, HSE Russia, 2014). Norway almost exclusively relies on the performance-
based model, which places ultimate control over handling risk on the operator (Lind0e, 
Baram, & Paterson, 2012). With nearly complete control, however, comes full responsibility. 
For example, in the case of an accident, an operator cannot use a faulty standard or technical 
regulation as defence. 
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In contrast, Russia follows the prescriptive model of regulation. Unlike the performance-
based model, prescriptive standards, rules, and regulations tell the operator exactly what to 
do - for example, what steps to follow, what thickness of steel to have on a drilling rig, and 
what kind of education a drilling foreman should have (Order N105, 2014). The so-called 
prede/'no dopustimye konsetratsii (maximum allowed concentrations) or POK play a 
particularly important role - as the HSE Manager put it, 'risk is included in POK' (Senior 
Manager, HSE Russia, 2014). If the operator checks all the boxes prescribed by the 
government, it is generally cleared of liability. A senior manager at a supermaj or who started 
his career in the oil and gas sector as a sailor on a service ship explained the difference to me 
in the following simple yet illustrative manner: 
Under the performance-based model, you are required to get a man out of the 
water in 4 minutes. So you figure out how to do it - and you'd better get it right, 
otherwise you will not be allowed to operate anymore. Under the prescriptive 
model, you need to have a required number of lifeboats, of the required 
specifications, the required number of men trained to operate this type of lifeboat, 
and you need to follow the required steps to get a man out of the water. Ultimately, 
it does not matter if you actually get the man of the water (Senior Manager, IOC, 
2013). 
The prescriptive model puts government as the ultimate authority on risk matters. Yet the 
prevalence of the prescriptive approach in risk regulation does not necessarily mean a top-
down approach where regional regulators and municipal authorities have no say. For 
example, the United States has relied almost exclusively on this approach to regulate offshore 
oil and gas activities until the introduction of the Safety Environmental Management Systems 
(SEMS) rule in the aftermath of the Oeepwater Horizon accident (Baker & Sidortsov, 2014). 
However, under the Coastal Zone Management Act, the federal government is required to 
solicit input from the state and local governments (Id.). Moreover, during the exploration and 
development and production stages of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act process, a 
consultation takes the form of a binding consistency review, meaning that an impacted 
coastal state can block exploration or production (Id.) . 
The prevalence of the performance-based approach does not translate into a situation where 
individual companies govern the risk realm without any public oversight. In Norway, for 
example, such oversight is premised on the so-called tripartite model featuring collaboration 
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among the industry, unions, and the Norwegian government (Bang & Thuestad, 2012). In 
addition, the general public has the ability to influence decisions over opening new areas to 
petroleum activities (Aven & Renn, 2012). 
Therefore, just as one should not judge a book by its cover, one should not draw far-reaching 
conclusions about a national risk legal and regulatory regime based on the prevalent 
regulatory model. For this reason, in the remainder of this chapter and in Chapters 5 and 7, I 
provide a broad overview of the Russian policy, legal, and regulatory framework with 
specific notations and references regarding regulation of risk. Because of this thesis's focus 
on the Arctic, I highlight the legal and regulatory areas relevant to the Russian leadership's 
ambitions in the region: expansion of the resource base via offshore exploration and 
extraction and expansion to new markets via pipelines and liquefied natural gas (LNG) 
projects. 
4.2.2.2. Applicable policy, legal, and regulatory framework 
Because of this study's focus on the ex-ante processes leading up to threshold decisions, I 
consider the operations component of the legal and regulatory decision-making process 
tangentially. This process includes enactment and implementation of standards and technical 
regulations. I provide a general overview of standards and technical regulations utilized for 
appraising and managing risks while exploring the overall institutional and organizational 
capacity of the Russian legal and regulatory framework to handle risks. 
4.2.2.2.1. Programmatic policy statements 
It would only be appropriate to start the discussion of the policy, legal, and regulatory 
framework governing risk in relation to Arctic oil and gas development in the Russian 
Federation where it is captured in the broadest terms. The Russian leadership appears to have 
a strong interest in having a programmatic statement on virtually every area of public policy 
regardless of whether it actually plans to act in furtherance of the enacted policy statement. 
This approach creates the appearance of control and order, although in reality administration 
of public affairs in Russia hardly resembles a well-oiled machine. 
128 
'The Energy Strategy of the Russian Federation for the Period Ending in 2030' is probably 
the most important document among energy policy-related programmatic statements from 
the Russian Federation (Directive NI 715-r, 2009). The document identifies Arctic oil and 
gas development, including development in the continental shelf, as a key component of 
Russia's economic future, or 'new economic infrastructure' (Id. art. 12). The Arctic 
continental shelf is mentioned some 26 times throughout the strategy (/d.). Other 
programmatic and policy documents that underscore the importance of the Arctic and 
Subarctic regions to Russia's economic development include: 'The Program for the 
Development of the Unified System of Extraction, Transportation of Gas and Gas Supply for 
Potential Gas Exports to Chinese Markets and Markets of Other Counties of the Asia-Pacific 
Region' (the 'Far East Gas Program') (Order N340, 2007) and 'On the Main Measures of 
Strengthening Russia's Positions in the Global Energy Sector for the Period Ending on 
January 1, 2016' (Directive N443-r, 2012). 
Interestingly, although Russian policy makers have put a great deal of importance on the 
continental shelf, they have never created a stand-alone program or strategy for the Artie 
continental shelf. Since 2006, the Ministry of Natural Resources and the Environment has 
written several drafts of the continental shelf strategy. However, the Government of the 
Russian Federation (the 'RF Government') did not approve 'The Strategy of Exploration and 
Exploitation of Oil and Gas Potential of the Russian Continental Shelf for the Period Ending 
in 2020' (Mazkov, 2008). Instead, it incorporated various continental shelf development 
provisions (including the Arctic continental shelf) into various Arctic- or otherwise energy-
related programmatic statements. 
In reality, doctrines, strategies, and programs specifically covering the energy sector often 
overlap with doctrines, strategies, and programs that apply to a specific region that has an 
energy component. There are two main documents that note the importance of Arctic 
hydrocarbon resources to the Russian Federation: 'The Foundations of the National Policy 
of the Russian Federation in the Arctic for the Period Ending in 2020 and Beyond' (Order 
Nl969-pr, 2008) and the more specific 'Strategy of the Arctic Zone Development and 
Ensuring National Security for the Period Ending in 2020' (Strategy of the Arctic Zone 
Development, 2013). Both identify the Arctic and the Arctic offshore in particular, as one of 
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the mam areas for large-scale economic development and for replenishing Russia's 
hydrocarbon reserves. 
Related to the Arctic-specific programmatic statements are those that target regions partially 
located in the Arctic. These include 'The Strategy of Socio-Economic Development of the 
Far East and Baikal Regions for the Period ending in 2025' (the 'Far East Strategy') 
(Directive N2094-r, 2009) and 'The Strategy of Socio-Economic Development of Siberia for 
the Period ending in 2020' (the 'Siberia Strategy') (Directive Nl 120-r, 2010). Remarkably, 
the Far East Strategy lists 'transportation support of the Arctic oil and gas fields, including 
those located on the continental shelf, and transport of oil and gas by sea' as the top objective 
of the Northern Sea Route development (Directive N2094-r, 2009). The Siberia Strategy lists 
'intensive mineral exploration and development of new deposits' as the top two priorities for 
the Arctic region, followed by environmental protection and support of indigenous peoples 
(Directive Nl 120-r, 2010). Interestingly, for the Northern (Subarctic) part of the region, the 
top priorities include: successful energy project development; construction of the Northern-
Russian transport corridor; extraction, including that of oil and gas; construction of pipelines 
leading to oil and gas deposits; and the construction and retrofitting of petrochemical plants 
(Id.). 
Many federal doctrines, strategies, and programs that do not have a specific geographic or 
sectorial reach have Arctic-specific provisions. Among those are 'Regional Policy and 
Federal Relations' aimed at supporting indigenous peoples, including those residing in the 
Arctic and Subarctic (Decree N307, 2014); 'Fisheries Sector Development', which aims to, 
among other things, grant priority access to fisheries to indigenous communities of the 
Russian North (Decree N314, 2014); and 'Development of the Transportation System', 
which specifically targets areas of new oil and gas development (Directive N2584-r, 2014). 
However, the programs entitled 'Regeneration and Use of Natural Resource' (Decree N322, 
2014) and 'Energy Efficiency and Energy Sector Development' (Decree N366, 2014) are of 
particular relevance to the topic of this study. The former creates an integrated and 
coordinated prospecting and exploration campaign that views the Arctic and Subarctic as 
nothing but a gargantuan resource base. A significant part of the latter, despite its 
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environmental-sounding title, aims to increase the recovery factor of the existing oil and gas projects and develop new technologically and geologically challenging projects. 
This is not say that programmatic statements completely ignore risks associated with oil and gas development in the Arctic. Developed as part of a United Nations Environmental Programme project, 'Strategic Action Program for Protecting the Environment of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation' focuses on the environmental dangers of hydrocarbon development in the Arctic, including increased pollution in the region, and warns about the environmental and socio-economic impacts (including climate change) of oil and gas exploration and extraction (Strategic Action Program, 2009). 
The same is true for a more encompassing federal program entitled (Decree N326, 2014), which specifically mentions potential negative environmental impacts of economic development in the Russian Arctic. The program lists water pollution, adverse effects on flora and fauna inhabiting the sea floor, an extinction of species endemic to the Arctic, and other dangers associated with oil and gas activities in the region. It singles out offshore oil and gas activities as posing the greatest threat to the Arctic environment. 
The Russian Federation's risk regulation regime includes a programmatic policy statement directed specifically at dealing with risk. Entitled 'Risk Reduction and Mitigation of Consequences Arising out of Natural and Technogenic Accidents in the Russian Federation until 2015' , it has the status of a 'federal objective-oriented program' (federalnaya tselevaya programma) (Decree N555, 2011). 41 This means that it has dedicated funding for certain measures set forth in the program. When the program was first introduced in 2011, its budget totalled over $1 billion for four years, a substantial number for the Russian Federation. The program has a significant Arctic component in which oil and gas activities were highlighted as particularly hazardous (Id.). 
In addition to programs intended to curb risks, including risks arising from oil and gas activities in the Arctic and Subarctic, virtually all the aforementioned programs mention such risks. However, the amount of attention given the discussion of the benefits of oil and gas 
41 
Despite having the end date (2015) in its title, this programmatic policy statement is regarded active. 
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development outweighs by a sizable margin the amount of attention given to risk. For 
example, the Far East Gas Program contains a risk mitigation plan to ensure its seamless 
implementation. Interestingly, the program touts the environmental benefits of natural gas, 
calling it 'ecologically clean fuel' throughout the document (Order N340, 2007). It would be 
remiss not to mention that the document actually contains several provisions intended to 
balance the dominance of the projected benefits of natural gas development in the Far East. 
In particular, the document encourages decision-makers to consider all development options, 
including nulevoi variant (zero option), which means no activity at all (Order N340, 2007, § 
19). 
Not all programmatic statements are alike. They differ based on the issuing authority, level 
of specificity, and perhaps most importantly, dedicated funding. As noted above, a type of 
program with dedicated funding is referred to as an 'objective-oriented program' (Decree 
N594, 1995). According to the 'Order of Development and Implementation of Federal 
Objective-Oriented Programs in which the Russian Federation Participates', such federal 
programs include 'an objective-, resource- and goal-coordinated complex of research, 
experimental, industrial, socio-economic, organizational, and other measures, providing an 
effective solution of systemic problems in the area of state, economic, environmental, social, 
and cultural development of the Russian Federation, as well as innovative development of 
the economy.' (Id. § 1) In addition to the federal level, such programs are also adopted at the 
agency level (Decree N239, 2005). The adoption of both federal- and agency-level 
(vedomstvennye) programs involves a multi-step process, featuring concept development and 
inter-agency consultation (Decree N239, 2005) (Decree N594, 1995, § 1). Aside from inter-
agency consultation, participation of non-government entities and actors is limited to 
solicitation of input from the Russian Academy of Sciences (for federal-level programs only) 
(Decree N594, 1995, § 1). 
In 2014, the Russian Parliament enacted a law entitled 'On Strategic Planning in the Russian 
Federation' ('On Strategic Planning') (Law N172-FZ, 2014). The chief purpose of this law 
is to bring more consistency to the country's policy-making. Statute makes risk one of the 
key concepts of strategic planning. For example, under Article 3, the primary goal of 
forecasting, an important term used throughout the law, is creation of knowledge about risks 
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to the nation's socio-economic development. In addition, On Strategic Planning includes risk 
analysis as a key element of 'The Strategy of the Russian Federation's Socio-Economic 
Development' (Article 16) and 'The Strategic Forecast of the Russian Federation' (Article 
23), two main strategic planning documents (Id.). 
4.2.2.2.2. Statutes 
The hierarchy of sources of law within the Russian legal system is robust. Atop sits the 
Russian Federation's Constitution, with constitutional statutes (konstitutsionnye zakony) and 
statutes (zakony) descending down the legal authority ladder (Constitution, 1993, art. 15). 
Beneath these are the so-called sub-statutes (podzakonnye akty). The Constitution, 
constitutional statutes, and statutes are enacted and amended by the legislature or, far less 
frequently, the people via a referendum. Conversely, sub-statutes are promulgated by the 
executive branch of the Russian government, typically under an enabling statute (though not 
always).42 Thus, the 'rules and regulations' found in western legal regimes are the closest 
functional equivalent of Russian sub-statutes. 
Eleven articles in the Russian Constitution are directly relevant to the environmental, 
regulatory, and jurisdictional aspects of exploration and extraction of oil and gas in the Arctic 
region. Perhaps the most important provisions are Articles 15, 67, 71, 72, and 76 concerning 
regulatory and jurisdictional issues. In light of the recent increase of federal control over 
mineral resources, these are also among the most controversial provisions. Article 72 lists 
matters within the joint jurisdiction of the Russian Federation and its territorial entities 
(subjekty federatsii)43 ; the list includes 'issues of the possession, utilisation and management 
of land and of subsurface, water and other natural resources' and 'protection of the 
environment and provisions for ecological safety'. This could be interpreted to mean that 
both federal and regional governments have an arrangement in which to create a balance 
between federal and regional interests. However, regarding all matters set forth in Articles 
71 and 72, the pre-emption doctrine found in Article 76 states that '[l]aws and other 
42 Because this subsection is devoted to legislatively enacted sources of law I will elaborate on the applicable 
sub-statutes in the following section. 
43 
Because Russia is an asymmetrical federation comprised of several types of territorial units with different 
legal statuses and names, I will refer collectively to them as 'regions'. 
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normative legal acts of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation shall not conflict 
with federal laws', and that 'the federal law shall prevail' in the event of a conflict. 
The strengthening of the vertical power policy by Vladimir Putin left regions with little 
authority over a great deal of matters, including distribution of all significant onshore and all 
offshore oil and gas deposits, as well as siting and permitting of large energy infrastructure 
(Nysten-Haarla & Kotilainen, 2009) (Law NI99-FZ, 2004). As I elaborate below, due to 
changes in the federal legislation, the role of regional governments in the decision-making 
process regarding oil and gas development was reduced to competing for federal subsidies, 
usually in the form of direct spending. 
Russia's territorial jurisdiction over the Arctic spans eleven time zones - the length of the 
entire country that consists of 84 constituent entities or subjects of federation (subjekty 
federatsii). An expectation that an area of this size can be governed effectively without 
proactive and meaningful participation from the regions is nai."ve. Yet not all of the 84 
federation subjects are equally powerless vis-a-vis the federal government. Under Article 65 
of the Constitution, the Russian Federation consists of the following six types of territorial 
entities: Republics (Respubliki), Provinces (Kraya), Regions (Oblasti), Autonomous Region 
(Avtonomnaya Oblast), Autonomous Districts (Avtonomny Okrug), and Cities of Federal 
Significance (Goroda Federalnogo Znachenya). Territorial entity's type does not impact its 
legal status. However, in reality, the two Cities of Federal Significance, Moscow and St. 
Petersburg, wield more political and economic power than any other territorial unit of the 
Russian Federation does. Moscow's status as a country within a country is due to its highly 
centralized revenue collection and distribution system, as well as it serving as the seat of 
nearly all key federal agencies and officials. Thus, Moscow resembles a gigantic 
administrative filter that accumulates the vast majority of Russia's revenue intake. St. 
Petersburg's economic and political prowess is not at the same level as Moscow's, but 
because of its size and ties with Vladimir Putin, the 'City on the Neva' remains a significant 
bastion of regional power in Russia. 
A Republic typically encompasses a territory that is influenced by a strong non-Russian 
ethnic group. Thus, historically, the Kremlin's relationship with Republics requires more 
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nuance and effort than with the rest of the territorial entities. At times, this leads to 
compromises regarding the extent to which the Republic's statutes and regulations are pre-
empted by federal law. I will consider one such rare example in Chapter 5 in relation to the 
Power of Siberia pipeline. 
When it comes to legislation governing mineral resource extraction and environmental 
protection, Russia seems to be in a state of perpetual reform. For example, the main statute 
governing oil and gas exploration and extraction, 'On Subsoil Resources', has been amended 
50 times since the Russian President signed it into law in 1992 (Law N2395-I, 1992). Most 
relevant to this study's topic, the environmental statute 'On Environmental Review' has been 
amended 34 time since its enactment in 1995 (Law Nl 75-FZ, 1995). Yet the quantity of 
amendments and revisions has not necessarily translated into quality. Many statutory 
provisions contradict one another, and the constant revising of the statutory framework has 
largely exacerbated the problem rather than resolved it. 
Because Russia's statutory framework governs a complex set of jurisdictional, 
environmental, health and safety, and licensing issues, the statutes relevant to oil and gas 
development are plentiful. As mentioned above, 'On Subsoil Resources' dominates the 
statutory framework. However, 'On the Continental Shelf' has pre-emptive authority over it 
by virtue of being a more specific statute (Law N187-FZ, 1995). The most pertinent statutes 
covering jurisdictional matters include: 'On Inland Sea Waters, Territorial Sea and Adjacent 
Zones of the Russian Federation' ('On Inland Sea Waters') (Law N155-FZ, 1998), and 'On 
the Exclusive Economic Zone of the Russian Federation' (Law N 191-FZ, 1998). The statutes 
governing environmental matters, including stakeholder participation in decisions involving 
risk to natural and human environment, are 'On Environmental Review', 'On Environmental 
Protection' (Law N7-FZ, 2002), and 'On the Natural World' (Law N52-FZ, 1995). Yet 
certain energy infrastructure, trunk pipelines for example, has been exempt from the 
environmental assessment process under 'On Environmental Review'. Instead, the City 
Building Code of the Russian Federation governs risk associated with the construction and 
operation of such infrastructure (Law N232-FZ, 2006). As the title suggests, 'On Guarantees 
of the Rights of Numerically Small Indigenous Peoples of the Russian Federation' sets forth 
the rights of indigenous communities in regard to extractive projects (Law N82-FZ, 1999). 
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'On Production Sharing Agreements' offers an alternative to the currently prevalent method 
of issuing oil and gas licences (Law N225-FZ, 1995). 'On Technical Regulating' establishes, 
inter alia, a framework for enactment of operational, health, safety, and environmental, 
search and rescue, and other standards for oil and gas operations (Law N184-FZ, 2002). 
While I elaborate on these statutes' most relevant aspects in the ensuing sections, it is 
important to note here that two common features of Russia's law-making process have 
hindered these statutes, along with the country's entire legal system. First, as revealed 
through a thorough analysis of amended legislation, the Russian parliament often makes 
statutory changes to fit the needs of a specific group, and sometimes a few individual actors. 
This practice is especially prevalent in relation to statutes governing access to mineral 
resources and their transportation and export, as exemplified by the 2013 amendments to the 
LNG export regime. Under the amending legislation, Rosneft' and Novatek became the only 
two additional (to Gazprom) companies qualified to hold LNG export licences. They were 
the only ones to have an ownership structure and operational and licensing history that 
matched the new set of requirements, leaving little doubt that the legislation was tailored for 
them.44 
Second, the checks and balances system within the Russian legislative process all but 
guarantees that any legislative initiative with Kremlin backing will become law. The LNG 
export amendments passed both the upper (Federation Council) and lower (State Duma) 
houses of parliament in 21 days without any substantive changes (State Duma, 2013) (Law 
N318-FZ, 2013). 
4.2.2.2.3. Regulations 
As I noted above, Russia employs a prescriptive regulatory model for governing risk in oil 
and gas activities. Given the high complexity of modem-day oil and gas technology and 
Russia's ambitions in what is one of the most challenging regions of the world, regulators 
must be equipped with an extensive and sturdy structure of rules and standards. As I elaborate 
in Chapter 7, the Russian regulatory framework has many gaps and remains a work in 
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progress. However, those significant gaps do not translate into a quantitative lack of rules, 
regulations, instructions, and orders. For example, there are over 800 legal and regulatory 
documents that concern matters of offshore mineral resource use and environmental 
protection (Baker, et al., 2011, p. 43). 
Some parts of the regulatory framework are detached from the overarching statutory 
framework. In fact, some sub-statutes are not promulgated under an enabling statute at all 
and hold the utmost authority on the issue they govern. An example of this would be the 
expired 2003 Oil and Gas Industry Safety Rules (Decree N56, 2003). The implementing 
agency had to reaffirm the rules in order for them to remain mandatory because 'On 
Technical Regulating' (Law N184-FZ, 2002) had replaced the enabling statute (Decree N56, 
2003). Therefore, the sub-statutory act remained the main authority on offshore oil and gas 
safety for over ten years despite the existence of a legislative act that enabled the creation 
new sub-statutory acts on this issue. I will expand more on the Russian government's failure 
to create a comprehensive framework of technical rules and standards for risk appraisal in 
Chapter 7. 
Various environmental standards exemplify how sub-statutes interact with enabling statutes. 
For example, in Articles 1 and 19-29, 'On Environmental Protection' sets forth the general 
legal framework for environmental standards (Law Nl87-FZ, 1995). Article 1 establishes 
general concepts of environmental protection, as well as the relevant categories of standards 
and regulations. Article 21 describes the environmental quality standards that establish 
maximum allowable concentrations, the aforementioned PDK. Article 22 discusses 
procedural standards that set forth environmental impact standards, and Article 23 covers air 
and water emission/discharge standards. The statute does not actually set the standards. 
Rather, it defers to the administrative agencies to develop individual, specific measurable 
requirements (Baker, et al., 2011, p. 49). 
Sub-statutes fall into various categories with various degrees of legal authority. They range 
from Presidential Orders (ukazy) to letters (pisma) and instructions (instruktsii) of an 
administrative agency's structural unit. To determine a document's pre-emptive authority, 
one should examine the issuing agency's place in the Russian government hierarchy (Order 
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N636, 2012). Documents issued by government special agencies and research institutions, as 
well as industry and corporate standards, supplement the decrees, orders, letters, and 
instructions that official government ministries and agencies enact. For example, it is not 
uncommon for an agency to utilize the research arm of a corporate entity, such as Gazprom's 
Natural Gases and Gas Technologies Research Institute, to develop mandatory technical 
regulations (Order N4347, 2009). 
In fact, it appears that various industry standards, some dating back to Soviet times, constitute 
the majority of technical risk analysis rules upon which companies rely in their day-to-day 
operations. Although they are not banned from doing so under 'On Technical Regulating', 
companies still need to comply with the multitude of other applicable sub-statutes. For 
example, the Federal Environmental, Technological and Nuclear Oversight Service 
(Federalnaya Sluzhba po Ekologicheskomu, Tekhnologicheskomu i Atomnomy Nadzoru), 
known as Rostekhnadzor, recently promulgated two regulations aimed at setting parameters 
for risk analysis - 'Safety Manual: Risk Assessment Methodology for Accidents in 
Technological Pipelines Related to Transportation of Flammable Gases' (Order N365, 2015) 
and 'Safety Manual: Risk Assessment Methodology for Accidents on Hazardous Offshore 
Oil and Gas Installations' (Order N364, 2015). Thus, if an industry standard contradicts such 
a manual, the provisions of the manual apply. 
4.2.2.3. The risk regulation process at a glance 
As I have shown above, the risk governance process starts well before a scientific inquiry is 
sent to a 'risk lab'. In the case of Russian oil and gas projects, it often starts with enactment 
of a programmatic policy statement, statute, or regulation, which paves the way for a more 
specific action. Such an action may include a grant of a licence to prospect, explore, or extract 
a hydrocarbon deposit. It may also include a decision to proceed with a project involving 
construction of a transportation system, such as the aforementioned Power of Siberia or 
Yamal LNG pipelines. Because the federal government has jurisdiction over all significant 
(e.g. 70 Mtoe and over) oil and gas deposits, and because all export and other hydrocarbon 
transportation involve broader policy considerations, these decisions are usually made at the 





This puts the President of the Russian Federation at the front and centre of the decision-
making process. A cursory review of Chapter 4 of the Russian Constitution reveals that the 
President enjoys significant if not overwhelming capacity to exercise power in virtually every 
area. This capacity extends to a day-to-day operational exercise of executive power. Pursuant 
to the Presidential Order No. 636 dated as of 21 May 2012, the President directly oversees 
and controls a number of key ministries and agencies. 
In this sense, the President co-leads the RF Government with the Prime Minister. The RF 
Government coordinates and directs all the federal agencies, including, to some extent, those 
under the control of the President. The RF Government system includes Ministries or 
Ministerstva, Agencies or Agenstva, and Services or Sluzhby. An Agency and Service can 
either be part of a Ministry or an independent, Ministry-like body, whereas Ministries are 
always independent bodies (Order N636, 2012).45 As Figure 18 shows, many administrative 
agencies (underlined in red or blue) take part in risk governance of oil and gas activities in 
the Russian Federation. For example, the following seven administrative agencies are 
involved in a combined licence issuance process: the Federal Agency for Mineral Resources 
(Rosnedra), the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Economic Development, the Federal 
Security Service, the Federal Fisheries Agency, and the Ministry of Energy (Decree N783, 
2009). Yet, as I demonstrate in the remainder of this thesis, the main administrative agencies 
involved in risk governance of oil and gas activities include: the Ministry of Energy 
(Minesterstvo Energetiki); the Federal Service for Ecological, Technological, and Nuclear 
Oversight (Rostechnadzor); the Federal Service for Technical Regulating and Metrology 
(Rosstandart); and the Ministry of Natural Resources and the Environment (Minprirody), as 
well as two of its subordinate agencies, the aforementioned Rosnedra and the Federal Service 
for Oversight of Natural Resources (Rosprirodnadzor). Interestingly, Minprirody is tasked 
with matters regarding both environmental protection and distribution of mineral resources. 
Also interesting is the fact that the head of the environmental ministry, Minister Sergey 
Donskoy, is a graduate of the Moscow Academy of Oil and Gas named after I.M. Gubkin 
(Minprirody, 2016). 
45 
For the sake of consistency, I will use the term "administrative agencies" to refer to the Russian administrative 
government entities as a group. 
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Figure 18: The structure of the Russian federal government (Order N636, 2012) 
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Figure 18: The structure of the Russian federal government (Order N636, 2012) 
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The vast majority of 'Presidential' agencies are so-called 'silovye' (force) agencies, meaning 
that they are authorised to wield physical force. As Figure 18 shows, none of the primary risk 
governance agencies is under the President's control and oversight. However, some of the 
Ministries, Agencies, and Services (underlined in red) that he does control and oversee can 
interfere in virtually any process or procedure for which the 'primary' risk governance 
agencies are responsible. As I noted above, the involvement of the regional and municipal 
administrative agencies is limited. Municipal governments, however, aid the environmental 
review process by facilitating solicitation of input from the local population (Law N187-FZ, 
1995). 
Thus far, I have made only a handful of references to the Federal Assembly (Federalnoe 
Sobranie), the Russian national legislature. My lack of attention to the Federal Assembly and 
its two houses, the State Duma (Gosudarstvennaya Duma) and the Federation Council (Sovet 
Federatsii), was not because they are uninvolved in the legislative process. On the contrary, 
based on my review of the legislative history of a few bills considered by both houses, these 
legislative bodies are frequently very efficient and effective in enacting legislation governing 
oil and gas activities. However, their efficient and effective law-making appears to be aimed 
mainly at legitimizing initiatives proposed by the President and the RF Government. I do not 
claim to have conducted a comprehensive review of the legislative process regarding oil and 
gas activities for the last decade. However, in-depth inquiries into the legislative history of 
the aforementioned LNG export regime amendments and the April 2008 amendments into 
'On Environmental Review', as well as discourse analysis of the Presidential commissions 
meetings, made me agree with the following op-ed statement by Evgeniy Gontmakher, a 
prominent economics scholar and civil activist: 
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Look at what happened with the State Duma and the Federation Council. They 
have become, de facto, another department of the Presidential Administration and 
the RF Government. I am not even going to try to enumerate all the laws enacted 
through a legislative effort that was akin to a malfunctioning printer (Gontmakher, 
2013). 
The comment made by Mikhail Fedotov, the head of the Presidential Council on the 
Development of Civil Society and Human Rights, during a 14 October 2014 meeting of the 
council seconds Mr Gontmakher's statement. Mr Fedotov noted that legislators largely 
ignore public input and hurry bills through the State Duma (President, 14 October 2014). 
As I noted in Chapter 1, Russia's court system is not a primary source of risk governance 
rules. Judicial precedents are not considered binding sources of law in Russia (Alekseev, et 
al., 2004). In addition, my review of relevant court decisions (albeit a cursory one) did not 
identify a single successful challenge to large oil and gas projects in the Arctic or Subarctic 
based on the alleged risks and impacts that these projects pose. 
Finally, I turned to mechanisms of broad public participation, such as public comments, in 
shaping organizational and institutional capacity for risk governance. The fact that Russia 
has a comprehensive platform for soliciting and tracking public comments on pending 
legislation might also come as a surprise to many in the West. Pursuant to Presidential Order 
No. 601 dated as of7 May 2012 (OrderN601, 2012), the RF Government promulgated decree 
No. 851 on 25 August 2012, to set up a public comment platform, entitled 'Federal Portal of 
Pending Legal and Regulatory Acts' at regulation.gov.ru, the government Internet site 
(Decree N851, 2012). In addition, the RF Government promulgated decree No. 96, dated as 
of 26 February 2012, 'On Anticorruption Expert Review of Legal Acts and Pending 
Legislation and Regulations' (Decree N96, 2012). The anticorruption expert review is aimed 
at identifying 'corruption-genie' (korruptstionnogenicheskie) factors, such as broad 
administrative discretion, vague descriptions of official powers, and even linguistic 
ambiguity (Id). Along with the 'appraisal of actual effect of legislative and regulatory acts' 
(otsenkafakticheskogo vozdeistviya normativnyh pravovyh aktov), the anticorruption expert 
review is part of the public review and comments process (Id.). This process, which will 
become effective as of 30 July 2016, replaces the equally curious process aimed at 
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barriers to business and investment activities' (Decree N83, 2015) (Ministry of Economic 
Development, 2016). 
The Federal Portal is intuitive, easy to use, and extremely informative. As Figure 19 shows, 
one can easily obtain a wealth of information. My inquiry into pending legislation and 
regulations regarding economic activity related to 'fossil fuel extraction' yielded 218 various 
documents, including two sets of amendments to the 'On Subsoil Resources' (Law N2395-I, 
1992) (shaded in light grey). In order to leave a comment, one merely needs to complete a 
straightforward registration process. 
Figu.re 19: Federal portal of pending legal and regulatory acts (Ministry of Economic 
Development, 2016a) 
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The public participation opportunities presented by the Federal Portal of Pending Legal and 
Regulatory Acts rival and even surpass those of advanced democratic states. Perhaps the 
Transparent Government policy is too new to judge in terms of its effect on inclusive 
governance of public affairs. However, Russia's position near the bottom of the Transparency 
International Index (2016) does not instil much optimism. In addition, in my review of the 
amendments of the legislation principally responsible for governing risks in the oil and gas 
sector, I came across only one instance where stakeholder input (from an environmental 
NGO) resulted in a real legislative change to the way risk is handled in the energy sector. 
This change came in the form of the amendments to the laws 'On the Continental Shelf 
(Article 22.2) (Law N187-FZ, 1995) and 'On Inland Sea Waters' (Article 16.1) (Law N155-
FZ, 1998) that require companies to prepare oil spill contingency plans for offshore 
operations . 
As I have and will continue to observe in this thesis, the RF Government and the President 
are the parties with the greatest influence over ex-ante processes that result in threshold 
decisions regarding oil and gas development in the Russian Arctic and Subarctic. Because 
the President holds a superior position in the Russian State hierarchy, he is the ultimate 
decision-maker on such matters. 
Despite Dmitry Medvedev's 2008-2012 Russian presidency, the Office of the President of 
the Russian Federation has been associated in this millennium with it current holder, 
Vladimir Putin. Time magazine's Person of the Year in 2007, President Pu tin, his policies, 
and his model of governance have received a gargantuan amount of criticism in the West. 
Dawisha (2015, p. 36) summarizes Vladimir Putin's reign as follows: 'By his third term, he 
had created a highly controlled security system able to use laws, the media, and the security 
forces as a means of intimidating, and critically balancing, rival economic elites. Others have 
called it a "corporation", "Kremlin, Inc.", "a Sistema", or a "corporatist-kleptocratic 
regime".' 
Contrary to the popular view portrayed in the West, in my view, President Putin does not 
exercise absolute control over all facets of political life in the country. As I note in the 








(Chatham House, 2015). Gregory Yavlinsky, a former presidential candidate and leader of 
an opposition to the Kremlin party, describes Vladimir Putin as an effective representative of 
the Russian power elite who is capable of negotiating often divergent interests (Y avlinsky, 
2014 ). I describe a few examples of such negotiations and mutual lobbying in the next three 
chapters. These chapters are predominately devoted to analysing the organizational and 
institutional capacity of the Russian State to handle threshold decisions involving risk in the 
oil and gas sector. 
4.3. Conclusion 
A discussion about risk governance of oil and gas activities must feature the government and 
the means by which it ought to govern - law. Although there are instances in which risk is 
and can be governed without government intervention, these instances are nonetheless part 
of the overarching policy, legal, and regulatory regime in which the government plays a 
central role. This role reaches its apogee during the PA and C&E phases of risk governance, 
especially in ex-ante decision-making involving threshold matters such as opening new areas 
for oil and gas development and incentivizing hydrocarbon activities. Because Russia follows 
the prescriptive model of regulation, the government's involvement transcends all phases of 
risk governance. The President and RF Government, along with a handful of administrative 
agencies, maintain a tight grip on setting rules of risk governance from broad programmatic 
policy statements to technical regulations. Although recent actions by the Russian leadership 
created opportunities for public participation in creating risk governance rules, Russia's poor 
track record in inclusive policy-making raises doubts about the effectiveness of these 
measures. 
Similarly to Chapter 3, I argued in favour of the contextual approach, this time, in defining 
the role of government in governance. I thereby added oil and gas to the list of sectors of 
which comprehensive governance cannot be analysed without examining the role that 
governments play. I highlighted the importance of conceptual rather than literal translation 
in studying non-Western national and regional governance systems. Whereas I attribute these 
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contributions to governance literature, in this chapter I also contributed to Russian studies 
and risk governance literatures. I contributed to the former by showing why focusing on the 
local impacts of oil and gas projects (Yakovleva, 2011) (Yakovleva, 2011a) (Yakovleva, 
2014) (Novikova & Martynova, 2011) and overlooking the ex-ante decision-making 
processes involving threshold matters is hardly sufficient for obtaining a comprehensive 
picture of the Russian oil and gas sector and its role in the Russian economy and society. I 
also articulated the dominant approach to handling risk in the Russian oil and gas sector by 
using data from legal sources, official transcripts, and semi-structured interviews. In addition, 
in furtherance of the proposed agenda for the development of the socio-legal aspect of risk 
governance (Sidortsov, 2014), I identified the key parts of the Russian policy, legal, and 
regulatory regime employed in handling risks in the national oil and gas sector. I contributed 
to risk governance literature by arguing the utmost importance of risk PA and C&E for 
making decisions involving new oil and gas projects, as well as identifying the legal sources 
and mechanisms, pursuant to which these phases are implemented in the context of oil and 
gas development. I thus made a case that the IRGC framework can serve as a foundation for 
analysing non-Western risk regimes. Also, I advanced Klinke and Renn's (2012) additions 
to the IRGC framework that emphasise capacities for dealing with risk by showing the 
complexity of actors involved in the process. More importantly, I determined the principal 
legal sources and mechanisms to be examined in greater depth in Chapters 5, 6, and 7. 
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5. The Concept of Power in Risk Governance 
5.1. The power knowledge dynamic 
I noted in Chapter 3 that handling and dealing with risk in the context of collective decision-
making is not just about obtaining knowledge about risk, but about who gets to decide what 
to do about risk. In other words, risk governance is also about power relations among people 
involved in making decisions about risk. In this chapter, I begin my investigation of the 
substance and nature of power relations that shape the generation and application of 
knowledge about risk. 
My principal goal in this chapter is not to critique existing theories of risk or attempt to offer 
an alternative one. It is to find a conceptual explanation of the risk governance processes 
captured in the data that I collected over the course of the study. Therefore, in this chapter, I 
aim to establish and develop a link between risk governance and the social concept of power 
by examining the power-knowledge interrelation, and thus contribute to the risk governance 
literature. Because I bring risk governance into the social power realm, I also aim to 
contribute to this body of literature through providing the largely underdeveloped risk 
governance context. In addition, due to the wide use of legal data in this study, I aim to 
contribute to the socio-legal literature focused on the intersection of the concepts oflaw and 
social power. 
The general idea of power-knowledge interrelation is far from new. Foucault (1994, p. 32) 
eloquently captures the myth of 'sanctity of knowledge' in the following quote: 
The West would be dominated by the great myth according to which truth never 
belongs to political power: political power is blind-the real knowledge is that 
which one possesses when one is in contact with the gods or when one remembers 
things, when one looks at the great eternal Sun or one opens one's eyes to what 
came to pass. With Plato there began a great Western myth: that there is enmity 
between knowledge and power. If there is knowledge, it must renounce power. 
Where knowledge and science are found in their pure truth, there can no longer 
be any political power. 
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This great myth needs to be dispelled. It is this myth which Nietzsche began to 
demolish by showing, in the numerous texts already cited, that, behind all 
knowledge [savoir], behind all attainment of knowledge [connaissance], what is 
involved is a struggle for power. Political power is not absent from knowledge, it 
is woven together with it. 
I consider this mutually reinforcing feedback loop foundational in the process of handling 
risk. Below, I examine this dynamic through the process of environmental assessment (EA) 
and ethnological review (ER) in relation to the Power of Siberia pipeline. 
5.1.1. Assessing Power of Siberia's environmental risks 
The law 'On Environmental Review' (Law Nl 75-FZ, 1995) sets forth the process of 
environmental expert review or ekologicheskaya ekspertiza. Article 1 of the statute defines it 
as 'the determination of whether documents or documentation that support an economic or 
other activity comply with the environmental requirements set forth in technical regulations 
and legislation in the area of environmental protection for the purposes of prevention of 
negative impact of said activity on the environment.' In addition to verbosity and lack of 
coherency, the definition reveals a narrow scope of the environmental expert review, 
effectively limiting it to a review of project documentation by a group of professionals 
thought to have relevant expertise. The nature of this process lies in the title of the statute 
that governs it 'Oh Ekologicheskoy Ekspertize'. 'Expertiza' translates from Russian as 
'expert review'. The statute differentiates between a 'state environmental expert review' 
(SEER) (Articles 10-18) and 'public environmental expert review' (Articles 20-25). Only 
SEER is mandatory, provided that the activity in question falls under the purview of the 
statute (Law Nl 75-FZ, 1995, art. 10). 
As of June 2016, oil and gas activities occurring offshore, pursuant to PSAs, and located in 
highly protected environmental areas are subject to SEER (Id. art. 11). In addition, oil and 
gas activities might be affected by the SEER process by virtue of being part of federal goal-
oriented programs, being impacted by new environmental administrative regulations, or 
involving construction waste disposal or recycling facilities. In the latter case, only 
documentation related to such facilities is subject to SEER. Therefore, the vast majority of 
oil and up-, mid- and downstream activities and facilities do not require SEER despite being 
major sources of environmental risks. 
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Unsurprisingly, the Power of Siberia project as a whole did not receive an environmental 
review. Several supporting infrastructure units are subject to mandatory environmental 
assessment, but these units have only secondary bearing on the pipeline's successful 
operation. At the time of writing this thesis, seven waste disposal sites near the pumping 
stations ( compressor stations) have undergone SEER (Rosprirodnadzor, 2015). 
SEER is the second step of a two-step environmental assessment process under Russian law. 
The first step is environmental impact assessment, or otsenka vozdeystviya na 
okruzhaiyschuiy sredu (OVOS). 'On Environmental Review' does not specify the mechanics 
of OVOS, nor does it clearly connect OVOS to SEER. In fact, 'On Environmental Review' 
mentions OVOS only once, in Article 3, where it sets forth OVOS comprehensiveness as one 
of the principles of SEER in Russia. 46 The 16 May 2000 Order of the Committee of the 
Russian Federation on Protection of the Environment ('Order 372') establishes a much 
tighter connection between OVOS and SEER by requiring the documents reviewed during 
SEER to be based on OVOS (Order N732, 2000). The brevity with which 'On Environmental 
Review' treats OVOS is puzzling as it the only source of data and analysis for the documents 
that state experts review during SEER. 
The lack of cohesion between 'On Environmental Review' and Order 372 affects risk 
governance. Article 3 of Order 372 mandates OVOS to include the assessment of 'risk 
probability', as well as the assessment of adverse environmental, social, and economic 
impacts of the proposed activity. However, because 'On Environmental Review' does not 
mention risk or social and economic impacts as part of SEER, experts are not required to 
include these items in their analysis. 
Although far from perfect, Order 3 72 creates some procedural opportunities for inclusive and 
comprehensive risk governance. During the initial OVOS stage under Order 3 72, the 
proponent prepares and submits to the authorities a notice of the planned activity along with 
preliminary information about the planned OVOS. During the following stages, the 
46 To avoid confusion, I utilize the Russian acronym for the preparation of an environmental impact assessment, OVOS (otsenka vozdeystviya na okruzhaiyschuiy sredu), and I utilize English acronyms for the second step of the process, state environmental review (SEER), and for the entire process, environmental assessment (EA). 
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proponent conducts all the necessary studies and gathers all the necessary information and 
performs analysis thereof (Order N732, 2000, art. 3). 
OVOS begins when the proponent of an activity submits a notice to government authorities. 
This notice includes preliminary information about the planned activity, including the so-
called tekhnicheskoe zadanie (technical assignment) (Id.). The proponent then undertakes the 
necessary research and compiles the relevant data. Although 'On Environmental Review' 
does not overtly create a right for the public to participate in the environmental assessment 
process, it does require that materials sent to the SEER commission reflect public opinion 
(Law Nl 75-FZ, 1995, art. 14). This mandate indirectly requires public discussions, or 
obschestvennoe obsuzhdeniya. Order 372 places the responsibility for organizing these public 
discussions on the proponent of the activity. Under Order 372, the developer conducts 'public 
discussions' with the municipal government, which makes the process more inclusive, at 
least in theory (Order N732, 2000, art. 3) (Sidortsov, et. al., 2016). 
Order 372 states that public discussion must follow two principal objectives. It must (1) 
inform the public of the proposed activity; and (2) identify public preferences. The second 
objective can be interpreted as a statutory requirement to take public preferences into account 
during the decision-making process (Id.). However, neither Order 372 nor 'On 
Environmental Review' clarify the extent to and ways in which the preferences must be 
considered. 
Because surveys and referendums may be used to inform the public and determine its 
preferences, public hearings are not mandatory. The proponent of the proposed activity must 
record survey and referendum results, submit them with the draft OVOS materials, and 
permit the public to review and comment on the draft (Order N732, 2000). Though these 
other modes of discussion may replace a public meeting, it is still customary for a public 
meeting to be conducted. In fact, developers face significant backlash and opposition if they 
do not follow this practice. This is evidenced by the campaign launched by Sakha NGOs 
when Transneft' decided to move public discussion of the East Siberia-Pacific Ocean 
(ESPO) pipeline to the federal and provincial halls of power (Yakutia Commercial Bulletin, 
2006). Syvatoslav Zabelin, a former member of Presidential Council on the Promotion of 
151 
Civil Society and Human Rights, explained Transneft's actions in the context of OVOS in 
the following sharp remark: 
Strange things happen with environmental review. Here we are faced with organized industry that pursuant to the law must take reasonable steps to discuss industrial projects with the public and to ensure that public and government interests were taken into account. Today, this does not happen. I will spare you details, but the most important thing is that companies with a high share of state ownership are the worst offenders. Unfortunately, you have heard rumours about the situation with the pipeline from Eastern Siberia to the Pacific Ocean, where a certain known company is demonstrating amazing creativity. This almost sounds like a joke: in order to conduct public environmental assessment, it founded its own NGO and registered it in Moscow. This NGO made decisions about what Primoryans, Irkutians, and Buryats need to do and what pipeline route would be better for them (President, 20 July 2005). 
Apparently, learning from Transneft's mistake, Gazprom organized public hearings as part 
of the Power of Siberia's OVOS.47 Although the public hearings were conducted in Sakha 
(Yakutiya), they did not attract the same amount of attention as that of the ESPO pipeline. 
The following factors contributed to the low public interest to the meetings. First, as noted 
above, only the isolated waste disposal sites located near compressor stations were subject to 
OVOS. The pipeline itself and its compressor stations and supporting infrastructure were not. 
Second, the Power of Siberia route in the areas where the meetings were conducted ran 
parallel to that of ESPO (Stammler & Ivanova, 2016a) (Sidortsov, et. al., 2016). Third, 
although the notice and format of the public hearings were technically in compliance with 
legal requirements, they had significant shortcomings. For example, notice for a meeting to 
discuss two waste disposal sites at the Amginskaya and Nimnyrskaya compressor stations 
was published in two issues of the national newspaper 'Transport Rossii' (Russian 
Transport), one issue of the regional 'Yakutia' newspaper, two issues of local 'Munitsipalny 
Vestnik' newspaper, and on the local government's website (Aldanskiy District, 2013). While 
the notice no doubt reached certain segments of the local population, it was not disseminated 
in a way so as to reach the indigenous people, who were busy in the forest with hunting, 
fishing, and tending their reindeer (Stammler & Ivanova, 2016a) (Sidortsov, et. al., 2016). 
Unsurprisingly, no indigenous peoples attended the meeting. In fact, only one person 
47 
The meetings were organized and conducted by a Gazprom subsidiary, OAO VNIPigazdobycha. For purposes of this discussion, I refer to both the parent company and the subsidiary as Gazprom. (Aldanskiy District, 2013) (Stammler & lvanova, 2016a) 
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representing the public was present - the head of a local library (Aldanskiy District, 2013) 
(Sidortsov, et. al., 2016). 
After finalizing the OVOS documentation, the process moves to the SEER stage. The Federal 
Service for Oversight of Natural Resources (Rosprirodnadzor) or its regional branch forms 
an expert commission from staff and invited experts on an ad hoe basis for each individual 
project (Law NI 75-FZ, 1995, art. 15). The process is not inclusive at this stage, as only 
provincial and municipal governments have the right to recommend their own experts to 
serve as observers at an expert commission meeting, and deliberation is limited to a 
discussion among experts (Id.). Dmitry Kobylkin, the governor of Yamal-Nenets 
Autonomous District, provided the following assessment of the process: 'Unfortunately, 
according to federal law, only federal-level facilities and activities are subject to 
environmental assessment. The mechanism by which regions can recommend their experts 
to serve as observers at federal expert commission meetings simply does not work.' 
(President, 9 June 2011) Therefore, regions are effectively excluded from EA of oil and gas 
activities. 
At the Project of Siberia's SEER stage, none of the seven associated waste disposal facilities 
was found to have any issues. Interestingly, expert commissions for all seven sites were 
formed on the same date, and all seven facilities were approved on the same date as well, just 
before the deadline (Rosprirodnadzor, 2015). 
5.1.2. Reviewing the Power of Siberia's risks to indigenous communities 
The Sakha (Yakutia) Law 'On Ethnological Review in the Areas Traditionally Occupied and 
Utilized by Indigenous Small-numbered People of the Republic Sakha's (Yakutia) North' 
('On Ethnological Review') intends to identify, avoid, or mitigate risks that industrial 
activities such as oil and gas projects pose to indigenous communities (Law 820-Z N537-IV, 
2010). The law also mandates that potential impacts be offset with monetary compensation 
when appropriate (Id. arts. 3, 1, 5, 8). 
'On Ethnological Review' is triggered when a project or activity is proposed to take place in 
traditionally indigenous areas and it affects the indigenous peoples' socio-cultural status quo 
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or the environment in the area that they have traditionally inhabited (Id. art. 5). Indigenous 
communities have the right to appoint representatives to participate in an ethnological expert 
commission. The representatives have the right to participate directly in the assessment only 
of federal and regional programs directed at environmental protection and natural resource 
development (Id.). This participatory right is especially important because it gives indigenous 
people access to strategic decision-making. At least in theory, 'On Ethnological Review' 
provides indigenous communities with real legal power because all projects and activities 
subject to the assessment must have ethnological expert commission approval (Id art. 8). 
Unfortunately, the statute's implementation is hampered by significant formal shortcomings. 
These shortcomings originate from a federal pre-emption similar to the pre-emption applied 
to regional environmental legislation, as noted in Chapter 4. The pre-emption provides 
developers with a strong argument against any additional restraints imposed by provincial 
law. For example, a decision to designate an area for traditional use made under provincial 
law can be trumped by a decision to deed an area for recreational use under the federal Forest 
Code (Sleptsov, 2013) (Sidortsov, et. al., 2016). 
The Power of Siberia pipeline traverses areas that have traditionally been occupied by 
indigenous hunters, reindeer herders, and fishermen (Stammler, 2014). Those impacted have 
expressed concerns over how areas used as traditional reindeer pastures and hunting grounds 
will be allocated for the pipeline construction. The influx of temporary workers and the 
lasting socio-economic changes that such migration brings have also been flagged as 
concerns. For these reasons, the Power of Siberia project unquestionably falls within the 
purview of the 'On Ethnological Review' and therefore requires an ethnological assessment 
(Stammler & Ivanova, 2016a). 
However, despite the fact that the pipeline construction commenced in September 2014, an 
ethnological assessment is yet to occur. I am not familiar with any formal discourse regarding 
this obvious omission. However, according to Stammler and Ivanova (2016a) whom I 
interviewed in February 2016, Gazprom's informal position is premised on the argument that 
because the Power of Siberia will run parallel to the ESPO pipeline, it will not create new 
impacts and will thus not need a new ethnological assessment. Additionally, because some 
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of the affected areas have not been formally designated as those for the traditional habitation 
and subsistence of indigenous peoples, it is all the more difficult for the regional government 
to compel a powerful developer to conduct an ethnological assessment (II Tymen, 2015). The 
regional government instead engages with developers on an ad hoe basis in an effort to 
persuade them into carrying out an assessment. For example, Pavel Marynychev, a provincial 
deputy prime minister, stated that the regional government 'almost reached an agreement' 
with Gazprom to conduct an ethnological assessment of an area located at the Chayandinskoe 
gas field (GTRK Sakha, 2015). 
5.1.3. Distilling the risk power-knowledge dynamic in environmental assessment 
and ethnological review 
In EA, generating knowledge of environmental risks is a two stage-process under Russian 
law. During the first stage (OVOS), the proponent of the activity collects the data about 
potential impacts on the environment and converts it into qualitative categories, 
concentrations, ratios, and probabilities. During the second stage (SEER), an expert 
commission assesses the fallibility of the knowledge put forward by the proponent and 
decides whether the activity can proceed. In this sense, the expert commission brings what 
Walsh (2013) calls a political certainty to the matter. 
In contrast, 'On Ethnological Review' does not elaborate on the details of the ER process 
when generating knowledge of socio-economic risks to impacted indigenous communities. 
Article 5, which is supposed to describe the process, states that the regional government is 
responsible for organizing and facilitating ER. Pursuant to Article 8, the data regarding the 
project and its analysis expressed in concentrations, ratios, and probabilities comes from the 
proponent of the activity. The expert commission assesses this knowledge in light of the 
knowledge possessed by its expert and generates new knowledge about socio-economic risks 
to indigenous communities. The commission's decision (zaklychenie) also creates political 
certainty by either allowing the activity, usually subject to risk mitigation and avoidance 
measures, or prohibiting it (Law 820-Z N537-IV, 2010, art. 8). 
Therefore, on the most primitive level, this power-knowledge dynamic occurs between an 
actor who is content with allowing a potentially risk-laden activity to proceed and an actor 
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who is not. Activity is of course a relative term, as it frequently emanates from the use of an 
object or substance. For example, the main reason for EAs in relation to the Power of Siberia 
is concern over handling hazardous substances in waste disposal facilities. 
On a macro level, in both EA and ER, the dynamic for generating knowledge about risks 
( environmental and socio-economic, respectively) consists of two stages. The first stage is 
the adoption of a designated framework, and the second stage is implementing it. 'On 
Environmental Review' and 'On Ethnological Review' serve as the legislative cornerstones 
of the legal framework. Adopting the framework involves generation of knowledge about 
risk and the actors that attempt to influence such generation. For example, before the 
enactment of the federal City Building Code on 18 December 2006, pipelines were subject 
to EA in their entirety (Law N232-FZ, 2006). However, pressure from the industry under the 
guise of removing administrative obstacles resulted in the effective removal of oil and gas 
trunk pipelines from the purview of 'On Environmental Review' (President, 27 May 2010). 
In other words, the economic benefits of the streamlined permitting process superseded 
concerns over whether the City Building Code's project documentation review would address 
the environmental risks associated with oil and gas trunk pipelines. 
The EA of the seven waste disposal sites exemplifies the implementation of a legal and 
regulatory framework aimed at handling environmental risks. The actor that is content with 
the activity is its proponent - Gazprom. The actor charged with scrutinizing the activity is 
Rosprirodnadzor. The knowledge creation at the second stage would be centred on the risks 
and benefits of the waste disposal sites. 
Both actors are driven by seemingly divergent interests - Rosprirodnadzor acts on behalf of 
the public and Gazprom acts on behalf of its shareholders.48 Sometimes these two sets of 
interests converge. For example, it is not uncommon for Gazprom subsidiaries to engage in 
outreach and consultations with the local population even though the law does not explicitly 
require it (Stammler & Ivanova, 2016a) (Stammler, 2014). However, a business entity has 
little incentive to consider environmental or social implications unless overlooking them 
48 
As I demonstrate in the forthcoming chapters, this seemingly bright line is often blurred. Some companies, especially state companies, act in furtherance of state interests, and governmental officials often pursue their personal interests over the public ones. 
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would pose regulatory or reputational risks. It is true that Gazprom organized public hearings 
when not required to do so under Russian law. However, the manner in which the meetings 
were conducted raises doubts as to Gazprom' s sincerity in wanting to obtain knowledge about 
potential risks from the people who would be exposed to them. This exemplifies the 
importance of public risk governance and the dangers of relying on private entities to handle 
risk. 
5.2. Defining social power 
In the previous section, I stated that power relations impact generation of knowledge about 
risk. However, I did not follow this observation with a definition of power. Weber's statement 
that the 'concept of power is sociologically amorphous' is a testament to the difficulty of 
deriving a universally accepted definition of power in the social context (Weber, 1978, p. 
53). Power, according to Weber, is 'the probability that one actor within a social relationship 
will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on 
which this probability rests' (Id). Weber appears to be mainly concerned with achieving 
precision of social analysis. For this reason, he outright rejects the concept of power as a 
useful one and instead adopts the concept of domination, which he defines as 'the probability 
that a command will be obeyed' (Id). 
Indeed, if the overarching goal of an analysis is the precise measurement of the relational 
link between the 'dominator' and 'dominated', Weber is indubitably correct. This approach 
puts an emphasis on the dominated party and provides a snapshot of power or, keeping true 
to Weber's preferred terminology, domination in action. But what if the overarching goal is 
to survey the power landscape and put some precision on it? In addition, does such a quest 
for precision in social analysis exclude power relations where the probability that a command 
will be obeyed is uncertain? 
Because the principal goal of this study is to determine the extent and ways in which risk 
governance is mandated and/or allowed under the Russian policy, legal, and regulatory 
regime, my foremost priority is to explore the power landscape, i.e. the multitude of actors 
and institutions involved in the power/counter-power relations. This is not to say that I am 
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not concerned with the mechanics of power relations. As the foregoing empirical analysis 
shows, I certainly am, but I do not place priority on the precision coveted by Weber. 
For this reason, I am not quite ready to abandon the imperfect concept of power. There is 
general agreement on the concept's basic elements. Castells, who considers power relations 
foundational to the organization of a human society, defines the power as follows: 'Power is 
the relational capacity of a social actor to influence asymmetrically the decisions of other 
social actors in ways that favour that power actor's will, interests, and values.' (Castells, 
2011) He adds that such power cannot exist without resistance or counter-power of the 
dominated agent (Id.). Castells admits that he follows the 'standard' definition of power, 
which is not very far from what Weber offers in Economy and Society in 1922 (Id.). 
Although Weber emphasises the importance of probability, the two scholars ( and many more) 
agree that the definition of power revolves around the following three elements: (1) the 
presence of at least two social agents, which Scott (2001) labels principal and subaltern; (2) 
a casual link between these two agents; and (3) a wilful act or the ability of the principal to 
act wilfully and the resistance or ability of the subaltern to resist. I will elaborate on each of 
these three elements below. 
A principal is the dominant agent and a subaltern is the subordinate. There can be many 
principals and many subalterns in a single power relationship. Moreover, the agents can 
switch their position, and a principal in one relationship can become a subaltern in another 
and vice versa. In the previous section's EA and ER examples, the federal and Sakha 
governments ostensibly held the power to protect the environment and the livelihoods of 
indigenous peoples on the territory of the Russian Federation and the Sakha Republic, 
respectively. Thus, the Rosprirodnadzor and the government ofSakha, which are tasked with 
implementing EA and ER, act as the principals, whereas Gazprom acts as a subaltern. 
However, in the ER process, Gazprom appears to have the upper hand and therefore holds 
power over the Sakha government. The Sakha government has not yet attempted to compel 
the company to conduct ER. Instead, it is in the process of negotiating ER in relation to the 
Chayandinskoe field. Although Gazprom conducted OVOS of the waste disposal sites and 
received SEER approval, a negative EA decision did not appear to be in the realm of real 
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possibility. As noted in Chapter 2, the political and geopolitical importance of the Power of 
Siberia made Gazprom the de facto principal in this relationship and a positive EA outcome 
is all but certain. 
Power is a causal relation (Isaac, 1992). As Scott notes (2001, p. 1), '[i]n its most general 
sense, power is the production of causal effects.' Thus, the concept of power forms the 
foundation of human agency because by definition human agency is the ability of a human 
actor to generate effects in the world (Id). Yet as I elaborate below, the casualty should not 
be confused with intentionality, or mental state of a subject toward the object. 
However, not all scholars build their view of social power around a human agent. According 
to Grewal (2008, p. 131 ), the failure to recognize the role of agency in the concept of power 
hindered works of many structuralists, as they were unsuccessful at dissecting the 
mechanisms by which power is exercised. Although not constrained by structural 
determinism, Foucault (1980, p. 90) is also not willing to give full credit to human agency. 
He builds his idea of disciplinary power, by concentrating on the effects of power and all but 
rejecting the value of examining the 'global relation of dominators and dominated' (Taylor, 
1984, p. 166). Thus, Foucault (1980, p. 93) describes his view of the concept of power as 
follows: 'power is not an institution, and not a structure; neither is it a certain strength we are 
endowed with; it is the name that one attributes to a complex strategical situation in a 
particular society.' Giddens (1995) criticises this approach as leading to 'subject-less history' 
and Taylor disparages Foucault for not even attempting to create a systematic account of 
micro reactions that constitute his interdisciplinary power (Taylor, 1984, p. 169). 
The Foucauldian concept of disciplinary power along with the concept of hegemony 
developed by Gramsci are two notable examples of the so-called heterodox theories of power 
(Grewal, 2008). Gramsci showed how socialization in schools, churches, and factories could 
be as effective as coercion in securing the consent of the subordinate classes. Interestingly, 
Gramsci considered hegemony the most prevalent form of power in the post-feudal Western 
society (Id p.132). 
Also known as the 'second stream' of social power research, these theories diverge from the 
mainstream exemplified above by the work of Weber. Whereas the mainstream theories focus 
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on the organizations of power, the second stream theories emphasize power strategies and 
techniques (Scott, 2001, p. 9). The 'power without agency problem' of at least some second 
stream theories (Foucault's and Gramsci's for example) comes from the view of power as 
the collective property of the entire system of actors linked by a multitude of social relations 
(Id). 
Grewal (2008), whose theory of network power belongs to the second stream, solves this 
problem in a creative and convincing manner. First, as I noted above, he does not preoccupy 
himself with finding the single source of power and identifying the 'super agent'. Second, he 
employs a theory of structuration, which, if examined at the most basic level, is reduced to 
an integrated account of agency and structure. Although he highlights works of Giddens as 
the pioneer of the structuration theory, he does not follow Giddens' or other scholars', such 
as Bourdieu and Habermas, exact interpretations of it. Instead, he uses a theory of 
structuration, or as he puts it, 'theories of structuration as a group' as a guiding principle to 
'avoid falling into one of two extremes' in his analysis (Id p. 56). 
The third element of the aforementioned definition of social power needs further explanation. 
An act compared to an ability to act is one of the main points of contention among power 
scholars or as Dahl (1968) described it, the difference between holding and exercising power. 
Morriss (2012, pp. xvi-xvii) rejects the latter as power, noting that holding or capacity to 
exercise power can be realized without an overt act of a principal. Continuing with the EA 
and ER example, Gazprom was not ordered by Rosprirodnadzor to conduct public hearings. 
It did so likely because holding public hearings is a customary practice that usually 
diminishes opposition to an industrial project (Stammler, 2014). It is true that the company 
did not technically need to conduct public hearings under Russian law. However, the 
comprehensiveness of the OVOS principle set forth in Article 3 of 'On Environmental 
Review' created the capacity for the government to deem public input from sources other 
than public hearings to be in violation of this principle (Law Nl 75-FZ, 1995). 
I did not aim to resolve this long-standing scholarly argument in this study. Rather, I chose 
to focus on the epistemic value of exercising power. Due to my training as a lawyer, I am 
partial to the view that power is akin to law and has some enduring quality to it. However, I 
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found that identifying instances where a principal exercises power overtly is useful for 
identifying its power capacity. In a sense, these instances partially comprise what Scott (2001 
. 15) caLI elementary forms of power 'from which more fully developed power relations 
y be built.' 
the act or ability to act above, I stopped short of using the term 
mtentional'. I also attribute this choice to my legal background - law pays particular 
ention to differences between intent, negligence, recklessness, and other mental states of a 
bject toward an object. In the common law tradition, mens rea (guilty mind) and actus reus 
criminal act) are the two necessary elements of a crime (Black's Law Dictionary, 2014). The 
u ian legal tradition, which is based on the continental law system, differentiates between 
the subektivnaya storona (the subjective side) and obyektivnaya storona (the objective side) 
fan unlawful act. The subjective side represents the mental connection between the actor 
ad the re ult of bis or her actions, whereas the objective side shows the 'outer' representation 
the un]awful act (Alekseev, et al., 2004, p. 263). 
I found bifurcating causality into the objective and subjective sides extremely helpful. In fact, 
wing power in its strongest sense as an agent's intentional use of causal relations largely 
eludes legislation and administrative rules and regulations from the analysis. When 'On 
ironmental Review' first came into effect in 1995, virtually all new oil and gas activities 
facilities, including oil and gas pipelines, became subject to EA (Law Nl 75-FZ, 1995). 
ce, the purview of the statute extended to all oil and gas companies, including Russia's 
est natural gas company, Gazprom, that proposed activities and facilities that could 
impact the environment. But if we view power in the strongest sense, unless the Russian 
gi lat r intended 'On Environmental Review' to apply specifically to Gazprom, the 
paoy should be left out of the power relation. For this reason, I thought that using the 
broader term 'wilful', implying some degree of deliberation, would be a more accurate and 
lusiv way of describing social power in the context of this study. 
ability of a subaltern to resist a principal's power is a far less controversial element of 
definition of social power. 'Resistance', 'counter-power', and 'counteraction' are often 
interchangeably to describe such an act or an ability (capacity) to act. Foucault (1982, 
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found that identifying instances where a principal exercises power overtly is useful for 
identifying its power capacity. In a sense, these instances partially comprise what Scott (2001 
p. 15) calls elementary forms of power 'from which more fully developed power relations 
may be built.' 
Whilst describing the act or ability to act above, I stopped short of using the term 
'intentional'. I also attribute this choice to my legal background - law pays particular 
attention to differences between intent, negligence, recklessness, and other mental states of a 
subject toward an object. In the common law tradition, mens rea (guilty mind) and actus reus 
(criminal act) are the two necessary elements of a crime (Black's Law Dictionary, 2014). The 
Russian legal tradition, which is based on the continental law system, differentiates between 
the subektivnaya storona (the subjective side) and obyektivnaya storona (the objective side) 
of an unlawful act. The subjective side represents the mental connection between the actor 
and the result of his or her actions, whereas the objective side shows the 'outer' representation 
of the unlawful act (Alekseev, et al., 2004, p. 263). 
I found bifurcating causality into the objective and subjective sides extremely helpful. In fact, 
viewing power in its strongest sense as an agent's intentional use of causal relations largely 
excludes legislation and administrative rules and regulations from the analysis. When 'On 
Environmental Review' first came into effect in 1995, virtually all new oil and gas activities 
and facilities, including oil and gas pipelines, became subject to EA (Law Nl 75-FZ, 1995). 
Hence, the purview of the statute extended to all oil and gas companies, including Russia's 
largest natural gas company, Gazprom, that proposed activities and facilities that could 
impact the environment. But if we view power in the strongest sense, unless the Russian 
legislators intended 'On Environmental Review' to apply specifically to Gazprom, the 
company should be left out of the power relation. For this reason, I thought that using the 
broader term 'wilful', implying some degree of deliberation, would be a more accurate and 
inclusive way of describing social power in the context of this study. 
The ability of a subaltern to resist a principal' s power is a far less controversial element of 
the definition of social power. 'Resistance', 'counter-power', and 'counteraction' are often 
used interchangeably to describe such an act or an ability (capacity) to act. Foucault (1982, 
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p. 229), for example, limits the reach of social power to 'free subjects', 'so far as they are 
free'. However, similar to the interchangeable principal/subaltern nature of an actor, the 
power/resistance dynamics are also fluid. With Gazprom getting the upper hand due to the 
Power of Siberia's political and geopolitical implications, it also found itself in a position of 
power to which the government was balanced with a great deal of counter-power. In fact, the 
EA and ER example presents a plethora of instances in which both Gazprom and the federal 
and Sakha governments held power whilst resisting each other's power. One of such 
instances occurred when Gazprom was forced to begin constructing the pipeline at the time 
of Vladimir Pu tin's visit to Yakutsk on 1 September (Figure 20), which was before it received 
SEER approval for the waste disposal sites (President, 1 September 2014). Another instance 
would be Gazprom's stalemate with the Sakha government regarding ER, in which the 
company seemed to be conceding ER of the Chayandinskoe field whilst overpowering the 
government regarding ER for the pipeline. Scott (2001, p.3) captures the essence of such a 
non-linear power dynamic as follows: '[t]he exercise of power and the possibility of 
resistance to it establish a dialectic of control and autonomy, a balance of power that limits 
the action of the participants in their interplay with each other.' 
Figure 20 President Putin at the Power of Siberia construction commencement ceremony in Yakutsk 
on 1 September 2014 (President of Russia, 2016) 
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5.3. Forms. mechanisms, and categories of power 
In addition to the aforementioned difference between the mainstream and second stream 
approaches to power, Scott (2001) notes another important characteristic in which these 
approaches differ from one another. The mainstream theories of social power are based 
predominately on research targeting corrective influence whereas second stream theories are 
premised predominately on exploring persuasive influence. He explains that '[c]orrective 
influence operates through the use of resources that can serve as punitive and remunerative 
sanctions that are able to work directly on the interests of subalterns in power relations.' 
(Scott, 2001, p. 13) In contrast, persuasive influence 'operates through the offering and 
acceptance of reasons for acting in one way rather than another.' (Id.) 
Force and manipulation are the two elementary forms of power that comprise corrective 
influence. Force is the most direct way of making a subaltern do what a principal desires, 
typically through negative sanctions (Id. p. 13). In the EA and ER example, Rosprirodnadzor 
had the power to render a negative SEER decision, thereby physically preventing Gazprom 
from proceeding with the project. 
Manipulation has both negative and positive sanctions in its arsenal. 49 (Id.) Manipulation by 
a principal affects the bases from which a subaltern chooses to act. For example, if Gazprom 
deviates from the documentation approved by the SEER commission whilst constructing the 
waste disposal sites, the government will have the ability to manipulate Gazprom's behaviour 
by imposing a fine under Part Two, Article 8.4 of the Administrative Code (Law N195-FZ, 
2001 ). 50 The R~ssian government also incentivized construction of the Power of Siberia and 
development of the Chayandinskoe and Kovyktinskoe fields by offering the following tax 
incentives: (i) a zero real property tax rate on the entire Power of Siberia infrastructure (Law 
Nl 17-FZ, 2000, art. 380); and (ii) a zero mineral extraction tax for the first 15 years on the 
natural gas produced from these fields (Id. art. 342.4). Neither example involves a physical 
49 It is important to note that in the Russian legal tradition, the term "sanction" is usually associated with its 
negative application. Positive sanctions are limited to a few specific instances. For example, a "prosecutorial 
sanction" (sanctsiya prokurora) is a permission given by a prosecutor's office to a law enforcement agency to 
conduct a search, seizure, or arrest. (Alekseev, et al., 2004) 
50 The full title of the Administrative Code is the Code of the Russian Federation on Administrative Offenses. 
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interference with the operator's activities. However, under certain circumstances such 
mechanisms can lead to more significant long-term results. 51 
Scott explains persuasive influence as working through 'cognitive symbols' and through 
'value commitments'. He therefore differentiates between signification and legitimation as 
the two principal forms of persuasion. One does not need to go further than the official 
discourse surrounding the signing of the Power of Siberia contract to see how both forms of 
persuasion work. As I noted in Chapter 2, Vladimir Putin used ostensibly impressive numbers 
to suggest the socio-economic importance of the deal whilst engaging in political and 
geopolitical pandering to appeal to Russian citizen's values. 
Because mainstream scholars largely focus on corrective influence, it should not come as a 
surprise that they often tap into sovereign power for the empirical base of their research. 
Naturally, they have targeted the power of the ultimate sovereign, the state, as the prime 
example of their investigations. However, some mainstream scholars, including the 'father' 
of the mainstream, Weber, also included non-state organizations like corporate entities and 
churches in the scope of their research. Second stream scholars, on the other hand, accentuate 
persuasive influence as the core area of their research. Thus, they often look beyond 
sovereign structures to find empirical support (Scott, 2001, pp. 6,12). 
Second stream scholars find it in what Grewal (2008, p. 8) terms relations based on 
sociability. He describes the key feature of sociability as follows: '[i]n this case, aggregate 
outcomes emerge not from an act of collective decision-making, but through the 
accumulation of decentralized, individual decisions that, taken together, nonetheless conduce 
to a circumstance that affects the entire group.' In contrast, sovereignty harnesses political 
will and enables collective decision-making (Id.). Although an individual, a government 
bureaucrat, CEO, or a pastor for example, often makes a final decision, he or she acts on 
behalf of a group of people. It might not feel to a citizen, shareholder, or parishioner that this 
individual decision-maker acts in furtherance of his or her beliefs, values, and choices. 
51 I elaborate further in Chapter 6 on the power of tax incentives for oil and gas development. 
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However, what matters here is the procedure and order that turns the plethora of divergent 
individual choices into one collective choice, which all the individuals are supposed to obey. 
Remarkably, one of the first scholars to articulate the idea of sociability-premised power was 
Weber, whose name is associated with developing the theory of sovereignty-grounded power 
relations. The so-called Weberian idea of power, or as Weber calls it, domination, exists by 
'virtue of authority'. Such domination comprises of 'patriarchal, magisterial, or princely 
power' (Weber, 1978, p. 943). The other form of domination exists 'by virtue of constellation 
of interests' (Id.). Weber uses a monopolist's position on the market as an ideal type of such 
domination. However, he goes beyond a monopoly example and sees domination 'by virtue 
of constellation of interests' also as 'derived exclusively from the possession of goods or 
marketable skills guaranteed in some way and acting upon the conduct of those dominated, 
who remain, however, formally free and are motivated simply by the pursuit of their own 
interests.' (Id.) He provides several examples, including the relationship between lenders and 
borrowers where the latter have little choice than to accept the financial institution's terms 
(Grewal, 2008, p. 117). 
A further theoretical foray into the nature and origins of sovereignty, especially as it relates 
to the concept of risk governance, is tempting. However, in order to stay within the scope of 
this study, I have limited it to a brief inquiry of a sovereign power of a state and the Russian 
state in particular. The theories that explain the origin of a state (teorii proishozheniya 
gosudarstva) occupy a significant portion of Russia's legal theory scholarship and its law 
school curriculum. Students are presented with several theories, including theological, 
patriarchal, conquest (nasiliya), Marxist (materialist), psychological, and social contract. 
Interestingly, post-Soviet textbooks do not favour one theory over another (Alekseev, et al., 
2004). 
Such a pluralistic view on the origin of a state perhaps foreshadows the understanding in 
Russian society that sovereignty is not necessary associated with a democratic decision-
making process. 52 'Orthodoxy, Autocracy, Nationality' (Pravoslavie, Samoderzhavie, 
Narodnost), the official ideology of Russian absolutism articulated by the Minister of Public 
52 
I explore public attitudes toward democratic institutions in Russia below. 
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Education Uvarov in 1832 connected the theological, patriarchal, and conquest theories and 
proclaimed the unquestionable authority of a God-connected, Viking-rooted father of all 
Russian people (Serov, 2003). 
The reason why I took this seemingly irrelevant historic detour is two-fold. First, such a view 
of a sovereign makes sovereignty and sociability in the context of decision-making virtually 
indistinguishable. In a democratic society, a government bureaucrat is deemed to represent 
the public interest determined through the process of collective decision-making. His or her 
choice as an individual actor cannot contradict the collective choice when he or she is 
engaged in so-called public service. If such a conflict exists, the bureaucrat must remove 
himself or herself from the position of an official decision-maker. Judges recuse themselves 
and legislators abstain from the vote. Under the Orthodoxy, Autocracy, Nationality ideology, 
such conflicts of interest do not and cannot exist because of l'etat, c'est moi - the monarch is 
the state and the state is the monarch (Caplan, 1999). This means that the choices that a 
monarch makes individually, to engage in a war or join a trade treaty, for example, are also 
the choices of the people, regardless of whether they were consulted in that regard. Moreover, 
under extreme absolutism, the monarch is not accountable for his or her decisions unless the 
people revolt and overthrow the monarch. 
The second reason for the historic detour is the merger of sovereignty and sociability in the 
risk governance of the oil and gas activities that I observed in the course of this study and 
expand on in Chapter 6. Instances of such merger are not unique to Russia - no country is 
immune to private interests permeating the public realm. A form of the merger, corruption, 
which Transparency International (Transparency International, 2016) defines as the 'abuse 
of entrusted power for private gain', has even affected Norway, a country atop its list. The 
fact that corruption is endemic in Russia is not unique either - there are many countries where 
corrupt practices are seen as a fact of social life (Ledeneva, 2013, p. 1136). What is 
remarkable about Russia is that many Russians see the modem day version of the Orthodoxy, 
Autocracy, Nationality ideology as the only way of confronting the ills that this very ideology 
brings, including the ills of corruption. This feedback loop questions the very existence of 
meaningful and balanced risk governance where collective public interests can be ambushed 
by overwhelming private interests at any moment. 
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5.4. Law as demarcation of sovereign power 
The purpose of this detour related to sovereign power is to put a key component of this study, 
law within the theoretical framework of social power. Similar to power, law is not an easy 
concept to define. Legal scholars have been arguing about the meaning of law since ancient 
times and are yet to reach consensus. Yet understanding different views on the concept of 
law is critical for the locating its place and role vis-a-vis the concept of social power and 
determining what empirical sources need to be analysed. It would have been impossible to 
provide a comprehensive account of a single major legal theory let alone all major legal 
theories in this study. For this reason, I will limit my investigation of conveying the essence 
of the following four most common theories in the contemporary legal scholarship -
positivism, natural law, realism, and pluralism. 
Positivist scholars see law as a 'matter of what has been posited (ordered, decided, practiced, 
tolerated, etc.)' and thus as a social construction (Green, 2009). The biggest criticism of 
positivism arises from the fact the theory does not premise the existence of law on its merits, 
for example on the ideals of justice and democracy. Many anti-positivists misinterpret this 
view as a justification for law that is unjust and undemocratic (Id.). Although this criticism 
is defensible regarding early branches of positivism such as imperatival theories, it is less so 
in the case of modem positivism. Bentham and Austin, who are regarded as the founders of 
legal positivism, view law as a compilation of commands that come from a sovereign. These 
commands come from implicit sovereign authority and therefore are valid and not subject to 
moral scrutiny (Id.). 
Hart, a legal philosopher responsible for modernizing positivism, brought a normative 
element to the theory by recognizing the root of a legal system's normative power of social 
custom (Lacey, 2004). In addition, in the first addition of his seminal book, The Concept of 
Law, Hart makes the following remark: 'No "positivist" could deny that these are facts, or 
that the stability of legal systems depends in part upon such types of correspondence with 
morals. If this is what is meant by the necessary connection of law and morals, its existence 
should be conceded.' (Hart, 1994, p. 204) This line of thinking opened the door for what Hart 
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(1958) calls 'soft positivism'. Also known as 'inclusive positivism' this branch of positivism 
allows for a wider inclusion of moral principles into legal analysis. 53 
Many view legal positivism as an antipode of the natural law theory. Black's Law Dictionary 
describes natural law as '[a] philosophical system of legal and moral principles purportedly 
deriving from a universalized conception of human nature or divine justice rather than from 
legislative or judicial action; moral law embodied in principles of right and wrong.' (Black's 
Law Dictionary, 2014) Natural law theories go back to works of Thomas Aquinas who 
defined law as: 'an ordinance ofreason made by him who has care of the community for the 
common good and promulgated.' (Finnis, 2015) Dworkin, who is regarded as one of the most 
vocal critics of positivism, is also seen as one the key scholars behind the development of 
legal interpretivism, a contemporary branch of the natural law theory. He premises his view 
of law on an abstract set of conditions under which the government can use force over its 
citizens (Id.). Such conditions must be determined in advance and honoured by society as a 
whole. In order to identify what the law is in a given jurisdiction, one must not go to a 
particular source, a legislature for example. Rather, one should engage in a political and 
moral analysis comparing the existing legal practices to the predetermined and honoured set 
of conditions (Id.). 
Whereas the natural law theory takes a high philosophical ground to oppose legal positivism, 
legal realism fights it in legal 'trenches'. Realism in its purest form is a theory of adjudication, 
as Leiter puts it 'a theory about what it is judges really do when they decide cases.' (Leiter, 
2001, p. 279) The best way to explain the essence of realism is by referring to the famous 
American case of Riggs v. Palmer. In this case, the beneficiary who murdered the decedent 
was set to benefit from the crime had the court adhered to the text of the will. The court 
however, followed the moral principle that an heir should not benefit from his or her 
wrongdoing and denied the inheritance (Ambrosio, 2000, p. 31 ). Similar to inclusive 
positivism, legal realism separates the descriptive and the normative sides of law, drawing a 
sharp boundary between 'the is and the ought'. Some realists believe that because of its focus 
53 The question of whether the validity of law is predicated on its conformity with certain moral principles is 
subject to a scholarly debate. Yet further investigation of this debate requires a more extensive discussion that 
is only tangentially related to the principal topic of this study. 
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on the descriptive end, it is close or even complimentary to positivism (Leiter, 2001). Others 
point at the origins of realism in the rebellion against formalism, and thus consider realism 
to be closer to natural law theories (Ambrosio, 2000, p. 32). 
Legal pluralism unlike the natural law theory and legal realism takes a somewhat 
reconciliatory approach. It emerged in the wake of anthropological investigations of 
indigenous ways of governance in remote parts of Africa and Oceania. Anthropologists were 
interested in the ways these communities maintained social order without the genius of 
conventional ( continental or common law) legal systems. The concept caught on and was 
utilized to study 'advanced' societies in the United Kingdom, France, and the United States. 
Legal pluralism has been especially helpful in researching complex multi-level legal systems 
governing resource extraction in the Arctic (Merry, 1988). Novikova (2014), for example, 
includes in her studies not only the indigenous customary law traditions of the Russian Arctic 
but also corporate norms and the national law of the Russian Federation. Griffiths (1986, p. 
1) defines legal pluralism as the 'state of affairs for any social field, in which behaviour 
pursuant to more than one legal order occurs.' He distinguishes between the 'social science' 
and the 'juristic' notions of legal pluralism. The former is concerned with the coexistence of 
different legal systems within a single social group. The latter is reduced to a problem when 
one legal system is placed over an already functioning legal system (Merry, 1988). 
Unsurprisingly, there is no agreement among social power scholars on what constitutes law. 
Foucault's view is a surprising outlier here given his major contribution to the second stream 
of social power research. He builds his concept of disciplinary power through the critique of 
the juridico-political model of power, and sees law as one of the main power mechanisms of 
this model (FoucaultM., 1977). Foucault's view is on the extreme end of the aforementioned 
imperatival positivist theories with law as a top-down, obey-or-die weapon wielded by a 
supreme sovereign capable of crushing skulls and bending social will with direct, as well the 
threat of, physical force. 
Hunt asserts and Silbey (1992) joins him in justifying Foucault's analysis as based on the 
distinction between classical and modem societies. However, this approach ignores the 
existence of what is known in modem jurisprudence as private law, the law of contracts, for 
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example. Ancient Babylonians, Greeks, and Romans were entering into transactions without 
much interference from a king, the Assembly, or the Senate and sought sovereign's input 
only in relation to disputes over such transactions. Yet, as Green (2009) points out, this view 
persists among some Foucauldians despite the plentiful evidence of the contrary. 
Those who did not read past page 34 of Economy and Society are likely to think that Weber's 
and Foucault's views on law in the context of social power are not that far apart. The 
definition that Weber provides - law as an organized threat of coercion - has made its way 
into many scholarly works. This oversimplification is due to Weber using the term law to 
describe a range of concepts in his works. Trubek (1972, p. 727), through an analysis of his 
arguments in the aforementioned treatises, deciphers the following Weberian view of law, 
premising his view on the following three elements: 
[T]he essential elements ofWeber's broad concept of 'law' are that it be a system 
of standards, maxims, principles, or rules of conduct, to some degree accepted as 
obligatory by the persons to whom it is addressed, and backed by a specialized 
enforcement agency employing coercive sanctions. To the extent that sanctions 
are applied in accord with a system of rules, law is said to be 'rational.' By 
highlighting the elements of coercion, legitimacy, and rationality, Weber puts law 
into the category of sovereign power or as he refers to it 'domination by virtue of 
authority.' 
Bourdieu, who in my view provides one of the most encompassing and cohesive accounts of 
law within the social power framework, builds on the Weberian idea of 'formal rationality' 
by recognizing law's 'power of form' (Bourdieu, 1986-1987, p. 809). Bourdieu's 
inclusiveness comes from his visualization of law as the 'juridical field' that he sees as 'an 
area of structured, socially patterned activity or "practice," in this case disciplinarily and 
professionally defined.' (Id. p. 806) These economic, psychological, social, and linguistic 
practices possess power that determines how law operates in the society. They are carried out 
within habitus, behavioural structures formed via tradition, professional custom, and 
education (Id. 807). Bourdieu is not completely satisfied with either excessive formalism 
(usually associated with exclusive positivism) or the extreme instrumentalism of some realist 
scholars. The genius of Bourdieu's approach is that he recognizes each theory's strongest 
points. He gives instrumentalists their due for connecting the juridical field with 'the exercise 
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of power in other social realms and through other mechanisms'. Bourdieu also tips his hat to 
formalists for deciphering the law's special feature, the aforementioned 'power of form' (Id.). 
I found this duality oflaw - its close substantive connection with social power and its special 
'power of form' - to be of critical importance to this study. First, law delimits the boundaries 
of social power and counter-power by establishing visible and socially significant markers. 
These markers are akin to physical boundary markers - some are set in stone and some are 
not. However, even some of the 'set-in-stone' markers that at first glance instil the sense of 
stability can and often are moved after a short while. Second, law delimits these social power 
boundaries in a special way. It employs special mechanisms such as language, reasoning, and 
organization, which amounts to what Riles (2011) calls a legal technology. For these reasons, 
I employed inclusive positivism as the theoretical basis of my legal analysis because it 
enabled me to use conventional legal sources such as statutes, rules, and regulations, as well 
as policy statements that do not possess the formal force oflaw. 
Cotterrell (1995, p. 6) notes that: 'the theoretical analysis oflaw reveals many forms of power 
at work through law, or related to it in intricate ways.' Correspondingly, analysis of Russell's 
theoretical take on social power leads to the same conclusion. Russell ( 193 7) relies on law in 
many examples to illustrate how different forms of power - priestly, kingly, economic, 
organizational, state, and the form where force is absent, or as he terms it, 'naked power' -
work in the society. Thus, contrary to the views of many Marxist philosophers and 
imperatival positivists, Russell does not appear to be willing to make law an exclusive 
prerogative of the state. This view is in line with Weber's analysis of sovereign power that, 
as I noted above, included large organizations such as churches and companies (Grewal, 
2008). For example, both the Catholic (Boudinhon, 1910) and Russian Orthodox Churches 
(Brokgaus & Effron, 1890-1907) have leaned on Canon law, as demonstrated by their own 
codified sets of laws for governing activities of clergy and church members, as well as their 
relationship with the secular governments. 
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5.5. Legal, regulatory, and policy regimes and structures of domination 
This chapter began with a real-life risk governance example. I have referred back to the 
example to illustrate how the law governing generation of knowledge about risk works in the 
context of social power. I close this chapter by connecting these theoretical points together 
and presenting the policy, legal, and regulatory regime that governs risk in connection with 
oil and gas activities in Russia as a structure of sovereign power. 
The policy, legal, and regulatory framework reviewed in Chapter 4 represents the boundaries 
in which it can exercise authority over handling risk posed by oil and gas development in 
Russia. Blomley (2014, p. 135), who draws upon Callon's concept of 'framing the states of 
the world', calls the creation of these boundaries 'bracketing'. He explains the purpose of 
bracketing as an attempt to draw a boundary within which interactions occur with some 
degree of independence of the surrounding factors. 
Legal brackets, even in relation to a particular activity, are rarely created by one piece of 
legislation. Rather they are built from the existing pieces, some of which may constitute a 
significant portion of a bracket structure. 'On Environmental Review', 'On Ethnological 
Review', and Order 372, which I reviewed in relation to the EA and ER of the Power of 
Siberia, lie within these brackets of the framework that I reviewed in Chapter 4, which in turn 
lies within the brackets of the Russian legal system. Many legal brackets that are part of a 
legal subsystem, energy law for example, overlap. Blomley (2014, p. 137) describes this 
phenomenon as 'brackets themselves becom[ing] inserted in other legal brackets'. The 
'bracket overlap' as well as 'bracketing' itself does not happen by virtue of concerted 
legislative action and rulemaking by administrative agencies. Blomley notes the 'mechanism 
of legal precedent' as one of such pathways (Id.). 
Blomley (2015) develops his account of bracketing by studying the treaty process between 
provincial and federal governments on one side and First Nations on the other. One of the 
aims of the Canadian government is to clarify its relationship with indigenous communities 
by extinguishing the disordered to the common law aboriginal title and replacing it with the 
straightforward fee simple category (Id.). This process is in some ways analogous to the 
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process of issuing a licence for oil and gas prospecting, exploration, and/or extraction 
reviewed in more detail in Chapter 7. There, the government sets the terms and conditions 
for a potential 'subsoil deposit user' regarding the oil and gas deposit. The process is not one 
sided as the Federal Law 'On Subsoil Resources' suggests (Law N2395-I , 1992, art. 9). 
Companies often play an active role in determining terms and conditions under such a licence 
(Senior Russian NOC Manager, 2014). Therefore, licensing is bracketing within the 
legislative and rulemaking bracketing that has already occurred. 
If exercised on an ad hoe basis, the aforementioned instances of force, manipulation, 
signification, and legitimation, would classify as what Scott (2001) terms as elementary 
forms of power. However, if these elementary forms of power are channelled through the 
institutional framework of a legal system and take the form of 'stable and enduring' social 
relations, they may transform into what Scott (2001, pp. 15-16) calls structures of 
domination. Scott aligns corrective influence with domination through constraint and 
persuasive influence with domination through discursive formation. The former is achieved 
through coercion and inducement whereas the latter is through expertise and command. 
Because his main concern is with 'domination as the basis of leadership', he builds his 
terminology accordingly. Thus, he associates coercion with 'lions', inducement with 'foxes', 
expertise with 'owls', and command with 'bears'. He also separates the patterns of resistance, 
or 'counteraction' as he calls it, from the aforementioned structures of domination, 
distinguishing between 'protest' and 'pressure' (Id.). 
It would have been amusing to use Scott's animal kingdom terminology in this thesis. It also 
would have been intriguing to examine the data that I collected through the lenses of 
counteraction structures. However, because this study does not focus on leadership, I found 
no utility in examining structures of counter-power separately. Thus, I studied the power and 
counter-power dynamics as part of the same power structure. For the same reason, I refrained 
from designating actors and groups of actors as lions, foxes, owls, and bears. 
Another element of Scott's structure of domination definition that I chose to forego is its 
large scale. For example, Order 372, which creates brackets for conducting OVOS, is a stable 
and enduring structure. Unlike constantly changing 'On Environmental Review', Order 372 
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remained largely the same since its adoption in 2000. Many other structures working through 
Russian formal and informal institutions are not necessarily large-scale. Most of the smaller-
scale structures, the licensing regime for example, were part of larger structures. 
This Matryoshka (Russian nesting doll) model enabled me to zoom in and out of a particular 
structure depending on the question at hand. This model is also consistent with Blomley's 
aforementioned observation regarding smaller legal brackets inserted into larger legal 
brackets. Thus, when sovereign power is channelled through law and forms a stable and 
enduring pattern, it can be described as a power structure demarcated by legal brackets. In 
this respect, it is similar to Eisner's concept of regulatory regime that identifies as 'marked 
by the "configuration of policies and institutions" structuring relations between social 
interests, state and economic actors in the economy.' (Eisner, 2000, p. 1) 
Hood, Rothstein, and Baldwin's (2003) definition of the term of regime in relation to 
regulation of risk is substantially similar to that of Eisner. These scholars use the term 'to 
denote the complex of institutional geography, rules, practice, and animating ideas that are 
associated with the regulation of a particular risk or hazard.' (Id. p. 9) They distinguish the 
following three characteristics of a risk regulation regime: (i) a systemic nature, (ii) temporal 
continuity, and (iii) bounds 'that can be specified at different levels ofbreadth' (Id.). Because 
of these definitional similarities, I use the terms 'regime' and 'power structure' 
interchangeably. 
Blomley (2015, pp. 169-170) draws on Callon's idea that although brackets provide some 
separation between the more stable inside and less stable outside, they do not sever one from 
the other. He also makes an astute observation about particular brackets, property boundaries, 
classifying them as 'only a line of separation, but also a zone of connection' (Blomley, 2014, 
p. 138). It is precisely at the legal brackets that some power relations encounter legally 
delimited power structures. This is where Gazprom's decision to develop the Chayandinskoe 
and Kovyktinskoe fields met the power or, depending on one's perspective, the resistance of 
a state in the form EA. This is an instance when sociability and sovereignty-based power 
structures start interacting, sometimes inside the legal brackets and sometimes outside of 
them. 
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A legitimate question arises - what happens inside the legal brackets of a particular power 
structure? Depending on the power structure and the scale of inquiry, one might find one or 
more additional power structures. In addition, a stable and enduring power structure provides 
room for agency. Under Article 3 of Order 372, Gazprom had a choice of soliciting public 
preferences via several pathways, including public hearings. Gazprom's agency in soliciting 
public input can be further limited by structural constraints of accepted business practices, 
which in the case of the Power of Siberia called for public hearings (Order N732, 2000). 
'On Environmental Review', 'On Ethnological Review', and Order 372, as well as any 
source of law intended to demarcate power structures, are also by-products of both human 
agency and political structures. Structural constraints of the Russian political system might 
have influenced the agency of the government officials responsible for promulgating these 
laws but these constraints did not draft or revise these instruments, nor did they vote for or 
sign them. Thus, law-making and rulemaking serve as crude but straightforward examples of 
structuration, where structure and human agency work together. 
Thus far, I have largely omitted generation of risk knowledge from the discussion of the 
concept of power. The omission was intentional - my foremost goal in this section was to 
flesh out the policy, legal, and regulatory regime that governs risk in connection with oil and 
gas activities in Russia as a structure of sovereign power. Having accomplished this goal, I 
can now segue back to where this section started, the discussion of knowledge about risk in 
the context of the EA and ER of the Power of Siberia pipeline. 
In order to do this, I will utilize the three-dimensional view of power developed by Lukes 
(1974). According to the Minutes of Public Hearings (Discussion) of Project Documentation 
in relation to the waste disposal sites for pump stations KS-3 'Amginskaya' and KS-4 
'Nimnyrskaya' (the 'Minutes'), the hearing took place on 25 October 2013 in the Sakha city 
of Aldan (Aldanskiy District, 2013). Twenty people participated in the meeting, including 
the Gazprom subsidiary's managers, local officials, and employees of Gazprom's sub-
contractors responsible for the design of the facilities in question. Project documentation for 
the aforementioned facilities served as the principal topic of the hearing. The meeting 
featured an introductory address and concluding remarks by the head of the local government 
175 
and two presentations by sub-contractor representatives. The Minutes also mention 15 
questions from the audience and a discussion. In addition, the Minutes state that as the result 
of the hearing, the project materials were approved subject to 'suggestions and comments' 
that should be incorporated in the project documentation 'if necessary' (Id.). 
The outcome of the hearing is what Lukes (1974, pp. 11-15) describes as the one-dimensional 
view of power. The decision was made as a result of the opinions of what appeared to be the 
majority of hearing participants. According to Lukes, this conception of power developed by 
Dahl, Polsby, Wolfinger, and other scholars, is hardly complete (Id.). Thus, he adds another 
'dimension' associated with the work of Bachrach and Baratz into his analysis of power in 
collective decision-making. 
The essence of this power dimension is 'control of the agenda' (Id. p. 21). The hearing 
discussed two waste disposal sites, which according to Stammler (2014) are usually not atop 
the local people's list of concerns. Local people are not necessarily worried about one 
industrial facility. Rather, they are concerned about the en masse development that comes in 
the form of roads, quarries, and the actual pipeline that disturbs traditional reindeer migration 
routes, hunting and fishing grounds, and reindeer pastures (Id.). However, because 'On 
Environmental Review' limits EA in relation to trunk pipelines to waste disposal issues, these 
more pressing issues were not on the hearing agenda (Law Nl75-FZ, 1995, art. 11). Thus, 
law is especially useful for bracketing agenda-setting power, as statutes, regulations, and 
precedents pay particular attention to jurisdictional and administrative discretion matters. 
The third dimension is exemplified by the fact that no one at the hearing questioned the very 
idea of the pipeline in the Aldanskiy district of Sakha. It is highly unlikely that the local 
official chairing the meeting would have allowed this issue for discussion, and if he did, the 
outcome of this discussion would have been only symbolic under the applicable law. Yet the 
absence of a single question about the underlying reason of the meeting shows the state of 
powerlessness and indifference. Lukes (1974, p. 25) categorizes the power to create such a 
state as the least transparent and the strongest dimension of power. 
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It is difficult to pinpoint the exact reasons for the utter resignation to a decision that will 
affect many lives in the Aldanskiy district, Sak.ha, and the Eastern Siberia and the Far East 
regions. However, the source of the resignation is a strong belief among Russian people in 
the competence and superiority of central power. For example, only 6% of Russians attribute 
the rise of economic prosperity in 2000s to efforts by regional and local governments 
(Levada-Centre, 2014, p. 87). In contrast, 62% believe the rise is due to Vladimir Putin's 
leadership (Id.). Only 19% of Russian citizens believe that regional and local legislators 
should be free of executive control, whereas 25% believe think that they should be fully and 
35% under partial control of the executive branch (Id.). This attitude is exemplified by the 
statement that a family member of mine made in response to my question about the ever-
increasing 'vertical of power' in Russia: 'Roma, did you forget what kind of country you 
came from? Without a strong leader, Russia will fall apart. It has always been this way.' 
(Family Member, 2014) 
While perusing Levada public polls under the impression of this conversation, I remembered 
the following passage from Nikolay Nekrasov's poem that I read in the secondary school: 
Grandma Nenila asked village head Vlas 
To give her some lumber to fix her hut 
He answered: 'We don't have any, and don't wait for it to come' 
'When the lord comes, he will settle this, 
He will see that the hut is bad 
And will order to provide lumber', thinks the grandma (Nekrasov, 1856). 
I was surprised to come across a reference to N ekrasov' s poem whilst reviewing the transcript 
of a 9 June 2011 State Council meeting (President, 9 June 2011). President Medvedev 
commented on a list of directives given to federal agencies in response to a flood of 
complaints voiced by environmental NGOs during a meeting that took place a day earlier 
(President, 8 June 2011 ). The Russian President was not completely certain about the veracity 
and credibility of the complaints and asked the Administration to verify the claims: 'Let them 
check. Let "the lord come and will settle this".' (President, 9 June 2011) In Russian society, 
the propensity to resign to the strong central power is hardly a secret to both the principals 
and the subalterns. 
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5.6. Conclusion 
I began this Chapter with examining the conceptual underpinning of the risk governance 
theory and its 'proto-foundation' - the mutually reinforcing feedback loop between power 
and knowledge. Analysing of the Power of Siberia example revealed that in the context of 
hydrocarbon development the power-knowledge dynamic occurs in two stages: creation of 
the general power structure and implementation within the structure. This analysis also 
revealed the importance of recognizing two opposing sides in the risk governance process 
that represent potentially divergent private and public interests. Most importantly, the social 
concept of power emerged as the common denominator for analysing how these two sides 
interact with each other in appraising, evaluating, managing, and communicating risk. The 
side charged with representing public interest relies on sovereign power structures that are 
demarcated by legal brackets. These power structures are best understood through a theory 
of structuration, which provides insight regarding the compliance with and ongoing changes 
of legal and regulatory landscapes. 
Unlike Beck, Giddens, and Luhmann, I did not aim to develop a universal theory of risk. My 
task was far less ambitious, as I searched for conceptual understanding of the decision-
making processes that I observed. I found an answer in the most fundamental of social theory 
concepts - power and knowledge. I therefore contributed to risk governance literature by 
offering a simple yet compatible approach to examination of risk governance processes on a 
micro (in comparison to Beck's, Gidden's, and Luhmann's) scale. I also identified a 
theoretical pathway for the risk governance researchers willing to explore beyond the existing 
risk theories - the complex but rich and diverse universe of the social power concept. I made 
another contribution to risk governance literature by showing (through the EA and ER 
mechanisms) the adversarial nature of risk governance when private and public interests are 
involved. In addition, my investigation of EA and ER as risk governance processes 
contributed to applied risk governance literature. These contributions also added to literature 
on the social concept of power. I illustrated through the Power of Siberia example how 
various forms of power are capable of explaining social phenomena in the context of risk 





requirements, my observations extend to other projects as a matter of law's general 
applicability. The multiplicity of social power forms, streams, and dimensions that I located 
throughout the example also confirmed Russell's (1937) postulate about the foundational 
nature of power in social sciences. In addition, I built on the work of Blomley (2014) (2015) 
and re-sketched the Bourdieusian duality of law as overlapping sovereign power structures 
delimited by brackets forged by legal technology. This set the stage for the development of 
the risk governance power framework, provided conceptual justification for using legal texts 
in analysis of power relations, and contributed to the socio-legal literature on the legal aspect 
of power. 
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6. Who Governs Whom? The Power of the Oil Standard 
6.1. Conceptualizing the power of oil and gas 
In the previous chapter, I focused my analysis on the origin of power behind those who 
govern risk posed by oil and gas activities. In this chapter, I shift my focus to the governed. 
My overarching goal here is to find underlying reasons behind challenges of governing such 
risks in Russia. With this overarching objective in mind, I commence the development of the 
Risk Governance Power Framework by first examining the hazardous activity at issue. In 
particular, I aim to contribute to risk governance literature by shifting away from the 
universal theories of risk offered by the aforementioned scholars and examining the qualities 
of the oil and gas sector that might influence the risk governance process. I also aim to 
contribute to the heterodox power theory literature and to the development of the network 
power theory by examining it in the context of the oil and gas sector. In addition, because of 
the empirical grounding in the Russian policy, legal, and regulatory regime, I aim to 
contribute to the literature regarding policy-making in the Russian oil and gas sector. 
6.1.1.1. Sociability and sovereignty in risk governance 
As I noted in the introduction, one of the limitations of this study is the difficulty of 
incorporating an in-depth analysis of all theories capable of explaining the collected data. For 
this reason, I restrained my examination of resource curse, path dependence, and social 
network theories to a cursory literature overview. Initially, I subjected the concept of network 
power to a review of similar depth. Yet even a cursory overview confirmed that the concept 
of network power was not only able to provide a compatible theoretical foundation for 
analysing power relations, it also possessed a great deal of explanatory capacity for the task 
at hand. 
In the simplest terms, network power is the power of a standard that coordinates social 
relations in a network (Castells, 201 la, p. 773). Perhaps the most straightforward example of 
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a standard is language. As I discovered after arriving in the United States on an exchange 
program in 1997, not speaking the English language at the level expected for certain types of 
social interactions may become problematic. As my American former girlfriend explained, 
the reason why she went on dates with me in October, and not in August when we first met, 
was because earlier I was not fluent enough to have a romantic conversation. 
Grewal develops the idea of network power in the context of globalization. The principal 
object of his investigation is the drive behind the globalization phenomenon, which he 
attributes to the standards that coordinate it: 
The standards that enable such global coordination display what I call network 
power. The notion of network power consists in the joining of two ideas: first, 
that coordinating standards are more valuable when greater numbers of people 
use them, and second, that this dynamic - which I describe as a form of power -
can lead to the progressive elimination of the alternatives over which otherwise 
free choice can effectively be exercised. It is support for, and criticism of, both of 
these elements, in various guises, combinations, and degrees of self-
consciousness, that fuels contemporary debates over globalization (Grewal, 2008, 
p. 4). 
Because the Russian oil and gas sector is an indispensable part of the global energy system, 
Grewal' s focus on globalization creates many parallels with the subject of my investigation. 
Yet the parallels do not end at the geographic scope. Grewal examines relationships and 
processes that orthodox theories of power fail to explain. After all, it is unheard of for a 
national leader or his or her state apparatus outside the United States to coerce the citizens 
into eating at McDonald's or manipulating them into going to see Star Wars. Similarly, there 
is no apparent coercion or manipulation in purchasing an automobile or living in a dwelling 
connected to the electrical grid. Yet the concept of network power can explain how these 
actions - based on ostensibly free but in reality often-forced individual choices - are a 
product of 'convergence on a dominant standard' (Grewal, 2008, p. 106). 
In Chapter 5, I noted the ontological difference between the mainstream and the second 
stream power theories, with the former grounded in the relations of sovereignty and the latter 
in those of sociability. Whereas the regulatory mechanisms described in Chapters 4 and 5 
rely largely on sovereign power, the counter-power of the regulated community is, at its core, 
premised on the relations of sociability. Network power is premised largely on the latter. Yet, 
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as the Power of Siberia example suggests, in risk governance it is often difficult to determine 
which end of the power-resistance spectrum each side occupies. Thus, the power dynamics 
between the sovereign-backed regulator charged with protecting the collective public 
interest, and the sociability-driven regulated community advancing individual interests, 
resemble two opposing lines constantly firing at each other. As I show in the remainder of 
the thesis, in the case of oil and gas development in Russia, the sovereign side is all but 
waving the white flag. 
This is a significant paradox considering the immense power of the Russian sovereign in 
regulating risk posed by oil and gas activities. Yet this paradox has a simple explanation. The 
practical effect of the Kremlin's modem-day version of the l'etat, c'est moi ideology 
translates, among other things, into control over the distribution of the immense benefits that 
oil and gas extraction brings. As I show in Chapter 7, the endemic abuse of sovereign power 
for private gain results in the diversion of a sizeable part of these benefits into the pockets of 
the Russian elite, including the Russian leadership. Because risk governance is as much about 
identifying and assessing risks as it is about weighing them against benefits, in the case of 
Russia, the sovereign regulator becomes more of a promoter and protector of the sociability-
driven regulated community. In this situation, unless the risks posed by oil and gas 
development threaten the development itself, the product of what happens in the risk lab is 
unlikely to be free of bias. And if by chance it is, the likelihood of it impacting risk 
governance, particularly at the characterization and evaluation (C&E) stage, is low. 
Yet attributing the network power of oil and gas to the benefits it brings without explaining 
their nature and origin does not elucidate the particular challenge that hydrocarbon-related 
activities pose for risk governance. However, these challenges become clearer through 
examining a conglomeration of standards upon which up-, middle-, and downstream oil and 
gas companies, as well as government officials, motorists, homemakers, and pensioners, 
converge. 
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6.1.1.2. The three ontologies of the Oil Standard 
In Chapter 2, I described the Russian oil and gas sector through three dimensions: (1) based 
on the technology and the size of the resource base; (2) based on the political and geopolitical 
ties it creates; and (3) based on the socioeconomic bonds it forms. Oil and gas standards can 
be characterized based on the same taxonomy. 
In the oil and gas sector, the term standard is usually associated with technical standards that 
set parameters for implementation of certain technologies or activities. Examples of such 
highly technical standards include NORSOK D-001 (drilling facilities) or IEC 60079, IEC 
61892, and IEC 80079 (ignition source control) (Barents 2020, 2012, p. 115). Such standards 
possess some network power, as a company that has chosen one standard over another will 
likely have to invest in certain equipment and in training its management and personnel. This 
means that it is unlikely to switch to a different technical standard because of the sunk cost. 
However, the network power of such standards is negligible in comparison to a standard that 
powers technology used by billions of people around the world. As noted in Chapter 2, global 
mobility runs overwhelmingly on oil. Oil-based petroleum products power the internal 
combustion engines of everything from an auto rickshaw on the streets of Mumbai to an 
A380 taking off from Heathrow airport. Natural gas has gained and continues to gain 
prominence in the power sector and as a heating fuel, but its penetration has not reached the 
scale of oil. However, due to the technological configuration of the systems that transport, 
store, and convert natural gas into heat and electricity under certain circumstances 
dependence on this commodity is much more pronounced than dependence on oil. Vivid 
examples of such dependence include the California energy crisis of 2000, caused in part by 
natural gas shortages (Yergin, 2011 ), and the freezing Eastern European cities in the winter 
of 2009 due to Gazprom's supply interruption through Ukraine (Kramer, 2009). 
Thus, oil is a standard of global mobility and natural gas is a standard of a significant part of 
the world's heating and electrical generation. In this sense, the vast oil- and natural-gas-
powered infrastructure reveals the ontologies of oil and gas's network power in technological 
dependence. And it is not just planes, trains, and automobiles, or furnaces and water heaters, 
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that require oil and natural gas to operate. Serving them is a vast network of drilling rigs, 
tankers, pipelines, storage facilities, refineries, petrol stations, and power plants. 
Grewal notes that a standard that has network power can become a universal standard. Such 
a standard resembles 'a convention on which all members of a network have settled' ( Grewal, 
2008, p. 10). There is little doubt that oil has reached this status given its 93% share in the 
transportation sector (IEA, 2015a, p. 33). Natural gas, however, is not a straightforward case. 
Not all electricity is generated through combustion of natural gas. However, because of the 
convergence of natural gas and electricity production, many electrical power systems around 
the world have incorporated natural gas as an integral part of the energy mix. Thus, the 
industrial, commercial, and individual consumers whom these systems serve settled on 
natural gas as one of the universal standards of electrical power. Similarly, when natural gas 
is used as the primary or the only fuel in district heating systems, the convergence on it as a 
'heating standard' is universal. Even in the case of furnaces and boilers serving individual 
residences, the cost of switching to a heating system powered by a different fuel all but 
ensures the universal acceptance of natural gas within the network of such furnace and boiler 
users. 
Grewal differentiates between two kinds of standards: mediating and membership. He 
defines the former as 'a standard that governs access to others by its very nature; some 
particular social activity is inherently regulated by it.' (Grewal, 2008, p. 21) In the case of 
oil, access to social mobility lies through oil, whether in the form of fuelling a car with 
gasoline or buying an airplane ticket. A membership standard 'usually requires enforcement 
by some actor or set of actors to exclude all but those who adopt particular norms.' (Id. p. 
22) Perhaps the two most recognized entities in the oil and gas world are the Organization of 
the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and the International Energy Agency (IEA). 
These two energy clubs epitomize the world's divide of into the oil and gas producing half 
and the consuming half. Russia, although not a member of OPEC, belongs to the producing 
half. 54 
54 Other "outliers" constitute a diverse group including Canada, Norway, Brazil, and Mexico. (Johnson, 2008) 
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The division is not completely accurate, however. Some members of the IEA are also major 
oil producers. For example, at the time of writing this thesis, the United States was the 
world's largest petroleum and natural gas producer (EIA, 2016). What really matters here is 
whether a country is a net oil and gas exporter. Net exporters belong to what Fesharaki (2013) 
calls the 'House of Oil', a network of nations that compete and at the same time often 
coordinate each other's policy initiatives. 
Dominance of a single sector in a nation's economy leads to Dutch disease and resource curse 
(Karl, 2007), and creates economic and social dependence, which is the second origin of oil 
and gas's network power. An oil- and gas-related activity - prospecting, production, and 
manufacturing of drilling equipment, among many others - serves as a standard here. The 
economic and social dependence on oil and gas exploration, production, transportation, and 
refining is what drives the best and the brightest to the oil and gas sector. The former lawyer 
for a large Russian oil company had the following to say about Moscow State University's 
law students: 'Most of them dream of obtaining their degrees and going to work for Gazprom 
or Rosneft.' (Former Russian IOC Lawyer, 2014) The economic and social dependence on 
oil and gas also makes other economic sectors subservient to the oil and gas sector, sometimes 
with the help of the government. For example, as noted above, the Kremlin's particular 
interest in bringing N orthem Sea Route navigation back to its former glory is attributed to 
the development of the hydrocarbon resource base in the Arctic (President, 17 September 
2008). 
The quantitative dominance and qualitative penetration of the oil and gas sector in the 
Russian economy and society suggest its near universal acceptance as such among Russian 
citizens. This makes oil- and gas-related activities a convention premised on what Hume 
(1998, p. 98) calls 'a sense of common interest'. This perception of common interest drives 
the economy and impacts significantly the social life of the nation. 
Conceptualizing oil and gas activities as a dominant socio-economic standard is not as 
straightforward as the language example given above. It is even less so regarding the impact 
that oil and gas have on political life. After all, the political manoeuvring that I described in 
Chapter 2 was by the head of the Russian state and thus had the flavour of a sovereign 
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defending government policy. However, President Putin's remarks pandered largely to the 
domestic audience enamoured by the common interest associated with Russia's 'sacred cow'. 
Judging by the questionable economics of the Power of Siberia deal, the remarks were not 
directed at advancing common interest but protecting the individual interests of the Russian 
governing elite. This exemplifies the political and geopolitical dependence on oil and gas, 
which I see as the third origin of oil and gas's network power. Here, the standard is the sense 
or perception of common interest, which often drives political and geopolitical decisions. 
Although the technological dependence serves as an overarching ontology of the oil and gas 
sector's network power, it is not necessarily the initial phase through which the standard 
emerges. For example, as I noted in Chapter 2, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the 
national oil and gas sector entered a period of decline. The decline lasted until the early 2000s, 
when surging oil and natural gas prices combined with the pro-extraction policies of the Putin 
administration led to the Russian oil miracle (Gustafson, 2012). This created a strong 
perception among Russian citizens of a correlation between oil and gas production and 
improved quality of life. As the official discourse surrounding the Power of Siberia deal 
suggests, the public perception of the socio-economic benefit - and not necessarily the 
technological dependence - served as the main reason why the Russian leadership pursued 
this risk-laden project. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that the technological, 
socioeconomic, political, and geopolitical dependences are locked in a non-directional 
feedback loop as Figure 21 illustrates. 
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Figure 21: Three origins of oil and gas sector's network power 
6.1.1.3 . Conceptual challenges of the Oil Standard 
Perhaps the biggest challenge of conceptualizing oil and gas as having network power is that 
there is not just one standard. The easiest standards to pinpoint are related to the technological 
dependence created by the use of hydrocarbons. The standards that are premised on socio-
economic and political dependence do not always apparently display the gravitational pull of 
network power. Grewal (2008) confronts the same problem while examining neoliberalism, 
also known as the Washington Consensus, as a standard of globalization. He concludes that 
neoliberalism is not a single standard but 'a host ofrelated standards, the network properties 
of which are not generally configured to provide them with network power' (Grewal, 2008, 
p. 14). He further elaborates that neoliberalism-based economic policies provide access to 
membership in certain 'clubs' such as the Word Trade Organization. However, often 
governments adopt such policies because their leadership finds them persuasive or because 
they are manipulated by a more powerful state or an alliance of states (Id). 
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eoliberalism as Grewal (2008, p. 15) concludes, is not a 'take it or leave it' standard and 
. be broken down, adopted piecemeal, and revised, as many successful economies have 'at can 
managed to do. · Oil and gas is not a 'take it or leave it' standard either, even though the world 
runs, drives and flies on oil, and powers and heats itself with natural gas. Internal combustion 
ngine including turbo fan jet engines, can run on biofuels, and an electrical grid can be 
powered by other types of generation. A few oil and gas net exporting countries, Norway for 
e ample have largely avoided socioeconomic and political dependence. 
Therefore, the scope and scale of a network, as well as the degree of a network power's 
strength erve as important qualifiers of a standard. Although bio fuels can be used to power 
mtemal combustion engines, they currently cannot and likely can never be used on a global 
ale, at least in the nearest future (Yergin, 2011 ). Similarly, although natural gas might not 
be indispensable fo r electrical power generation mid- and long term, it certainly is in the short 
t rm. In addition, in certain national grids and locales, natural gas will remain the standard 
fuel of J ctrical power generation and heating. Thus, in terms of technological dependence, 
th oil and gas remain conventions of the current energy system. 
lthough Norway's economic dependence on oil and natural exports is numerically similar 
to Rus ia 's, the oil and gas sector does not have the same kind of social and economic pull 
it does in Russia (EIA, 2015a). The quantitative and qualitative difference in the level of 
ial anxiety in these two countries over falling oil prices serves as one example. The 
housing price and consumer confidence data cited by Koranyi and Skonnord (2014) confirms 
that an average Norwegian was not worried about the impact on 20% of his or her country's 
GDP. And although my Norwegian interviewees, including a few connected to the oil and 
ector showed some concern about the plummeting oil prices, it was not nearly at the 
same le el as Russian citizens. 
Thi is not to say that the network of Norwegian politicians is completely free from the 
Influence of the oil and gas sector. R0stvik (2015), for example, declares Norway to be the 
IDost corrupt Scandinavian country, due in large part to the regulatory capture by the oil and 
sector. Although R0stvik's accounts belong more to the category of conspiracy theory 
lban to academic investigation, the Norwegian leadership does not shy from highlighting its 
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oil and gas sector as a significant part of the national economy (Solberg, 2014) (Solberg, et 
al., 2015). The degree to which Oslo politicians use oil and gas to advance their agendas on 
the national scale cannot defensibly be compared with the Russian leadership's public 
relations campaigns. However, a local politician in a region and municipality with heavy oil 
and gas industry presence, Finnmark or Nordland, for example, would lean more on the 
alleged benefits of hydrocarbon development to score political points (Nilsen, 2016). 
Conceptualizing the gravitational pull of oil and gas through a multitude of standards does 
not yield a precise and all-inclusive answer. The oil and gas sector is a complex 
conglomeration of overlapping multi-layered networks of different scopes and scales, some 
of which are closely connected with each other while others are more loosely so. Yet, they 
all have at least one common denominator, oil and ( or) natural gas. Proliferation of oil and 
natural gas to every comer of the world turned the multitude of standards upon which 
members of these networks converge into technological, socioeconomic, and political 
conventions with global reach. 
The complexity and multitude of different standards spanning technological, socioeconomic, 
and political dimensions makes it tempting to explore more precise second-stream power 
forms exercised in the networks. Castells (201 la, p. 773) adds the following three more forms 
of such power: 
Networking Power: the power of the actors and organizations included in the 
networks that constitute the core of the global network society over human 
collectives and individuals who are not included in these global networks. 
Networked Power: the power of social actors over other social actors in the 
network. The forms and processes of networked power are specific to each 
network. 
Network-making Power: the power to program specific networks according to the 
interests and values of the programmers, and the power to switch different 
networks following the strategic alliances between the dominant actors of various 
networks. 
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Yet I find that the three proposed ontologies of oil and gas network power provide a 
sufficiently nuanced explanation of the ways in which oil and gas affects the risk governance 
process. In addition, the aforementioned common denominators provide yet another reason 
to keep the analysis under the same conceptual umbrella. 
Determining the event or occurrence that gave birth to the network power of oil and gas 
presents the same set of challenges as deciphering the standards and identifying the networks. 
There is likely not a single event that brought oil and gas to its current prominence. Rather it 
is a combination of such events and occurrences that by virtue of reason, force, and chance 
contributed to the rise of hydrocarbons in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries (Grewal, 
2008, p. 10). 
Grewal (2008, pp. 38-40) differentiates two tipping points, or what he calls thresholds of 
network power: the threshold of visibility and the threshold of inevitability. He describes the 
former as 'the point past which a network is sufficiently large to become attractive to non-
users' (Id. p. 39) and the latter as 'the point past which a network has become so dominant 
that we can expect virtually all non-users to adopt its standard' (Id. p. 40). Yergin's (2011) 
masterful description of the history of personal transportation identifies the meeting of 
entrepreneur Eugene Langen and the brilliant self-taught mechanic Nikolaus Otto as the 
event that lead to the invention of the 'Otto cycle' internal combustion engine in 1876 and 
the birth of the auto industry in Germany in 1890. Collaboration between Langen and Otto 
gave visibility to the internal combustion engine and to petrol as its fuel (Id. p. 10864). 
However, it was not until the release of the Ford Model Tin 1908, followed by 'Horseless 
Carriage fever', that the internal combustion engine-powered automobile and petrol started 
their accent to the threshold of inevitability (Id. p. 10936). 
According to Henry Ford, the man who is principally responsible for this accent, his August 
1896 conversation with Thomas Edison, the father of electrification, is what emboldened the 
young engineer from Dearborn, Michigan to pick an internal combustion engine over an 
electric motor to power his 'quadricycle' (Yer gin, 2011 ). After asking Ford, who at the time 
worked for the Detroit Edison Company, a number of questions regarding his design, Edison 
banged his fist on the table and exclaimed, 'You have the thing, keep at it!' (Id. p. 10813) 
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The odds were stacked against Ford - in 1898, gasoline-powered cars were not even among 
the top five types of vehicles on the streets of New York. Electric and steam-powered cars 
were much more popular. However, by 1910, global conversion to the personal vehicle with 
an internal combustion engine was all but inevitable (Yergin, 2011). 
In contrast, the story of natural gas ascendance as a critical fuel for electrical power 
generation and heating lacks such events. And as mentioned above, natural gas owes its 
demand to capital-intensive infrastructure, such as pipelines, power plants, and LNG 
terminals. However, both oil and natural gas did not become dominant transportation, 
heating, and electrical generation fuels completely by chance. Oil and natural gas possess 
high energy density, which made them attractive fuels for such uses (Hanania, et al., 2016). 
These intrinsic qualities, as Grewal calls them, pushed hydrocarbon to the threshold of 
visibility (Grewal, 2008, p. 32). Sir Winston Churchill, for example, argued for the British 
Navy's switch from coal to petrol on the basis of higher energy density of the latter, resulting 
in increased battleship armour and speed (Yergin, 2011, p. 4307). However, extrinsic 
reasons, such as the widespread use of powered cars and the availability of fuelling stations, 
caused doctors and women - who initially preferred electric vehicles - to switch (Id. p. 
10913) (Grewal, 2008, p. 32). 
In risk governance of oil and gas activities, recognizing the difference between intrinsic and 
extrinsic reasons for proceeding with an activity is especially important. Oil and gas 
development is frequently portrayed as superior to other activities in meeting goals such as 
mobility, energy security, and economic development. In reality, however, it is largely 
extrinsic reasons - the size of the existing oil- and natural gas-powered transportation, power 
generation, and heating networks and thus the demand for hydrocarbons - that all but 
determine the decisions made in relation to oil and gas development. 
This is not to say that intrinsic qualities of oil and gas become irrelevant - oil and natural gas 
remain dense packets of chemical energy. However, their conventional value outweighs any 
intrinsic merits or demerits. Therefore, risk governance has a difficult task in scrutinizing 
what is known as 'conventional energy systems' adopted on the global scale (Sovacool, et 
al., 2013). 
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Unsurprisingly, the richest person in the history of humanity, John D. Rockefeller, amassed 
his wealth by conventionalizing the oil and gas business. What was initially an effort to 
deliver a lighting kerosene of standard quality turned into all-out domination of the global oil 
and gas industry through control of the budding U.S. oil and gas sector (Doran, 2010). Thus, 
it is only fitting that Rockefeller named his company 'Standard Oil'. In addition, it is only 
fitting that I refer to the network power of the oil and gas sector as the power of the Oil 
Standard. 55 
One does not need to look further than the turn of the twentieth century to see the 
technological, socioeconomic, and political origins of Standard Oil's network power. From 
dominance in transporting and refining crude oil to mercilessly wiping out his competitors 
and leaving behind oil ghost towns, Standard Oil kept a tight grip on the U.S. economy and 
society for many decades (Doran, 2010). Standard Oil also skilfully penetrated the political 
realm, deploying an army oflawyers and lobbyists in Congress and state legislatures. It took 
the enactment of the Sherman Antitrust Act (the landmark anti-monopoly statute), twenty-
one years of hard effort, and a decision by the U.S. Supreme Court to break up Standard Oil 
into smaller companies (Doran, 2010a). When Rockefeller was told about the court's 
decision, he seemed unfazed. In fact, he encouraged the bearer of the news to buy Standard 
Oil's stock, predicting that the power of the company would only grow stronger (Id.). 
As the turn-of-the-twentieth-century cartoon below depicts, the sociability-premised Oil 
Standard ( or Standard Oil in this case) has had a complicated relationship with sovereign 
power. 
55 In some respects, the Oil Standard is similar to the gold standard used in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. The gold standard elevated the intrinsic value of gold as a precious metal to the extrinsic value of the 
legal tender. (Grewal, 2008) 
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Figure 22: A cartoon from the 23 May 1906 Edition a/Puck magazine depicting US. President 
Theodore Roosevelt as a toddler Hercules wrestling with the two-headed Standard Oil serpent, 
Nelson W. Alsrich and John Rockefeller (Nankivell, 1906) 
This is hardly surprising - Grewal (2008, p. 45) notes that in real-life decision-making, the 
line between sociability and sovereignty is blurred: 
[A]ny actual social structure may well be constituted by relations of both 
sociability and sovereignty. Indeed, these relations are intertwined in a rather deep 
way. Excepting perhaps the most elementary or fleeting forms, the relations of 
sociability usually depend upon background conditions determined and enforced 
by the relations of sovereignty. Similarly, without the sociability that renders us 
mutually intelligible, we would not be able to assemble ourselves into larger 
decision-making bodies- that is, we would not be able to constitute our 
sovereignty. 
Such convergence poses another challenge for conceptualizing the network power of oil and 
gas because it clouds the identity of the principal and the elementary form of the relation. For 
example, an adoption of an aggressive hydrocarbon exploration policy might be presented as 
a product of deliberate government decision-making. However, in reality, it is driven by 
individual choices of the governing elites whose individual interests are intermingled with 
those of the industry. As I have highlighted in this section and will elaborate further below in 
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the remainder of the chapter, intermingling individual interests with entrusted responsibilities 
to advance common interests distorts the very purpose of risk governance. 
6.2. The life of the Oil Standard 
6.2.1. Unquestionable benefits of the Oil Standard 
Having conceptualized the gravitational pull of the oil and gas sector through network power, 
I continue with examining the Oil Standard in the Russian Federation in the context of risk 
governance. In the rest of the chapter, I explore how the power of the Oil Standard interacts 
with the Russian state's sovereign power. In this section, I focus on the manner in which the 
benefits of oil and gas development are presented in the risk PA and C&E setting. 
In most instances, the discussion of oil and gas development benefits precedes the discussion 
of risks. This should not be surprising, because risks of oil and gas development should not 
be discussed absent the source of the hazard, the development itself. Thus, it is not necessarily 
the order in which risks and benefits are presented, but the combination of the order, extent, 
and precision with which benefits are described that elevates them (the benefits) over risks, 
which are frequently mentioned as an afterthought. As a result, the incumbent, expansive, 
and ostensibly certain knowledge of benefits creates a power dynamic that negatively affects 
the creation of new bias-free knowledge about risks. 
The Russian leadership likes to focus on occurring and potential benefits of oil and gas 
development. Every reviewed presentation or speech made at a meeting or press conference 
related to oil and gas development began with a great deal of discussion about the realized 
and unrealized resource potential. For example, President Medvedev began his speech at the 
17 September 2008 Security Council meeting, which was devoted to Russia's interests in the 
Arctic, with emphasizing the region's importance for maintaining Russia's competitive 
advantage on global commodity markets. He immediately drew attention to the scale of the 
on-going mineral resource extraction and concluded his introduction with the following 
statement: 'Of course, our foremost goal is to transform the Arctic into Russia's resource 
base in the 21 st century .... ' (President, 17 September 2008) 
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As I elaborated in Chapter 2, the Russian leadership is concerned with the shrinking oil 
reserves and thus the real possibility of declining oil production. According to the head of 
Federal Agency for Mineral Resources (Rosnedra), Alexander Popov, if already-explored 
fields were not developed, the rate of production would start declining in 2020, reaching 360 
million tonnes a year by 2030 (President, 13 February 2013). This would represent a nearly 
35% drop from the 2014 level of 540 million tons (EIA, 2016). However, the rate of 
extraction of already explored oil fields is an even bigger problem. Not only does the Russian 
leadership encourage extraction, but it also requires the subsoil deposit users ( oil and gas 
operators) to produce. Under this scenario, the acquisition of benefits becomes a foregone 
conclusion regardless of the risks that stand in its way (President, 13 February 2013). 
In contrast, a discussion of risks does not always take place, and when it does, it almost 
always follows the discussion of benefits. When risks are considered, they are frequently 
manipulated in order to highlight the overall value and supremacy of benefits. At the same 
September 2008 meeting when President Medvedev set transformation of the Arctic into 
Russia's resource base as the nation's foremost goal, he also briefly acknowledged that 
'resolution of environmental problems of the North remains a priority.' (President, 17 
September 2008) Considering that this was the eighth item on his agenda list, following a 
discussion of airport modernization and development of the Northern Sea Route, doubts arise 
as to whether addressing environmental risks is indeed a Kremlin priority (Id.). 
The Russian leadership has made several other references to the risks posed by oil and gas 
development, and each was just as laconic, if not more so. The following two-sentence 
remark by President Medvedev captures this extreme brevity: 'The effect of the fuel and 
energy sector remains rather negative. It is what it is.' (President, 13 December 2010) Perhaps 
the brevity can be attributed to the fact that Russian leadership does not give such risks as 
much as an afterthought. In a meeting that took place on 9 June 2011, Dmitry Kobylkin, the 
governor of the Yamal National Autonomous District, started his presentation about on-going 
and planned oil and gas projects in the Russian Arctic by emphasizing that they are aimed at 
strengthening Russia's economic presence and potential in the region. He switched to the 
environmental part of his presentation by stating that a 'thorough thought must be given as 
to how to avoid a negative impact on the environment.' (President, 9 June 2011) 
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Mr Kobylkin's statement is concerning because he suggests that no thought has been given 
to environmental risks despite a great deal of planned and occurring oil and gas activities in 
the region. At the same time, oil and gas extraction is perceived as unavoidable and as part 
of human nature. As President Putin pointed out, humans have always used nature for 
subsistence, and hydrocarbon extraction is the modem day subsistence. 'ls it possible to stop 
it? Of course not. It is impossible to stop it', said Mr Putin at the plenary session of the 
international Arctic forum, 'The Arctic, Territory of Dialogue' (President, 25 September 
2013). In contrast, although minimizing environmental risks is something that the Kremlin 
aspires to do, doing so 'now is difficult' (Id.). 
The 'impossible to stop' oil and gas development is presented via benefits expressed in real 
numbers. In contrast, the presentation of risks is usually made in less certain terms. 
Paradoxically, in speeches and meetings, the overarching topic of which was energy 
development, Slovic's (1987, p. 281) uncertain risk factor was utilized to ease and not 
emphasize fears about potentially negative impacts of the development. The meeting 
participants and the Russian leadership framed unknown risks as insignificant, especially in 
comparison to significant, substantial, and concrete benefits. Omitting references to 
potentially catastrophic spills in Arctic waters and catastrophic changes in demand for oil 
and gas certainly helped to accomplish this goal. 
For example, during a 26 September 2013 (President) meeting regarding the Yamal LNG 
project, Mr Putin highlighted the 1.3 tern resource potential of the Yuzhno-Tambeyskoe 
natural gas field and 53% increase in the Northern Sea Route (NSR) passage traffic as two 
strong reasons for proceeding with the project and for the Russian government's investment 
in the project's infrastructure. As to the risks, they were to be determined later per the 
president's directive. However, whatever these risks would tum out to be, they were not 
going to reverse the decision to proceed with Yamal LNG (Id.). 
Presenting oil and gas reserves and resources as certain benefits is misleading. According to 
the Society of Petroleum Engineers (SPE) (2016), proved reserves, offer '90% probability 
that the quantities actually recovered will equal or exceed the estimate'. Probable reserves 
offer 50% of such probability and possible reserves offer 10% (Id.). Russia does not follow 
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the widely accepted SPE classification and does not use probabilities of recovery that are 
similar to the SPEs (Order N477, 2013). In particular, it lacks the analysis of the quality and 
economics of deposit recovery (President, 13 February 2013). According to the Head of 
Rosnedra, these shortcomings of the reserve classification system lead to international 
financial auditors underestimating the true resource potential of the Russian Federation by 
30% (Id). An oil and gas professor in the United States who worked on a legislative bill of 
Russia's first petroleum law in the 1990s made the following remark: 'I never trust what the 
Russians say about their reserves.' (U.S. Oil and Gas Professor, 2014) Her comment is clearly 
much harsher than 'underestimate', but she is not alone in her assessment of the veracity of 
Russia's official reserve information. For example, Smil (2010, p. 99) notes that the accuracy 
of the Soviet and Russian reserve data 'has always been questionable'. 
Mr Putin's remark about the NSR traffic was also misleading because it did not represent the 
trend in Arctic shipping. In 2014, the NSR traffic dropped by 75% from 2013, and in 2015 it 
dropped by 86% from 2014 (Rodova & Geller, 2016). There were no oil and gas transit 
cargoes in 2014 or 2015 (Id). However, the President had.firm numbers for the benefits and 
slight concerns for the risks. In this scenario, numbers win handily making the decision to 
proceed with Yamal LNG appear perfectly rational. 
A 5 June 2014 (President) meeting, with the officially designated topic of 'on effective and 
safe development of the Arctic' (Figure 23), epitomizes the deafening primacy of oil and gas 
activities in the Russian energy policy discourse. The meeting began on a surprising 
environmental note with President Putin signifying its coincidence with the World 
Environment Day. The President emphasized the importance of environmental protection for 
the region's fragile flora and fauna, and noted the devastating 'consumer-like' attitude of the 
past (Id). He summarized the first half of his address with a call not to make the same 
environmental mistakes in the future. 
Figure 23: President Putinjlanked by the Minister of Natural Resource and the Environment 
Donskoy and Emergency Situations Minister Puchkov at the 5 June 2014 meeting (President of 
Russia, 2016) 
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After this atypical introduction, the president's address and the following presentations took 
a 180-degree tum. The World Environment Day meeting, the main topic of which was 
supposed to be systemic risks posed by oil and gas development in the Arctic, turned into a 
meeting about handling risks threatening oil and gas development in the Arctic. One after 
another, participants discussed what various government agencies, the scientific community, 
and civil society could do to aid oil and gas development in the Arctic. 
Some of the remarks were related to mitigating the risks of oil and gas development in the 
Arctic. For example, the head of the Russian branch of the World Wildlife Federation (WWF) 
Alexey Knizhnikov touched on his organization's cooperation with the industry on matters 
such as oil spill prevention in Arctic waters and endangered species protection during 
hydrocarbon activities (Id.). However, none of the participants questioned the supremacy of 
oil and gas in the economic development of the Arctic region over all other policy concerns. 
None of the presenters scrutinized the perceived grand benefits of turning the Arctic into 
Russia's resource base for the twenty-first century. Additionally, no one at the meeting 
wondered whether the risks of oil and gas development in the Arctic might outweigh its 
ostensible benefits. The World Environment Day meeting began and ended with oil and gas 
development in the Arctic being a foregone conclusion and the risk discourse centred on 
mitigating the potential adverse impacts to oil and gas activities. 
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An argument could be made that if this meeting were to be run by Greenpeace, which 
unequivocally opposes hydrocarbon development in the Arctic, the scenario under which oil 
and gas development in the Arctic could proceed would not have been on the table. The 
difference, however, lies in the forum where the discourse takes place, as well as in the 
practical outcomes of the discourse. The 5 June 2014 meeting was not the gathering of a 
stakeholder group in which the group refined its position and strategies. This was a meeting 
organized and run by the ultimate sovereign decision-maker with agenda-setting power. The 
sovereign framed the discourse so that acquisition of oil and gas benefits was the only option, 
whereas an analysis of the risks posed was reduced to determining the ways of fostering 
acquisition. 
6.2.2. Subsidizing the Oil Standard 
Inflating benefits of oil and gas development while downplaying the risks that come with it 
is an indirect way of manipulating risk governance. Doing so on the scale of the Russian oil 
and gas sector requires a systemic approach, the underpinnings of which I will explore in the 
following chapter. In this section, I examine the subsidies that create a direct path for ensuring 
that oil and gas development remains an attractive and desirable option regardless of the risks 
that it poses. Because subsidies traditionally are not considered part of the risk governance 
ecosystem, they are not viewed as capable of influencing decisions involving risks. As I show 
in this section, the opposite is true. 
The World Trade Organization's (WTO) Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures (ASCM) (1999, art. 1), to which Russia and 149 other countries have agreed, 
defines a subsidy as follows: 
(i) a government practice involves a direct transfer of funds (e.g. grants, 
loans, and equity infusion), potential direct transfers of funds or liabilities 
(e.g. loan guarantees); 
(ii) government revenue that is otherwise due is foregone or not collected 
(e.g. fiscal incentives such as tax credits); 
(iii) a government provides goods or services other than general 
infrastructure, or purchases goods; 
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(iv) a government makes payments to a funding mechanism, or entrusts or 
directs a private body to carry out one or more of the type of functions 
illustrated in (i) to (iii) above which would normally be vested in the 
government and the practice, in no real sense, differs from practices 
normally followed by governments. 
Article 2 of ASCM clarifies that such a measure must be specific to 'an enterprise or industry 
or group of enterprises or industries' to qualify as a subsidy. Article 2 further clarifies that a 
measure does not need to be specific on 'its face'. It can have an effect of a subsidy, for 
example, if the economy is dominated by a single sector (Id). 
To say that the Russian leadership subsidizes oil and gas activities in the Arctic would be an 
understatement. For example, according to Gerasimchuk (2012), there were 30 federal 
subsidies schemes for the oil and gas sector in 2009 and 2010. She had sufficient data to 
quantify 17 out of30 schemes, concluding that the Russian government conferred $8.1 billion 
in 2009 and $14.4 billion in 2010. Table 13 depicts the ten largest oil and gas subsidies in 
2010. 
Table 13: Top ten subsidies conferred to the Russian oil and gas sector in 2010 (Gerasimchuk, 
2012) 
Subsidy Approximate Amount in 
U.S. Dollars 
The export duty exemption for East Siberian oil $4 billion 
Tax holidays with respect to the mineral extraction tax on East $2 billion 
Siberian oil 
The property-tax exemption for trunk oil and gas pipelines $1.9 billion 
Tax holidays with respect to the mineral extraction tax on oil $1.5 billion 
produced at new onshore fields in the Nenets Autonomous 
Okrug and of the Yamal Peninsula in the Yamalo-Nenets 
Autonomous Okrug 
The reduced tariff for transportation of oil through the East $1.1 billion 
Siberia-Pacific Ocean pipeline 
The reduced rate of mineral extraction tax on oil from mature $1 billion 
fields 
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The export-customs duty exemption for natural gas exported $0.8 billion 
through the Blue Stream pipeline to Turkey 
The deduction of R&D and exploration costs from taxable $0.6 billion 
profits 
The accelerated depreciation allowance $0.6 billion 
Federal budget spending on oil and gas exploration $284 million 
Lunden and Fjrertoft (2014) conducted an in-depth review of subsidies for the Prirazlomnoe 
and Yamal LNG projects. Table 14 lists categories of subsidies that principal owners of the 
projects, Gazprom Neft' and Novatek, respectively, received from the Russian government. 
Table 14: Main subsidies for the Yamal LNG and Prirazlomnoe projects (Lunden & Fjaertoft, 
2014) 
Yamal LNG Prirazlomnoe 
Direct and indirect transfer of funds and liabilities 
Construction and operation of the following 
infrastructure: 
• Administrative facilities 
• Ice-protection construction 
• Port harbour 
• Approach channel 
• Seaway channel 
Substantial investment in the following 
facilities: 
• Sabetta seaport 
• Icebreaking fleet through state-owned 
company Atomflot 
• LNG tanker fleet through state-owned 
company Sovcomflot 
Payment of compensation for environmental 
harm due to industrial activities including 
dredging 
State bank (Vneshekonombank) involvement in 
the financing of the LNG tanker fleet 
Financing of the project through Gazprom 
budget partially funded by the Russian 
government 
'Legacy' benefits and on-going government 
support of the construction contractors, 






Mineral Extraction Tax (MET) exemption for 
natural gas for up to 250 hem during initial 12 
years of production and for natural gas liquids 
(NGLs) for up to 20 Mt during initial 12 years 
of production 
Exemption for export duties (ED) for LNG and 
Stable Gas Condensate 
Exemption for property tax until 250 bcm of 
gas has been produced, but during 12 years 
from the time the property was put into service 
Reduced profit tax rate, 13.5% (from 18%) for 
the first 250 hem of gas production during the 
initial 12 years of production 
Immediate accelerated depreciation allowance 
for up to 30% for fixed assets 
Accelerated (double the regular rate) 
depreciation for the assets located in the Arctic 
zone 
MET exemption up to 35 million tonnes for 7 
years starting 1 January 2015 
Exemption from property tax (normally 
assessed at 2.2% on the annual value of the 
assets) 
Initial 44.6% of usual ED rate 
Immediate accelerated depreciation allowance 
for up to 30% for fixed assets 
Accelerated (double the regular rate) 
depreciation for the assets located in the Arctic 
zone 
Other Subsidies 
The Yuzhno-Tambeyskoe natural gas field 
initial exploration and development costs were 
borne by the Soviet government when the field 
was first discovered in 1974 
Licence to Novatek subsidiary, 
Tambeyneftegaz, was issued on uncertain terms 
Changes in the natural gas export legislation, 
allowing Yamal LNG to contract with foreign 
customers directly 
The Prirazlomnoe field initial exploration costs 
were borne by the Soviet government when the 
field was first discovered in 1989 
Virtually no development cost to Gazprom 
Neft' prior to 2006; a significant part of 
development cost was borne by the Russian 
government 
Lunden and Fjrertoft (2014) estimate the total quantifiable value of the Russian government 
investment in the Yamal LNG project to be $7.4 billion including $3.3 billion in seaway 
dredging costs and $4. l billion for the Sabetta area development (President, 26 September 
2013). Remarkably, at the very minimum, $5 .75 billion would be a de facto gift to Novatek 
and its partners (Id). Lunden and Fjrertoft also estimate a government take decrease from 
77% to 24% due to tax subsidies (Id). This drop would translate into a near $15 billion tax 
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revenue loss at the natural gas price of $12 per MMBtu, condensate price of $100 per barrel, 
and the exchange rate of 30 rubies per U.S. dollar (Id) (Gerasimchuk, 2012). 
As Table 14 suggests, the Prirazlomnoe project did not enjoy nearly the same level of support 
in terms of direct government investment in the project's infrastructure. However, it is 
important to note that the project was marred by numerous delays and cost overruns. For 
example, as of 2008, the construction costs of the infamous Prirazlornnaya platform neared 
$3 billion (Id.). Because Gazprom did not enter the project until 2006, it did not have to bear 
a significant portion of these costs, whereas the Russian government did. Due to the tax 
subsidies given to Gazprom N eft', the Russian state's take in the Prirazlomnoe revenue 
dropped from 92% to 53%. With the assumed price of oil at $100 per barrel and the exchange 
rate at 30 rubles per U.S. dollar, the tax subsidies amount to a nearly $4 billion loss in tax 
revenue (Id.). 
Considering the more than two-fold decrease in the price of oil and two-fold devaluation of 
the Russian ruble compared to the rates used by Lunden and Fj£Crtoft (2014), the effect of the 
government subsidies conferred to Yarnal LNG and Prirazlomnoe might not seem as drastic. 
However, because of the profound shrinking of its primary revenue base, the Russian 
government is currently in dire need of revenue, especially foreign currency funds. In 
addition, a great deal of equipment and materials was purchased and financed abroad, and 
thus was not offset by the corresponding (to the drop in oil price) devaluation of the ruble. 
This is all contrary to maximizing tax revenue and achieving an economic 'multiplication 
effect', the official primary goals of Russia's new Arctic projects (President, 13 February 
2013). 
Yamal LNG and Prirazlomnoe are not isolated examples of subsidizing the oil and gas sector. 
Although the Russian leadership praises 'pinpoint [ tochechnoe] tuning of the delicate oil and 
gas sector', it also employs a systematic and programmatic approach to supporting Russia's 
'sacred cow' (President, 21 June 2012). The goal-oriented government programs reviewed in 
Chapter 4 are one of the primary means though which such support is dispensed (President, 
17 September 2008). 
203 
These programs serve as a prime example of the preferential treatment of the oil and gas 
sector within the Russian economy. One could argue that Russia should have programs aimed 
at protecting the hydrocarbon sector because it is the largest sector of its economy. However, 
such logic creates a perpetual vicious cycle: the larger the economic sector, the more support 
it deserves. As a result, the other sectors have less opportunity to challenge the Oil Standard 
on economic, environmental, and social grounds. 
Nothing is completely off the table for the Russian government to support oil and gas projects 
- assistance with obtaining 'cheap money' financing (President, 10 July 2012) or financing 
private projects (Yamal LNG) with transfers from the National Welfare Fund (President, 31 
October 2014)- especially during the initial phase (President, 6 September 2013). However, 
the Kremlin finds its biggest arsenal for pinpoint 'tuning' of the energy sector in the Tax 
Code. Not only does the system provide enough flexibility to manipulate the effective tax 
rate and create 'tax holidays', but the Kremlin's control of the Federation Council ensures 
that amendments to the Tax Code are passed at will. 
Oil and gas companies operating in Russia are subject to the following taxes: (i) profit tax, 
(ii) value added tax, (iii) licence fees, (iv) corporate property tax, (v) social security taxes, 
(vi) excises, (vii) MET, and (viii) ED (EY, 2013). As noted in Chapter 2, the latter two taxes 
comprise the backbone of Russia's fiscal system. For example, in 2013, MET and ED 
accounted for more than 90% of all taxes paid by upstream oil and gas companies in Russia 
(EY, 2013). Downstream companies do not pay MET; they are, however, subject to excises 
on the petroleum products they sell domestically and internationally (Id.). 
Russia is the only Arctic littoral state with the so-called revenue-based system of hydrocarbon 
taxation (EY, 2012). This is frequently seen as a deterrent to development of new projects, 
because a company becomes subject to tax liability the moment it starts producing oil and 
gas regardless of whether the company is actually making profit (Id.) (Russia Director, 
Consulting Company, 2014). In addition, ED liability commences when extracted oil and gas 
are exported. MET is calculated by multiplying the base rate by several coefficients, 
including the world oil price dynamics coefficient, reservoir depletion coefficient, deposit 
size coefficient, and extraction difficulty coefficient. The base rate and some coefficients are 
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set forth legislatively by amending the Tax Code, and some coefficients are set jointly by tax 
authorities and the taxpayer. ED rates are set in the tax code and by the RF Government (EY, 
2013). This allows the Kremlin to grant some oil and gas subsidies 'in-house' and avoid a 
few weeks of legislative process delay. 
A federal law dated as of 21 July 2011, amended Part II of the Tax Code and gave Novatek 
the aforementioned 12-year MET, and thus serves as an example of a legislative act granting 
an individual subsidy (Law N258-FZ, 2011). Federal Law dated as of 30 September 2013 is 
an example of a 'tax manoeuvre', a sweeping amendment aimed at reconfiguring the system 
of hydrocarbon incentives (Law N268-FZ, 2013). As a result of the September tax 
manoeuvre, a series of substantial subsidies for exploration and development of Arctic oil 
and gas fields were created, including: 
• Gradually inclining MET base rate and declining ED rate for crude oil and declining 
ED for light petroleum products; 
• A full MET exemption for Arctic and some Subarctic onshore and offshore fields if 
developed in 7-10 years and until the total production of approximately 250 mbo has 
been reached; 
• Reduced MET for offshore Arctic oil and gas until 2032, 2037, or 2042 depending on 
the location of the deposit; 
• A full ED exemption for offshore Arctic oil and gas until 2032 or 2042 depending on 
the location of the deposit; and 
• Lower tax rates for corporate assets located in the Arctic continental shelf (Id.). 
These changes were first proposed in a 12 April 2012 directive signed by then Prime Minister 
Vladimir Putin (Directive N443-r, 2012) (Donskoy, 2012) (President, 13 February 2013). 
President Putin signed the measures into law as part of the Tax Code in September 2013. 
The most recent tax manoeuvre was adopted in December 2014 (EY, 2014a). Its key elements 
included raising the base MET rate and lowering the crude oil ED rate. They also included 
lowering the ED rate for light oil petroleum products and raising the ED rate for heavy oil 
petroleum products (Id.). Faced with plummeting oil prices and U.S. and E.U. economic 
sanctions, the Kremlin had little alternative than to maximize the government's take of oil 
and gas revenues. According to Fjrertoft and Lunden, (2015) the December 2014 manoeuvre 
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The main reason Russia adopted the current revenue-based system of taxation in the early 
2000s was to increase simplicity, thereby masking the systemic deficiencies of poor tax 
collection and enforcement. These deficiencies negated the advantages of the profit-based 
system that existed during the 1990s and during which companies routinely inflated their 
costs and underreported their profits (Id.). However, as of May 2016, Part II of the Tax Code 
that includes the section on mineral resource taxation has been amended 401 times since the 
Code's inception in July 2000. The result of such 'over-manoeuvring' is the loss of simplicity 
and creation of fertile ground for extensive lobbying for individual subsidies. 
Jockeying for individual subsidies is a frequent occurrence of presidential energy-focused 
meetings. For example, even after receiving generous tax breaks for the Yamal LNG project, 
Novatek lobbied for more, including further regional subsidies (President, 13 February 
2013). There are two distinct camps: one supporting profit-based taxation reform and another 
favouring the revenue-based status quo. The first camp is numerous and features powerful 
figures, such as Rosneft's Igor Sechin, energy minister Alexander Novak, and the 
environmental minister Sergey Donskoy (CSIS, 2015). During a 4 June 2014 (President) 
energy commission meeting, Sechin provided a bleak forecast for Rosneft's plans in the 
Arctic should the 2014 tax manoeuvre be allowed to proceed. He stated that Yurubcheno-
Takhomskoe and Kuyumbinskoe field developments, as well as the modernization of the 
Angarsk Petrochemical Plant, would have to be put on hold (Id.). Moreover, he argued for 
adopting the profit-based model of taxation and praised the stability of the arrangements that 
the Production Sharing Agreements of 1990s had created. He promised a $400 billion 
investment in the Russian continental shelf over the next 20 years and multiple projects that 
would span 30 to 50 years, provided Russia reforms its petroleum taxation framework (Id.). 
However, Camp Sechin, Novak, and Donskoy have very stem and currently insurmountable 
opposition - the Ministry of Finance and President Pu tin himself (CSIS, 2015). With revenue 
either lost due to generous tax breaks and/or delayed due to new projects that have yet to 
produce, Russia might soon end up with bare coffers, a position it has not been in since the 
default of 1998. In addition, despite seemingly airtight control on the energy sector, Vladimir 
Putin simply does not trust either the oil and gas companies to report their true profits and 
losses, or the Federal Tax Service to do its job, as evidenced by the following quote: 
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[Addressing Mr. Novak] Aleksandr Valentinovich, regarding the profit tax - to 
what extent is it possible to administer it? Financial result is not a tonne, it is a 
very fluid thing. We have very experienced people here [ acknowledging heads of 
energy companies present at the meeting] and they employ excellent specialists 
whose skills are well above yours and definitely mine. I would not even 
understand what they tell us and the profit would always be minimal and the tax 
base negligible (President, 4 June 2014). 
Mr Novak then tried to persuade the President by proposing pilot projects, citing Western 
experience with the profit-based model, to which Mr Putin replied: 'Fine, let's talk later.' 
(Id.) 
However, tax revenue concerns exacerbated by low oil prices and Western sanctions and 
President Putin's distrust of the Russian oil executives, including a few members of his inner 
circle, appear to be the only barriers to even more rapid and extensive adoption of tax 
subsidies for oil and gas development. The only record of openly querying subsidies for 
systemic risk-laden projects that I found was a question during the final G20 meeting press 
conference in September 2013: 
A question regarding 'green' economy and energy: Will the decision to 
consolidate state budgets impact our country's tax policy regarding giving oil and 
gas companies subsidies to develop deposits located on the continental shelf, 
including the Arctic continental shelf? Considering that risks are high, especially 
the economics ones, is the risk of losing this investment high as well? What about 
risks for the state budget - they are, of course, colossal? 
V. Putin 
You have to understand that these are very capital-intensive projects with 
unknown final results. For this reason, it is necessary to conduct geological 
prospecting and development work. Even at the initial stage, these activities will 
take place in hard-to-reach regions, with the use of cutting-edge technologies, 
often far away from the shore and at significant depth. All of it makes these 
projects expensive. And, without government support at least at the initial stage, 
these projects will not materialise. Regarding the environmental side of this issue, 
I must tell you that we will not allow a single project to proceed without subjecting 
it to very serious, if not the utmost serious environmental assessment (President, 
6 September 2013). 
As I demonstrated in Chapter 5, Russia is yet to create a framework for 'serious' 
environmental assessments. In addition, the socioeconomic benefits of both projects, 
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especially considering the loss of tax revenue due to the subsidies granted to Gazprom Neft' 
and Novatek are marginal at best (Lunden & Fjaertoft, 2014). Most importantly, it was 
subsidies that lifted the economics of both projects to the point where they became profitable 
options ( albeit at $100 per barrel), despite significant risks and severely reduced societal 
benefits. 
6.3. Conclusion 
The theory of network power provides a comprehensive conceptual explanation of the oil 
and gas sector's resistance to risk governance. In addition, this theory brings a common 
denominator, the social concept of power, to an analysis of the interaction of those who 
govern risk and those whose risks are governed. The conceptualization of the oil and gas 
sector as having network power is complicated by the number of divergent standards that 
display network power properties. In order to confront this challenge, I offer three ontologies 
of hydrocarbon sector's network power: (i) technological dependence on oil and gas as fuels 
and all facilities and equipment involved; (ii) economic and social dependence on oil and gas 
activities that overwhelm other sectors of a nation's economy; and (iii) political and 
geopolitical dependence premised on the perception of common interest among the 
leadership and citizenry. The network power of the oil and gas sector, which I termed the 
'Oil Standard', becomes particularly potent if it receives help from sovereign power 
structures. In the context of the Russian oil and gas sector, such assistance is especially visible 
in prioritizing benefits of oil and gas extraction in the policy discourse and subsidizing oil 
and gas exploration, development, and extraction. 
Pursuant to the overarching objective stated in the beginning of this chapter, I focused on the 
hazardous activity that is subject to risk assessment, appraisal, characterization, estimation, 
management, and communication. I departed from the 'grand narrative' universal theory of 
risk reviewed above and argued for an approach that presumes that the outcome of risk 
governance might be influenced by the nature of hazardous activity and the influence that 
this activity has in the socio-economic and political realms. Therefore, I contributed to the 
risk governance literature by emphasising the importance of looking beyond the universal 
theories of risk and by developing a three-dimensional feedback loop, the analysis of which 
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can lead to measuring the resistance of such activity to risk governance. I also contributed to 
this body of literature by illustrating how sovereign power structures representing the public 
interest might distort the risk governance process through prioritising a hazardous activity in 
an official policy discourse and directly and indirectly subsidising it. This analysis also 
highlighted an instance of sovereign- and sociability-derived power forms working together 
and furthered Grewal' s (2008) argument regarding the lack of either power structure type 
existing in a pure form. I built my conceptual model of the Oil Standard on Grewal's theory 
of network power and therefore contributed to supporting its validity. However, I also argued 
against Grewal' s narrow definition of a standard and presented an argument and an 
alternative to such a narrow view. In addition, because I made these contributions by using 
the applicable Russian policy, legal, and regulatory regime as a case study, I also contributed 
to the literature regarding Russia's oil and gas sector and, in particular, to the role ofrisk and 
benefits discourse in the federal policy-making and policy implementation. 
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7. Governing Risk in a Petrostate: Sovereign Power 
Structures and Allocation of Risks and Benefits 
7 .1. Acquisition and distribution of benefits as part of risk governance 
I began Chapter 5 with demonstrating how risk governance of oil and gas activities occurs in 
the context of environmental and ethnological assessments. In Chapter 6, I showed how 
sovereign power structures aid acquisition of benefits associated with oil and gas production. 
In this chapter, I continue the analysis of how sovereign power structures approach handling 
risks posed by oil and gas activities. 
I have maintained throughout this thesis that in the context of oil and gas development, 
understanding the benefits that drive it is as critical for risk governance analysis as 
understanding risks that accompany the development. Therefore, I begin this chapter with 
investigating distribution of the right to the resource, as well as the right to convert the 
extracted resource into financial benefit. Because Russia consumes only one quarter of the 
oil that it produces and because it has been trying to find a way to export its vast natural gas 
resources, I focus on transportation and access to the foreign markets (EIA, 2015). 
Therefore, my overarching objective in this chapter is to complete the Risk Governance 
Power Framework and provide perhaps this study's most important contribution to risk 
governance literature. In addition, due to the abundance of empirical data, I also aim to 
contribute to Russian energy and environmental policy literature. More specifically, I aim to 
locate additional (to environmental assessment and ethnological review) risk governance 
regulatory mechanisms. I also aim to explore the role that personal benefits to public officials 
play in the energy and environmental policy-making and implementation in the Russian 
Federation. 
210 
7.1.1. Access to subsoil resources 
Pursuant to 'On Subsoil Resources', there are two categories of mineral deposits. The first 
category comprises deposits 'of federal significance' that are designated as such for 'the 
purposes of defence and security of the state' (Law N2395-I, 1992, art. 2.1). Whether a 
hydrocarbon deposit belongs to this category is determined by its size and location. This 
category includes the following type of hydrocarbon resources: (i) all deposits with 
recoverable reserves of seventy million tonnes or more of oil or fifty billion cubic meters 
(bcm) or more of natural gas; and (ii) all mineral deposits (regardless of their size) located 
on the territory of internal sea waters, territorial sea, and continental shelf (Id.). This means 
that every large onshore oil or natural gas field (per U.S. EIA classification) and every 
offshore field fall into this category (Budzik, 2009). The second category comprises mineral 
deposits not included in the category of federally significant deposits. 
The April 2008 amendments to 'On Subsoil Resources' and 'On the Continental Shelf 
expanded the RF Government's already broad authority regarding access to and management 
of deposits of federal significance (Law N58-FZ, 2008). All subsoil users must be entities 
formed under the Laws of the Russian Federation, and the RF Government may restrict 
access to licensing auctions to entities with foreign ownership (Law N2395-I, 1992, art. 9). 
The RF Government bestows the right to use an onshore subsoil deposit of federal 
significance pursuant to the results of an auction or on an ad hoe basis (Id. art. 10.1 ). The RF 
Government may forego auctions in respect to any deposit of federal significance and include 
it on the 'List of Federal Significance Deposit Areas That are Granted without Auctions' (the 
'List of Federal Significance') (Law N2395-I , 1992, art. 10) (Directive N873-r, 2016). In 
this case, the right to use such a deposit is reflected in an RF Directive amending the previous 
list (Directive N873-r, 2016). For example, the 11 May 2016 amendment to the List of 
Federal Significance confirmed transfer to Rosneft' of the Bogatinsky deposit located on the 
Sakhalin Island (Id.). Beyond this, the ad hoe process and the criteria used for bestowing the 
right thereunder are vague. 
Access to continental shelf deposits is further restricted. In addition to the requirement of 
formation under the laws of the Russian Federation, an entity allowed to access the areas, 
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which are at least in part located on the continental shelf, needs to meet the following two 
conditions. First, such an entity needs to have five or more years of experience operating on 
the Russian continental shelf. Second, more than 50% of its voting stock has to be under 
control of the Russian state (Law N2395-I, 1992, art. 9). As a result, only two companies, 
Rosneft' and Gazprom, had met and continue to meet these criteria. 
The second category of deposits (not included in the category of federally significant 
deposits) is distributed via auctions and tenders, which are organized by the Federal Agency 
for Mineral Resources (Rosnedra). A tender involves evaluation of numerous factors, 
including the quality of the proposed development program, recovery rate, contribution to 
the socio-economic development of the surrounding area, proposed duration of the 
development and production, effectiveness of the measures aimed at mitigating and 
preventing environmental damage, and national security considerations (Law N2395-I, 1992, 
art. 13 .1 ). In contrast, an auction involves only one criteria - financial as the highest bidder 
receives the rights to the deposit (Id.). Vladimir Putin criticised tenders for their lack of 
transparency and 'low effectiveness' for the state budget (President, 10 July 2012). Mr 
Putin's criticism is surprising given the degree of control the federal government exercises 
over the organization of tenders and auctions, and the transparency safeguards set forth in 
Article 13 .1 of 'On Subsoils'. 
Once an entity is granted the rights to a mineral deposit, Rosnedra formalizes it by issuing a 
licence. Pursuant to 'On Subsoil Resources' (Law N2395-I, 1992) and 'On the Continental 
Shelf (Law Nl87-FZ, 1995), regional prospecting, prospecting, and exploration and 
extraction are the types of subsoil deposit uses for which a mineral licence is required.56 
Accordingly, Rosnedra can issue licences for all three uses. It may also issue a 'combined' 
licence that permits prospecting and exploration and extraction, but a combined licence does 
not automatically give the right to explore and extract hydrocarbons once prospecting has 
been completed (Law N2395-I, 1992, arts. 6, 10.1) (Law N187-FZ, 1995, art. 7). As 
mentioned above, to increase control over exploration and exploitation activities on the 
continental shelf, Article 6 of 'On Subsoil Resources ' was amended in April 2008 to require 
56 The principal difference between regional prospecting and prospecting is that the latter has a smaller spatial 
scale and a higher degree of invasiveness. 
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a separate authorization from the RF Government before proceeding with such activities 
upon completing the prospecting phase, even in the case of a combined licence that includes 
all three phases (Law N58-FZ, 2008). 
It might appear that issuing a licence is a purely formal step because the right to a deposit has 
already been granted. This is not the case. A licence includes important economic and 
environmental requirements, including the term for completing the allowed activities. The 
content of the licences is not publicly available, and Gazprom, Rosneft', and Rosnedra are 
all unwilling to share it. I attempted to obtain a sample Rosnedra licence through my industry-
insider interviewees, but was unsuccessful. 
Based on the requirements stated in 'On Subsoil Resources' and 'On the Continental Shelf, 
a licence typically allows for several activities that are associated with the principal phase for 
which the licence is issued. For example, a licence issued for exploration and extraction 
would likely also allow for reinjection of associated water and gas (Law N2395-I, 1992, art. 
11 ). Article 9 of 'On the Continental Shelf distinguishes the licensing procedure related to 
subsoil uses from the process for issuing permits for drilling operations (Law N187-FZ, 
1995). Thus, some activities essential to oil and gas development, such as drilling and waste 
disposal, are subject to a separate permitting process. 
Under 'On Production Sharing Agreements' ('On PSAs') (Law N225-FZ, 1995), the role of 
RF Government as the principal decision-maker in matters concerning major oil and gas 
deposits is diminished in comparison to the regime created by 'On Subsoil Resources' and 
'On the Continental Shelf. Pursuant to Article 2 of the statute, the State Duma determines 
which areas can be licenced pursuant to PSAs. Despite several amendments diminishing the 
Duma's authority, 'On PSAs' remains the most transparent legal instrument for allocating 
significant hydrocarbon deposits for exploration and production. Not only does it make the 
allocation process more transparent by moving it to a legislative body, but it also expands 
opportunities for public participation. For example, if a deposit is located in an area occupied 
by indigenous people, 'On PSAs' mandates a decision by the provincial legislature and the 
local government that oversees the interests of the indigenous population (Id., art. 2). 
Although the statute does not elaborate on the exact legal impact of such a decision, 'On 
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PSAs' nonetheless creates opportunities for provincial, local, and indigenous input that other 
federal laws lack. 
Paradoxically, despite PSAs popularity with foreign investors and, as oflate, Igor Sechin, the 
Russian government rarely utilizes it. As noted above, to date, only three PSAs had been 
entered into - all three prior to the enactment of the statute (Minenergo, 2011) (Mazkov, 
2008, p. 66). It appears that the Kremlin values absolute control over distribution of large 
hydrocarbon deposits above near-absolute control. As a result, the opportunities under 'On 
PSAs' for early identification of risks associated with developing such deposits and 
determination of their tolerability and acceptability at the regional and local levels have 
remained unrealised. 
The departure from tenders is another lost opportunity for commencing risk PA and C&E 
before the decision to proceed with an activity has been made. The comprehensive criteria 
listed in Article 13 .1 of 'On Subsoil Resources' can weed out entities that lack capacity and 
motivation to handle risks associated with developing the tendered oil and gas deposit. In 
addition, Rosnedra can utilize the data regarding the potential environmental and socio-
economic risks to design conditions on the mineral deposit use during the licensing process 
or restrict and even withdraw the deposit from the pool offered for the development. 
Meanwhile, deposits containing significant reserves, akin to the deposits of federal 
significance, usually come with systemic risks that require timely, comprehensive, and 
inclusive risk governance. Therefore, the current process of granting rights to develop oil and 
gas deposits does not provide for this. Instead, it is built upon closed-door decision-making 
that favours a few industry actors who are close to the Kremlin. 
7.1.2. Pipelines, tankers, and railway carts: access to foreign markets 
As I noted in Chapter 5, state-owned Transneft' is responsible for transporting 80% of all oil 
produced in Russia. Transportation of oil and petroleum products via trunk pipelines is 
considered a natural monopoly under Russian law (Law Nl47-FZ, 1995, art. 4). For this 
reason, Transneft' is the lone owner and operator of the centralized oil pipeline transportation 
system, most of which was built during Soviet times (Perchik, 2005). The Russian legal 
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system lacks a statute devoted to pipeline transportation of oil. As a result, producers, brokers, 
consumers, and Transneft' rely on a patchwork oflaws and regulations (Id.). 
In contrast to natural gas, oil and petroleum products are more flexible in terms of their 
transportation to the market. Therefore, in theory, most Russian producers are not tied to the 
Transneft' pipeline system, as they can ship oil to their foreign customers by rail, sea, and 
even road. However, this ability is restricted by the current sea terminal allocation system. 
The Ministry of Energy grants producers and their parent companies access to the terminals, 
but in proportion to the volumes delivered to the Transneft' pipeline system and not in 
proportion to the production volumes (King & Spalding, 2012). This quota system appears 
to be the main reason behind Lukoil' s decision to build Varandey oil export terminal in the 
Arctic waters (Lukoil, 2016). 
The Ministry of Energy also allocates quotas and sets the schedule for pumping oil through 
the Transneft' system. Producers are usually allowed to assign their access rights to third 
parties, which makes the access rights a valuable commodity and good relationships with the 
Ministry of Energy an important part of an oil producer's business strategy (King & Spalding, 
2012). Petroleum products are transported by another state monopoly, Transnefteprodukt. 
The Federal Tariff Service sets tariffs for Transneft' and Transnefteprodukt (Id.). Because 
tariffs apply equally to all producers and thus do not restrict access to Transnefteprodukt's 
pipelines, the Federal Tariff Service has little capacity for preferential treatment of producers 
(Order N223-e/l, 2014). 
Transportation of natural gas via trunk pipelines, much like that of oil, is considered a natural 
monopoly (Law N147-FZ, 1995, art. 4). Natural gas trunk pipelines are part of the Unified 
Gas Supply System ('UGSS'), a centralized system for natural gas production, transportation, 
storage, and supply throughout Russia (Law N69-FZ, 1999). Gazprom owns the UGSS and 
is responsible for the operation, maintenance, and safety of the UGSS (Gazprom, 2016g). 
Gazprom is required to allow independent suppliers to access the UGSS as long as: (i) the 
pipeline system has spare capacity; (ii) the natural gas meets certain quality requirements; 
and (iii) there are available distribution pipelines leading to consumers (King & Spalding, 
2012). 
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However, this semi-open access policy is only relevant for the domestic market because, 
under 'On Exports of Natural Gas' (Law N 117-FZ, 2013) and 'On the Foundations of the 
State Regulation of Foreign Commerce' ('On Foreign Commerce') (Law N164-FZ, 2003), 
the owner and operator of the UGSS (i.e. Gazprom) has a monopoly over pipeline gas 
exports. This leaves only LNG as the sole route for independent producers to reach foreign 
markets. Until late November 2013, access to this route was open only to Gazprom as the 
owner of the UGSS. However, on 30 November 2013, 'On Exports of Natural Gas' and 'On 
Foreign Commerce' were amended to expand the right to export LNG to two additional 
categories of entities (the 'LNG Export Amendments') (Law N318-FZ, 2013). 
The first category consists of entities whose subsoil use licence complies with three criteria. 
First, the licence must cover deposits of 'federal significance' (Id., art. 2). Second, the licence 
must allow construction of a natural gas liquefaction plant; alternatively, it may allow for 
transmission of the extracted natural gas to a natural gas liquefaction plant (Id.). Third, the 
licence must have contained this provision prior to 1 January 2013 (Id.). 
The second category comprises entities that are allowed to access hydrocarbon offshore 
resources under Russian law, provided they meet either of the following two sets of 
conditions. Under the first set, the users of offshore subsoil resources must produce LNG 
from the gas that they extract or from the gas produced by another entity pursuant to a PSA. 
However, the Russian state must own more than 50% of such an entity's common stock 
and/or control more than 50% of the voting stock (Id.). Under the second set, the users of 
offshore subsoil resources must be subsidiaries of the entities that produce LNG from the gas 
extracted pursuant to a PSA and must otherwise satisfy the first set of conditions. In addition, 
an eligible parent company must own more than 50% of the subsidiary's voting stock (Id.). 
To understand this rather confusing pile of conditions that the LNG Export Amendments 
created, we must examine the planned and ongoing LNG projects in Russia. Russia's lone 
operating LNG project, Sakhalin LNG, falls into the second group of entities under the LNG 
Export Amendments and meets the second set of conditions. First, its parent company, 
Gazprom, is one of two entities with the right to use mineral deposits found on the Russian 
continental shelf. The government owns 50.23% of Gazprom's stock, and Gazprom has at 
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least five years' experience working on the Russian continental shelf (Gazprom, 2016f) 
(Gazprom, 2016k). Second, Sakhalin LNG operates under a PSA and Gazprom owns more 
than half of the project.57 This is not to say that Sakhalin LNG had been operating in violation 
of Russian law prior to the enactment of the LNG Export Amendments. Gazprom's 
ownership of the UGSS ensured such compliance. However, the LNG Export Amendments 
cemented the Russian government's control over the project and its possible expansion. 
The first set of conditions applied to entities eligible to access offshore hydrocarbon deposits 
opened the door for Shtokman Development AG, the Shtokman project operator, to obtain 
an LNG export licence, because Gazprom owns 75% of its stock (provided this maligned 
projects ever gets off the ground) (Shtokman, 2016). Additionally, this set of conditions puts 
Rosneft' in a position to carry out its LNG plans, such as the Dalnevostochnyj SPG (Far 
Eastern LNG) project developed jointly with ExxonMobil (Rosneft', 2016). 
The first category of entities is subject to a rather curious condition - the 1 January 2013 cut-
off date (Law N318-FZ, 2013, art. 2). It turns out that Novatek was the only entity with a pre-
2013 licence to develop a natural gas deposit of federal significance and that allowed 
construction of a natural gas liquefaction plant ( or transmission of the extracted natural gas 
to a natural gas liquefaction plant) (Novatek, 2016a). 
The Russian state exercises tight control over exports of both oil and natural gas. In the case 
of oil, it controls access to export sea terminals and trunk pipelines. In the case of natural gas, 
it eliminated all competition to export via pipeline by granting exclusive rights to Gazprom, 
and to three companies, two of which are state-owned, it granted exclusive rights to export 
LNG. 
7.1.3. Rebracketing the rules of benefit acquisition and distribution 
I noted in Chapter 4 that contrary to popular belief, Vladimir Putin does not rule the country 
the same way the Rurikids and Romanovs did prior to 191 7. Instead, Mr Pu tin must work 
57 Sakhalin LNG current ownership structure is as follows: (i) Gazprom Sakhalin Holdings B.V., 50% + 1 share; 
(ii) Shell Sakhalin Holdings B.V., 27.50%; (iii) Mitsui Sakhalin Holdings B.V., 12.50%; and (iv) Diamond Gas 
Sakhalin B.V. , 10% (Gazprom, 2016f). 
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within power structures, boundaries of which are often delimited by law. The process of 
rebracketing of the power structure in which benefits of oil and gas development are 
distributed did not happen overnight. It took time and effort for the actors through their 
agency to build on the existing structure and for the structure to shape the agency of the 
dominating actors, resulting in near-absolute control of the oil and gas sector by the Kremlin. 
As I elaborate in this chapter's ensuing sections, this near-absolute control is one of the main 
barriers to inclusive and comprehensive risk governance of oil and gas activities in the 
Russian Federation. Therefore, examining how the current power structure came about may 
shed light on how it can be rebracketed towards a more balanced risk governance framework. 
The foundation of the current Kremlin-controlled sector was formed as the Russian 
Federation transitioned out of Soviet rule. Gustafson describes the process in relation to the 
oil sector as such: 
Despite the weakening of the state control in the first half of the 1990s and the 
appearance of near-total privatization that followed, the state never fully exited 
from ownership and control of the oil industry. It retained legal rights over every 
part of the system: from ownership of oil in the ground to ownership of the 
pipeline systems; from licensing of exploration and development to regulation of 
reserves and field development plans; from control over the allocation of export 
quotas and access to export capacity, to control (by municipal governments) over 
much of domestic distribution and sales. In legal terms, all that the emerging 
private sector actually owned was the oil that had been extracted, together with 
the revenues from it, and even that was subject to major restrictions. There was 
never a clear delimitation of private property rights and state regulatory powers. 
What was built in the first half of the 1990s, in other words, was a system of quasi-
private property that restricted the ownership rights of the companies to junior 
roles vis-a-vis the state. This was not apparent at the time. Indeed, so weak and 
disorganized was the sate at all levels - especially at the centre - that it appeared 
to contemporary observers, even to the major players themselves, as though the 
oil industry had genuinely escaped from state control. But it had not. All that had 
happened was that the system of state controls had gone dormant. It retained large 
power over the industry in theory, but in practice that power became largely latent, 
present mainly as an invitation to evasion (Gustafson, 2012, pp. 96-97). 
This explains the rapid return to near-total government control over the oil and gas sector 
when the current regime led by Mr Putin came to power (Id. pp. 95-96). The manner by which 
private actors acquired rights to oil and gas assets aided the current leadership in legitimizing 
its case for reclaiming them. Hoffman (2011 ), Dawisha (2015), and Gustafson (2012) provide 
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multiple accounts of manipulation and even outright coercion that accompanied transfer of 
pipelines, refineries, export terminals, and oil fields into private hands. The infamous 'loans 
for shares' program by which Mikhail Khodokovsky and Roman Abramovich, among others, 
acquired much of their oil and gas assets resembled more of a divvying up of loot by gang 
members than a privatization auction, the principal official aim of which was maximizing the 
financial return for the struggling state (Hoffman, 2011). For this reason, when Yukos was 
forced into bankruptcy and its leader, Mr Khodorkovsky, was tried for fraud and tax evasion, 
approximately the same percentage of Russian citizens supported his prosecution and the 
government's takeover of Yukos as the percentage who opposed it (Levada-Centre, 2008). 
Remarkably, the vast majority of people were simply indifferent to the fate of one of Russia's 
most successful oil and gas companies and its leaders (Id.). 
While battles often literally raged over the Soviet oil industry's assets, the Soviet natural gas 
production, transportation, processing, and distribution system stayed largely together under 
the canopy of Gazprom. Although the state's ownership of Gazprom had gone from 100% at 
the Soviet Union's collapse to 40.875% in 1996 and 1997, and 38.37% in 1998 through 2004, 
the state never lost ownership of the controlling share (Gazprom, 2016k). Thus, the 
reinstatement of the Russian state's majority ownership of Gazprom in 2005 lacked the drama 
of a de facto expropriation of Yukos in the aftermath of Mr Khodorkovsky's arrest 
(Gustafson, 2012). 
Given the constraints of this thesis, it would be impossible to track all of the structural 
changes since the 1990s within the framework that governs access to Oil Standard benefits. 
However, the two notable examples that I consider below provide a representative view of 
the interests involved and structural barriers and opportunities for balanced risk governance. 
The first example would be the April 2008 amendments in the legal framework governing 
access to Russia's continental shelf that made Rosneft' and Gazprom the only eligible entities 
to do so. Prior to the April 2008 amendments, generally, any entity or person had the right to 
access the Russian Federation's subsoil deposits (Law N2395-I, 1992a). Pursuant to Article 
9 of 'On Subsoil Resources', the RF Government was able to restrict access deposits under 
very limited circumstances (Id.). The April 2008 amendments, spearheaded by Deputy Prime 
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Minister Igor Sechin and supported by soon-to-be President Medvedev, turned this exception 
into the rule. As a result of the support, the April 2008 amendments did not encounter any 
opposition in the Russian Parliament (President, 18 July 2008). In July 2008, 'On Subsoil 
Resources' was further amended to eliminate tenders as a means of distributing access to 
mineral deposits located on the continental shelf and to give the RF Government the authority 
to forego auctions (Law N2395-I, 1992). 
Notably, while serving in his government post, Mr Sechin also served as Rosneft's Head of 
the Board of Directors from 2004 until 2011, when he became the company's full-time CEO 
(Rosneft', 2016b). Dmitry Medvedev served as Gazprom's Deputy Head of the Board of 
Directors and Head of the Board of Directors in 2000-2002 (RF Government, 2016). 
Moreover, according to Dawisha (2015), Mr Medvedev was instrumental in Gazprom's 
takeover by members of Vladimir Putin' s inner circle. 
Mr Sechin and President Medvedev met on 18 July 2008 to discuss both sets of amendments 
(Figure 24). The transcript of the meeting leaves little doubt that it was more of a public 
relations event than a substantive conversation regarding the April and July 2008 
amendments (President, 18 July 2008). During the meeting, Mr Sechin recited the access 
restrictions imposed by the April 2008 amendments and emphasized the RF Government's 
role in carrying the legislative bill through to the Federal Assembly when Mr Medvedev was 
still at the helm of the RF Government. Yet both men also noted the ostensible policy reasons 
for enacting the amendments. Mr Sechin pointed to the simplified procedure and hence the 
increased expediency in decisions regarding development of the Russian continental shelf 
(Id.). Whereas Mr Sechin's statement holds truth - after the July 2008 amendments, the RF 
Government had no external barriers regarding access to Russia's continental shelf - the logic 
of the President's statement praising 'targeted solutions' for in 'exploiting Russia's national 
treasure' is less clear: 
The continental shelf is our national treasure. For this reason, this is a special law 
that contains special procedures. It does not have tenders and auctions that are a 
common practice; instead, we have a targeted solution. This was done 
consciously, to exploit the national treasure in a rational manner (Id.). 
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Figure 24: President Medvedev and Deputy Prime Minister Sechin meeting on 18 July 2008 to 
discuss amendments to the legal framework governing access to the continental shelf (President of 
Russia, 2016) 
Rosneft's and Gazprom's lack of true experience in offshore exploration and extraction is yet 
another reason why the 'targeted solution' is based on reasons other than merit. Both entities 
satisfied the five-year Russian continental shelf experience condition by virtue of being part 
of joint ventures with foreign companies. However, two Russian companies that actually 
have the requisite offshore experience have been excluded from the continental shelf. 
The first entity, Zarubezhneft' , is a state-owned company. It has more than five years' 
experience operating on the foreign continental shelve, but not on that of Russia. This 
company has been unsuccessful in getting access to the Russian continental shelf, the Arctic 
section in particular (Zarybezhneft', 2016). The company went as far as to acquire another 
state company, Artikmoreneftegazrazvedka, that held licences to the Russian continental 
shelf in the 2000s for over five years yet ultimately failed to gain access to offshore deposits 
(OilCapital, 2013). 
The second company, Lukoil, has experience operating the Varandey offshore oil-loading 
terminal in the Russian Arctic (Lukoil, 2016). Since 1999, it has been operating offshore in 
several parts of the world, including in the Black, Baltic, and Caspian Seas, but none of these 
formally qualify as the Russian continental shelf (Lukoil, 2015). Additionally, Lukoil is a 
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privately owned company, and this disqualifies it under Article 9 of 'On Subsoil Resources'. 
Vagit Alikperov, the head of Lukoil, suggested that President Medvedev substitute the state-
ownership requirement with the designation of a 'national oil company' (President, 11 
February 2010). However, despite Lukoil's significant contribution to the country's economy 
and support from the Minister of the Environment and Natural Resources, the Russian 
continental shelfremains in the hands of Rosneft' and Gazprom (Donskoy, 2012). 
The second example of rebracketing comes from the LNG Export Amendments. Both 
Novatek and Rosneft' actively lobbied for the LNG Export Amendments' enactment 
(Barsukov, et al., 2013). Some believe that President Putin adopted the idea during an official 
meeting in February 2013 regarding energy sector issues (Id.). During this meeting, Mr 
Sechin, as head of Rosneft', asked the President to consider expanding the right to export 
natural gas to companies that have access to the Russian continental shelf s hydrocarbon 
resources: 
Taking into account ... the fact that Article 23 of the statute 'On Subsoil 
Resources' requires comprehensive development of oil and gas deposits located 
on the continental shelf, we are asking you to consider liberalizing gas exports. 
What is meant here is only liquefied gas. The timing of these decisions is of 
strategic importance, as they need to be made in response to the opportunities 
presented by the global markets and the development of the global economy. 
Creating economic and regulatory conditions for LNG exports from deposits 
located on the continental shelf is not only a question of the development of the 
natural gas industry; it is a question of the effectiveness and appropriateness of 
the continental shelf development. In the end, it is a question of the energy 
industry's future and our national economic development (President, 13 February 
2013). 
Mr Sechin also noted that the 'liberalization proposed by us' will not hurt Gazprom, 'our 
main gas producer' (Id.). He pointed to the different markets that its beneficiaries would 
reach and confirmed that the LNG Export Amendments were drafted with both 
predetermined entities and predetermined projects in mind (Id.). 
A legislative note accompanying the proposed LNG Export Amendments cited concerns over 
the adequacy of domestic supply as justification for the 1 January 2013 cut-off date for the 
subsoil use licence (State Duma, 2013). Given Russia's slumping domestic demand and spare 
production and pipeline capacity, the justification appears rather puzzling (CSIS, 2015a). 
However, this was not the most bewildering part of the note. It stated that the government 
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had decided that not all qualified subsoil use licence holders would automatically receive the 
right to export LNG (State Duma, 2013). The RF Government introduced the LNG Export 
Amendment bill to the State Duma on 6 November 2013 (Medvedev, 2013). Thus, it was 
certainly aware which entities held eligible licences by 1 January 2013. Yet 'not all qualified 
entities' turned out to be just one company, Novatek (Ishmukhametov, 2013). 
During my February 2014 fieldwork trip to Moscow, I met with a former law school 
classmate who at the time worked as a lawyer and a government relations specialist in a 
foreign company. When I uttered the word 'liberalization' in relation to the Russian LNG 
sector, an ironic smile appeared on her face. 'That was for the friend,' she replied cryptically. 
'What friend?' I asked. 'Putin's,' she said. 'Everyone knows that.' (Russian Lawyer, Foreign 
Company, 2014) The person to whom my former classmate was referring is Gennady 
Timchenko, a Novatek board member and the owner of 23.5% of the company's stock 
(Dolgov, 2014). Mr Timchenko's fortune is estimated at $15.3 billion, and he is believed to 
have close personal and financial ties to President Putin (Id) (Dawisha, 2015). In fact, in the 
aftermath of the March 2014 referendum in Crimea on whether the region should leave 
Ukraine and join Russia, the U.S. Department of the Treasury imposed economic sanctions 
on companies and individuals. The sanctions designated Mr Timchenko as the top member 
of Mr Pu tin's inner circle in the imposing of economic sanctions on select Russian individuals 
and companies (U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2014). The agency explained its decision 
thusly: 
Gennady Timchenko is one of the founders of Gunvor, one of the world's largest 
independent commodity trading companies involved in the oil and energy 
markets. Timchenko's activities in the energy sector have been directly linked to 
Putin. Putin has investments in Gunvor and may have access to Gunvor funds 
(Id.). 
A day before the sanctions were announced, Gunvor announced that Mr Timchenko had sold 
his 43% share of the company (Dolgov, 2014). Gunvor labelled reports of a purported 
com1ection with Mr Putin as 'fundamentally misinformed and outrageous', emphasizing that 
the Russian President had never directly or indirectly been a beneficiary of Gunvor (Id). 
However, based on a thorough investigation by Dawisha (2015), this statement does not 
appear to be true. 
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As noted in Chapter 4, the LNG Export Amendments bill took only a few weeks to become 
law. During this rather brief legislative process, an additional amendment was made that 
brought Lukoil into the fold (Barsukov, 2013). However, legislators rejected the amendment, 
as well as a later stand-alone bill that would have moved the cut-off date of the subsoil use 
licence from 1 January 2013 to 1 July 2014 (Legislative Bill N531218-6, 2013) (State Duma, 
2013a). This forced another company, ALLTEK, which was allegedly behind the subsequent 
amendments, to sell its majority share in the Pechora LNG project in May 2014 to Rosneft' 
(Pechora LNG, 2013). In anticipation of the deal, Rosnedra amended ALLTEK's licence to 
cover LNG-related activities (Id.). As a result, all proposed and ongoing LNG projects in 
Russia that are eligible for an export licence are controlled by company heads who belong to 
Vladimir Putin's inner circle. 
Concentration of access to oil and gas sector benefits in the hands of a few decision-makers, 
combined with their close personal relationships with Russia's ultimate policy-makers, has 
created significant agency for pursuing the benefits of oil and gas development, regardless of 
the risks it presents. However, these actors have displayed surprising commitment to 
exercising their power within the bounds of the legal structure. When the structure could no 
longer accommodate their interests, they followed the procedural rules to rebracket it. 
Although it is unclear whether the Kremlin would have gone outside the legal framework if 
the State Duma refused to rubberstamp the aforementioned amendments, the Kremlin's 
respect for the legitimacy of a legislative process is a promising sign. 
7.2. Appearance of sovereign checks and balances on the Oil Standard 
The significant power of the Oil Standard aided by government policies and efforts by 
government officials can be counterbalanced by the power of sovereign structures-
government institutions-tasked with handling risks to public interests. As I concluded in in 
the previous section, the process by which access to oil and gas benefits is distributed offers 
very limited opportunities for the counterbalance. Programmatic policy statements, 
especially the goal-oriented programs aimed at advancing socio-economic development that 
I reviewed in Chapter 4 can serve as the foundation for such institutional controls. However, 
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they are predominately concerned with maximization ofresource extraction and not ensuring 
that the extraction is not contrary to public interest. The legal and regulatory framework 
aimed at environmental protection appears to be the most formidable 'line of defence' , the 
counter-power capable to balance individual interests advanced by the Oil Standard. Another 
line of defence, although not as formidable is the system of technical regulating and 
standardisation that allows the government influence the ways by which companies handle 
risk. 
7.2.1. The state of checks and balances 
7.2.1.1. Environmental protection 
The basic principles of environmental protection in the Russian Federation include: (i) the 
right to a healthy environment; (ii) a science-based approach to ensure sustainable 
development of natural resources; (iii) compensation for environmental harm; a presumption 
of hazard to the environment associated with economic activity; (iv) a preventive provision 
to reduce the negative impact of economic and other activities through the use of best 
available technologies; (v) the mandatory participation of business and government actors in 
environmental protection; the right to information about the health of the environment; public 
participation in the process; and international cooperation in the field of environmental 
protection (Law N7-FZ, 2002, art. 3). 
Although these basic principles provide a strong foundation overall, 'On Environmental 
Protection' is hampered by a number of inconsistent and underdeveloped provisions. For 
example, Article 1 entitled 'Main Definitions' includes a definition of environmental risk. 
However, the statute fails to incorporate environmental risk into any substantive mechanisms 
thereunder and mentions it only once in relation with virtually non-existent in practice 
environmental insurance (Law N7-FZ, 2002, art. 18). Another example is environmental 
audit. Aside from a definition of the term in Article 1, 'On Environmental Protection' does 
not mention environmental audit anywhere else in its text. 
State environmental control serves as the main mechanism of environmental protection in 
Russia. Article 1 of 'On Environmental Protection' defines state environmental control as: 
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'the system of measures aimed at prevention, identification, and enforcement environmental 
protection legislation and ensuring compliance of business entities and sole business owners 
with regulatory requirements in the area of environmental protection.' (Law N7-FZ, 2002) 
State environmental oversight is a type of state environmental control. It focuses on ensuring 
compliance of government agencies and business entities with environmental laws and 
regulations (Law N7-FZ, 2002, art. 65). Environmental monitoring is another type of 
environmental control that received much attention in 'On Environmental Protection' (Law 
N7-FZ, 2002, Ch. 10). The main purpose of environmental monitoring is gathering and 
systematizing environmental data. It is important to note that both environmental oversight 
and environmental monitoring designate mineral subsoil deposits as a focal area (Law N7-
FZ, 2002, arts. 63 & 65). 
As to the state of the legal and regulatory framework governing environmental protection as 
implemented, President Medvedev described it as follows: 
Today, activities aimed at protecting the environment and environmental 
protection as a whole are governed by series of incoherent, often contradictory 
statutes, codes, and of course sub-statutory acts. Mechanisms that provide 
economic incentives are not always put on paper and supported by legislation. 
And very often, laws do not work for years because of the lack of supporting 
regulations (President, 27 May 2010). 
According to Dmitry Kobylkin environmental controls applied to oil and gas activities in the 
Arctic are not immune from the problems that hinder the entire system of environmental 
protection: 
The problem of the weak legal and regulatory regime must be resolved 
immediately on a national level in the interest of environmental protection of the 
Arctic zone. This problem is due to poor legal framework governing 
environmental requirements for developing and exploiting Arctic offshore oil and 
gas deposits, and due to the lack of fast-response facilities in the proximity of 
such deposits (President, 9 June 2011). 
Mr. Kobylkin' s statement is particularly important because oil and gas activities represent 
the main source of environmental risks, as acknowledged by the Russian leadership (Id.). 
Archaic emission standards and maximum allowable concentrations, the aforementioned 
PDK, as well as the rules that mandate them, are specific examples of lagging environmental 
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protection in Russia. According to President Medvedev, Russian environmental enforcement 
agencies were still using PDK developed in the 1940s and 1950s (President, 27 May 2010). 
Kirsan Ilumzhinov, former President of the Kalmyk Republic and member of the State 
Council, noted that this outdated framework is subjective and creates opportunities for 
uncurbed environmental pollution (Id.). Yuri Trutnev added that as of May 2010 the 
maximum fines for non-compliance have not been indexed since 1991 (Id.). Article 8 of the 
Administrative Code confirms that it was still the case as of May 2016 (Law N195-FZ, 2001). 
As result, non-compliance had become an institutionalized business practice. Because the 
fines have been set so low, the majority of industrial enterprises have been exceeding 
maximum allowed emissions for decades (President, 27 May 2010). In addition, Mr. Trutnev 
indicated that because the enforcement is subjective, and because the list of pollutants 
contains over 2,000 items, some of which Minprirody cannot even measure, it is not difficult 
for a bureaucrat to find a violation (Id.). This eliminates any remaining incentives for 
businesses to reduce their negative impact on the environment while creating opportunities 
for 'feeding' local and original officials (Id.). Unsurprisingly, Mr Medvedev acknowledged 
poor compliance with environmental laws and regulations by Russian companies during a 30 
January 2008 presentation while serving as Prime Minister (President, 30 January 2008). 
Russian government agencies appear to be a long way from effective monitoring of the 
nation's environmental situation. According to Mr Medvedev, as of 2010, Russia lacked a 
system for collecting and systematizing environmental data. As a result, Mr Medvedev said, 
'state environmental control lacked objective and instrumental environmental data' 
(President, 27 May 2010). 
Unlike government financing of exploration and prospecting activities, state environmental 
control has not enjoyed the same level of funding. For example, in 2010 the Ministry of the 
Environment and Natural Resources (Minprirody) had developed seven pilot projects to 
target regions and areas marred by environmental pollution problems. Yet, it was unable to 
proceed due to lack of funding. This prompted Mr Trutnev to ask publicly President 
Medvedev for money: 
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D. Medvedev: Got it. So there is no activity in any of [the pilot projects]? 
Y. Trutnev: Dmitry Anatolyevich, unfortunately, that is the case. We need some 
money. 
D. Medvedev: What numbers are we talking about? 
Y. Trutnev: lfwe were to receive about two to three billion rubles [approximately 
$70-100 million U.S. in 2010], we can start working this year (Id.). 
Moreover, when the funds are available, sometimes they cannot be properly allocated due to 
a lack of appropriate budgetary mechanisms (Id.). As are result, environmental protection for 
now remains an afterthought of the Russian state. 
Perhaps the most anticipated changes in the environmental protection system came in July 
2014, in the form of amendments to a series of environmental statutes, including 'On 
Environmental Protection' (Law N219-FZ, 2015) (Lamikhova, 2015). Pursuant to these 
amendments, which do not come into full effect until 1 January 2019, all activities and 
facilities are grouped into four categories depending on the level of harm they pose to the 
environment: 'significant impact' (Category I), 'moderate impact' (Category II), 
'insignificant impact' (Category III), and 'minimal impact' (Category IV) (Decree Nl029, 
2015).58 A 28 September 2015 RF Government Decree entitled 'On Affirmation of Criteria 
for Categorization of Facilities Impacting the Environment Into Facilities of Categories I, II, 
III and IV' ('Decree 1029'), included both upstream and downstream (refining) oil and gas 
facilities into Category I. However, oil, natural gas, and petroleum products pipelines are 
included in Category II (Id.). 
Entities operating Category I facilities will be required to obtain a comprehensive 
environmental permit, or kompleksnoe ekologicheskoe razreshenie, which due to its 
inclusiveness can potentially tum into the most comprehensive mechanism of handling 
environmental risks on the operational level in Russia. In contrast, entities operating 
Category II facilities will not need to obtain permission (Law N219-FZ, 2015, art. 31.1). 
Instead, they will be required to file a declaration of environmental impact (Law N219-FZ, 
58 The July 2014 amendments affecting categories of facilities and activities subject to environmental review 
enter into force on 1 January 2018. 
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2015, art. 31.2). A declaration of environmental impact is premised on self-assessment of the 
activities negatively impacting the environment and measures aimed at mitigating the impact 
(Id.). 
7.2.1.2. Environmental assessment 
Until the July 2014 amendments take full effect, 'On Environmental Protection' largely fails 
to put state environmental control in the context of the actual responsibilities and activities 
of Minprirody and its sub-agencies. It does, however, refer to assessment of an economic 
activity in terms of its 'direct or indirect' impact on the environment under Article 32 
(OVOS) and to a state environmental expert review (SEER) under Article 33. As I noted in 
Chapter 5, internationally, these two mechanisms are usually part of one process, 
environmental assessment (EA). However, in Russia, they are two distinct processes that are 
stitched together largely with the help of administrative regulations. 
The state of EA, the mechanics of which I reviewed in Chapter 5 through the Power of Siberia 
example, is indicative of the state of Russian environmental protection overall. The former 
Minister of Environment and Natural Resources Yuri Trutnev listed 'termination of 
environmental assessment' as the leading environmental protection problem in Russia 
(President, 27 May 2010). The minister clarified that the scope of EA had been reduced to 
the point where it covered only 5% of activities that were originally in the purview of 'On 
Environmental Review' (Id.). Although Mr Trutnev made this observation in 2010, judging 
by a lack of progress in relation to the action items identified in several presidential meetings 
dedicated to the environment, EA in Russia remains in a sad state. 
As I noted in Chapter 5, SEER is only required for oil and gas activities occurring offshore, 
pursuant to PSAs, and located in highly protected environmental areas (Law Nl 75-FZ, 1995, 
art. 11 ). However, pursuant to the July 2014 amendments, the situation is set to change as of 
1 January 2018 when all Category I facilities, including upstream oil and gas and refineries, 
become subject to SEER (Law N219-FZ, 2015). Oil and gas pipelines, however, will remain 
excluded from the purview of 'On Environmental Review' (Id.). 
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Another significant positive change in environmental risk governance of oil and gas 
exploration, development, and extraction, albeit one that affects only offshore activities, 
came into effect on 30 December 2012 (Law N287-FZ, 2012), when amendments to 'On the 
Continental Shelf and 'On Inland Sea Waters' required proponents of offshore projects to 
include oil spill contingency plans in the documentation reviewed as part of SEER. 59 
In addition to SEER, 'On Environmental Review' sets forth the public environmental expert 
review (PEER), a more inclusive mechanism that offers perhaps the most opportunity for 
deliberation (Law Nl 75-FZ, 1995, arts. 20-25). PEER is not mandatory. It can be initiated 
by citizens, local governments, and NGOs (Id.). A party wishing to conduct a public 
environmental assessment must seek permission from the local government (Id., art. 23). 
Permission may be denied on several grounds. For example, government officials may 
decline to permit the public environmental assessment if information about the project or a 
related activity contains 'commercial secrets.' (Id., art. 24) This gives government officials 
an easy out, so to speak, as virtually every project or economic activity contains sensitive 
information. 
Although PEER is not mandatory, it creates a pathway for a developer to gain a social licence 
to operate, an example of which would be the NGO Sakhalin Environmental Watch assessing 
the Exxon Negtegaz Limited project in Sakhalin Island's Piltun Bay (Baker, et al., 2011). On 
the other hand, if a developer is uncooperative, as in the case of Gazprom during the 
Prirazlomnoe project, the process may be derailed, thereby elevating public anxieties about 
the proposed activity (WWF, 2016). The results of PEER are not binding, which weakens its 
practical effects. The only requirement posed by 'On Environmental Review' is that the 
results of any permitted public environmental assessment must be considered during the 
mandatory SEER process (Law Nl 75-FZ, 1995). 
Russia does not have a framework for performing strategic environmental assessments 
(SEAs), despite Russian and international environmental NGOs and academia advocating for 
the adoption of such since the 1990s (Bogolybov, 2013). Thus, the two-step EA process 
59 'On the Continental Shelf Article 22.2 and 'On Inland Sea Waters' Article 16.1 'On the Continental Shelf 
Article 31 and 'On Inland Sea Waters' Article 34 (Law N287-FZ, 2012). 
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serves as the main mechanism for environmental risk governance of hydrocarbon activities. 
To borrow from Yuri Trutnev, EA will remain in a largely 'terminated' state at least until 
2018. 
7.2.1.3. Technical regulating 
'On Technical Regulating', enacted in 2002, introduced technical regulations (tekhnicheskie 
reglamenty) intended to organize technical standards into coherent groups (Law N 184-FZ, 
2002, art. 2). Technical regulations also set the minimum standards for products, processes, 
and facilities (Id). The minimum requirements are developed pursuant to acceptable and 
tolerable risk, which the statute defines as 'probability and severity of harm to life or health 
of citizens, personal, corporate, state, and municipal property, environment, life or health of 
flora and fauna.' (Id) The scale upon which 'On Technical Regulating' utilizes risk to shape 
regulatory requirements makes it de Jure the most innovative law in terms of risk governance. 
A technical regulation can take the form of statute, sub-statute, or even an international treaty 
(Law Nl 84-FZ, 2002, art. 2). This means that it is the government that determines the 
tolerability and acceptability of the risk at issue, which is in line with Russia's historic 
approach to risk. This also means that all technical standards that fall under a technical 
regulation must comply with the regulation. In addition, these standards cannot contradict 
other administrative regulations such as the 2014 'Federal Industrial Safety Regulations 
"Offshore Oil and Gas Safety Rules'" ('Offshore Oil and Gas Safety Rules') and tens and 
even hundreds of other administrative regulations (Order N105, 2014). 
Such regulatory ambiguity creates a great deal of 'grey space' between compliance and non-
compliance, and effectively expands the 'administrative discretion' within which a 
government official or agency is allowed to act. In the words of social theory, this creates a 
great deal of agency for government actors to function, and often not necessarily in the public 
interest. This was a major source of anxiety for Team Russia members during the September 
2013 workshop in Oslo (Oslo Event, 2013). According to a manager with project experience 
in the country, the foreign partners in the joint venture tasked the Russian partner with 
handling permitting and compliance matters due to their concerns over regulatory ambiguity 
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and broad administrative discretion. It was assumed that the Russian partner had more 
experience in dealing with the Russian regulatory system. However, based on questions and 
remarks from workshop participants, the manner in which the Russian partner engaged with 
the government lacked transparency, which in tum raised fears of illicit behaviour (Id.). 
Comprehensive technical regulations can address some of these types of concerns, as they 
are expected to bring order to the multitude of technical standards and ensure that 
administrative regulations, such as the Offshore Oil and Gas Safety Rules, do not send 
contradictory messages to companies. Unfortunately, Russia is a long way from reaching this 
goal. President Medvedev described the state technical regulations in early 2010 as follows: 
I am talking about the technical regulating legislation. The law as it was enacted 
had proven to be completely ineffective. As a result, we had to take immediate 
measures to bring it in compliance with today's requirements (President, 20 
January 2010). 
The Russian President was puzzled that in 2010, eight years after 'On Technical Regulating' 
was enacted, the RF Government was still unsure how many technical regulations were 
necessary for its full implementation. 'At first they said 40 to 50. After that, some other 
number emerged; and after that I was told 400.' (Id.) The Russian leadership remarked that 
this not only represents a significant gap between technical standardization in the Western 
countries and Russia, it also indicates a marked decline in the quality of technical regulation 
since the collapse of the Soviet Union (President, 13 February 2013). 
The situation remains largely the same in 2016. The only technical regulation adopted by the 
RF Government since the enactment of 'On Technical Regulating' that directly relates to the 
oil and gas sector is a regulation concerning distribution of natural gas pipelines 
(Rosstandard, 2016). Thus, in the foreseeable future, instead of receiving clarification 
regarding the parameters of acceptable and tolerable risk, oil and gas companies are exposed 
to regulatory risks created by legal ambiguity. 
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7.2.1.4. Arctic ready? 
One of the best ways to determine the effectiveness of a particular public policy is to examine 
a policy-maker's 'to do' list, which usually reveals items that need urgent attention because 
they have not been addressed satisfactorily, if at all. 
In 2014, after the meeting on World Environment Day, President Putin issued through his 
administration the 'List of Directives in Following the Meeting on the Effective and Safe 
Development of the Arctic' (Directive List PR-1530, 2014). The list of directives included 
the following items related to environmental controls on hydrocarbon development in the 
Russian Arctic: (i) development of measures aimed at protecting biodiversity, including 
prevention of wildlife loss because of oil and petroleum products spills; (ii) compiling of a 
list of flora and fauna species that can serve as indicators of marine ecosystems sustainable 
development; (iii) creation of a pilot project for comprehensive environmental management 
of offshore oil and gas activities and implementation of this project in the Russian portion of 
the Barents Sea; and (iv) recommend that oil and gas companies developing offshore deposits 
adopt programs aimed at protection of biodiversity (Id.). 
None of the above items has come to fruition. Therefore, the Russian leadership's directive 
for the RF Government to work with 'scientific institutions and environmental NGOs' on 
'the prevention and mitigation of negative impacts of economic activities on the environment 
in the Arctic zone' remains an aspiration (Id.). Of even greater cause for concern is the fact 
that the Russian leadership raised these issues seven months after the Prirazlomnoe field 
started production and after decades of oil and gas exploration in the Russian Arctic offshore. 
Meanwhile, according to the head ofWWF, oil spills presented a serious problem well before 
the 2014 World Environment Day meeting, and the industry lacked the capacity to address 
it: 
Our negotiations with oil companies indicate that, unfortunately, not a single one 
of them has the technology to handle oil spills on ice. They just do not have such 
technologies. Many invest in developing them. BP is working on them, so is Shell. 
Our companies are trying to come up with a solution as well (President, 9 June 
2011). 
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In September 2013 while attending the Oslo workshop, I witnessed a conversation between 
two Norwegian scientists, one representing a university and another representing a company 
that was working on oil dispersants for ice conditions. Their heated exchange made it clear 
that the necessary technology is yet to emerge. This conclusion was shored up by other 
presentations related to oil spills in ice waters and the lack of any breakthrough in response 
(Oslo Event, 2013). Notwithstanding this concern, with the blessing of the Russian 
government, the industry has plunged headlong into icy waters in pursuit of the benefits and 
regardless of the risks, or even the consideration thereof. 
7 .2.2. Re bracketing of checks and balances 
Peterson and Bielke (2001 ), Bobylev (2005), and Bykov (2005) attribute the demise of 
environmental protection in Russia to the policy of reviving the extractive sector. This 
process, termed by Mol (2009) as 'environmental deinstitutionalization', began with the 
absorption of the State Committee of the Russian Federation for the Protection of the 
Environment (Goskomekologia) into the Ministry of Natural Resources (Minresursov). As a 
result of this 'environmental coup' (IQ HSE, 2002), Minresursov, which is currently known 
as Minprirody, subjugated environmental protection to the interests of mineral resource 
development (Crotty & Rodgers, 2012). 
The next round of changes came in 2003 and 2004 in the form of 'recentralization' when 
environmental enforcement, permitting, and monitoring were transferred from regional 
agencies to five federal agencies mentioned in Chapter 4: Rosprirodnazdor, Rostekhnadzor, 
Rosnedra, Rosvodnadzor, and Rosgydromet (Crotty & Rodgers, 2012, p. 17). This left 
regions largely in the role of observers to oil and gas projects occurring in their territory. 
Yet the Kremlin was not quite done with administrative reform in the environmental sector. 
Its next target was EA. As noted above, EA received the most significant blow in December 
2006 when the enactment of the federal City Building Code prompted comprehensive 
changes in environmental legislation (Law N232-FZ, 2006). According to Mr Truntev, 
Dmitry Kozak, who is a member of Mr Putin's inner circle (Dawisha, 2015) and currently a 






promising an all-inclusive assessment of facilities under construction (President, 27 May 
2010). Remarkably, I did not find any official statements criticising Vladimir Putin, who 
presided over the dismemberment of environmental protection in Russia during his first stint 
as Russia's President, though I did come across a few references to the RF Government and 
the State Duma as potential culprits, in addition to Mr Kozak, behind the 'environmental 
deinstitutionalization'. However, as a general rule, meeting attendees described the situation 
without attributing it to a specific actor. 
Igor Chestin, the head of WWF Russia, provided a few details on the manner in which these 
and other less significant changes were made: 
During the last few years, we have witnessed a situation when environmental laws 
are destroyed or weakened and this process occurs as follows: the amendments 
are drafted and passed in literally a month without any consultation or discussion. 
Environmental assessment has been wiped out and the legal status has been 
changed, and all of it was done very quickly with no discussion (President, 27 
May 2010). 
Mr Chestin also noted that every structural change that in theory was supposed to strengthen 
state environmental control actually weakened it. He added: 'At the some point, we, with the 
leadership of our country, need to decide what the system of environmental control should 
look like in for the next five to seven years, and let this system to establish itself in terms of 
its expertise and personnel.' (Id) 
The July 2014 amendments into environmental legislation signalled the reversal of a trend 
that had been devastating for environmental protection. However, the changes that are set 
come to force in 2018 and 2019 are incremental. In contrast, Kirsan Ilumzhinov proposed the 
following comprehensive yet simple solution to jumpstart the reversal as early as in May 
2010: 
First: resurrection of the original definition of environmental assessment. 
Second: mandatory comprehensive environmental assessment for all facilities and 
activities that are subject to state assessment that includes public deliberation. 
Third: expanding the scope of environmental review (Id.). 
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Mr Ilumzhinov's first point is particularly important considering the original definition of 
environmental expert review under 'On Environmental Review' for the following reasons.60 
First, as Table 15 depicts, it transforms a document review into an assessment of an actual 
activity. Second, it focuses on risk, i.e. 'potential adverse consequences of the activity' . 
Third, it includes social and economic risks in the purview of EA. 
Table 15: Definition of Environmental Assessment Under Article 1 of 'On Environmental Review' 
(Law Nl75-FZ, 1995) 
Current Definition Original Definition 
(last amended on 29 December 2015) (as of23 November 1995) 
The determination of whether documents or The determination of whether a planned 
documentation that support an economic or economic or other activity meets 
other activity comply with the environmental environmental requirements and determination 
requirements set forth in in technical of whether the activity can proceed considering 
regulations and legislation in the area of the goals of prevention of potential adverse 
environmental protection for the purposes of consequences of the activity on the 
prevention of negative impact of said activity environment and related social and economic 
on the environment and other consequences of the activity. 
However, judging by the level of resistance to such efforts, bringing to life meaningful checks 
and balances of the Oil Standard will not be easy. As the State Council's 27 May 2010 
meeting drew to its end, President Medvedev shifted the discussion to the action items. Mr 
Chestin warned the President about the challenges ahead: 
When we are talking about proposed legislation that can move us forward in terms 
of environmental protection, it remains dormant for years if not decades. 
Therefore, in my view, the main point here is not what makes the directives list 
but your political will, Dmitry Anatolyevich, of making sure that this legislation 
is actually enacted (President, 27 May 2010). 
These remarks served more than a reminder than a piece of new information. Mr Medvedev 
oversaw a great deal of legislative proposals by the RF Government whilst serving as 
Russia's Prime Minister. In addition, according to Mr Truntnev, Minprirody began working 
on improving the legal framework for environmental protection pursuant to Mr Medvedev's 
first orders as Russian President in the summer of 2008. In two years, the ministry 
promulgated over 100 regulations to address the 'accumulated issues'. However, the State 
60 I have stressed the importance ofEA's scope and inclusiveness above. 
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Mr Ilumzhinov's first point is particularly important considering the original definition of 
environmental expert review under 'On Environmental Review' for the following reasons.60 
First, as Table 15 depicts, it transforms a document review into an assessment of an actual 
activity. Second, it focuses on risk, i.e. 'potential adverse consequences of the activity' . 
Third, it includes social and economic risks in the purview of EA. 
Table 15: Definition of Environmental Assessment Under Article 1 of 'On Environmental Review' 
(Law N175-FZ, 1995) 
Current Definition Original Definition 
(last amended on 29 December 2015) (as of 23 November 1995) 
The determination of whether documents or The determination of whether a planned 
documentation that support an economic or economic or other activity meets 
other activity comply with the environmental environmental requirements and determination 
requirements set forth in in technical of whether the activity can proceed considering 
regulations and legislation in the area of the goals of prevention of potential adverse 
environmental protection for the purposes of consequences of the activity on the 
prevention of negative impact of said activity environment and related social and economic 
on the environment and other consequences of the activity. 
However, judging by the level of resistance to such efforts, bringing to life meaningful checks 
and balances of the Oil Standard will not be easy. As the State Council's 27 May 2010 
meeting drew to its end, President Medvedev shifted the discussion to the action items. Mr 
Chestin warned the President about the challenges ahead: 
When we are talking about proposed legislation that can move us forward in tenns 
of environmental protection, it remains dormant for years if not decades. 
Therefore, in my view, the main point here is not what makes the directives list 
but your political will, Dmitry Anatolyevich, of making sure that this legislation 
is actually enacted (President, 27 May 2010). 
These remarks served more than a reminder than a piece of new information. Mr Medvedev 
oversaw a great deal of legislative proposals by the RF Government whilst serving as 
Russia's Prime Minister. In addition, according to Mr Truntnev, Minprirody began working 
on improving the legal framework for environmental protection pursuant to Mr Medvedev's 
first orders as Russian President in the summer of 2008. In two years, the ministry 
promulgated over 100 regulations to address the 'accumulated issues'. However, the State 
60 I have stressed the importance ofEA's scope and inclusiveness above. 
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Duma refused to act on any of the ministry's recommendations and did not prepare a single 
piece of legislation in time (Id). Yet, unlike Mr Putin, Mr Medvedev appeared to have the 
political will to reverse his predecessor's policies. He proposed a long list of directives, 
including reversing some of the changes to 'On Environmental Review' (Id). 
A year later, the State Council convened a follow-up meeting, the day before which President 
Medvedev had held a meeting with environmental NGOs that turned into one collective 
grievance hearing (President, 8 June 2011). With this meeting fresh in his mind, Mr 
Medvedev opened the State Council meeting by following up on the directives made after 
the May 2010 gathering. In response, he met with systemic institutionalized resistance in 
both the RF Government and the State Duma, and no real results. This resistance was hidden 
behind a smokescreen of speeches that recognized the problem, described in general terms 
the great amount of work that had been done, and sketched an ambitious agenda (President, 
9 June 2011). 
7.3. Allocation of risks and benefits 
7.3.1. The merger of beneficiaries and gatekeepers of the Oil Standard 
Minprirody resembles a 'cross-purpose' regulator, an agency responsible for distinct and 
conflicting functions: advancing and managing resource extraction whilst subjecting it to 
stringent environmental and safety checks and balances. 61 In addition to a clear conflict of 
interest, the resource acquisition function steamrolls virtually any sovereign checks and 
balances that stand in its way. Therefore, at the project and operational levels, the sovereign 
power structures responsible for representing public interest become subservient to the 
network power of the oil and gas sector aided by the sovereign structures that support oil and 
gas extraction in Russia. 
61 This term was used by the National Commission (2011, p. 57) on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and 
Offshore Drilling to describe the Minerals Management Service (MMS). 
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This all but eliminates a plurality of viewpoints in the risk governance process. Meanwhile, 
Renn and Schweizer (2009, p. 179), who build their case for inclusive risk governance on the 
Habermasian discourse theory, note that '[m]odern societies are characterized by a plurality 
of values and world views'. They further observe that: 'Discursive decision making is 
oriented towards the common good and seeks the rational competition of arguments. It looks 
for diversity in participants and perspectives in the sense that all potentially affected parties 
should be able to agree with its outcome.' (Id. p. 178) The risk governance processes 
occurring under Minprirody's roof involve little discourse, thereby diminishing the chances 
of arriving at a decision that advances public interest. 
The pro-extraction orientation of Minprirody is the effect of a much bigger problem. Russia 
is governed by pro-extraction vlast ', elites led by Vladimir Putin that have virtually unlimited 
power over sovereign institutions that in theory should advance the common good. The 
origins of the current leadership's pro-extraction orientation can be traced to Vladimir Putin's 
dissertation as a Candidate of Sciences in Economics. 62 Entitled (in Russian) 'Strategic 
Planning for the Regeneration of the Regional Mineral Resource Base during the Formation 
of Market Relations in St. Peters burg and Leningrad Region' (Putin, 1997), the dissertation 
was written and successfully defended midway through Mr Putin's career in 1997 (Vladimir 
Putin, 2016). He asserted that his dissertation's main practical application was to provide a 
basis for designing policy recommendations that create a strategic planning system for 
achieving goals in the development of the mineral resource sector (Putin, 1997, p. 175). The 
strategic planning to which Vladimir Putin referred was a stark departure from the Soviet-
style five-year planning system, as it was largely based on theories and concepts applied in 
large Western companies and other organizations (Gaddy & Kuchins, 2008, p. 118). 
Mr Putin's dissertation has been labelled a blueprint for Russia's economic policy (Goldman, 
2010, p. 97). Indeed, Mr Putin used his scholarly work as an opportunity to expound upon 
some of the cornerstones of said policy - for instance, the significance of mineral resources 
to economic development and of systematic strategic planning in mineral resource 
development (Balzer, 2006). He did not apply the results of his work, however, to Russia's 
62 The "Candidate of Sciences" degree awarded by Russian universities falls between the master's and doctorate 
degrees awarded by universities the United Kingdom. 
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economy as a whole until 1999, when he published an article entitled 'Mineral Resources in 
the Strategy for Development of the Russian Economy' (Putin, 2000). In the article, Putin -
a member of Boris Yeltsin's government at the time - outlined the rationale, methodology, 
and recommendations that have since predominately served as the foundation for Russia's 
policies. Of course, the extractive sector was central to Mr. Putin's vision, as it is the driving 
force of the Russian economy, the vehicle of Russia's integration into the global economy, 
and the basis for the nation's transition to a post-resource-based model (Id. p. 2). 
In recent years, Russian opposition leaders and politicians have referred to the Russian oil 
and gas sector as 'Kremlin Incorporated', and it is hard to disagree with such a title 
(Klubmann, 2006). Gazprom, Rosneft' , and Transneft' comprise the vast majority of the 
Russian oil and gas sector and are run, respectively, by Mr Putin's friend and St. Petersburg 
colleague Alexey Miller, close friend Igor Sechin, and former KGB colleague in Germany 
and friend Nikolai Tokarev (Forbes, 2016) (Dawisha, 2015). All of these men have at some 
point held high positions within the Russian government and have been awarded state medals 
for their service to Russia (Forbes, 2016) (Rosneft', 2016b) (Gazprom, 20161). 
However, as mentioned above, Vladimir Putin does not have an absolute monarch's power. 
His inner circle consists of powerful people that amassed great wealth. For this reason, while 
remaining the first among equals, he often mediates conflicting groups within state 
companies, the Presidential Administration, and the RF Government. According to a Russian 
energy analyst, Gazprom's top management consists of three clans: economists from the St. 
Petersburg City Administration, Yeltsin-era Gazprom managers, and former St. Petersburg 
KGB officers (Russian Energy Analyst, 2013). These people rarely possess the necessary 
skills, experience, and knowledge for the positions that they occupy. Nepotism is also 
prevalent - for example, Sechin's son Ivan is a deputy director of Rosneft's joint venture 
department; and Andrey Patrushev, the 34-year-old son of Mr Putin's Leningrad KGB 
colleague and former head of the Security Council Nikolay Patrushev, was recently appointed 
to lead the offshore arm of Gazprom Neft' (Tretyakov, 2015). 
This model of vlast ', which Ledeneva (2013a) calls 'Sistema', is not very effective at public 
or corporate governance. As a result, Presidential directives are frequently mismanaged, 
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stalled, or outright ignored, which explains why generally benign technical regulations are 
yet to emerge, even though they would often benefit the oil and gas industry. In the corporate 
realm, cost overruns are staggering (Id.). For example, the cost of Nord Stream pipeline 
construction on the German side was 2.1 million euros per kilometre. On the Russian side, -it 
was three times higher - 5.8 million euros per kilometre (Dawisha, 2015, p. 306). This 
paradox has a very simple explanation- 'In Russia, money is not made on profits, it is made 
on costs.' (CSIS, 2015a) 
Effective public and corporate governance 1s not Sistema's mam objective-its mam 
objective is enrichment of its members. It certainly pays to run Kremlin Inc., as evidenced 
by the total compensation for Rosneft's and Gazprom's heads, Mr Sechin and Mr Miller. 
According to Forbes, the former netted $50 million in 2013 and between $37 and $25 million 
in 2014 and the latter $25 million in 2013 and 2014 (Forbes, 2014). 
Sistema is built on extractive institutions. Acemoglu and Robinson capture the essence of 
such institutions as follows: 
Extractive political institutions concentrate power in the hands of a narrow elite 
and place few constraints on the exercise of this power. Economic institutions are 
then often structured by this elite to extract resources from the rest of the society. 
Extractive economic institutions thus naturally accompany extractive political 
institutions. In fact, they must inherently depend on extractive political 
institutions for their survival (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, p. 75). 
As I noted in Chapter 6, a merger of Oil Standard beneficiaries and gatekeepers results in a 
situation in which risk governance posed by oil and gas development extends only to the risks 
threatening the development itself. In addition, this not a theoretical observation - when I 
asked a senior government relations manager at one of Russia's NOCs what type ofrisks his 
company considers in its Arctic operations, he said without any hesitation: 'Economic.' I 
followed up by asking whether he meant risks posed to the regional and national economies. 
'No,' he replied, 'to the company.' (Senior Russian NOC Manager, 2014) 
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7.3.2. Spatial allocation of risks and benefits 
One of the common arguments in favour of mineral resource development is the ostensible 
prosperity that it brings to the areas where minerals are extracted. The Russian leadership 
uses this argument extensively whilst pointing north or east in the area of resource base 
expansion. This argument is also used to justify the development against the significant risks 
that oil and gas development brings. 
A study by National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) (Gennaioli, et al., 2013) found 
Russia among the three worst countries in the world in terms of regional inequality 
(Gennaioli, et al., 2013). NBER researchers attributed the country's low ratings to its 
expansive mineral extractive sector, as regions where mineral resources are extracted are 
among that country's wealthiest (Id p. 13). Another report lists two hydrocarbon-producing 
regions, Tyumen and Sakhalin, among the wealthiest in terms of GDP per capita (Oxfam, 
2014, p. 13). 
Having a large GDP per capita due to oil and gas activities does not necessary mean that the 
actual financial benefits stay where the extraction occurs. As I stated in Chapters 2 and 6, the 
two main taxes on oil and gas production are the mineral extraction tax (MET) and export 
duty (ED). Both are federal taxes that go directly to the federal budget. Pursuant to Article 
14 of the Tax Code, the regions are left with the corporate asset (property) tax and the road 
tax, and per Article 15 of the Tax Code, municipalities are left with the land tax and the 
personal property tax (Law N146-FZ, 1998). MET and ED dwarf these taxes in terms of the 
collected revenue. Additionally, oil and gas companies frequently lobby for regional tax 
breaks. As I noted in Chapter 6, both Yamal LNG and Prirazlomnoe received significant 
regional tax incentives. In addition, a practice called transfer pricing that allows extraction 
companies to allocate their profits to the location of their headquarters. As a result, 10% of 
all Russia's energy production and fossil fuel extraction is statistically 'allocated' to Moscow. 
This brings a large surplus to the city budget, even though no oil or gas is extracted there in 
meaningful quantities (Sovacool, et al., 2013, p. 146). 
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A high level of wealth inequality further exacerbates the spatial allocation of oil and gas 
revenues. In its 2014 report, Credit Suisse (2014, p. 53) ranks Russia well ahead of the world 
in percentage of wealth controlled by the top decile (85%), a category that is considered the 
most indicative of allocation of wealth in society. Indeed, Russia was seven percentage points 
ahead of the next country, Turkey (Id. p. 33). In addition, the report notes that 111 people 
control 19% of the country's wealth (Id. p. 53). According to Rosstat, in 2012, the average 
Russian earned between $4,000 and $10,000, a far cry from the salaries of Mr Sechin and Mr 
Miller (Breslow, 2015). Therefore, although the per capita GDP in hydrocarbon-producing 
regions is tantamount to that of Norway and Hong Kong, (Oxfam, 2014, p. 13) the average 
income per capita is only one-third higher than in the rest of Russia (Breslow, 2015). 
Kremlin Inc. allocates the financial benefits of oil and gas extraction from the producing 
regions to Moscow, where Gazprom (2016m), Rosneft' (2016c), Transneft' (2016a), Lukoil 
(2016a), and Novatek (2016a) headquarters are located. Meanwhile, the environmental, 
social, and economic risks largely remain with the land. Taleb (2014) describes this situation 
as the absence of 'skin in the game', meaning that the actor gets all the benefits of the activity 
without facing the risks it poses. 
The immense environmental and social damage of past oil and gas activities demonstrates 
unequivocally that the risks are real, probable, and severe. To describe such impacts in any 
meaningful detail will take many volumes and reams of paper. As I mentioned in the 
introduction, there have been many studies capturing the environmental and socio-economic 
legacy of the Russian production. The following excerpt form a 2001 study conducted by 
Iwaco, an independent Dutch consulting group, and Greenpeace regarding the impact of oil 
and gas activities in the Nizhnevartovsk region is indicative of the situation in West Siberia, 
which is where 62% of oil and 89% of natural gas was produced in 2013 (EIA, 2014): 
The activities of the oil sector have consequently resulted in significant direct 
environmental impacts and a number of direct and indirect socio-economic 
impacts in the Nizhnevartovsk region. It can be concluded, with caution, that 
particularly environmental impacts to soil, surface water, groundwater, and 
te1Testrial biology have similar impacts in a wider area of in West Siberia, 
resulting in widespread but unquantified oil and chemical polluted soils, 
groundwater and surface water that among others, contaminates drinking water, 
inducing human health risks and affects fish. Oil spills have caused some of the 
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most significant, widespread negative impacts to the environment in West Siberia 
and affected all environmental media. Both past and new spills continue to have 
a major impact the present environment. The industry has also had widespread 
indirect effects on local ecosystems and native cultures. The sector's most notable 
positive impacts have been socio-economic, including employment and 
infrastructure development in urban areas in the main oil fields (IW A CO, 2001). 
To give this excerpt a quantitative perspective, here are some numerically expressed findings 
from the Iwaco report: 
Between at least 700,000 to 840,000 hectares of polluted soil in West Siberia and 
around 2% of land in the oil fields in the Nizhnevartovsk Region are polluted by 
oil 
Surface water pollution in West Siberia, particularly in water bodies around oil 
fields, and especially older fields in the Nizhnevartovsk Region . . . reaching 
between 5 to 50 times the Russian PDK norm 
97% of drinking water extracted from the River Vakh over a five-year period was 
polluted with oil exceeding the PDK norm. 
Over 50% of fished rivers in the region is contaminated with oil products, 
resulting in reduced health, breeding ability, changed spawning behaviour and 
possibly linked to declining fish catches (Id.). 
According to Greenpeace's ongoing monitoring of oil and gas activities in the Russian Arctic 
and Subarctic, the situation remains largely the same. The organization estimates that over 
10,000 oil spills occur in Russian fields each year, totalling 5 million tonnes (Greenpeace, 
2016). This figure is six times the amount of oil spilled into the Gulf of Mexico due to the BP 
Deepwater Horizon accident (Id). Greenpeace also estimates that least 10% of this oil ends 
up in the Arctic Ocean (Id). 
Although the Russian leadership may object to some of these numbers, it does not deny the 
gravity of what it frequently refers as the 'accumulated environmental damage' and its 
primary sources - the oil and gas sector (President, 9 June 2011 ). Yet its initiatives to address 
these problems have been mainly limited to the 'deep cleaning' (generalnaya uborka) of 
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Russia's Arctic islands (President, 27 May 2010). Despite its promising title, the 'deep 
cleaning' resembled removal of old fuel oil barrels left from Soviet times (President, 30 July 
2012). In comparison to the more pressing problems mentioned above, it amounted to the 
removal of an obvious eyesore rather than a serious solution to an environmental problem 
(President, 25 September 2013). 
7.3.3. Temporal allocation of risks and benefits 
Not all risks associated with oil and gas exploration and extraction are bound to the locales 
there the development occurs. Although it is widely believed that climate change will affect 
people differently based on their location and socioeconomic status (Global Humanitarian 
Forum, 2009), the cumulative and systemic negative impact has the potential to cause global 
'ruin' (Taleb, et al., 2014). 
Judging solely by the Russian Federation's official actions in response to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change, the Russian leadership recognized the gravity 
of the global threat posed by climate change. Russia ratified the Kyoto Protocol on 18 
November 2004 (UNFCCC, 2006). Russia made a commitment to reducing its emissions by 
15-25% from 1990 by 2020, subject to '[a]pproprate accounting of the potential of Russia's 
forestry in frame of contribution in meeting the obligations of the anthropogenic emissions 
reduction' (Frolov, 2010). 
Although Russia did not adopt a national climate change statute, it nonetheless took several 
legislative and regulatory steps to further UN Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) and the Kyoto protocol domestically. The President approved the 'Climate 
Doctrine of the Russian Federation' (the 'Climate Doctrine') in 2009 (Directive N861-rp, 
2009) and the RF Government approved the 'Plan oflmplementation of the Climate Doctrine 
of the Russian Federation' (the 'Climate Plan') in 2011 (Directive N730-r, 2011). RF 
Government Directive No. 278 and the Order of the Russian Meteorological Service No. 141 
established the national GHG inventory, pursuant to Article 12(1)(a) of the UNFCCC and a 
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7(4) of the Kyoto Protocol (Directive N278-r, 2006) (Order Nl41 , 2006) (Climate Change, 
2016). 
President Medvedev even acknowledged its contribution to global climate change as a major 
fossil fuel producer and recognized the importance of making corresponding changes to its 
energy system: 
According to experts, Russia currently produces 10% of the world's primary 
energy. Our energy sector remains not only the source of the benefits that we 
receive but also the source of pollution and greenhouse gas emissions. This 
unquestionably, leads to the necessity of coordination of energy development and 
problems associated with climate change, which is one of the issues that we are 
currently working on (President, 14 December 2009). 
The ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, the adoption the administrative regulations in its 
furtherance, and even the ostensibly ambitious 15-25% reduction goal did not mean that the 
Russian Federation would have to actually cut its current emissions let alone change its 
energy system. Russia entered into the Kyoto Protocol with a great deal of spare capacity, 
referred to as 'hot air', which is the difference between the baseline from which it was 
supposed to reduce its carbon emissions (1990) and the actual emissions (Nielson, 2009). In 
2008, the peak year of Russia's economic growth, Russia's emissions were 33.4% below the 
1990 baseline (Russian Federation, 2006) (Minprirody, 2010). In 2009, the emissions fell to 
about 35.6% of the 1990 level (Id.). Several modelling studies conducted around that time 
concluded that Russia's emissions would remain in the 20-25% range under the 1990 baseline 
without any significant changes and cost to the Russian economy (N ovikova, et al. , 2009). 
Unsurprisingly, no actual changes were made to the oil and gas exploration and extraction 
policies (Sidortsov, 2012). 
It is doubtful that the Russian leadership ever intended to take any meaningful action on 
climate change. Russia entered the Kyoto Protocol in exchange for the EU's promise not to 
object to Russia's application for membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
(ICTSD, 2004). However, Russia's ratification of the Kyoto Protocol allowed it to reach the 
requisite number of signatories (55) and percentage of global emissions (55%), which in tum 
effectively put the Protocol into full effect (Paton Walsh, 2004). 
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Russia became part of the global climate change regime not to prevent and mitigate the risks 
associated with it, but to reap the accidental economic benefits. Although President 
Medvedev mentioned the 'difficult obligations' that came with ratifying the Kyoto Protocol 
and the Russian leadership's awareness of the dangers posed by climate change, he did not 
hide economic benefits as the main reason behind joining Kyoto: 
We definitely need to utilize mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol. . . . They 
come with significant funds. But the Kyoto Protocol is nearing its end. I must be 
honest with you, judging by the way the negotiations are proceeding in G8 and 
G20 countries, I am not sure if the majority of states will come to agreement [to 
extend the Protocol]. We will then either get nothing or we will be left with what 
we have right now, which is not a lot (President, 9 June 2011). 
It is often difficult to compare a specific actor's palpable benefits with uncertain, complex, 
and ambiguous risks shifted to society as a whole. In this case, such benefits can be 
understood through what I call the 'risk-benefit flip', i.e. when a benefit of an activity is 
'flipped' into the risk of not receiving the benefit (if, for example, the activity is delayed). 
President Medvedev's remarks reveal that he is concerned with the risk of not acting fast 
enough on the Kyoto Protocol mechanisms that come with 'significant funds'. 
Examining the history of the Russian oil and gas sector through the risk-benefit flip also 
reveals why only a few projects under the Kyoto Protocol were implemented in Russia. The 
tens of millions of dollars that they brought in were dwarfed by the tens of billions of dollars 
that were made in the oil and gas sector. Rosneft', for example went from a minor player in 
2000 to the largest publicly traded oil producer in 2013 (Rapoza, 2013). As I noted earlier in 
this chapter, the Russian oil and gas sector has seen one of the greatest distributions and 
redistributions of assets in history. The failure to recognize the risk of a fast disappearing 
opportunity to acquire a multi-billion dollar oil and gas asset dwarfed the risk of missing an 
opportunity to capitalize on a multi-million dollar Kyoto project (President, 9 June 2011). 
A Russian law professor and permanent member Gazprom's internal arbitration body made 
the following statement at a meeting of the U.S.-Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission's 
Energy Scholarship Working Group: 'Don't get me wrong, I love the environment and nature 
very much. However, we should not say "no" to the great certain benefits that the oil and gas 
industry creates just because of a distant possibility of uncertain climate change risks' 
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(Lakhno, 2012). This remark provides insight on several points made in this chapter, 
including on why Kyoto Protocol never had a chance in Russia - a bird in hand that can 
disappear at any time is worth more than two in the bush, even though ignoring the two will 
probably destroy everything around them. 
7.4. Conclusion 
The Russian policy, legal, and regulatory regime currently lacks real capacity for timely, 
inclusive, and comprehensive risk governance of oil and gas activities. The mechanisms that 
distribute access to subsoil resources have been stripped of checks and balances. Meanwhile, 
continuous legislative rebracketing further increased concentration of the benefits of oil and 
gas production into the hands of the country's government and business elites. Environmental 
and technical standardization legislation has suffered from rebracketing aimed at prioritizing 
mineral resource extraction. The result of these legislative and regulatory initiatives is a de 
facto merger of the direct beneficiaries and gatekeepers of the Oil Standard. A few positive 
signs include the Russian leadership's respect for the legitimacy that the formal bracketing 
brings, an attempt to bring some life to the otherwise toothless system of environmental 
protection, and an attempt to increase transparency and public participation in law- and 
administrative rule-making. The practical effect of these attempts remains to be seen but the 
outlook does not provide many reasons for optimism. The benefits of oil and gas extraction 
are personalized, imminent, and generally concentrated where their recipients reside. The 
risks, in contrast, are largely shifted away from the recipients both spatially and temporally 
creating little incentive for developing a capacity for timely, inclusive, and comprehensive 
risk governance of oil and gas activities in the Russian Arctic and Subarctic. 
In this chapter, I added two factors impacting the power relations that shape risk governance 
of oil and gas activities in the Russian oil and gas sector, the capacity of risk governance 
structures and actors, and allocation of risks and benefits. Correspondingly I added two 
remaining elements to the Risk Governance Power Framework. The completed analytical 
framework serves as the biggest contribution of this study to the risk governance literature. 
En route to developing the Risk Governance Power Framework, I made additional 
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contributions to this body ofliterature. Namely, I identified regulatory mechanisms, such as 
mineral resource tenders, that normally are not associated with dealing with risks that have a 
potential to play an important role in the governance of oil and gas activities. I also reviewed 
the process of re bracketing of sovereign structures involved in the risk governance process, 
therefore providing a methodology for forecasting changes in risk governance's 
organizational and institutional capacity. These two contributions advanced the development 
of applied risk governance away from a narrow view of the legal and regulatory mechanisms 
involved in the process toward a more holistic and encompassing view. The rest of my 
findings in this chapter contributed to literatures on the oil and gas and environmental 
policies. In particular, I identified a legislative pathway to the current model governance and 
argued about the importance of the legislative process for strengthening the Kremlin's grip 
on distribution of wealth in Russia. I also argued that despite overwhelming and often 
unchecked presidential power in Russia, structural barriers and opportunities are critical for 
advancing presidential initiatives and policies. In addition, I noted the state of Russia's 
preparedness for offshore oil and gas development in the Arctic, and the country's timid 
attempts to halt the trend of weakening environmental protection. Finally, I provided further 
support to Dawisha' s (2015) argument about personal benefits sought by public officials as 
the key consideration in energy policy-making in Russia. I strengthened this argument by 
utilizing Taleb's (2014) insight and demonstrating that acquisition of such benefits is rarely 
accompanied by assumption of risks. 
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8. Concluding Remarks 
8.1. Research question revisited 
In this study, I aimed to answer the following research question: 'In what ways and to what 
extent is risk governance of oil and gas activities in the Arctic and Subarctic region mandated 
and/or allowed by the Russian policy, legal, and regulatory regime?' In order to answer this 
question, I viewed risk governance as an approach and an observation (van Asselt & Renn, 
2011, p. 435). I utilized the risk governance approach to identify the scope of the empirical 
field and categorize the relevant processes and structures. I also utilized the texts of official 
policy statements, laws, and regulations, as well as official government and policy discourse 
data, to observe how risks posed by oil and gas activities in the Arctic and Subarctic are 
governed in Russia. The most interesting part of my investigation was companng my 
observations to the theoretical model I used as the approach. 
Therefore, my answer to the research question is two-fold. First, I have observed that risk 
governance as described in the IRGC framework (2008a) is mandated under the 
programmatic policy statements, statutes, and administrative regulations listed in Chapter 4. 
The federal agencies responsible for implementing the programmatic policy statements are 
mandated to take into account risks posed by oil and gas development in the Arctic and 
Subarctic. The practical effect of these requirements is uncertain, as I was unable to find 
sufficient evidence of their implementation. Risk governance of oil and gas activities under 
'On Environmental Review' is limited to projects located offshore and in highly protected 
areas, as well as to development occurring under PSAs (Law NI 75-FZ, 1995, art. 11). 'On 
Environmental Protection' offers little in addition (to 'On Environmental Review'), although 
recent changes in Russia's environmental legislation are likely to bring oil and gas 
exploration, development, and extraction back into the purview of 'On Environmental 
Review'. On the resource acquisition side, the risk governance mechanisms provided by 'On 
Subsoil Resources' (Law N2395-I, 1992) have all but vanished due to a series of legislative 
amendments since Vladimir Putin's accent to the presidency. Mandatory risk governance in 
the form of technical standardization has been hampered by the slow implementation of 'On 
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Technical Regulating' (Law N184-FZ, 2002) and the almost complete absence of technical 
regulations that should set acceptable and tolerable risk limits for oil and gas activities. 
Second, other than requirements to conduct prospecting, exploration, and development under 
licences issued by Rosnedra, the Russian policy, legal, and regulatory regime does not 
impose any formal restrictions on risk governance of oil and gas activities. However, because 
of the de facto merger of the direct beneficiaries and gatekeepers of the Russian oil and gas 
sector and astronomical financial benefits that the sector creates, risk governance of oil and 
gas activities in the Arctic and Subarctic is allowed to the extent that it does not threaten these 
activities. In addition, because all major decisions regarding oil and gas development in the 
region are either made in or approved by the Kremlin, risk governance is allowed to the extent 
that it does not contradict such decisions. This elevates the Kremlin to the position of ultimate 
arbiter on threshold decisions regarding risk in the oil and gas sector and establishes the 
Russian President as the country's Risk-Governor-in-Chief. 
8.2. Literature contributions 
The results of my analysis reveal that the current risk governance literature pays insufficient 
attention to power relations, even though such relations are in large part responsible for the 
outcome of the risk governance process. Conceptualizing risk analysis as generation of 
knowledge about risk, and following Foucault's (1994, p. 32) insight on inseparability of 
power and knowledge, allows one to deduce this shortcoming. My inductive analysis of the 
empirical data in this study not only confirmed this theoretical insight but also highlighted 
the need for filling this scholarship gap. Unfortunately, the literature on the social concept of 
power does little to compensate for this gap. Risk, let alone risk governance, of a particular 
sector has not been a feature of any research endeavours known to me. 
The socio-legal aspect of risk governance represents another significant gap in this body of 
literature. More specifically, this gap exists between the aforementioned 'grand narratives' 
of risk, which are epitomised by the work of Beck and rules and regulations that usually 
govern the risk analysis, risk management, and risk communication. This means that with the 
exception of a few chapters in the volume edited by Lindoe, Baram, and Renn (2014) and in 
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Aven and Renn's (2012) article, policy, legal, and regulatory mechanisms akin to 
environmental assessment, ethnological review, oil and gas license tenders, and production-
sharing agreements remain largely disconnected from risk governance literature. 
The quest for a universal theory of risk on one hand and the pursuit of regulatory solutions 
to technical risk analysis and risk management on the other shifted attention from an 
important factor in risk governance analysis - sectorial characteristics of a hazardous activity. 
As I showed above, not all risks are alike. Correspondingly, the technological, socio-
economic, and political settings in which risks arise differ. My focus on the oil and gas sector 
allowed me to recognize this shortcoming and make sectorial characteristics the centrepiece 
of the Risk Governance Power Framework. 
Although there is a sizable body of academic and analytical literature featuring the Russian 
oil and gas sector and providing great insights on the industry, such literature generally lacks 
theoretical orientation. Another shortcoming of this literature is the underdeveloped 
comprehensive and holistic view of the Russian oil and gas sector featuring its technological, 
socioeconomic, and political dimensions. With the exception of the Nazarova's (2016) study, 
the concept of risk in the context of the Russian oil and gas sector remains unexplored. This 
concept is also yet to be explored in both Russian- and English-language literatures regarding 
contemporary Russian law and public policy. The energy and environmental law-themed part 
of this body of literature generally leans toward either technical legal analysis or the 
development of legal theory, thereby showing little connection to the social theory and the 
concept of power in particular. 
The last decade has seen a surge in the literature on the Arctic region, including literature 
regarding oil and gas development. However, except for the aforementioned scholarly works, 
the discussion of risk in the Arctic has focused on the descriptive side of risks arising in the 
context of industrial activities in the region and with little effort to enrich the risk and risk 
governance theory. As I determined in this study, similar to sectorial particularities, regional 
characteristics provide insights capable of contributing to better conceptual understanding of 
risk and risk governance. 
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Therefore, this study presented an opportunity to not only answer a research question with 
significant public policy implications, but it is also allowed me to contribute to several bodies 
of literature. Although the overall objective of Chapter 2 was to provide a multidimensional 
background on the Russian oil and gas sector, and more specifically set the stage for the 
network power analysis in Chapter 6, I also contributed to academic and analytical literature 
on the Russian oil and gas sector. In particular, I concluded that the Petrostate is not only a 
state of a national economy captured in statistical averages, it is also a state of mind of its 
citizenry, those lives directly involved in and impacted by the economy. Therefore, 
accounting for the interlocked physical and technological, political and geopolitical, social 
and economic dimensions of the Russian oil and gas sector will likely lead to a more accurate 
analysis of the Russian energy policy. 
Similarly to Chapter 2, the main purpose of Chapter of 3 was to provide the necessary 
background for the ensuing analysis. As I went through the risk and risk governance 
inventory of theoretical tools, I made the following observations and suggestions. First, I 
bolstered Horlick-Jones and Sime's (2004) argument regarding the importance of a 
contextual approach to studying risk governance. Second, I identified three reasons for the 
prevalence of systemic risks in the energy sector: the prerequisite nature of energy as a good, 
uneven geographic distribution of primary energy producers and consumers, and high 
concentration and centralization of modem energy systems. Third, I incorporated Walsh's 
concept of political certainty in collective decision-making to the risk governance phases 
under the IRGC framework. Fourth, I conceptualized risk governance process as generation 
of knowledge about risk. 
In Chapter 4, my overarching objective was to ground the theoretical observations from 
Chapter 3 in the data that I collected throughout the study. I advanced the research agenda 
set in the early stages of this study (Sidortsov, 2014) and identified the scope of the applicable 
Russian policy, legal, and regulatory regime. More specifically, I made the following 
contributions to governance and risk governance literatures. First, I concluded that the 
analysis of governance in the oil and gas sector must include the analysis of the role that the 
government plays in the process, in the context of the given national jurisdiction. Second, I 
concluded that ex-ante decisions regarding threshold matters, such as allocation of rights to 
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develop oil and gas deposits, are best analysed through the lenses of the risk pre-assessment 
(PA) and risk characterisation and evaluation (C&E) phases of the IRGC framework. Third, 
I strengthened Klinke and Renn's (2012) argument regarding the critical importance of 
organizational and institutional capacity in risk governance. In addition, I made the following 
contributions to literature on the Russian oil and gas sector. First, I determined the dominant 
approach - prescriptive - to handling risk in this sector of the Russian economy. Second, I 
provided a description of the Russian legal system through the lenses of risk and risk 
governance. 
In Chapter 5, I turned to two regulatory risk governance mechanisms identified in the 
previous chapter, environmental assessment (EA) and ethnological review (ER), and the 
notion of risk governance as knowledge generation. I analysed it through the lenses of the 
power/knowledge interrelation. This analysis led me to an in-depth discussion of the social 
power concept in the context of oil and gas governance under the Russian policy, legal, and 
regulatory regime, which in tum enabled me to contribute to the development of the risk 
governance theory as follows. First, I offered a simple yet fundamental approach to studying 
risk governance - through the lenses of the concept of social power. Second, I suggested that 
risk governance of oil and gas activities can be understood as an adversarial process with a 
proponent of the activity advancing individual interest and the government protecting public 
interest involved in a power-resistance ( counter power) relationship. Third, I concluded that 
this process has two stages: first, the creation of a structure, a legislative or regulatory 
framework, and second, implementation within the structural bounds of the existing 
framework. Fourth, the government's power in the risk government process originates from 
sovereignty, whereas the power of a proponent of a potentially hazardous activity arises in 
sociability. My scholarly contributions in this chapter were not limited to risk governance 
literature. I showed the explanatory capacity of the social power concept in relation to risk, 
and thus further supported Russel's (1937) argument about the nature of the power concept, 
which is fundamental to social sciences. In addition, I contributed to socio-legal literature by 
building on Blomley's (2014) (2015) concept of rebracketing and conceptualizing law as 
overlapping sovereign power structures delimited by legal brackets. 
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The groundwork laid in Chapters 2 through 5 provided a solid foundation for the most 
significant scholarly contribution of this study - the Risk Governance Power Framework 
(RGPF). This foundation enabled me to make the following contributions to risk governance 
literature in Chapter 6. First, I showed that understanding the social power setting of a 
hazardous activity can be instrumental for governing risks associated with it. Second, 
sovereign power structures and actors may negatively impact the risk governance process by 
propping up the benefits of the activity in the official policy discourse and by providing 
subsidies. This foundation also enabled me to contribute to the development of the network 
theory as I offered an alternative to Grewal' s narrow view of a network power standard. I 
also contributed to literature on heterodox theories of power by presenting a conceptual 
model of the oil and gas sector's network power, or as I termed it, the Oil Standard. In 
addition, I enriched scholarly and analytical literature on the Russian oil and gas sector by 
highlighting the role of official discourse regarding risk in policy-making and 
implementation. 
In the final Chapter of this thesis, I completed the RGPF development. I introduced two more 
elements - the capacity of risk governance structures and actors, and allocation of risks and 
benefits. En route to finalizing the RGPF, I made the following contributions to risk 
governance literature. First, I demonstrated that laws and regulations governing allocation of 
mineral resources can contain risk governance mechanisms. Second, I showed how law- and 
rule-making processes can be used to forecast the changes in organizational and institutional 
capacity to govern risks. I also made the following contributions to the literature on the 
Russian oil and gas and environmental policies. First, I tracked the legislative changes that 
lead to the current governance of the oil and gas sector. Second, I demonstrated the 
importance of legitimisation of the Kremlin's policies through duly enacted legislation. 
Third, I identified structural limits to a Russian President's power in relation to energy and 
environmental policy matters. Fourth, I provided evidence as to the Russian government's 
lack of readiness for offshore oil and gas development in the Arctic. Fifth, I analysed the 
forthcoming changes in the Russian environmental protection legislation, which may stop 
the current trend of diminishing environmental controls on mineral resource development. 
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8.3. Risk Governance Power Framework 
As I noted above, I consider the RGPF to be the most important contribution of this study. 
My analysis left little doubt that power relations play a critical role in the ways and extent to 
which risks are governed in the oil and gas sector. Yet the concept of social power is difficult 
to define let alone apply in a consistent and systemic manner. This observation served as the 
principal reason for development of a framework (RGPF) that would enable me to do so. As 
a preliminary matter, I concluded that an agnostic approach to theories of power provides the 
necessary breadth to the real-life problem of this study. In particular, I recognized the 
importance of two origins of power in the context of collective decision-making: sociability 
and sovereignty. In addition, I found that a theory of structuration in its simplest sense aids 
examining government and corporate actors attempting to govern risks posed by oil and gas 
activities. Accordingly, I contend that the following three factors are critical for 
understanding power relations in risk governance of oil and gas activities. 
The first factor is the strength of network power behind the hazardous activity. This strength 
is grounded in the following three origins of the oil and gas sector: (i) technological 
dependence on oil and gas as fuels and all equipment and facilities involved; (ii) economic 
and social dependence on oil and gas activities that overwhelm other sectors of a nation's 
economy; and (iii) political and geopolitical dependence premised on the leadership and 
citizenry's perception of common interest. I titled the network of the oil and gas sector the 
'Oil Standard' (OS), the strength of which increases if it receives preferential treatment from 
sovereign power structures, including financial subsidies. 
The second factor is the capacity of the sovereign power structures and agents responsible 
for governing risks related to the activity to counter-balance the OS. These actors and 
structures charged with representing public environmental, social, and economic interests 
employ sovereign power as demarcated by legal brackets. Therefore, the ability to respond 
to creation of new legal brackets and the agency allowed within the structure are both 
important for counter-balancing the power of the OS. This ability all but disappears when the 
same actors and structures become responsible for pursuing acquisition of benefits and 
providing necessary checks and balances on such activities. 
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The third factor is the spatial and temporal allocation of individual and public risks and 
benefits. Little incentive exists to develop a timely, inclusive, and comprehensive risk 
governance process if the benefits of oil and gas extraction are personalized, imminent, and 
generally concentrated where their recipients reside and risks are largely shifted away, both 
spatially and temporally, from the beneficiaries. Put another way, the beneficiaries reap all 
the benefits without having any 'skin in the game'. 
These three factors comprise RGPF's three elements. As Figure 25 below shows, the 
analytical framework can be applied sequentially, akin to the approach I took in this thesis. 
Correspondingly, the first step would be determining the network power of the hazardous 
activity at issue. In this study, I examined the oil and gas sector on a national scale. This, 
however, does not preclude scaling the analysis up or down depending on the research task. 
Because of the interconnectedness of the energy global energy system, it is important to 
factor in the place of the sector analysed within the more encompassing sector. For example, 
for an analysis of the oil and gas sector of a particular U.S. state, it is important to account 
for its relationship with the national and global oil and gas sectors. 
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The second step in the RGPF's application is determining the power of risk governance 
structures and agents to resist the network power behind the hazardous activity. This power 
can be undermined by sovereign support of the hazardous activity, the analysis of which I 
performed in Chapter 6. Although I analysed these structures and agents prior to those 
directly responsible for governing risk in the Russian oil and gas sector, it does not mean that 
the RGPF must be applied in the same sequence. 63 In the analysis of both structures and agent 
types it is important to take into account their capacity rebracket in response to the hazardous 
activity's network power. The capacity to rebracket should be analysed in terms of its 
resilience to the network power: to create additional safeguards with the increase of the 
network power and to resist rebracketing when there is pressure to modify or remove them. 
In this study, I showed that the increase of Russia's Oil Standard in the 2000s did not 
correspond with the adoption of additional sovereign controls. In fact, as I showed in Chapter 
7, several sovereign risk governance mechanisms under the environmental and mineral 
resource legislation were weakened as a result of pro-extraction policies from the Putin 
administration. This is not to say that the first and second steps in the RGPF analysis cannot 
be reversed. In fact, this would be a prudent move, if the research task were to evaluate the 
institutional and organizational capacity that is applied across several economic sectors. 
The third step is the comparative analysis of the network power behind the hazardous activity 
and the power of sovereign structures and agents involved in risk governance. This analysis 
aims to answer perhaps the most important question - whether comprehensive, timely, and 
inclusive risk governance, the results of which the society accepts, is possible under the 
current policy, legal, and regulatory regime. In this study, I found a perverse lack of balance 
as the Russian Oil Standard overwhelms the sovereign structures and agents that are supposed 
to counter it. However, the opposite scenario is conceivable. Risk governance structures and 
agents can become too restrictive and overpower initiatives premised on aggregation of 
individual choices, despite these choices being accepted by the society as a whole. 
A researcher concerned mainly with evaluating the capacity of risk governance to handle a 
hazardous activity can end the analysis with these three steps. However, an inquiry as to the 
63 As I mentioned above, the main reason for this sequence was to show the intertwined existence of sovereign-
and sociability-premised power forms. 
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reasons for the network power's strength behind the hazardous activity and capacity of the 
risk structures and agents to handle it would require an inquiry into the spatial and temporal 
allocation of individual and public risks and benefits. Such inquiry is particularly important 
for the rebracketing analysis, because it is likely to reveal incentives for keeping or changing 
the status quo. 
I used a sequential perforated arrow extending from the RGPF's second to its third element 
in the Figure 25 diagram to designate the fourth step as a discretionary one. I also used 
perforated arrows connecting the first and the third and the first and the second of RGPF's 
elements to indicate that the third element can be used for independent inquiries regarding 
the strength of the hazardous activity's network power or sovereign structures and agents' 
capacity for risk governance. 
The RGPF does not replace or amend the IRGC framework or IRGC-based frameworks akin 
to the one proposed by Klinke and Renn (2012). The RGPF complements and enhances these 
risk governance frameworks by providing a set of conceptual lenses for more insightful and 
in-depth analysis of the setting in which risk governance occurs. Although this study focused 
on risk PA and C&E, it does not mean that RGPF cannot be applied to other phases of risk 
governance. In fact, the entire risk governance process or individual phases, especially those 
laden with social context, can be analysed with the RGPF help (IRGC, 2005). For example, 
a RGPF analysis of risk management, a traditional risk analysis element, can reveal the extent 
to which the process is shaped by the industry's interests. 
In addition, the RGPF provides yet another argument m favour of the constructivist 
epistemology of risk because it asserts that people's approach to handling risk is not only a 
product of a subjective perception thereof, it is also a product of power relations. 
Accordingly, the RGPF further undermines the ostensibly objective probability and severity 
position of a risk realist by providing a comprehensive explanation of how both categories 
can change depending on the sector of a hazardous activity, the mechanism upon which it is 
evaluated, and the spatial and temporal allocation of potential adverse consequences. 
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Yet the RGPF's value does not end with theoretical contributions to theories ofrisk and risk 
governance. I believe that taking these encompassing and transcending characteristics of the 
oil and gas sector into account can contribute to comprehensive energy policy design in which 
technological, socioeconomic, and political considerations do not compete with but 
complement each other. In the context of the Arctic region, a RGPF-aided analysis can help 
explain the continuous push for oil and gas development and public acceptance of the 
development despite widely recognized risks and ostensibly strong institutions charged with 
representing the public interest. 
The RGPF can also find application in the industry. The aforementioned characteristics can 
serve as indicators for oil and gas companies to diversify their activities and prepare for the 
decline of the Oil Standard. The world has seen a few energy transitions (Sovacool, et.al, 
2013), thus there is little reason to believe that the Oil Standard will dominate the global 
energy system in perpetuity. Technological innovations alone cannot accurately predict an 
energy transition; after all, commercially scalable cost-competitive non-fossil fuel 
technologies already exist (NREL, 2012). When such energy technologies arrive at a visible 
scale and their arrival is combined with the shift in the perception of this technology's socio-
economic value and politicians sense this shift, the oil and gas industry as we know it is likely 
to experience a rapid contraction. Therefore, oil and gas companies need analytical tools like 
RGPF, to paraphrase Sir David King, in order to be. 
In this section, I have identified potential applications and uses of RGPF. Yet these 
applications and uses are largely hypotheses and therefore need to be tested and supported. 
The current Russian policy, legal, and regulatory regime, as well as its political landscape 
and data-rich policy discourse, provided fertile ground for the study. The non-Russia 
examples used in this study indicate that the RGPF is also transferrable to regimes where 
power over decisions involving risk is exercised in a seemingly more inclusive and subtle 
manner. More in-depth investigations are needed. Therefore, in future research, I plan to 
apply the RGPF to risk governance in connection with the following Arctic oil and gas 
projects: 
• The Goliat project in Norway; 
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• The First Nations opposition to oil sands development in the Canadian Subarctic; 
• Cairn Energy's unsuccessful campaign in the Greenlandic Arctic waters; and 
• The Chukchi Sea lease sale 193 and the impact of the U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals decision in Native Village of Point Hope v. Jewell. 
Following these investigations, I plan to expand the RGPF scope to other energy subsectors. 
I am particularly intrigued by the proliferation of distributed solar photovoltaics in the 
European Union and the United States. 
Whether I will expand application of the RGPF beyond the energy sector will depend on the 
results of these investigations. I feel inspired by what I have learned in the span of the last 
four years and by the foundation that this study created. Although my study is now complete, 
I feel I am just beginning my research. 
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Appendix II: Official transcripts 
No. Date Subject 
1. Address at the meeting of the State Council 
4 June 2003 regarding improvement of the environmental 
situation 
2. 
20 July 2005 
Meeting of the Council on the Development of 
Civil society and human rights 
3. 
7 April 2006 
Meeting with the President of Transneft' Semyon 
Vayshtock 
4. 17 October Meeting of the Presidential Council on Science, 
2006 Technology, and Education 
5. 
19 February 
Meeting of the State Council's Presidium on the 
2007 
support of industrial development in the Russian 
Federation 
6. 4 June2007 Meeting the members of the RF Government 
7. 16 January Meeting with the President of Lukoil Vagit 
2008 Alikperov 
8. 30 January Meeting of the Security Council on environmental 
2008 security. 
9. 14 February Annual press conference 
2008 
10. 
18 July 2008 
Working meeting with Deputy Prime Minister Igor 
Sechin 
11. 1 7 September Address at the Security Council, 'On the Protection 
2008 of Russia's National Interests in the Arctic' 
12. 14 December Meeting regarding issues related to the 
2009 development of the energy sector 
13. 20 April Press conference after Russian-Finish summit 
2009 
14. Address at a meeting of the Commission on 




















No. Date Subject Location 
15. 
22 June 2009 
Meeting of the Commission on Modernization and Sarov 
Technological Development of the Economy 
16. 
31 August 
Address at a meeting of the Commission on Pokrov 





Meeting of the interregional forum on cooperation Orenburg 
2009 
between the Russian Federation and Republic of 
Kazakhstan 
18. Joint meeting of the Commission on Modernization Moscow 
30 September and Technological Development of the Economy 
2009 and the Presidential Council on Science, 
Technology, and Education 
19. 
28 October 
Address at a meeting of the Commission on MoscowOblast 
2009 
Modernization and Technological Development of 
the Economy 
20. 25 November Meeting of the Commission on Modernization and Moscow 
2009 Technological Development of the Economy 
21. 14 December Meeting on the development of the energy sector Moscow Oblast 
2009 
22. 25 December Meeting of the Commission on Modernization and Moscow 
2009 Technological Development of the Economy 
23. 20 January Meeting of the Commission on Modernization and Lipetsk 
2010 Technological Development of the Economy 
24. 11 February Meeting of the Commission on Modernization and Tomsk 
2010 Technological Development of the Economy 
25. 23 March Meeting of the Commission on Modernization and Khanty-
2010 Technological Development of the Economy Mansiysk 
26. 29 April Meeting of the Commission on Modernization and Obninsk 
2010 Technological Development of the Economy 
27. 
13 May 2010 
Meeting of the Commission on Modernization and Moscow Oblast 
Technological Development of the Economy 
28. Meeting of the State Council' s Presidium on the Moscow 
27 May 2010 issues relating to improving state oversight of 
environmental protection 
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No. Date Subject Location 
29. 28 May 2010 Meeting with the core of the United Russia party Moscow Oblast 
30. 
19 June 2010 
Meeting of the Commission on Modernization and St. Petersburg 
Technological Development of the Economy 
31. 
27 July 2010 
Meeting of the Commission on Modernization and Moscow 
Technological Development of the Economy 
32. 31 August Meeting of the Commission on Modernization and Moscow 
2010 Technological Development of the Economy 
33. Meeting of the Commission on Modernization and Ramenskoe 
22 September Technological Development of the Economy on 
2010 the issue of innovations in the arms manufacturing 
sector 
34. 26 October Meeting of the Commission on Modernization and N aberezhnye 
2010 Technological Development of the Economy Chelny 
35. 
29 November 
Meeting of the Commission on Modernization and Moscow Oblast 
2010 
Technological Development of the Economy on 
the issue of legal regulation of innovations 
36. 13 December Meeting of the Security Council regarding the Moscow 
2010 status of energy security in Russia 
37. 14 December Meeting of the Commission on Modernization and Skolkovo 
2010 Technological Development of the Economy 
38. 31 January Meeting of the Commission on Modernization and Arzamas 
2011 Technological Development of the Economy 
39. 28 February Meeting of the Commission on Modernization and Moscow 
2011 Technological Development of the Economy 
40. 2 March Meeting with the Chairman of Total, Christopher Moscow Oblast 
2011 de Margerie 
41. 11 March Meeting of the Commission on Modernization and Magnitogorsk 
2001 Technological Development of the Economy 
42. 25 April 
Joint meeting of the Commission on Modernization Moscow 
and Technological Development of the Economy 
2011 
and Skolkovo foundation's advisory boards 
43 . 
24 May 2011 
Meeting of the Commission on Modernization and Moscow 
Technological Development of the Economy 
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No. Date Subject Location 
44. 8 June 2011 Meeting with environmental NGO representatives Moscow 
45. 
9 June 2011 
Meeting of the State Council on environmental Dzherzhinsk 
security matters 
46. 
27 June 2011 
Meeting of the Commission on Modernization and Moscow Oblast 
Technological Development of the Economy 
47. 26 September Meeting of the Commission on Modernization and Dimitrovgrad 
2011 Technological Development of the Economy 
48. 26 November Meeting of the Commission on Modernization and Moscow 
2011 Technological Development of the Economy 
49. 24 January Meeting of the Commission on Modernization and Moscow Oblast 
2012 Technological Development of the Economy 
50. 21 March Meeting of the Commission on Modernization and Vladimir Oblast 
2012 Technological Development of the Economy 
51. 21 June 2012 Meeting with heads of energy companies St. Petersburg 
52. Meeting of the Commission on the Development of Moscow 
10 July 2012 the Fuel and Energy Sector and Environmental 
Security 
53 . 
30 July 2012 
Meeting with members of environmental Archangelsk 
expedition to the Land of Franz-Joseph 
54. 15 October Meeting regarding development of administration Moscow Oblast 
2012 of the transmission and distribution sector 




Meeting of the Commission on the Development of Moscow Oblast 
2012 
the Fuel and Energy Sector and Environmental 
Security 




Meeting of the Commission on the Development of Moscow Oblast 
2013 
the Fuel and Energy Sector and Environmental 
Security 
59. 10 April Meeting on government support of industrial waste Moscow Oblast 
2013 disposal activities 
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No. Date Subject Location 
60. 22 April Meeting on economic matters Sochi 
2013 
61. 
16 July 2013 




Meeting of the Commission on the Development of Kemerovo 
2013 
the Fuel and Energy Sector and Environmental 
Security 
63. 6 September Vladimir Putin post-G20 meeting press conference St. Petersburg 
2013 
64. 25 September Address at the international Arctic forum, 'The Salekhard 
2013 Arctic: Territory of Dialogue' 
65. 26 September Meeting regarding implementation of the Yamal Salekhard 
2013 LNG project and construction of the Sabeta seaport 
66. 10 October Meeting with the President of Lukoil Vagit Moscow Oblast 
2013 Alikperov 
67. 19 December Vladimir Putin's press conference Moscow 
2013 
68. 9 January Working meeting with the Minister of Energy Moscow Oblast 
2014 Alexander Novak 
69. 
4 April 2014 
Meeting with the Minister of Natural Resources Moscow Oblast 
and the Environment Sergey Donskoy 
70. 18 April Video conference with the Prirazlomnaya platform Moscow Oblast 
2014 
71. 18 April Meeting with the head of Shell Ben van Beurden Moscow Oblast 
2014 
72. 22 April Meeting of the Security Council regarding on the Moscow 
2014 government's policy in the Arctic 
73. 
5 May 2014 
Working meeting with the governor of Murmansk Moscow 
Oblast Marina Kovtyn 
74. 
23 May 2014 
Meeting with the participants of the World St. Petersburg 
Business Leaders Summit 
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No. Date Subject Location 
75. Remarks at the St. Petersburg Economic Forums' St. Petersburg 
24 May 2014 session 'Oil and Gas Companies as the "Engine of 
Changes" in the World Economy"' 
76. 24May Meeting with heads of global news outlets St. Petersburg 
2014a 
77. Meeting of the Commission on the Development of Astrakhan 
4 June 2014 the Fuel and Energy Sector and Environmental 
Security 
78. 
5 June 2014 
Meeting on matters relating to effective and safe St. Petersburg 
development of the Arctic 
79. 
16 June 2014 
Address to the participants of the World Oil Moscow 
Congress 
80. 
20 June 2014 
Working meeting with the Governor ofKhanty- Moscow 
Mansi Autonomous District, Natalya Komarova 
81. 27 June 2014 Video conference with Berkut drilling platform Moscow 
82. 9 August Video conference with the West Alpha platform in Sochi 
2014 the Kara Sea 
83. 29 August Meeting at the national youth forum 'Seliger' Tverskaya 
2014 Oblast 
84. 1 September Meeting with the students and faculty of the Yakutsk 
2014 Northeastem Federal University 
85. 
4 September 
Video conference with Igor Sechin regarding Gomo-Altaysk 
2014 
commencing production at the Northern Chaivo 
field 
86. 1 7 September Meeting with the Chairman of Gazprom's Board of Moscow 
2014 Directors, Alexei Miller 
87. 19 September Meeting with young nuclear scientists Sarov 
2014 
88. 27 September Greeting to participants in the Tiger Day Unknown 
2014 celebration 
89. 23 September Interview with Around the World magazine Unknown 
2014 
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No. Date Subject Location 
90. 1 October Security Council meeting Moscow 
2014 
91. 2 October Address at the investment forum, 'Russia is Moscow 
2014 Calling!' 
92. 3 October Meeting with members of the RF Government Moscow Oblast 
2014 
93. 13 October Meeting with members of the RF Government Moscow Oblast 
94. 14 October Meeting of the Council on the Development of Moscow 
2014 Civil Society and Human Rights 
95. 24 October Meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Sochi 
2014 Club 
96. 31 October Meeting with the Chairman of N ovatek's Board of Moscow 
2014 Directors, Leonid Mikhelson 
97. 6 November Interview with leading Chinese news outlets Unknown 
2014 
98. 7 November Address at the 15th Meeting of the Russian Moscow 
2014 Geographic Society 
99. 18 November Address at a gathering of the All-Russia People's Moscow 
2014 Front 
100. 28 November Meeting with CEO of Total, Patrick Pouyanne Sochi 
2014 
101. 4 December Address to the Federation Council Moscow 
2014 
102. 2 February Meeting with Lukoil 's President Vagit Alikperov Moscow Oblast 
2015 
103. 2 March Working meeting with the Minister of Energy, Moscow Oblast 
2015 Alexander Novak 
104. 
8 April 2015 
Press conference after meeting with Greek Prime Moscow 
Minister Alexis Cypras 
105. 
8 April 2015 
Meeting with the head of Gazprom's Board of Moscow 
Directors Alexey Miller 
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Appendix III: Codes and code groups used m the analysis of official 
transcripts 
Code Group Codes 
Activity Background, Russian Oil and Gas 
Benefits Known Before Risks 
Dependence, Crisis (historic path, rationalization) 
Dependence, Modernization 
Financial Incentives 
Actors & Structures Acquisition of Benefits, Law 
Acquisition of Benefits, Rebracketing 
Background, Russian Industry 
Checks and Balances, Law, Environmental and Ethnological 
Assessment 
Checks and Balances, Law, Rebracketing 
Culture, Petrostate Merger and Komandy (Teams) 
Effect, Individual Benefits 
Effect, Weak Analysis of Risks 
Allocation Background, Russian Oil Legacy Fast and Reckless Development 
Spatial, Resignation Effect 
Spatial, More Power and Less Control 
Spatial, Verticalization of Power Centralization of Wealth 
Temporal, Disappearing Benefits 
Temporal, Uncertain Climate Risks 
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Appendix IV: Interviews and notes from fieldwork 
Semi-structured interviews 
No. Interviewee Date Subject Location 
1. Classmate, Russian 17 June 2015 Petrochemical refinery in via Skype from 





2. Family Member 15 September Response to the U.S. and via phone from 




3. Former Russian 20 January Access to Russian oil and gas via Skype from 





4. Former Russian 28 February Handling of risk in Russian Moscow, 
IOC Lawyer 2014 energy companies, corporate Russia 
culture of Russian energy 
compames 
5. Former Russian 8 August Government support of via Skype from 
IOC Lawyer 2014 Russian oil and gas Moscow, 
companies under goal- Russia and 
oriented programs Cambridge, 
United 
Kingdom 
6. Norwegian Oil and 21 March Operational aspects of risk B0d0, Norway 
Gas Trade 2013 management of oil and gas 
Association activities on the Russian 
Representatives sector of the Barents Sea 
7. Russia Director, 20 January Licensing, permitting, and Troms0, 
Consulting 2014 taxation of oil and gas Norway 
Company activities in Russia 
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No. Interviewee Date Subject Location 
8. Russian Energy 26 March Gazprom's corporate London 
Analyst 2013 structure 
9. Russian Lawyer, 28 February Novatek and LNG export Moscow, 
Foreign Company 2014 amendments Russia 
10. Senior Manager, 17 September Gazprom's and Rosneft's risk Oslo, Norway 
Consulting 2013 analysis practices 
Company 
11. Senior Manager, 24 January Evolution of risk in the Troms0, 
HSE Russia 2014a Russian legal and regulatory Norway 
framework 
12. Senior Manager, 29 January Risk management in Russian via Skype 
HSE Russia 2014 and Norwegian energy and Troms0, 
transportation companies Norway and 
operating in the Arctic Cambridge, 
United 
Kingdom 
13. Senior Manager, 21 March Risk regulatory models Bod0, Norway 
IOC 2013 employed by oil supermajors 
14. Senior Manager, 27 February Company's risk practices, Moscow, 
Russian NOC 2014 licensing, government Russia 
relations, and regulatory 
response to the Prirazlomnoe 
protest by Greenpeace 
15. Stammler, F. 22 October Russian oil and gas Cambridge, 
(anthropologist) 2014 companies' relationships with United 
indigenous communities Kingdom 
Power of Siberia and ESPO 
16. Stammler, F. 18 February Russian oil and gas Cambridge, 
(anthropologist) 2015 companies' practices during United 
environmental assessment Kingdom 
and ethnographic review in 
Y amal and Sakha 
17. Stammler, F. 12 February Power of Siberia's impact on Cambridge, 
(anthropologist), & 2016a local communities in Sakha, United 
lvanova, A. Yakutia Kingdom 
(Russian lawyer 
and legal scholar) 
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No. Interviewee Date Subject Location 
18. Rouillard, R. 10 December Environmental situation in Cambridge, 
(anthropologist) 2014 the Komi Republic. United 
Environmental assessment of Kingdom 
oil and gas projects in Nenets 
Autonomous District. 
19. Novikova, N. 25 February Russian oil and gas Moscow, 
( anthropologist) 2014 companies' practices during Russia 
environmental assessment 
and ethnographic review in 
Y amal and Sakhalin 
20. Russian 25 February Oil and gas sector's influence Moscow, 
Environmental and 2014 over environmental and Russia 
Indigenous Rights indigenous rights legislation 
Lawyer 
Changes in the legislation on 
the territories of traditional 
subsistence 
21. U.S. Oil and Gas 20 November Transparency in Russian oil via phone from 





22. Employee of the 22 January The Prirazlomnaya protest by Troms0, 
Russian 2014 Greenpeace Norway 
Geographic Society 
23. Program Director at 26 September Oil spill risks in the Russian via Skype from 





environmental NGOs and 
Cambridge, 
NGO 
Russian government officials 
United 
Kingdom 
24. Business 24 April Oil and gas industry via Skype from 
Journalists from 2014 cooperation after the first Murmansk, 
Murmansk round of the E.U. and U.S. Russia and 
economic sanctions Cambridge, 
Subsidies from the national 
United 
government for the 
Kingdom 
infrastructure supporting the 
Prirazlomnoe project 
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No. Interviewee Date Subject Location 
25. Business 17 March The state of the oil and gas Bod0, Norway 
J oumalists from 2015 industry in Murmansk six 
Murmansk months after the E.U. and 
U.S . economic sanctions 





27. Environmental 19 September Environmental data about the Oslo, Norway 
Specialist at a 2013 Arctic and Subarctic 
Norwegian accumulated in Russia 
Consulting 
Company 
28. Engineer, 22 January Public perception of oil spills Troms0, 
Norwegian 2014 in the Arctic and the Norway 
Consulting Prirazlomnaya protest by 
Company Greenpeace. Prirazlomnaya 
design and oil spill 
preparedness 
29. Aide to a 22 January Perception of the Troms0, 
Murmansk Oblast 2014 Prirazlomnaya protest by Norway 
legislator Greenpeace in Murmansk. 
Russian government's 
support of Arctic research 
Notable observations from fieldwork 
No. Interviewee Date Subject Location 
1. Vasiliev, A. R., 20 January Remarks from the Arctic Troms0, 
Russia's Ambassador 2014 Frontiers conference Norway 
at Large and 
Representative to the 
Arctic Council 
2. Lakhno, P. , energy 24 October Remarks at the meeting of the Moscow, 
law professor at 2012 U.S.-Russia Bilateral Russia 
Moscow State Presidential Commission's 
University Energy Scholarship Working 
Group in Moscow 
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No. Interviewee Date Subject Location 
3. Participants at the 17-19 Remarks and comments made Oslo, Norway 
Oslo Industry Event September during group projects 
2013 
4. Masvie, N.A. DNV 19 March Address at the Arctic Bod0, Norway 
GL 2013 Dialogue conference 
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Appendix VI: Definitions of risk (EPA, 2016) 
No. Source (EPA Definition 
Vocabulary) 
1. Environmental 'A measure of the probability that damage to life, health, property, 
Monitoring and and/or the environment will occur as a result of a given hazard' 
Assessment Program (EPA 1992, 25). In statistics, ' the expected loss due to the use of a 
Master Glossary given decision procedure'. (QAMS 1993, 20). 
2. Environmental A chance of loss with respect to person, liability, or the property of 
Insurance & Risk the insured. 
Mgmt Tools Glossary 
3. Pesticides Glossary A measure of the chance that damage to life, health, property, or the 
environment will occur. 
4 . Terms of Environment A measure of the probability that damage to life, health, property, 
and/or the environment will occur as a result of a given hazard. 
5. Safety, Health, and Combination of the likelihood of an occurrence of a hazardous 
Environmental event or exposure(s) and the severity of injury or ill health that can 
Management Systems be caused by the event or exposure(s). 
Terms and Definitions 
6. Community-Based Air In the context of human health, the probability of injury, disease, or 
Pollution Projects death from exposure to a chemical agent or a mixture of chemicals. 
Glossary In quantitative terms, risk is expressed as values ranging from zero 
(representing the certainty that harm will not occur) to one 
(representing the certainty that harm will occur). 
7. Superfund for Likelihood or probability of injury, disease, or death. 
Students and Teachers 
Glossary 
8. Benchmark Dose Probability that an animal or individual exhibits a particular adverse 
Software Glossary effect for a specified exposure, expressed on a probability scale of 0 
to 1. May be expressed as the proportion of a population effected 
and often converted to the percent effected. 
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No. Source (EPA Definition 
Vocabulary) 
9. Waste and Cleanup The expected frequency or probability of undesirable effects 
Risk Assessment resulting from exposure to known or expected stressors. 
Glossary 
10. Check Up Program for The potential for realization of unwanted adverse consequences or 
Small Systems events. 
Glossary 
11. Exposure Factors The probability of an adverse effect in an organism, system, or 
Handbook Glossary population caused under specified circumstances by exposure to an 
agent. 
12. Radiation Protection The probability of injury, disease or death from exposure to a 
Program - Radiation hazard. Radiation risk may refer to all excess cancers caused by 
Glossary radiation exposure (incidence risk) or only excess fatal cancers 
(mortality risk) . Risk may be expressed as a percent, a fraction, or a 
decimal value. For example, a 1 % excess risk of cancer incidence is 
the same as a 1 in a hundred (1/100) risk. 
13. RadTown Glossary The probability of injury, disease, or death under specific 
circumstances. 
14. I-BEAM Glossary of The probability of injury, disease, or death under specific 
Terms circumstances. In quantitative terms, risk is expressed in values 
ranging from zero, which represents the certainty that harm will not 
occur, to one, which represents the certainty that harm will occur. 
15. Environmental This is the probability that something undesirable will happen from 
Management System exposure to a hazard. 
Glossary 
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